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DE RUEHBO #4742/01 1802218
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 292218Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6704
INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 7615
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 9128
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ JUN 8802
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA PRIORITY 5200
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO PRIORITY 5798

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 004742 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/22/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM SNAR MARR PTER ECON ETRD KCRM
CO 
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE GATES 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor John S. Creamer 
Reason: 1.4 (b,d) 
 
 
------------ 
Introduction 
------------ 
 
¶1.  (C) Your visit follows President Uribe's May and June 
visits to Washington.  Uribe fears unsubstantiated claims 
that he and his family were tied to the paramilitaries are 
undermining prospects in the U.S. Congress for continued high 
aid levels and ratification of the bilateral Free Trade 
Agreement (CTPA).  He needs substantial U.S aid and the CTPA 
to help him finish the fight against narcoterrorism and to 
manage a complex domestic and regional climate.  Uribe 
supports our efforts to locate and rescue the three U.S. 
hostages held by the FARC, and recently released a FARC 
leader to try to spur talks on a humanitarian exchange.  He 
remains popular with the Colombian public, but faces 
challenges in blocking the rise of new criminal groups, 
addressing human rights concerns, and maintaining 
governability while supporting the investigation of links 
between former paramilitaries and members of Colombia's 
political, military, and economic elites.  He maintains an 
uneasy, yet cordial, relationship with Venezuelan President 
Chavez, and is trying to maintain a dialogue with Ecuadorian 
President Rafael Correa.  Key issues: 
 
-- U.S. Support for Plan Colombia 
 
-- U.S. Hostages 
 
-- Free Trade 
 
-- Paramilitary Investigations 
 
-- Drug Eradication and Narcotrafficking 
 
-- Colombia's Regional Influence 
 
-- Extradition 
 
-- Human Rights 
 
-- New Criminal Groups and Reintegration 
 
-- FARC and ELN 
 
------------------------------ 
U.S. Support for Plan Colombia 
------------------------------ 
 
¶2.  (C) U.S. assistance is key to help Colombia defeat 
narcotics trafficking and terrorism.  Without security, 
economic and social goals cannot be achieved.  The GOC's 
proposal for Plan Colombia's next phase continues efforts to 
establish control throughout the national territory, but it 
also substantially boosts resources for education, health, 
Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities, and development. 
The U.S. Congress is considering cuts in U.S. aid as well as 
shifting resources from security assistance to social and 
justice programs.  Secuity cuts would mainly affect 
counterdrug spray programs and Colombian Army mobility and 
logistics.  Some military and counternarcotics programs may 
be assumed by the GOC, but this would likely require 
offsetting cuts in social programs.  Uribe fears Colombian 
Congressional debates on paramilitary ties to politicians 
have harmed prospects for U.S. ratification of Plan Colombia 
and CTPA.  Opposition Senator Petro has also made 
unsubstantiated claims linking President Uribe to 
paramilitaries.  We have no evidence tying Uribe to 
paramilitaries. 
 
------------- 
U.S. Hostages 
------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) The FARC has held three Americans for more than four 
years, with the April 28 escape of a Colombian policeman 
providing our first credible proof of life since 2003.  The 
GOC supports our efforts to locate and rescue the Americans. 
Uribe has committed, publicly and privately, to ensuring the 
three Americans are included in any humanitarian exchange. 
In June, Uribe unilaterally released about 200 FARC members, 
as well as a senior FARC official, to press the FARC to 
release its hostages.  Still, the FARC continues to insist 
the GOC demilitarize a large area before starting talks and 
to link the freeing of the three Americans to the U.S. 
release of extradited FARC leaders "Sonia" and "Simon 
Trinidad."  With GOC support, France, Spain and Switzerland 
are active in efforts to initiate talks on an exchange, but 
have made little progress due to FARC intransigence.  On June 
28 the FARC announced the deaths of 11 Colombian state 
legislators held for over five years.  The FARC alleged the 
deaths occurred in a crossfire during clashes with an 
"unidentified military group." The GOC denies any military 
operations occurred on that date. 
 
---------- 
Free Trade 
---------- 
 
¶4.  (C) The Colombian Congress ratified the CTPA in June, but 
it still needs to be reviewed by Colombia's Constitutional 
Court before becoming law.  Uribe considers ratification 
essential for Colombia to attract long-term investment, 
increase economic growth, create jobs, and boost government 
revenues needed to fund social spending.  Uribe is concerned 
about possible U.S. Congressional rejection of the Colombia 
accord, and also fears Colombia being left behind if 
agreements with Peru and Panama are approved.  Failure to 
approve the CTPA would be a major political blow to Uribe 
domestically and internationally.  It would boost Venezuelan 
President Chavez' alternative ALBA and convince many that the 
USG does not deliver for its closest allies.  The U.S. 
Congress extended trade preferences for Colombian exporters 
under the Andean Product Tariffs and Drug Eradication Act 
(APTDEA) through February 2008. 
 
--------------------------- 
Paramilitary Investigations 
--------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Uribe's democratic security policy and the 
paramilitary demobilization have created the space needed for 
Colombia's institutions -- the Courts, National Prosecutor, 
and media -- to expose ties between the paramilitaries and 
members of Colombia's political elite.  Arrests to date 
include 13 Congressmen and two governors, with 12 mayors 
under investigation.  The former head of the GOC intelligence 
service, who was a close Uribe ally, was jailed for links to 
paramilitary crimes, but released on a technicality.  A 
colonel has been removed from duty; the impact on the 
military is expected to widen with more testimony from 
ex-paras.  Uribe strongly supports the investigations, though 
most of those implicated to date are members of his 
coalition.  Despite the scandal, Colombia's Congress 
continues to pass key legislation such as the CPTA. 
 
------------------------------------- 
Drug Eradication and Narcotrafficking 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) Uribe is committed to fighting narcotrafficking, but 
he is frustrated that record aerial and manual eradication 
numbers do not appear to be reducing coca crops.  The CIA 
recently released its annual Colombia coca cultivation 
estimate, showing an increase from 2005.  Critics cited the 
CNC statistic to claim aerial spraying of herbicide does not 
work.  Interagency post-spray verifications show glyphosate 
kills sprayed coca at rates approaching 90 percent, but high 
replant rates show the illicit industry's resilience.  In 
contrast, the U.N. cultivation estimate shows a decrease of 
almost 10 percent compared to its previous estimate.  Uribe 
is concerned about the competing numbers since the GOC uses 
the U.N. figure as its official estimate.  Uribe will ask for 
greater U.S. resources to end narcotrafficking.  We are 
planning to give him less. 
 
----------------------------- 
Colombia's Regional Influence 
----------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Uribe is working with Peru, Chile, Mexico, Canada, 
and Caribbean and Central American countries to strengthen 
regional economic and security cooperation.  He envisions a 
Pacific Coast bloc of like-minded democracies linked through 
interlocking free trade agreements and committed to greater 
integration and security cooperation that would be a de facto 
alternative to Chavez's Bolivarian model.  Colombia's close 
commercial ties and shared border with Venezuela lead Uribe 
to maintain cordial relations with President Chavez despite 
sharp ideological differences, but he vigorously defends 
Colombia's security and commercial interests.  Uribe is 
reaching out to Ecuador's Rafael Correa, but he fears 
Correa's unpredictable nature and close ties to Chavez. 
Uribe maintains good relations with other neighbors, but 
Panama opposes a Colombian plan to extend the Pan-American 
highway through the Darien Gap. 
 
----------- 
Extradition 
----------- 
 
¶8.  (C) Colombia is the best U.S. partner in the world on 
extraditions, with over 450 traffickers and terrorists sent 
to the U.S. since Uribe took office in 2002.  Uribe has 
suspended the extradition of five narcotraffickers due to 
their participation in the paramilitary demobilization 
process.  Human rights groups argue several paramilitaries 
have violated the terms of the demobilization process and 
should be extradited.  The GOC has not made such a 
determination, preferring to keep the paramilitaries in the 
Justice and Peace Law Process for now. 
 
------------ 
Human Rights 
------------ 
 
¶9.  (C) Colombia's human rights record is improving, but 
progress in the prosecution of major human rights 
violators remains slow.  The recent UN High Commission on 
Human Rights' annual report on Colombia recognized advances, 
but flagged an increase in extrajudicial killings by the 
military.  We are helping Colombia transition from its 
antiquated inquisitorial system to an accusatorial system -- 
a process that now covers 75 percent of the population -- and 
this will help make progress in recent human rights cases.  A 
proposed reform of the military criminal justice system will 
also help.  We are working with the GOC to achieve justice 
and reparations in the paramilitary process, as well as to 
strengthen protection programs for victims and witnesses.  We 
also support a special prosecutorial team set up to 
investigate crimes against union members. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
New Criminal Groups and Reintegration of the Demobilized 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶10.  (C) The rise of new criminal groups in areas previously 
controlled by the paramilitaries is a problem.  The new 
groups lack the national structure and political ambitions of 
the defunct United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), and 
the GOC has set up police stations in rural areas -- as well 
as joint police-military task forces -- to combat them.  We 
support GOC efforts to reintegrate 32,000 former 
paramilitaries into civilian life, but these efforts are 
hampered by the magnitude of the problem and insufficient 
resources.  The lag in effective reintegration programs and 
the easy money of narcotrafficking and extortion have led a 
small number of ex-paramilitaries to return to crime. 
 
------------ 
FARC and ELN 
------------ 
 
¶11.  (C) Increased Colombian military presence and operations 
have put pressure on the FARC, but they have not forced the 
group to enter serious peace negotiations.  On a defensive 
footing, the FARC has largely withdrawn to more remote 
regions and moves in small units -- avoiding direct 
engagement and using explosives and land mines to ambush 
security forces.  Narcotics trafficking remains its chief 
financing source.  The GOC continues peace talks in Havana 
with the ELN, a smaller left-wing terrorist group, and some 
kind of cease-fire could come in July. 
Drucker