VZCZCXRO8586
PP RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHTRO
DE RUEHYD #0667/01 1491119
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 291119Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7772
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 YAOUNDE 000667 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/25/2015 
TAGS: EPGOV KCOR EAIR PREL CM
SUBJECT: KENYA AIR CRASH PUTS CAMEROON'S GOVERNANCE 
PROBLEMS IN STARK RELIEF 
 
REF: A. YAOUNDE 567 
 
     ¶B. YAOUNDE 578 
     ¶C. YAOUNDE 594 
     ¶D. MAY 15 YAOUNDE WEEKLY E-MAIL 
     ¶E. MAY 22 YAOUNDE WEEKLY E-MAIL 
 
Classified By: Poloff Tad Brown for 1.5 b and d. 
 
¶1.  (C)  Summary.  The May 5 crash of Kenya Airways flight 
507 (reftels) brought to stark relief some of the worst 
characteristics of governance in Cameroon.  Although the 
event would have challenged even a capable government, 
Cameroon's response was hampered by many of the same factors 
that impede progress on development and reforms: an aversion 
to public communication, a stifling regard for hierarchy and 
protocol, a crippling regard for style over substance, and an 
inability to react to events in a timely manner.  For the few 
days when the world's attention was focused on Cameroon, the 
Government was left looking lost, uncaring, and incompetent. 
End Summary. 
 
------------------------ 
Not That This is Easy... 
------------------------ 
 
¶2.  (U)  The Kenya Airways crash would have been challenging 
to even a capable government.  The six-month old Boeing 737, 
registered to a foreign carrier and including 114 passengers 
from more than thirty countries, disappeared in the middle of 
a tropical storm in the deep of the night into an area that 
can best be described as thick mangrove swamp.  To further 
complicate matters, the plane's homing beacon (intended to 
guide search efforts) appears to have been destroyed by the 
impact, and signal intelligence provided by a credible 
international agency led Cameroon's limited search resources 
-- and those of France, the U.S., and South Africa -- on a 
wild goose chase far from the crash site for more than 24 
hours. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
...But It Doesn't Have to Be This Difficult 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C)  The Government of Cameroon (GRC) got off to a bad 
start by not starting at all.  During the crucial first hours 
after the disappearance of the plane, the highest levels of 
the GRC were all personally participating in the funeral 
services for a recently departed former vice prime minister. 
Phoned Saturday morning by the Ambassador with an offer to 
help, Prime Minister Inoni saiod he was required to be 
present as the representative of President Biya, which meant 
that almost the entire cabinet was too.  In addition to the 
compulsions of protocol, personal political futures were at 
stake as, with elections looming and a government reshuffle 
on the horizon, the many hours of mourning would be as much a 
ruling CPDM party congress as funeral rites.  The first 
interministerial meeting to address the crash did not take 
place until late Sunday, May 6, more than 36 hours after the 
plane went missing.  Interior Minister Marafa, to whom the 
Governor of the Littoral province (where the accident 
occurred) reports, tried to mobilize resources but could not 
do so over the Prime Minister's head.  Indeed, at our 
suggestion, Marafa convened a meeting with the Communication 
Minister and the French and U.S. ambassadors on Sunday 
afternoon, but it had no impact. 
 
---------------------- 
Who is in Charge Here? 
---------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C)  The GRC's efforts were further crippled before they 
began by the lack of an effective government spokesperson and 
the complete absence of the Minister of Transportation.  The 
public could be forgiven for thinking that Kenya Airways CEO 
Titus Naikuni was leading the search and relief efforts as 
his public statements--immediately issued from Nairobi and 
then from Douala where he arrived the next day--were the only 
authoritative information available to the Cameroonian and 
international public.  President Biya, off in his village, 
was entirely absent from the public eye (and, as far as we 
can tell, from internal deliberations as well) for the 
duration of the crisis and he never made any public statement 
of condolence (though he did call a day or mourning two weeks 
later).  Biya's silence appeared even worse as he did find 
time to congratulate the French and Nigerian 
presidents-elect.  Further embarrassing to Cameroon, the 
Kenyan Minister of Transport was the most visible and active 
public official on the scene.  Cameroon's Minister of 
Transport and a notorious drunk, Dakole Daissala, only 
recently emerged from his village in the Far North where he 
had been campaigning for July Parliamentary elections.  In a 
May 14 meeting with the Ambassador, Prime Minister Inoni 
 
YAOUNDE 00000667  002 OF 003 
 
 
wearily recounted having left numerous unanswered messages on 
Dakole's voice mail over the 10 days since the crash 
informing him of the plane crash and the need for his 
presence. 
 
¶5.  (C)  Given his incompetence, it is unlikely that Dakole's 
presence would have helped as all levels of the GRC appeared 
unable to adapt its strict hierarchical style to allow for 
the necessary decentralized, rapid decision-making for a 
proper response.  Nonetheless, his evident absence only 
served to highlight his irrelevance and had Cameroonians -- 
not to mention foreigners -- openly asking what purpose he 
serves.  Officials in the capital, up to and including Prime 
Minister Inoni, insisted that the officials in the field 
(governor and provincial delegate) were in charge of the 
operation.  But US officials in the field reported that those 
officials were paralyzed by an unwillingness or inability to 
take any decisions without first receiving instructions from 
Yaounde.  The absence of clear orders from Yaounde meant the 
absence of action or decision on the field.  For example, 
officials from Kenya Airways and their contracted mortuary 
experts were unable to access the local morgue to inspect 
recovered remains until they complained to diplomatic 
officials in Yaounde who in turn were able to pressure 
Yaounde GRC officials to order the mortuary officials to 
allow them entry.  On May 16, ten days after the crash, this 
paralysis continued to the point that National Transportation 
and Safety Board (NTSB) team leader Dennis Jones decided to 
send the rest of his team of experts back to the US because 
they had been unable to start work.  Much of the NTSB's 
frustration arose from the GRC's failure to transfer the 
"black box" voice recorder -- located just two days after the 
crash -- to an overseas processing facility.  Ambassador 
Marquardt pressed Prime Minister Inoni on May 14 to order its 
immediate shipment to Canada (the Kenyans' preference), which 
he agreed to do, but without effect.  Once a decision was 
formally made to ship the box to Canada (which itself only 
occurred after the ambassador cornered the Prime Minister, 
Deputy Transport Minister, Foreign Minister and Director of 
Civil Aviation after the mourning ceremony on May 18), the 
GRC was still incapable of quickly tackling the logistics of 
transferring the box, leaving the ambassador to intervene 
with the Canadian High Commission, for example, to help the 
box's escorts obtain Canadian visas over what had become a 
five-day weekend. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Now That It's Over, Doing the Right Thing 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  President Biya declared a national day of mourning 
for Friday, May 18, 14 days after the crash and 4 days after 
his Kenyan counterpart had done the same.  A commemorative 
ceremony that same day was attended by Prime Minister Inoni 
(representing Biya), the entire cabinet, ambassadors, and 
perhaps 10,000 mourners.  The event was a welcome if overdue 
gesture by the GRC, which been pilloried in the press and 
public opinion for lack of a timely and compassionate 
response to the crash, whose casualties included 34 
Cameroonian nationals.  While obviously reflecting a lot of 
work under pressure at a difficult site, the ceremony itself 
was marred by a some significant shortcomings, including an 
official program that inexplicably failed to list 32 of the 
114 victims (entirely omitting the Kenyan victims, for 
example) and the absence of any statement at all from the 
government.  Likewise, a relatively robust and effective 
effort to secure the area, recover remains and improve access 
to the remote location was overshadowed by a bureaucratic 
incompetence and/or friction with Kenya Airways that 
prevented or delayed the visit of many family members to the 
crash site.  The fact that the GRC never appointed a 
spokesman meant that even its legitimate accomplishments went 
unnoticed.  An initial sortie before the press by the 
professorial Communication Minister went over poorly (he 
appeared to be blaming the French for the initial false 
start), and was not repeated. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
Comment: Crash Crystallized Cameroon's Governance Problems 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
¶7.  (C)  The GRC's handling of the Kenya Airways crash is a 
metaphor for the problems that plague Cameroon's governance 
more generally and stymie even the best efforts for reform. 
Even observers steeped in the peccadilloes of African 
governments professed incredulity at what they perceived to 
be the GRC's complete disinterest and incompetence in the 
face of a terrible and enduring disaster.  The 
characteristics that manifested themselves so starkly in this 
episode -- an inwardly focused ruling elite, a President who 
takes all key decisions despite being out of touch, excessive 
deference to hierarchy and protocol, no sense of urgency 
 
YAOUNDE 00000667  003 OF 003 
 
 
(even in an emergency), over-reliance on instructions from 
the capital, an abhorence of initiative, the presence in key 
jobs of individuals who add nothing other than 
regional/tribal "balance", lack of cohesion among ministers, 
and an aversion to public communication except by turgid, 
untimely presidential decree -- are the same attributes that 
prevent Cameroon from being a much better place.  What is 
even more distressing is that the GRC, with a few exceptions, 
is probably unaware of -- and unconcerned about -- its 
lamentable performance.  Minister Marafa, one of the few 
senior actors who gets it here, told the Ambassador 
afterwards that he was "fed-up with this entire operation." 
MARQUARDT