VZCZCXRO0228
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHGB #2158/01 1811418
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 301418Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1965
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 002158 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/01/2017 
TAGS: ECON EIND ENRG EPET IZ KCOR
SUBJECT: PRT TIKRIT: BAYJI REFINERY SHUTS DOWN AMID RISING 
TENSIONS 
 
REF: A. A. BAGHDAD 677 
     ¶B. B. BAGHDAD 682 
     ¶C. C. 06 BAGHDAD 4535 
 
Classified By: Classified by Christian Redmer, PRT Iraq Provincial Acti 
on Officer (IPAO), for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (U) This is a PRT Tikrit, Salah ad Din cable. 
 
¶2. (C) This cable has been cleared by the intelligence 
section, 3 BCT, 82nd Airborne Division. 
 
¶3. (C) SUMMARY.  The Bayji oil refinery closed its 
distribution gates on June 25 in accordance with the 
qada-wide general movement curfew decreed by the Governor of 
Salah ad Din, Hamad Hamoud al Shakti.  Coupled with a 
production shutdown due to concurrent power failures, the 
three day curfew ) imposed by al Shakti in response to the 
devastating car bomb attack upon the Bayji IP (Iraqi Police) 
station ) had the effect of turning the facility into a 
ghost-town, according to onsite CF (Coalition Forces) 
reporting.  While the June 25 attack appears to be unrelated 
to the refinery, its repercussions interrupted the steady ) 
if inconsistent ) improvement in refined fuel production and 
distribution.  Even before the attack, apprehensions seem to 
be rising about the possibility of an AQIZ (Al Qaeda in Iraq) 
strike upon the ISF (Iraq Security Force) and/or CF forces at 
the facility.  END SUMMARY. 
 
----------------- 
Some Hands Honest 
----------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Five months after the order by PM Maliki to mount a 
&military invasion8 (reftel A) of the Bayji refinery, a 
number of positive indicators are seen in Bayji and Salah ad 
Din.  For example, average gasoline production increased from 
2021 cubic meters from February 13-18 to 2851 cubic meters 
during June 17-23 (two periods unmarked by facility 
shutdowns).  According to atmospheric reports, the average 
wait at fuel stations in Tikrit decreased from 8-10 hours in 
January to 2-4 hours in June. 
 
¶5. (C) In addition, the improved onsite security ) largely 
due to greater CF presence as well as the 8th Strategic 
Infrastructure Brigade (SIB) ) resulted in an apparent 
reduction (although certainly not elimination) of corruption 
within the refinery gates.  During interviews conducted in 
April, May, and June, residents of Tikrit consistently told 
IPAO that they saw improvements in the supply of fuel 
reaching the streets.  (NOTE: Severe fuel shortages remain - 
especially in the southern areas of the province such as 
Samarra and Balad ) however, Operation Honest Hands thus far 
appears to be partially succeeding in strict fuel 
distribution terms.  END NOTE.)  While increased production 
helped to alleviate the severe shortages throughout northern 
Iraq, fuel distribution is largely a zero-sum game; the 
increased amount of fuel sold at fuel stations is derived not 
only from surplus production but also from onsite smuggling 
operations, some of which are operated by AQIZ. 
 
---------------------------- 
Leaving the Faucet Intact... 
---------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) During a confidential interview on April 18, the 
Director General of the North Refineries Company, Ali 
Al-Obeydi, told IPAO that he was regularly threatened by AQIZ 
through text messages.  According to Al-Obeydi, AQIZ 
operatives were ¬ happy8 with the increased security 
measures and were demanding that he comply with their demands 
to steal fuel.  In particular, Al-Obeydi mentioned that AQIZ 
insisted that he leave the tunnel road valves ) the pipeline 
which runs south to the propane distribution facility - open 
so that the excess fuel could be siphoned by their 
operatives.  In contrast to the area ex-Baathists, whom he 
said that he was &taking care of8 ) through his tribal 
relationships ) Al-Obeydi left no doubt that he believed 
that AQIZ was the chief threat to the refinery security. 
 
¶7. (C) Nonetheless, Al-Obeydi strongly emphasized that AQIZ 
would not attack the refinery production complex for two 
reasons: the immense profits flowing back to the organization 
from fuel smuggling, and the great value the local Sunni 
tribes placed on the refinery and their own smuggling 
operations.  According to Al-Obeydi, direct or tacit support 
currently enjoyed by AQIZ from many quarters would quickly 
evaporate after any kind of attack on the refinery facility 
itself. 
 
----------------------------- 
 
BAGHDAD 00002158  002 OF 003 
 
 
...But Tightening the Spigot? 
----------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) While the Bayji refinery still suffers from various 
technical challenges; inadequate HFO disposal consistently 
ranks as the most significant impediment to greater 
efficiency (reftel B).  Capitalizing on this situation, AIF 
may have terrorized HFO (Heavy Fuel Oil) tanker drivers ) 
threatening to blow up their tankers ) in order to end 
production temporarily when it suited their political 
purposes (reftel C).  During the second half of June, 
according to Bayji contacts, HFO tanker drivers reported 
increasing intimidation on the highway ) especially in the 
vicinity of El-Amin, a trucker restaurant on the road to Ash 
Sharqat, with &mujahedin8 warning drivers not to drive HFO 
that &would be sold to the Zionists.8  Due to increased 
security measures and better coordination amongst tanker 
drivers, this latest effort appears to have been less 
successful than in the past.  Although HFO distribution 
ceased temporarily, refinery officials were able to maintain 
production through the crisis.  A potential next step - an 
attack on the facility periphery, such as damage of the 
distribution gate or the SIB command post ) could more 
effectively halt fuel distribution but leave the vital 
infrastructure intact. 
 
------------------- 
&Crafty Like a Fox8 
------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) During an interview conducted on June 22, the 
Governor,s cousin and long-time insider (and fellow al Qaisi 
member), Kheralla Essa Turuk, told IPAO that he and the 
Governor were both &fearful8 about the possibility of an 
imminent AQIZ attack at the distribution gates.  When queried 
about specific measures the Governor would take to address 
the situation, however, Kheralla did not have a response. 
(NOTE: The Governor appears to arbitrarily assign fellow al 
Qaisi members to the refinery from time to time.  This is as 
much related to an internal power struggle as well as simple 
nepotism than to a genuine attempt to improve security, 
reftel. END NOTE.) 
 
¶10. (C) Turuk told IPAO that he was being sent to the 
refinery by the Governor to &clean out8 the OPF and remove 
the AQIZ influence in the organization.  Turuk said that the 
Governor was concerned about the security situation and 
needed a &good man8 onsite.  When asked about the current 
director of OPF (Oil Protection Forces), Amar Sawadi, Turuk 
replied that he was not trustworthy.  Specifically, Turuk 
said that Sawadi was allowing AQIZ infiltration of the 
facility and that he was &crafty, like a fox.8  Although he 
would not specify his role within the complex (he said he 
would be a &facility security expert8), Turuk indicated to 
IPAO that he would provide a list of all of the AQIZ 
operatives working within the refinery to CF; however, this 
list is still forthcoming. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Obeydi, Samir, Walid Gone Simultaneously 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) Three of the most influential officials at the 
refinery, Director General of Distribution, Samir Abbas, 
Director General of Distribution for Salah ad Din Province, 
Walid Murshed, and Al-Obeydi are currently absent from the 
facility.  While Al-Obeydi is in Baghdad for consultations 
and Abbas is on a regularly scheduled vacation, Murshed left 
suddenly - ostensibly for emergency leave.  Before leaving, 
Murshed told a CF contact that &things were getting too 
hot.8 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶12. (C) COMMENT.  The Bayji oil refinery and its environs 
never lack drama, and the devastating attack on the IP 
station clearly exacerbated local apprehensions.  However, in 
addition to mounting CF intelligence and the recent uptake in 
AIF (Anti Iraq Forces) attacks in and around the facility, a 
number of subtle recent changes may suggest that AQIZ may be 
planning a spectacular attack upon the refinery periphery. 
Considered by many to be untouchable, the refinery is the 
&prize jewel8 to most SaD Sunnis (CF-friendly and 
unfriendly alike) ) given the common perception of GOI here 
- and a direct AQIZ attack upon refinery infrastructure which 
would lead to a prolonged or permanent shutdown of the 
facility appears unlikely.  However, AQIZ has demonstrated a 
willingness to impede fuel production and distribution via 
intimidation of HFO drivers to achieve its political ends.  A 
 
BAGHDAD 00002158  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
spectacular attack upon the distribution gates or another 
peripheral target at the refinery could be merely an 
escalation of a previous strategy.  It could also serve 
multiple AQIZ aims in one deft blow: increased intimidation 
of the ISF, disruption of the steadily improving ) and 
hard-earned - fuel distribution situation (with the resulting 
negative political and economic effect), and a powerful 
demonstration of AQIZ,s continued potency.  Most important, 
the currently feeble reaction of local leadership to this 
threat ) in and out of the refinery - also casts doubt on 
their ability to effectively counter the AQIZ menace in the 
long-term.  END COMMENT. 
 
¶13. (U) PRT Tikrit thanks the soldiers of the 1st Battalion, 
505th Paratroop Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division for their 
invaluable contributions and support that make this reporting 
possible. 
 
¶14. (U) For additional reporting from PRT Tikrit, Salah ad 
Din, please see our SIPRNET reporting blog: 
 
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Tikrit. 
 
CROCKER