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PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0421/01 1220916
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 020916Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2193
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 2508

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000421 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  4/30/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM LY
SUBJECT: QADHAFI'S CALLS FOR AFRICAN AND MUSLIM UNITY RESONATE IN 
LIBYA 
 
TRIPOLI 00000421  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Elizabeth Fritschle, Pol/Econ Chief, Embassy 
Tripoli, Department of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
¶1.  (C)  SUMMARY.  In two recent public appearances -- a March 
27 Al Jazeera interview and a March 31 speech to Tuareg tribal 
leaders in Agadez, Niger -- Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi 
continued his long drift away from the Arab world and worked to 
portray himself as a distinctly African leader. Speaking just 
after his decision not to attend the Arab League summit in 
Riyadh, Qadhafi dismissed Arab leaders as "headed for 
extinction," declaimed divisions in the Muslim world between 
Sunni and Shia camps, and called for the resurrection of the 
tenth century Fatimid Caliphate in North Africa. While 
better-educated Libyans dismiss Qadhafi's ramblings, many 
Libyans take the "brother Leader's" calls for Muslim unity 
seriously and link Qadhafi's comments to sectarian violence in 
Iraq.  Qadhafi's latest remarks should been seen as ongoing 
efforts to position himself as an African leader, while at the 
same time framing himself as a "pure" Muslim leader relentlessly 
criticizing other Arab governments.  END SUMMARY. 
 
QADHAFI LASHES OUT AGAINST ARABS AND CALLS FOR A NEW FATIMID 
STATE 
 
¶2.  (C)  Qadhafi's recent public remarks -- a March 27 Al 
Jazeera interview and a March 31 speech to Tuareg tribal leaders 
in Agadez, Niger (commemorating the Prophet Muhammad's birthday) 
-- strongly criticized the Arab League for allowing the United 
States' to set its agenda and attempting to pit "Arabs against 
Persians."  In addition, Qadhafi spoke out against the division 
of Muslims into Sunnis and Shiites as a "colonialist plot" to 
weaken Muslims' political power. Trying to set himself apart as 
a unifier, when other Muslim leaders focused on divisions, "the 
Caliphate has nothing to do with religion, and this is a worldly 
struggle for rule."  At the same time, Qadhafi's comments served 
his continuing interest in trying to counter Saudi influence in 
Islamic affairs. 
 
¶3.  (C)  The Agadez speech elaborated on Qadhafi's criticism of 
the "conspiracy of mobilizing Arabs against Persians" with a 
convoluted argument that African Muslims are really Shiites and 
that Africa, not Iran, is the true center of Shia power. 
Qadhafi claimed many Libyans have Shiite names (they do not) and 
celebrate Shia holidays, including Ashoura. (NOTE: Ashura is 
observed in Libya, but as a minor holiday focusing not, as in 
Iran on the martyrdom of Hussein, but rather on the Prophet 
Musa's parting of the Red Sea.  Children wear costumes and carry 
effigees.  Libyans with whom we have spoken are universally 
scornful of self-flagellation and other Shiite Ashura practices 
associated with the seventh century martyrdom of Hussein.)  In 
addition, Qadhafi spoke nostalgically of the 260-year Fatimid 
reign in North Africa from the tenth to the thirteenth century, 
describing it as a halcyon period of African Muslim political 
unity. "The Shiites are North Africa. We will build the modern, 
second Fatimid state... on the condition that it be free of all 
the sectarian conflicts and the debate about the Imamate and 
religious rule" said Qadhafi. 
 
QADHAFI'S CALLS FOR MUSLIM UNITY RESONATE WITH LIBYANS CONCERNED 
ABOUT IRAQ 
 
¶4.  (C)  While it is difficult to find a chain of logic in any 
Qadhafi speech, and there are invariably inaccuracies or unique 
interpretations, there are always segments that strike a chord 
with his audience and the broader Libyan population.  Though 
Qadhafi's remarks are easily dismissed in most parts of the Arab 
world and among most better-educated Libyans, his calls for 
Muslim and African unity strongly resonate among certain, less 
worldly segments of Libyan society.  Describing the Al Jazeera 
interview, one Libyan (and LES mission employee) praised Qadhafi 
as a strong leader willing to stand up to imperialist powers and 
their Arab puppets.  In contrast, an LES who spent much of his 
life outside Libya rolled his eyes and dismissed Qadhafi as a 
lunatic.  A number of Libyans echoed Qadhafi's sentiment that 
Sunni-Shia divisions reduce the Muslim world's capacity to 
respond to foreign powers.  However, we have also heard highly 
educated Libyans expressing visceral hatred for Shiism and 
recent efforts to project Iranian power into Iraq.  Qadhafi's 
reminder that all Muslims share a single Qu'ran and should 
return to the text to find the true faith also falls on 
receptive ears. 
 
¶5.  (C)  While most Libyans were confused by Qadhafi's comments 
that all African Arabs are really Shiites, none would criticize 
"the Leader" to Poloff, instead redirecting the conversation to 
a defense of Qadhafi's calls for Muslim unity.   "Libyans did 
not know from Sunni and Shia before the U.S. killed Saddam 
Hussein," one bookstore owner told Poloff.  While all Libyans 
 
TRIPOLI 00000421  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
are (by Libyan government definition) Sunni, Saddam's death and 
continuing sectarian turmoil in Iraq have created a new 
awareness in Libya about sectarian division.  One taxi driver 
told Poloff that he had never met a Shiite before Iraqi refugees 
began to arrive in Libya following the 2003 U.S. invasion of 
Iraq. 
 
IMAM MUSA AL-SADR CASE STILL AN OBSTACLE FOR QADHAFI TO OVERCOME 
 
¶6. (C) Libyan thoughts, official and un-official, about Muslim 
unity are further complicated by the case of Imam Musa al-Sadr, 
a Lebanese Shia cleric who disappeared in 1978 after traveling 
from Lebanon to Libya to seek funding from Qadhafi.  Sadr's 
disappearance continues to cast a cloud over Libyan-Lebanese 
relations that has only slightly dissipated over time. 
Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri claimed publicly that 
the Libyan regime is responsible.  The Lebanese Charge in 
Tripoli regularly bemoans being in the Libyan backwater with 
nothing to do since most Lebanese can not travel here unless 
they have Libyan sponsors using "wasta" to get exceptional visa 
issuances.  U.S. government officials have inquired about the 
background and status of the case on numerous occasions and are 
given the standard response that Sadr departed Libya and 
disappeared in Italy.  We understand that an Italian 
investigation of Sadr's disappearance was closed without any 
conclusive results.  The Libyans also consider the Sadr issue 
"case closed" as long as the Lebanese or the Arab League don't 
put it on the agenda.  The cold Libyan relationship warmed 
slightly during the summer 2006 war in Lebanon, when the Libyan 
public responded enthusiastically to Hizballah's "resistance" 
against Israel and the Government jumped on the bandwagon by 
trying to send humanitarian aid to the Lebanese people. 
 
COMMENT: THE LATEST STEP IN A LONG DRIFT FROM THE MIDDLE EAST TO 
AFRICA 
 
¶7.  (C)  Qadhafi's latest remarks should be seen in the context 
of his long drift away from the Arab world and ongoing efforts 
to position himself as an African leader.  His speeches were 
riddled with anti-Saudi rhetoric, ranging from thinly-veiled 
criticism of state-sponsored extremism (Wahhabism) to a line 
that the two holiest places in Islam are actually Mecca and 
Jerusalem rather than Mecca and Medina.  While anti-Saudi 
sentiment has long been central to Qadhafi's worldview, King 
Abdullah ibn Abdulaziz's recent successes brokering a 
Hamas-Fatah power-sharing agreement in Palestine and hosting a 
productive Arab League summit have clearly rankled.  While King 
Abdullah -- Qadhafi's self-styled nemesis -- has seen his star 
rise, Qadhafi's own efforts to unite Africans under his 
leadership are struggling.  Qadhafi has been unable to implement 
a Chad-Sudan ceasefire signed in Tripoli in February 2006; 
promises to unite Darfur rebels as a step towards a political 
settlement have stalled, and Qadhafi's "Cen-Sad" organization 
continues to play a distant second fiddle to the African Union 
as a coordination mechanism for African foreign policy. 
 
¶8.  (C)  Qadhafi's seeming defense of Iran in the wake of Arab 
League attempts to retool the Iraqi constitution in favor of 
Iraqi Sunnis may have more to do with personal antipathy towards 
Arab leaders than any great support for Iran. Though GOL 
interlocutors frequently claim that the United States did not 
appropriately reward Libya for renouncing WMD and terrorism, and 
therefore Iran has no incentive to dismantle its own nuclear 
program, Qadhafi's latest ramblings are more contemptuous of the 
Arab League than supportive of Iran's nuclear ambitions.  END 
COMMENT. 
CECIL