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DE RUEHBS #1736/01 1451432
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O 251432Z MAY 07
FM USEU BRUSSELS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L USEU BRUSSELS 001736 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/ERA AND EUR/RPM 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/23/2017 
TAGS: PREL MOPS EUN NATO CY TU
SUBJECT: CYPRIOTS DODGE AND WEAVE ON TURKISH DEMANDS FROM 
ESDP 
 
REF: A. ANKARA 1232 B. ANKARA 1192 
 
Classified By: USEU Pol-Mil Unit Chief Jeremy Brenner for reasons 1.4 ( 
b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  Cyprus responds to Turkish concerns within 
ESDP by citing its own litany of grievances against Ankara. 
Any meaningful change in Turkey's status within ESDP requires 
Council approval, thus being subject to veto. There is no 
visible 
pressure being exerted by major Member States on Nicosia, 
despite 
German Presidency engagement. Cyprus expects to participate 
in 
both the Kosovo and Afghanistan ESDP missions. The Cypriots 
will 
accept the NATO-EU Technical Arrangements provided they can 
remain 
below the political-level radar screen. End summary. 
 
----------------------------- 
Examining the Turkish Demands 
----------------------------- 
¶2. (C)  POLMINCOUNS and Pol-Mil chief met May 23 with 
Ambassador Costas Militiades, Cypriot Ambassador to the 
EU's Political and Security Committee (PSC) to get a sense of 
the 
parameters of the EU's ability to address Turkey's 
grievances about its treatment within the structures of 
ESDP.  Militiades, described to us by (Greek) PSC 
colleagues as reasonable and relatively open, clearly 
welcomed the contact. He said he could not comment 
definitively on Ankara's demands because he had not 
"formally been made aware of them." He complained that 
Ankara had made selective demarches to a small group of 
member states, and that he had not seen their points. He 
was clearly aware of Ankara's concerns, however, and 
implicitly acknowledged that some of Ankara's demands were 
legitimate -- specifically, access to the European 
Defense Agency and a Security Agreement with the EU -- and 
that Nicosia had vetoed them because of the broader 
political problems between Cyprus and Turkey.  Other 
Turkish demands constituted over-reaching, he maintained, 
and implied a status with respect to the EU that Turkey 
does not enjoy. We have heard this same formulation from 
senior EU officials within the ESDP structures. 
 
------------------------------ 
A Litany of Counter-Grievances 
------------------------------ 
¶3. (C) Militiades then produced a six-page paper entitled 
"Turkey's Persistent Vetoing of Cyprus Membership in 
International Organizations, Arrangements, Regimes and 
Treaties." He also presented us with a non-paper on 
"Cyprus' Participation in and exclusions from ESDP," and 
the points of an EU demarche to Ankara urging admission of 
Cyprus to the Wassenaar arrangement.  He said the purpose 
of citing these Turkish vetoes was to make the point that 
the current dispute over Turkey's role within ESDP was part 
of the larger political context related to the Cyprus 
question. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Few Prospects for Reversing the Spiral 
-------------------------------------- 
¶4. (C) In an effort to gauge the dimensions of a possible 
package that could begin to reverse the downward spiral of 
tit-for-tat obstructionism by both Ankara and Nicosia, we 
asked if there was any domestic political willingness to 
reexamine the question of a Turkey-EU Security Agreement -- 
one of Ankara's key frustrations. He said that he saw no 
advantage in "treating a political problem as a technical 
issue," but also hinted that political timing was also a 
factor. Militiades pointed out that Qprus is already in a 
"pre-election" phase, with voting schQuled for February 
¶2008. He pointed out that the Communists are opposed to any 
concession to Anara, and that President Papadopoulis will 
nee Communist support to win the election. Following the 
election, some package of positive gestures might be more 
possible.  He said he was not sure it would soon be 
possible to reverse the downward spiral, but he was hopeful 
that, at least, it could be kept from going any lower. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Cyprus to Participate in ESDP Missions 
-------------------------------------- 
¶5. (C) Militiades told us that Cyprus planned to contribute 
to both the Kosovo and Afghanistan ESDP missions. Nicosia 
 
will offer a small number of police officers for the Kosovo 
mission and proposes to provide diplomats to support reform 
of key ministries as part of the Afghanistan mission. This 
decision reflected a desire in Nicosia for Cyprus to play a 
fuller and more active role in issues related to European 
security concerns. 
 
-------------------------- 
On the Ground Arrangements 
-------------------------- 
¶6. (C)  Militiades said that Nicosia was willing to accept 
the technical arrangements agreed by NATO and EU at the 
staff-to-staff level, so long as these arrangements were 
designed 
to facilitate "on the ground" cooperation between commanders. 
(Note: The presence of Cypriot officers within the ESDP 
mission 
could complicate communication and information exchange 
between 
the EU mission and KFOR under a strict application of the 
NATO-EU 
Security Agreement - to which Cyprus and Malta are not 
parties. 
End Note.) He said that he felt comfortable that the 
necessary 
information would flow as needed to ensure security and 
operational 
effectiveness. He implied that Nicosia would object if the 
arrangements 
were put before the NAC and PSC for political-level approval. 
 
-------------- 
Cyprus in PfP? 
-------------- 
¶7. (C) Militiades, speaking strictly personally, hinted 
that a Cypriot application to join PfP might not be out of 
the question. He voiced appreciation for USNATO Ambassador 
Nuland's positive comments at a February 26 informal session 
of the NAC-PSC welcoming the presence of all 32 European 
representatives at the table. He said that if Cyprus took 
the step to apply for PfP, it should be with the 
understanding that it would be a full step predicated on 
meaningful participation. In this vein, he dismissed the 
idea of negotiating a security agreement with NATO merely 
in order to gain greater access to deliberative fora. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
¶8. (C) Militiades reacted to Turkish concerns 
much as we anticipated, by reciting his own litany of 
complaints against Ankara. Although Militiades seemed genuine 
in stressing that the priority was to ensure that "lives were 
not endangered" on the ground in Kosovo and Afghanistan by 
artificial obstacles to information sharing, neither did he 
see 
any likelihood of flexibility in Cypriot positions. This 
tracks 
with a separate conversation with the German PSC ambassador 
this 
week, who told us that the German Presidency had tried to 
broker 
a deal involving a reciprocal signing of security agreements 
-- Turkey with the EU and Cyprus with NATO -- which would have 
facilitated cooperation between the EU and NATO.  However, 
both 
countries had rejected the idea of this "technical" solution. 
 
Consequently, the German continued, there was little appetite 
among major EU Member States to put pressure on Cyprus now. 
First, he said, pressure from other MS would not work as long 
as the Cypriots could fall back on both Greek support and its 
right of veto of Council decisions.  Second, there was little 
inclination to go out on a limb for Turkey as long it failed 
to demonstrate any real flexibility itself. 
 
¶9.  Comment Continued. In the immediate term, therefore both 
Cyprus and the German presidency in Brussels are pinning 
their 
hopes on the technical solution of an agreement in the field 
that avoids a formal PSC debate.  Neither sees an opportunity 
for a larger package. Even after the Turkish and Cypriot 
elections, 
this looks problematic absent a push from an honest broker 
with 
credibility and clout on both sides. 
 
McKinley 
 
.