VZCZCXRO9699
PP RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHLB #0896/01 1701603
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 191603Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8544
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 1259
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000896 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/MARCHESE/HARDING 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/18/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL UNSC AA
SUBJECT: LEBANON: AOUN RECEPTIVE TO RAPPROCHMENT WITH MARCH 
14 CAMP, OPPOSES SECOND GOVERNMENT 
 
REF: A. BEIRUT 851 
     ¶B. BEIRUT 875 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d 
). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) In a June 18 meeting with the Ambassador, Free 
Patriotic Movement (FPM) leader General Michel Aoun agreed 
that a second government would be catastrophic for Lebanon. 
The FPM is exploring cooperation with the March 14 majority 
to form a national unity government, but claims the ball is 
in March 14's court.  While appearing vaguely positive, Aoun 
refrained from making explicit guarantees that the FPM would 
not resign from a newly formed government.  Aoun said he 
would not oppose by-elections for the seats of two 
assassinated March 14 MPs.  He agreed that the Lebanese Armed 
Forces were doing well in Nahr al-Barid and offered his 
suggestions for improving Lebanon's security forces.  End 
summary. 
 
 
RAPPROCHEMENT WITH MARCH 14? 
---------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) In a June 18 meeting with the Ambassador, DCM, and 
Pol/Econ Chief at his residence in Rabieh, Aoun, accompanied 
by his advisor and son-in-law Gebran Bassil, agreed with the 
Ambassador's assertion that the formation of a second 
government would be catastrophic for Lebanon.  Aoun had heard 
that President Lahoud was looking to form a second government 
by July 15 if the current political impasse was not resolved. 
 This would allow time, he reasoned, before the 
recently-scheduled August 5 by-elections and before Lahoud 
became preoccupied with the legal procedures leading up to 
the September 25 presidential election.  But, Aoun concluded, 
we will not arrive at this. 
 
¶3. (C) The FPM leader expressed his willingness to explore a 
national unity government with the March 14 camp to avoid 
such a scenario, but wondered aloud whether Amal and 
Hizballah would agree.  The Ambassador noted that March 14 
feared PM Siniora's resignation or a constitutional collapse 
of the cabinet (due to resignation of more than a third of 
the ministers) more than it hestitated to join with the Aoun 
bloc, especially if Aoun guaranteed that he would not resign 
from the newly formed government.  Emphasizing that he was 
speaking in a personal capacity, the Ambassador urged Aoun to 
talk to PM Siniora, arguing that agreement between the FPM 
and March 14 on the cabinet would circumvent Parliament 
Speaker Nabil Berri's obstructionism by robbing his Amal 
party (and its Hizballah allies) of the ability to force the 
government to fall.  (Note.  If Aoun's FPM joins March 14 in 
an expanded government and gives guarantees not to resign, 
the remaining opposition groups Amal and Hizbollah would not 
have enough combined cabinet seats to form the one-third plus 
one majority needed to topple the government.  Should Amal 
and Hezbollah resign from an expanded cabinet, the issue of a 
lack of Shia representation in an expanded government, 
however, cited by Lahoud and his supporters to discredit the 
current government's legitimacy since the November 2006 
resignation of five Shia cabinet members, would continue to 
pose a problem.  End note.) 
 
¶4. (C) The Ambassador stressed that now was the time for Aoun 
to prove the USG wrong, i.e., that, as he asserts, he is not 
part of the Hizballah/Berri March 8 bloc.  The FPM took a 
first step in distancing itself from Hizballah when it 
supported the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in Nahr al-Barid 
rather than accepting Hizballah's red line that the LAF 
should not enter the Palestinian camp.  Now it could take a 
second important step by supporting the government's efforts 
to form a national unity government by giving a guarantee of 
not resigning, rather than side with the March 8 opposition. 
 
¶5. (C) While appearing to be positive, Aoun refrained, 
however, from providing explicit assurance that he would not 
resign from a reconstituted government, arguing that it was 
not in FPM's interests to resign as long as there was no 
agreement on the Presidency.  (Note.  Support for Aoun's 
presidential ambitions are his sine qua non for the FPM's 
continued alliance with Hizballah and Amal.  End note.) 
Nevertheless, he did tell us to "consider (the question of a 
national unity government) solved."  The Ambassador again 
 
BEIRUT 00000896  002 OF 003 
 
 
urged him to provide a formal guarantee not to resign; 
otherwise, Aoun's assertion that his party had no reason to 
resign was no better than Berri's own unconvincing "why would 
March 8 resign?" (Ref A) in the eyes of a wary March 14. 
 
BALL IS IN MARCH 14'S COURT 
--------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) The Ambassador further suggested that Aoun could use 
March 14's fear of Siniora's resignation to the FPM's 
advantage, in particular by extracting concessions that March 
14 will finally move on a new electoral law, clearly in the 
interest of all of Lebanon (but not necessarily in the 
interest of all political leaders).  Aoun, visibly warming to 
the idea, said an agreement must be reached soon.  Bassil 
interjected that the FPM would need guarantees of its own, 
noting that he had recently held a four-hour discussion with 
Siniora's chief advisor Mohamad Chatah to discuss cooperation 
between the two sides.  Unfortunately, he said, Chatah did 
not appear to have any decision-making authority and needed 
to check with Siniora before responding to the FPM's 
overtures.  Acknowledging Chatah's goodwill, Bassil further 
said the PM's advisor now realizes that the FPM can be a good 
partner on security matters but is somehow unable to 
translate this into concreate measures.  The ball is now in 
March 14's court, he concluded. 
 
¶7. (C) Aoun later stated that, in addition to making progress 
on the new electoral law, the FPM and March 14 could reach 
agreement on two points on the security front:  the 
Palestinian issue and Lebanon's relationship with Syria.  He 
did not anticipate any major initiatives on regional security 
issues, but recalled his 1990 article (published before the 
Madrid conference) advocating a comprehensive peace plan 
between Lebanon, Israel and Syria.  Aoun said Bassil and 
Chatah also discussed portfolio allotments in a new cabinet. 
 
¶8. (C) At a separate lunch with the Ambassador and Pol/Econ 
Chief the same day, Aoun MP Ibrahim Kenaan, apparently 
unaware of the Bassil-Chatah discussion, said he had held a 
(separate) discussion with Chatah regarding a "Declaration of 
Principles," to which the two sides would publicly subscribe 
in an effort to form a new cabinet.  Like Bassil, Kenaan was 
sketchy on the details.  Kenaan also indicated that the FPM 
had its sights set on the Ministry of Justice. 
 
FPM WON'T OPPOSE BY-ELECTIONS 
----------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Noting that is was President Lahoud's "prerogative" to 
sign the June 16 cabinet decree calling for by-elections to 
replace the two assassinated March 14 MPs Pierre Gemayel 
(November 21, 2006) and Walid Eido (June 3, 2007), Aoun said 
he would not oppose the elections.  The Ambassador stressed 
that Lahoud's refusal to sign the cabinet decree (Ref B) 
sends a message that "murder pays."  Aoun sidestepped the 
allegation, countering that the two seats should be deducted 
from the 128-member quorum, creating a new quorum of 126, in 
which March 14 would still have the majority.  The Ambassador 
further argued that Lahoud is essentially using an 
administrative process to violate the constitution, which 
requires that elections be held within 60 days after a 
vacancy occurs.  Aoun replied that the solution was an 
accelerated formulation of a new government; once a new 
cabinet was in place, he argued, Lahoud would sign the 
decree.  Following the parliamentary by-elections (scheduled 
for August 5), Lahoud could then consult with the new 
parliament to form a new government. 
 
¶10. (C) In response to the Ambassador's question as to 
whether the FPM would field a candidate in Pierre Gemayel's 
Metn district (where Gemayel's father Amine, brother of 
assassinated President Bashir Gemayel and potential 
presidential candidate is widely expected to run despite his 
current disavowals), Aoun said that depended on Amine's 
behavior; the FPM was still reeling from the insult of 
Amine's refusal to accept Aoun's condolence call after 
Pierre's assassination, and there had been no efforts at 
reconciliation since.  Aoun, noting that the FM had not 
fielded a candidate in the elections to replace MP Gebran 
Tueni (assassinated December 12, 2005), argued that, in any 
case, the ruling of a country does not depend on one seat. 
 
IMPLICATIONS OF NAHR AL-BARID 
----------------------------- 
 
 
BEIRUT 00000896  003 OF 003 
 
 
¶11. (C) Agreeing with the Ambassador that the Lebanese Armed 
Forces (LAF) was doing a good job in Nahr al-Barid, Aoun 
seized the moment to expound on his ideas for improving 
Lebanon's security.  First, the LAF needed more equipment. 
Aoun also advocated the creation of two units, an 
anti-terrorist unit and what he termed and "anti-subversive 
warfare" unit in addition to traditional military units and 
was working on a plan in this regard.  Lebanon also needed an 
operations center comprising all of its various intelligence 
services, including Surete Generale, army intelligence (G-2), 
and the intelligence branch of the Internal Security Forces 
(ISF).  A quick response team also was needed to react to but 
also prevent security incidents.  Lamenting the lack of a 
parliamentary security committee (which he had proposed in 
2005), Aoun said what was needed was a body able to consult 
with the heads of al the security forces to delineate 
responsibilities.  The confusion that currently reigned made 
Lebanon more vulnerable than necessary to security threats, 
Aoun argued, noting that Al-Qaeda now has operations in 
Lebanon. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶12.  (C)  With Aoun, the primary question is always whether 
the General is a willing ally of the Syrians or not.  If he 
is simply an unwitting participant in their schemes, then it 
should be theoretically possible to appeal to his ego and 
ambitions to peel him away from his unholy alliance with 
Hizballah and the assorted pro-Syrians in Lebanon.  For some 
time now, some of his MPs and many of his supporters have 
been expressing discomfort with his positions, leading to 
wistful thinking on the part of March 14 activists.  If Aoun 
would give credible guarantees that his ministers would not 
resign from an expanded cabinet, for example, then March 14 
leaders should find the concept of a national unity 
government less frightening:  the potential resignation of 
Shia ministers would not (as it didn't in November) spell the 
constitutional collapse of the cabinet.  But if -- as we 
expect -- the only guarantee Aoun seeks in return is the 
presidency, of course, then there can be no deal.  While we 
think the odds remain stacked against any kind of Aoun-March 
14 deal, we will continue to nudge March 14/GOL leaders and 
the Aounists into exploring possible cabinet options and 
guarantees. 
FELTMAN