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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001348 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/31/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL TU US
SUBJECT: THE U.S. AS POLITICAL FOOTBALL IN TURKEY'S 
ELECTION CAMPAIGN 
 
REF: A. ANKARA 1326 
     ¶B. ANKARA 1318 
     ¶C. ANKARA 1300 
     ¶D. ANKARA 1291 
 
Classified By: DCM Nancy McEldowney, reasons 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary and comment:  As Turkey's parliamentary 
election campaign heats up, all players will use any hook to 
drag the US into the campaign.  The name of the game is to 
embarrass, trip up or sideline PM Erdogan's Justice and 
Development Party (AKP).  The context includes an overheated 
political situation, featuring a civilian-military high-wire 
act, increased terrorist PKK action, and the very real 
possibility of a cross-border operation (CBO) into northern 
Iraq.  At stake is what Turkey will look like in the next 
decade.  In many cases, we are a proxy for the very real 
issues and balances that Turkey must sort out - secular and 
pious; military and civilian; Turks and Kurds; and the nature 
of Turkey's future relations with Iraq.  The best USG 
responses when accusations arise will be factual and designed 
to prevent throwing more fuel on the already overheated fire. 
 End summary and comment. 
 
It's Their Campaign, But We're on Page One 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶2. (C) Before party ballot lists are even published June 4, 
several issues have arisen in quick succession that suggest 
all parties will not hesitate to use Turkey's relations with 
the US -- and the tense situation in neighboring Iraq -- as 
fodder in the run-up to the July 22 parliamentary election: 
 
--The F-16 "cross-border incursion":  The US two F-16s that 
strayed across Turkey's southern border for four minutes, the 
result of pilot error overflying mountainous terrain, would 
normally have been handled at the staff level.  Instead, TGS 
chose to tell selected media outlets it had posted the 
violation on its website, and it became front-page news, 
complete with dramatic photos of war planes.  It subsequently 
morphed into "when did the TGS tell MFA and what did they 
know", a way of showing that the military had information 
that it alone could dole out to the civilian leadership when 
it so chose.  This has also been linked -- by both columnists 
and political cartoonists -- to the US presence at Incirlik 
Air Base (up for renewal in June). 
 
--The freight train that the PKK bombed May 25 in Bingol 
province:  While the meat of this story should be Turkey's 
lax customs regime at its borders with Iran and Syria that 
apparently allowed arms to transit Turkey from Iran to Syria, 
the initial headline was that weapons discovered in one of 
the derailed freight cars were of US-origin, a story since 
debunked but which people will remember.  It has now shifted 
to "did the US give this information to the terrorist PKK in 
order to uncover this illicit weapons transit?" 
 
--Handover of control in three provinces of northern Iraq: 
This story has just started to gain traction, but is the next 
in the series of "if the US is plotting against us we will 
just have to take care of ourselves"; it is excellent fodder 
for ultra-nationalists, who like to believe that Turkish 
territorial integrity remains under threat, not just from the 
PKK but from the US-backed KRG as well. 
 
--Alleged contacts with the PKK:  Just as the Chief of the 
General Staff Buyukanit, in his May 31 speech to an Istanbul 
security conference, accused allies of helping the PKK 
(septel), a story appeared in mainstream daily "Milliyet," 
citing Ozgur Akdag, a PKK member who had allegedly 
surrendered to Turkish security forces, as saying that US 
military officials came to Kandil mountain in northern Iraq 
(home to PKK camps) by helicopter, met with people there for 
3-4 hours, after which they allegedly started fortifying 
camps against a possible CBO.  There was also an allegation 
in the press on May 28 that U.S. Special Envoy Ralston met 
 
ANKARA 00001348  002 OF 002 
 
 
with the PKK. 
 
Why We Are Fodder 
----------------- 
 
¶3. (C) The US is a handy target for several reasons.  First, 
US-Turkish relations matter here -- a lot.  Any Turks who 
didn't already realize that found out after the March 1, 2003 
vote when relations went into the deep-freeze.  At the same 
time, many of our current policies and policy approaches are 
deeply unpopular, as evidenced by opinion polls showing 90% 
of the population with negative views of the US.  This is 
fueled in large part by our Iraq policy, our inability to go 
after the terrorist PKK in its hideouts in northern Iraq, and 
our perceived unwillingness to talk tough with KRG President 
Barzani.  And because US-Turkish relations are both important 
and controversial, they are at once something with which the 
military can tar the AKP (for being too close) and excoriate 
them (for doing a poor job).  We are so deeply involved in 
their region that we are an easy target - and scapegoat. 
Finally, conspiracy-minded Turks, who see themselves 
consistently as the victims, generally view us as the hidden 
hand, responsible for everything (at least everything bad). 
 
Lessons to Draw 
--------------- 
 
¶4. (C) This is only the beginning and is principally about 
domestic politics (though it has obvious ramifications 
elsewhere).  Given our proximity in Iraq and the renewal of 
PKK violence, we should anticipate heightened tensions and 
hair trigger responses.  Our challenge is to help lower the 
temperature by having TGS and politicians alike shift away 
from using us as a proxy and instead focus on the real 
issues:  how they solve the Kurdish issue; how they deal with 
the PKK; how they should deal with the KRG; how they can cope 
with a volatile Iraq on their southern border; and how they 
deal with their pressing set of internal divides:  civilian 
versus military, secular versus pious, Turks versus Kurds. 
For now, we are a convenient proxy as all sides here play 
with fire. 
 
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ 
 
WILSON