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INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 000337 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/17/2017 
TAGS: PREL PARM KCFE NATO RS
SUBJECT: HLTF MEETING MAY 16, 2007 
 
REF: A. STATE 065839 (GUIDANCE) 
     ¶B. HLTF-N(2006)0031-REV2 DATED 16 JANUARY 2007 
        (MATRIX) 
     ¶C. HLTF-N(2006)0032-REV7 (POSITIVE AGENDA) 
 
Classified By: Political Advisor Stuart Seldowitz, 
reasons 1.4 (b and d) 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY.  The May 16 HLTF meeting focused on 
CFE-related comments in Russian President Putin's April 26 
statement and the positive steps the Alliance should take in 
response.  The U.S. delegation was led by DOS/VCI DAS Karin 
¶L. Look.  Allies concluded that NATO should continue to send 
a positive message to Russia, including in the NRC(ACE) 
regarding NATO's own commitment to CFE and to ratification of 
Adapted CFE after all remaining Istanbul commitments have 
been fulfilled.  Allies also agreed that it would not be 
useful to continue to press Moscow to explain what it meant 
by a "moratorium" on implementation of CFE.  END SUMMARY. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
RESPONSES TO PRESIDENT PUTIN'S STATEMENT 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Allies agreed that President Putin's comments on CFE 
raised serious concerns for the future of the CFE regime, but 
most observed that it was not yet clear what practical impact 
the suggestion of a Russian "moratorium" would have on 
Russia's CFE implementation.  Germany informed Allies it had 
raised Putin's speech with Russian DFM Alexander Grushko and 
asked him to clarify what Putin had said.  Grushko responded 
that he viewed the speech as an invitation to intensified 
dialogue.  Romania spoke with Russian embassy reps in 
Bucharest, who reiterated Putin's concerns about Missile 
Defense (MD), NATO enlargement and the CFE Treaty.  The 
Spanish Rep to the HLTF related the Russian request, made in 
Vienna, for Russian FM Lavrov to address a joint session of 
the PC and FSC on the topics of Kosovo, OSCE reform, MD, 
Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs), and CFE. 
 
¶3.  (C) Allies agreed that one clear message was Putin's 
desire to discuss concerns about CFE in the NRC framework. 
They also concluded that Russia does not appear to be 
planning an immediate withdrawal from the CFE Treaty; the 
idea appeared to be that Russia would implement its 
moratorium, or possibly take further steps, if its concerns 
were not addressed in a way that Moscow found acceptable. 
HLTF Chairman Martin Erdmann reported to the HLTF that CFE 
had figured prominently in a five-and-one-half hour lunch 
with Russian Ambassador Totskiy in which MD, airbase upgrades 
in Lithuania, U.S. forces' training in Romania and Bulgaria, 
and NATO enlargement were discussed at length.  Despite the 
meeting length and discussion, Erdmann did not emerge with a 
clear understanding of Russia's intentions.  Erdmann also 
noted that while Russian CHOD Baluyevskiy's discussion with 
Allied Military Chiefs was not confrontational, Baluyevskiy's 
tone at a press conference that immediately followed the 
CHOD,s meeting was completely different and confrontational. 
 
¶4.  (C) Turkey (Gun) remarked that it was quite concerned 
about Putin's speech because of the importance Turkey places 
on the CFE Treaty.  Gunn proposed (and nearly every member of 
the Alliance who spoke afterwards agreed to the merit of his 
proposals), that the Alliance should not press for more 
clarity from Russia on its "moratorium" but the Allies should 
monitor Russia's responses and how they react.  He urged NATO 
to adopt an active public diplomacy program that includes the 
following four elements:  (a) stress the utmost importance of 
CFE and early entry into force of A/CFE;  (b) emphasize the 
benefits of the CFE Treaty for Russia and for Allies;  (c) 
emphasize that there is not any threat towards Russia from 
NATO; and (d) dialogue should continue through existing 
channels. 
 
¶5.  (C) Other strong remarks from the Allies included: 
 
(a) Germany (Biontino) declared that there was not a need for 
clarification because Russia has made numerous statements in 
the past year regarding its concerns on missile defense, 
cross-group stationing, the CFE Treaty, and its views on the 
European Union.  He concluded that relations with Russia are 
in a wider but more difficult context.  Germany was looking 
for a compromise that defined the "way ahead" for Allies to 
move forward with ratification. 
(b)  The Czech Republic called for the Allies to stay 
positive.  Russia continues to implement the CFE Treaty and 
the Alliance must send a clear message of solidarity.  He 
reiterated that host nation consent was the core value, A/CFE 
was important, and that Czech Republic would be prepared to 
ratify the adapted Treaty as soon as conditions were met. 
 
(c) U.S. rep Look agreed that we should not press Russia for 
clarity on the moratorium but that we should have common 
themes in our Public Diplomacy campaign, which included that 
there was no room in CFE for partial implementation.  DAS 
Look added that we need to respond seriously but we should 
not jump to compromise (as had been suggested by Germany). 
 
(d) France (Grand) noted that Putin's statement had no 
concrete implications for the CFE Treaty.  He suggested that 
the Putin Statement was delivered to the Russian Parliament 
for internal use.  He agreed to most of the points already 
made and to the importance of keeping Russia engaged in 
dialogue to discuss their concerns.  He also reiterated that 
discussions did not equal compromise or re-negotiations. 
 
(e) UK (Totty) questioned if anyone in the Alliance knew what 
Russia was up to.  He asked what the Alliance's response 
should be, seeking a clear answer on how we should continue 
our dialogue with Russia. 
 
(f) Lithuania addressed the accession issue recalling that it 
and the other Baltic states had stated that they would join 
the Treaty and their position has not changed.  Lithuania 
also noted its skepticism of Russian claims, and would like 
to see the CFE Treaty maintained as a "strong" Treaty with 
host nation consent being highlighted as fundamentally 
important. 
(e) Italy, in an overarching statement, opined that over the 
years arms control has grown confrontational; therefore, a 
strategic review with a goal of stabilizing partnerships with 
Russia may be needed. 
 
¶6.  (C) Additionally, since the "work program and strategic 
orientation" was pulled from the agenda, U.S. Rep Look used 
this opportunity to propose that the HLTF sponsor a seminar 
in fall or winter 2007 to discuss the implementation of the 
Adapted CFE Treaty.  Look indicated that the value of such a 
seminar would be both to highlight our determination to get 
the A/CFE Treaty into force, and also to get us prepared, in 
practical ways, for its implementation.  Germany spoke 
immediately urging agreement on the "Matrix" as a clean NATO 
position and also indicated support for the seminar.  UK, 
Turkey and France endorsed the seminar as relevant and 
important.  The Chairman (Erdmann), also supportive, noted 
that venue and details would be quite important.  Look urged 
that the IS develop a concept for the seminar in the coming 
months. 
 
---------------------------------- 
FULFILLMENT OF ISTANBUL COMMTMENTS 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Discussion of Istanbul commitments always includes a 
lengthy discussion of the German-originated "Matrix," a 
working NATO document which attempts to outline the status of 
all Istanbul commitments.  Erdmann remarked that it would be 
useful if the Matrix could spell-out for Russia what the 
Istanbul commitments required.  In that case, it would need 
to make clear whether the Russian Peace Keeping Forces (PKF) 
in Moldova was covered by the Istanbul commitments or not. 
The Netherlands encouraged agreement on the Matrix.  The U.S. 
(Look) said that, based on previous discussions, it appeared 
impossible that Allies could agree on this basic point in 
this context.  Thus, the "Matrix" was not the answer. 
However, Allies could agree that a new peacekeeping force 
should replace the current Russian led force.  While many 
Allies agreed with this U.S. observation, many also expressed 
concerns ) and confusion ) regarding the current Moldovan 
position on the issue, having heard rumors of a possible 
agreement between Moldova and Russia on an overall political 
settlement, which would include a continued Russian presence. 
 U.S. Rep Look suggested that Moldova and Georgia be asked to 
brief the HLTF (in a 26 1 format), since they had not done so 
for over a year. 
 
---------------------------- 
PREPARATION FOR THE NRC(ACE) 
---------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) In preparations for the NRC(ACE) meeting later that 
afternoon (Note: coverage of the NRC(ACE) meeting is reported 
septel), ASYG Erdmann proceeded through the proposed ACE 
agenda.  U.S. Rep Look opined that we, as the Alliance, 
should not press Russia to expand on Putin's speech and 
should keep discussion on the CFE Treaty positive, that host 
nation consent was a core issue, and that Russia needs to 
continue to implement the Treaty.  Germany agreed that we 
 
 
should use the ACE as an opportunity to discuss positive 
ideas on the way ahead. 
 
¶9.  (C) Other topics for discussion in preparation for the 
ACE included: 
 
(a) need to emphasize that all Allies continue to agree that 
fulfillment of Istanbul commitments is necessary before 
Allies will move forward with ratification procedures for the 
Adapted CFE Treaty; 
 
(b) NATO airbase in Lithuania ) NATO Secretary General will 
explain the purpose of the airbase in a letter to Russia, and 
why the airbase should not be viewed as threatening; 
 
(c) CSBM Seminar in Vienna, scheduled for October ) France 
and Germany are co-sponsoring that with Russia; 
 
(d) Spain announced that Russia will address CFE in the 
Annual Security Review Conference to be held in Vienna on 
19-20 June; and 
 
(e) that the Alliance does not need to schedule an NRC(ACE) 
meeting after every HLTF. 
 
----------------- 
NEXT HLTF MEETING 
----------------- 
 
¶10.  (SBU) With all the activities scheduled in Vienna and 
with NATO-Russia Council Tenth Anniversary meetings, four 
dates were identified for possible HLTF meeting dates (May 
31, June 21, July 12, and July 19).  The U.S. proposed the 
next meeting be on June 21, prior to the NRC anniversary 
meeting in Russia (June 25-26).  Other Allies agreed.  If 
workable, that will be the date of the next HLTF, pending a 
final announcement by the International Staff. 
OLSON