VZCZCXYZ0004
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHVN #0416/01 1410827
ZNY CCCCC ZZH (CCY ADC0757F MSI1875-695)
R 210827Z MAY 07 ZDS
FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1234
INFO RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L VIENTIANE 000416 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
//C O R R E C T E D COPY; ADDEE CHANGE TO ARF FORUM/// 
 
STATE FOR EAP/MLS (BESTIC) 
STATE FOR EAP/RSP (SHEIVES) 
MANILA FOR U.S. ARF DELEGATION 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/20/2017 
TAGS: KN KNNP LA PINR PREF PREL PTER ARF
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S FAREWELL CALL; HMONG ISSUES; ARF 
DEMARCHE; NORTH KOREAN REFUGEES 
 
REF: A. VIENTIANE 0382 
     ¶B. 06 VIENTIANE 1117 
     ¶C. 06 VIENTIANE 1141 
     ¶D. STATE 64134 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR PATRICIA M. HASLACH for reasons 1.4 (b) and ( 
d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: The Ambassador used the opportunity of a 
farewell call on one of MFA's more sophisticated Vice 
Ministers, and the Lao Senior Official for ASEAN and ARF 
affairs, to present the most recent Department demarche on 
ARF issues.  VFM Bounkeut expressed support for the USG ISM 
proposals, and joined us in questioning both the Russian 
"inter-civilization" dialogue proposal and the Indonesian 
attempt to add "disarmament" to the nonproliferation issue. 
We recommend the U.S. ARF delegation discuss U.S. positions 
in detail with VFM Bounkeut in Manila.   The Ambassador also 
raised North Korean refugees, where Bounkeut indicate support 
for "quiet" handling, and the Hmong in Thailand.  On the 
latter issues, it appeared that Bounkeut has to work within 
very tight parameters.  End summary. 
 
VFM Bounkeut Sangsomsack 
------------------------ 
¶2. (U) The Ambassador paid a farewell call on Vice Foreign 
Minister (VFM) Bounkeut Sangsomsack May 11.  VFM Bounkeut had 
served at the Lao UN Mission (1978-82), as Charge in 
Washington, D.C. (1982-87), and Lao Ambassador to Thailand 
(1990-98), before becoming Vice Minister in 2001.  Bounkeut 
told the Ambassador three new portfolios had been added to 
his previous duties of supervising MFA's ASEAN Department and 
Department of Economic Affairs.  Now he also oversees MFA's 
International Organizations Department as well as MFA's 
Institute of Foreign Affairs and represents MFA in the border 
committees set up with all five of Laos' neighbors (China, 
Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, and Burma).  This has kept him 
extremely busy during the past year. 
 
The Ambassador's Assessment 
--------------------------- 
¶3. (C) The Ambassador highlighted our first Comprehensive 
Bilateral Dialogue, held in Vientiane in October 2006 (ref 
B), as marking a significant step forward in our bilateral 
relationship.  She noted the two sides have had existing 
channels to discuss POW/MIA accounting, counter-narcotics 
cooperation, and programs to clear unexploded ordnance (UXO). 
 The Comprehensive Dialogue now allows a wider set of 
discussions to include more complicated issues such as human 
rights and trade.  The participation of the USAID regional 
director from Bangkok was particularly helpful since USAID 
helps fund ASEAN economic and technical assistance.  It may 
be possible for USAID to help fund trade implementation.  The 
Ambassador noted the advantage of exchanging views on issues 
at times other than when problems arise.  She expressed hope 
the next Comprehensive Dialogue might take place in autumn 
2007 in the United States. 
 
AI 
-- 
¶4. (C) The Ambassador highlighted the U.S. contribution of 
close to $10 million including via the World Health 
Organization and the Food and Agriculture Organization to 
help Laos prepare for a possible avian influenza (AI) 
pandemic.  She applauded the Ministries of Health and 
Agriculture for their cooperation on this issue.  The 
Ambassador also complimented the Government of Laos (GOL) for 
its national plan and for its handling of the March AI 
outbreak among poultry and the first two human AI cases. 
Bounkeut noted that Laos, with its smaller population, had an 
easier time managing these situations than some of its 
neighbors. 
 
North Koreans 
------------- 
¶5. (C) The Ambassador expressed special appreciation for the 
role VFM Bounkeut has played in resolving cased involving 
North Korean refugees in Laos.  Bounkeut assessed that more 
North Koreans are transiting via Burma to Thailand rather 
than coming through Laos.  Others are traveling by commercial 
boats on the Mekong River without passing through Lao 
immigration check points.  Since North Koreans do not stand 
out in appearance, this is difficult to control, he noted. 
He then pointed out that, Lao is sensitive about its 
relations with all countries, so "quiet is better" in dealing 
with these cases. 
 
The Hmong Issue 
 
--------------- 
¶6. (C) Bounkeut noted he had been involved with the GOL's 
Border Committee with Thailand since becoming VFM.  So he 
will be attending the May 17-18 Border Committee in Bangkok 
which will focus on security issues.  He emphasized a) that 
the two governments had agreed to deal with the Hmong in 
Thailand, both at the Nongkhai Immigration Detention Center 
and at the holding camp in Petchabun Province, on a bilateral 
basis; b) that their return to Laos would be on a voluntary 
basis; and c) that there had to be screening to ensure the 
Hmong involved are actually from Laos rather than possibly 
being from Vietnam or China. 
 
¶7. (C) Bounkeut noted that he had met Thai MFA Permanent 
Secretary Virasak Futrakun in Khon Khen, Thailand on May 9 to 
 
SIPDIS 
discuss the agreement to resolve the Hmong issue bilterally. 
He added that, when UN Resident Representative in Laos Sonam 
Yangchen Rana had recently asked him to allow UNHCR to play a 
role in dealing with the Hmong, he emphasized to her that 
UNHCR should allow the Lao and Thai governments to resolve 
the issue first bilaterally.  Bounkeut emphasized he had also 
just met with the Thai Ambassador to Laos and stressed the 
need for any return to be voluntary; otherwise the two 
governments would wind up in "great difficulty." 
 
¶8. (C) The Ambassador emphasized that any return to Laos of 
Lao Hmong in Thailand should be voluntary.  However, the 
group of 155 in the Nongkhai Immigration Detention Center was 
a special case since the UNHCR had identified them as 
"persons of concern" and had referred them to the United 
States, Australia, and the Netherlands for resettlement. 
Since we have not been able to interview members of the 
group, we are unsure how many the United States will take. 
Still, the Ambassador argued, it is important to understand 
the situation of the group in Nong Khai is different from the 
majority of Hmong in the Petchabun camp. 
 
¶9. (C) The Ambassador noted that the majority of Hmong in the 
Petchabun camp are likely to be economic migrants or people 
enticed by traffickers claims about being able to be 
resettled in the United States.  Only a small percentage of 
this group might qualify for resettlement.  Bounkeut 
complained about companies exploiting the possibility of U.S. 
resettlement to make a lot of money from these people.  The 
Ambassador reminded him that PRM Assistant Secretary Ellen 
Sauerbrey, during a Bangkok visit, made clear last August 
that the United States did not intend any further large 
resettlement of Lao Hmong to the United States.  Of course 
that did not stop manipulation of the issue by the 
trafficking companies. 
 
¶10. (C) Instead of trying to bring the 155 from Nong Khai 
back to Laos, since they all have UNHCR referrals, the 
Ambassador asked why the GOL and the Thai did not return a 
group of purely economic migrants from Petchabun.  The GOL 
could set up a pilot project to resettle them, allow 
international monitoring, and the world could see they are 
not being mistreated. 
 
¶11. (C) The Ambassador emphasized that our primary focus is 
to work together to improve the bilateral relationship 
between the United States and Laos and reminded Bounkeut our 
diplomatic relations have been uninterrupted for 50 years. 
It would not have been in our interest to have supported the 
Hmong insurgency since 1975, and we have not done so.  We do 
not support talk of a separate homeland for the Hmong. 
American citizens offering armed or material support for the 
Hmong insurgency are breaking U.S. laws. 
 
¶12. (C) Bounkeut askeed how many Hmong the USG planned to 
accept, apparently referring to Nong Khai as well as 
potential refugees from the Petchabun camp.  The Ambassador 
said DHS would have to complete its interviews before that is 
decided.  The law is strict, and people referred for 
resettlement have to meet specific criteria.  The Ambassador 
also mentioned the discussion in the United States about the 
ongoing review by Congress of a possible material support 
waiver for the Hmong.  She noted that such a waiver should 
not be seen as impinging on Lao sovereignty. 
 
¶13. (C) The Ambassador noted the return to their families in 
April of the 21 girls from the group of 26 Hmong children who 
had been detained since December 2005 as a positive step. 
However, most have not been reunited with their parents who 
remain in Petchabun.  Bounkeut pointed out that, if the 
parents choose to return to Laos to be reunited with their 
daughters, "there is no reason not to treat them well."  The 
Ambassador pointed out that the fate of the 5 boys from the 
 
group remains undetermined.  The Ambassador noted reports 
they were somewhere in northern Laos.  Bounkeut promised that 
the GOL would continue to try to "find" the 5 boys.  (Note: 
as reported ref C, to our knowledge, the five boys have never 
been moved from Prison Number 4 in Phongsaly City.) 
 
ARF Demarche 
------------ 
¶14. (C) The Ambassador took advantage of the meeting's timing 
to deliver the points from Ref D which had arrived that 
morning.  Bounkeut was familiar with the issues and said that 
the ASEAN side would separately discuss the U.S. proposals 
before the ARF meeting begins.  He opined that the GOL would 
agree generally with the USG's ISM proposals.  Commenting on 
Russia's draft Minister,s Statement on Inter-Civilization 
Dialogue, Bounkeut noted that there have been "interfaith 
dialogues, including with the EU, to focus on religious 
issues, but discussing "civilization" delves deeply into the 
history of a country and is "too big."  He wondered if this 
is a mis-translation from Russian to English. 
 
¶15. (C) Regarding Indonesian ARF Senior Official 
Director-General Primo Jaliento's letter to A/S suggesting 
that the ISM be retitled "ISM on Nonproliferation and 
Disarmament" or "ISM on Nonproliferation in All of Its 
Aspects," Bounkeut said the GOL supports a focus 
nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction.  Thus the 
Indonesian proposal is too broad; the group should stay 
focused on nonproliferation particularly of nuclear weapons. 
He wondered what levels of disarmament Indonesia would want 
covered, noting that ASEAN had discussed small arms issues 
(when the Indonesian Government was concerned about the flow 
of small arms to Acheh).  Bounkeut concluded that the GOL 
will support the continued focus to be nonproliferation, an 
issue which he called increasingly important with a nuclear 
North Korea and a nuclear Iran. 
 
Belarus 
------- 
¶16. (C) The Ambassador had presented the USG position on the 
upcoming vote on new members of the UN Human Rights 
Commission to Vice Foreign Minister Phongsavath Boupha when 
they met May 10 (ref A).  Learning that VFM Bounkeut now 
supervises the International Organizations Department, the 
Ambassador also briefed him on the Belarus-Slovenia-Bosnia 
competition, and the Embassy delivered the non-paper to VFM 
Bounkeut for further information.  Note: MFA has three Vice 
Foreign Ministers, and the division of responsibilities among 
them shifts irregularly. 
 
Comment 
------- 
¶17. (C) Bounkeut has been the most supportive of the three 
Vice Foreign Ministers although his portfolio does not 
include supervising the Europe/Americas Department.  We and 
other Embassies have asked for and received his support for 
quiet resolution of cases involving North Korean refugees. 
With his almost two decades in New York, Washington, D.C., 
and Bangkok, Bounkeut has a broader world view than many of 
his colleagues.  We are not surprised he was practical about 
the need for a quiet flow of North Korean refugees, 
supportive of the U.S. ARF ISM proposals, and understanding 
that the Russian proposal for "inter-civilization dialogue" 
and Indonesia's attempt to add disarmament to the 
nonproliferation issue would be problematic.  Still, Bounkeut 
appears to have very little room to maneuver on the Hmong 
issues which continue to be of great concern to the 
international community. 
 
¶18. (C) The Embassy recommends the U.S. ARF delegation in 
Manila provide VFM Bounkeut its latest thinking in advance of 
the ARF SOM Meeting.  We expect VFM Bounkeut can be helpful 
in the ASEAN-only pre-meetings in pressing for "friendly" 
positions on U.S. proposals. 
 
HASLACH