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RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRUSSELS 002056 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/ERA, NSC FOR MCKIBBEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/20/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV EUN MARR MOPS PO XG
SUBJECT: EU FOREIGN POLICY UNDER THE PORTUGUESE PRESIDENCY: 
THE VIEW FROM BRUSSELS 
 
 
Classified By: Laurence Wohlers, Political Minister Counselor, for reas 
ons 1.5(d) and (e). 
 
------------------------ 
Summary and Introduction 
------------------------ 
¶1.  (C) Big changes in style and management of the policy 
process are expected when Germany hands off the six-month 
rotating EU Presidency to Portugal on July 1.  In the realm 
of the EU,s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), 
Council decision by consensus remains the rule and the EU 
Presidency has the power to convene the 27 EU member states 
and steer them toward decisions.  Conversations in Brussels 
indicate that Portugal will be more traditional and certainly 
less disciplined than the German presidency and does not 
aspire to a strong leadership role on the CFSP.  Indeed, 
apart from its strong CFSP policy focus on Africa, the 
Portuguese Permrep here has indicated that Lisbon's goal will 
not be to drive the policy process as the Germans have done, 
but rather to manage it in a way that is seen by the other 26 
to be inclusive and even-handed.  This will inevitably give 
more margin for initiative to other member states and the 
Council secretariat.  It also will have implications for how 
the United States can most effectively engage the EU on 
CFSP/ESDP issues.  This message outlines the major 
characteristics of the incoming Portuguese Presidency, 
dynamics at play on key issues in its foreign policy docket, 
and ways in which we may need to adapt our diplomacy.  (Note: 
This message will not cover the economic agenda and does not 
suggest that the issues discussed below are the only 
priorities.)  END SUMMARY 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
Can an "honest broker" presidency still manage the EU of 27? 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
¶2. (C/NF)  The German presidency broke the traditional mold 
of honest broker presidencies by successfully imposing 
German-conceived  policies and discipline on Council 
deliberations.  Though some in the EU chafed at the 
centralization, most ultimately saluted the Germans' 
accomplishments.  The Portuguese have made clear that they 
will return to the traditional, more neutral management 
style.  This by all accounts worked well for them in 
Portugal's previous presidencies of 1992 and 2000.  Will it 
be able to do so again in today's EU, which is not only much 
larger but more complex in the scope of its CFSP agenda?  In 
describing the Portuguese Presidency in waiting, our contacts 
have praised its openness and flexibility, and the savvy of 
its key leadership, but also expressed concern about the 
impact of the country's small size, narrow foreign policy 
agenda (it will have to devote substantial, senior-level 
attention to the inter-governmental conference on the new 
institutional treaty and other economic issues) , lack of 
deep expertise on key strategic issues (except Africa), and 
"seat of the pants" working style.  In light of these 
factors, how should the United States adjust its approach to 
working with the EU on CFSP under the Portuguese Presidency? 
 
¶3. (C/NF) As a smaller country Presidency, Portugal will rely 
heavily on the EU institutions for policy as well as 
administrative support.  We expect that on CFSP issues the 
Council Secretariat will frequently write the first drafts of 
policy conclusions that shape internal discussions.  Some EU 
insiders think Portugal will look to CFSP High Rep Solana for 
counsel and direction, giving him more room for maneuver than 
he currently enjoys.  This could irritate smaller states such 
as Denmark and Greece, who complain privately that the High 
Rep already operates according to his own agenda and lacks 
transparency.  Council contacts also expect European 
Commission President Barroso to help lend a guiding hand to 
his compatriots here and in Lisbon. 
 
Implication:  The European Commission and the Council 
Secretariat will wield more influence in framing CFSP policy 
 
SIPDIS 
decisions than they currently enjoy under the German 
Presidency.    The USG will need to intensify consultations 
with these institutional actors to shape key policy decisions. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
Accelerated competition for policy dominance among bigger 
member states 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
¶4. (C/NF) Since the Portuguese only intend to focus on a 
limited number of issues, they will leave the way open for 
others (be it the EU institutions or big member states) to 
either shape or fight over shaping policy decisions in other 
areas important to us.  France, Germany, the UK, and (on 
certain issues) Spain, are expected to drive CFSP debates on 
 
BRUSSELS 00002056  002 OF 004 
 
 
the more contentious regional and thematic issues, including 
Iran, Russia/frozen conflicts, Kosovo, and the Middle East. 
For example, we are already seeing a coalition of resurgent 
French diplomacy and French nationals in the Council 
Secretariat seeking to dominate ESDP policy, particularly 
 
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with regard to Chad/Sudan -- with the Germans pushing back. 
At the same time, the Portuguese may lack the rigor shown by 
the German working group chairs who forced member states to 
reach consensus on core issues. 
 
Implication:  The Portuguese management style will create 
openings that others will rush to fill, but that we too can 
exploit.  We will need to go directly to other Member States 
(both in Brussels and in capitals) who are focused on issues 
we care about.  On the other hand, we must be on guard for 
surprise policy initiatives or language coming up to senior 
levels for decision that could have been weeded out at the 
expert level. 
 
------------------------ 
Brussels-Centered Action 
------------------------ 
¶5. (C/NF) On CFSP issues (as opposed to JHA, 
economic/competition issues, or constitutional issues) the 
locus of action for the Portuguese Presidency will be 
Brussels and not Lisbon. While Lisbon will look to guide 
policy debate on Africa, the Middle East and the 
Mediterranean, on other CFSP issues, they will be more a 
coordinator than a driver, unlike the current German 
presidency which took a controlling hand in all issues. 
 
Implication:  If the Portuguese strive to take everyone's 
interests and desires into account, we will need to make 
clear early what our needs are; and probably need to do as 
much of this in Brussels as in Lisbon.  A Presidency capital 
focus will not work as well here as it did under the Germans. 
 
 
------------------------ 
Informal Working Methods 
------------------------ 
¶6. (C/NF) Operational effectiveness remains a big question 
mark. On the positive side, Portugal has good relationships 
at senior levels.  EU President Barroso is on excellent 
personal terms with PM Socrates as well as the Portuguese 
Permanent Representative to the EU Alvaro Mendonca e Moura. 
During his three-year tenure as Chef de Cabinet for 
then-Foreign Minister Barroso, Moura told us that he lunched 
one-on-one with Barroso twice a week to review all foreign 
policy matters.  Our overall impression of Moura is that he 
is approachable, smart, and operationally effective.  His PSC 
Ambassador Carlos Pais is also responsive and capable. 
However, at the working level, concerns have been expressed 
both about the level of preparedness and the degree of 
expertise that the Portuguese will bring to their role in the 
day-to-day running of the hundreds of decision-making 
groupings that the Presidency must chair.  One German 
Ambassador told us that he noticed that the Portuguese did 
not seem to have many formal meetings among themselves to 
prepare; they all seemed to know each other and simply 
delegated issues in a very informal manner.  This suggests 
that working groups leads in Brussels will have a lot more 
autonomy on various issues before they are taken to higher 
levels for decision. 
 
Implication: To achieve pro-U.S. outcomes, we will need to 
not only work informal connections with influential players 
in Brussels (Solana, Barroso, Mendonca) and Lisbon, but reach 
out more earlier and more widely to those in the institutions 
and other member states who will influence the early 
direction of internal EU policy discussions.  The way we 
approach the new Presidency will differ by topic.  Following 
are critical issues on the EU CFSP agenda over the next six 
months and proposals for U.S. approaches to them over the 
next six months. 
 
----- 
Kosovo 
------ 
¶7.  (C/NF) Although the Portuguese are strongly supportive of 
the Ahtisaari proposal and share our views of the perils of 
further delay, they are not going to be among the primary 
drivers within the EU on Kosovo.  If there is a UNSCR on 
Kosovo, ICR-designate Pieter Feith and the Council will set 
the political tone, with the Commission planning the Donors' 
Conference and planning for medium-term assistance.  We are 
told here that Portuguese Ambassador Tanger (who will remain 
resident in Vilnius) will visit Pristina (where the 
 
BRUSSELS 00002056  003 OF 004 
 
 
Portuguese have no meaningful presence) and key EU capitals 
on occasion to portray Portuguese activity.  In the event of 
a split in the EU on Kosovo, the way the Portuguese 
Presidency manages Council deliberations may have a major 
impact on which way the EU swings.  This is an additional 
reason for working closely with the Portuguese Mission here 
in Brussels and in the Contact Group. While the Portuguese 
Mission's COWEB expert is competent, we expect Ambassador 
Tanger to be the key player on any decision falling below the 
ministerial-level radar. 
 
---------- 
Enlargement 
---------- 
¶8.  (C/NF) The Portuguese government and PM Socrates 
personally are strongly in favor of Turkish accession. 
However, enlargement remains a low priority for this 
presidency.  In any case, Commission contacts believe that 
the Portuguese MFA, rather than their Brussels Permrep, will 
take the lead within the Portuguese bureaucracy on this 
issue.  We do not expect significant problems on Croatian 
accession negotiations, although Slovenia and Italy could 
still raise objections to opening some chapters.  Portugal 
likely will follow the Commission's lead (and Solana's 
advice) on SAA negotiations with Serbia.  We would not expect 
the Portuguese to champion Macedonia against a likely 
Commission recommendation (and strong Greek antipathy) not to 
offer Skopje the beginning of accession negotiations late 
this year. 
 
------ 
Africa 
------ 
¶9.  (C) The EU-Africa Summit in early December will be the 
cornerstone of the Portuguese Presidency,s focus on Africa. 
Portuguese Permrep Mendonca told the Ambassador that there 
will be equal emphasis on development, security and migration 
issues.  The Portuguese are well aware of the depth of some 
EU member states' and U.S. opposition to Mugabe's 
participation in the summit.  That said, they are determined 
to hold a summit with Africa and fear that not inviting 
Mugabe would derail the entire event.  Mendonca made a 
special plea to the Ambassador for understanding the 
situation.  He insisted that the Portuguese could not stop 
Mugabe from coming, and were prepared to speak bluntly "to 
his face" about human rights.  However, Mendonca said it 
would be very important that the U.S. not make negative 
comments about Mugabe's attendance, as this would only divert 
attention away from strong statements that the EU was 
prepared to make.  Since some EU Member States, including the 
UK and the Netherlands, have threatened to boycott the summit 
if Mugabe is there, just getting the summit successfully off 
the ground will be a challenge.  On Sudan, contacts in the 
Council Secretariat expect Portugal to stick to the current 
EU sanctions policy which supports sanctions only within a 
UNSC framework.  On other Africa-related matters, the 
Portuguese Permrep here has floated a number of Africa-themed 
high-level meetings but not yet revealed concrete outcomes 
they might hope to achieve. 
 
----------------- 
NATO-EU Relations 
----------------- 
¶10.  (C/NF)  The Portuguese may find themselves stuck with 
managing a drawn out dispute over how the NATO and EU 
interact on ESDP missions in Afghanistan and Kosovo..  This 
will defy easy resolution and we suspect the Portuguese will 
be looking to others for support and guidance, namely, the 
Council Secretariat and the larger Member States such as 
France, Germany, and possibly the UK.  Lisbon,s relationship 
with Madrid on these issues also bears watching. We have 
already seen instances in which Lisbon has followed Madrid,s 
policy lead, even if their own inclinations might be 
different. This was the case for the deployment of the 
Eurogendarmerie Force to Kosovo, which Madrid opposed and 
Portugal favored. When the UN pressed for a deployment, 
Lisbon sided with Madrid. 
 
----------- 
Middle East 
----------- 
¶11.  (C) There appears to be a gap between Lisbon,s obvious 
interest and activity on Middle East issues and their 
preparations in Brussels.  Council Middle East Policy Unit 
contacts tell us that the Portuguese have thus far been 
reluctant to engage on Middle East policy or even schedule 
bilateral EU-Israel meetings.  Moreover, the Portuguese reps 
have not made an effort to develop relationships with their 
 
BRUSSELS 00002056  004 OF 004 
 
 
counterparts in the Council an contrast to the German 
Presidency). EU interlocutors are concerned that Portugal,s 
lack of engagement will create a vacuum in leadership on the 
Middle East that others could try to fill.  At the same time, 
Portugal,s PSC Ambassador indicated Lisbon,s intention to 
focus more attention on the EU,s policies toward its 
Southern neighbors than had been the case under the German 
and Finnish Presidencies. 
 
---- 
Iran 
---- 
¶12.  (C) Portugal has been a strong supporter of ramping up 
the pressure on Iran.  However, EU and local diplomatic 
contacts believe that the Portuguese will generally defer to 
High Rep Solana and the EU-3 (France, UK, Germany) on Iran. 
Portuguese diplomats here have confirmed this impression.  In 
a recent meeting with Polmincouns, PSC Ambassador Carlos Pais 
largely stuck to the EU party line emphasizing a "two track" 
approach on the nuclear file (read: dialogue and sanctions) 
as well as unanimity in the Security Council.  Pais candidly 
admitted that Portugal was not as informed as it could be on 
the nuclear issue because it is not a member of the IAEA 
Board of Governors (BOG).  He specifically requested U.S. 
back-briefings on IAEA developments, if possible.  The good 
news is that the Portuguese are inheriting a complete set of 
Common Policy guidance and implementing regulations on Iran 
from the German EU Presidency.  This means that they will 
have the tools and the authority to convene the Council to 
consider further measures to bring Iran into compliance with 
the will of the international community.  Early and focused 
encouragement from us could be helpful in this regard. 
 
--------------------------- 
Russia and the Neighborhood 
--------------------------- 
¶13. (C)  We are hearing a growing chorus of concerns from our 
EU contacts, both Council and Permreps, that the Portuguese 
will want to "play nice" with Russia.  PM Socrates recent 
visit to Moscow appears to be the source of much of this 
concern.  Well-placed contacts tell us that senior Russian 
officials may have indicated to the Portuguese that their 
conduct of the Presidency will have an impact on the future 
of their bilateral relationship.  Furthermore, Council 
Secretariat contacts have described the Portuguese Ambassador 
 
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to Russia Manuel Marcelo Monteiro Curto as a one-man 
juggernaut on Portugal,s Russia policy, friendly with Putin 
and decidedly "pro-Russian.."  Curto is also accredited to 
all of the Southern Caucasus and some Central Asian countries 
which may influence Portuguese positions on frozen conflicts. 
 This all may come to a head as the Portuguese prepare for 
the EU-Russia summit on October 25-26 in Lisbon. 
 
------------ 
Central Asia 
------------ 
¶14.  (C/NF)  We expect Portugal to continue to let Germany 
take the lead on Central Asia.  Portugal lacks diplomatic 
representation in any of the five Central Asian countries, 
most of which are covered by its embassy in Moscow.  The 
French may represent the Portuguese in Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan, with the Czechs representing them in Uzbekistan 
and the Germans in Kyrgyzstan.  The Germans have already 
indicated they will work to ensure that the new EU Central 
Asia strategy will be implemented over the next six months, 
particularly in the areas of education and environment. 
Action-forcing events in this regard could be the EU-Central 
Asia ministerial dinner on the margins of UNGA in New York in 
late September; a likely EU Central Asia Heads of Mission 
meeting in Ashgabat in October; and a possible Solana visit 
to Central Asia in the autumn. 
 
---------- 
Comment 
---------- 
¶15. (C/NF)  Although the Portuguese have signaled their 
desire to work closely with us during their Presidency, they 
will be swept up quickly in the tide of EU business.  This is 
particularly true because their Presidency team in Brussels 
is numerically small and overstretched.  Consequently, we 
will only a have a limited number of opportunities to reach 
them with our key concerns and expertise.   We will also need 
to work with key member states and the Council who will drive 
the EU-27 decisions.  END COMMENT 
GRAY 
.