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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 TOKYO 002004 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/07/2017 
TAGS: MOPS PARM PREL JA NATO
SUBJECT: JAPAN URGES PROGRESS ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS IN CCW 
 
REF: A. TOKYO 00438 
     ¶B. TOKYO 1716 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i., Joseph R. Donovan for reasons 1. 
4(b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY.  Japan believes in the need for close 
U.S.-Japan coordination on cluster munitions (CM) and wishes 
to see the U.S. encourage progress on CM via the Convention 
on Conventional Weapons (CCW) for a formal negotiating 
mandate ""by the end of the year,"" DDG Shimbo told visiting 
DAS Ruggiero on April 27.  This mirrored the message Acting 
Assistant Secretary Mull received during a visit on April 11. 
 Japan feels compelled to participate in the Oslo process 
meetings in order to influence any ""unrealistic"" proposals, 
maintain positive and growing relations with European 
nations, and to counter domestic public criticism that Japan 
is not acting. The CCW mandate provides an alternative to the 
Oslo process for moderate and CM possessing nations besides 
Japan such as Britain, France, and Germany to participate 
while potentially rolling in Russia and China. DAS Ruggiero 
reiterated the utility of cluster munitions and underscored 
the U.S. desire to see any discussion of CM balance security 
and humanitarian  concerns. Ruggiero also conveyed the 
willingness of the U.S. to discuss ) in principal - a 
negotiating mandate for the June CCW, but reserved the final 
U.S. position until that time.  END SUMMARY. 
 
----------------------------- 
APRIL 27 MEETING INTRODUCTION 
----------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) In his first meeting with Political-Military Affairs 
Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary Frank Ruggiero on April 27, 
MOFA Disarmament, Nonproliferation, and Science Department 
Deputy Director-General Masatoshi Shimbo extended a warm 
welcome to DAS Ruggiero.  Ruggiero noted the recent visit to 
Tokyo of AA/S Mull and said this demonstrates the great 
importance Washington attaches to working with Japan on the 
CM issue.  U.S. Force Japan (USFJ) Deputy Commander Major 
General Timothy Larsen was also in attendance for the U.S. 
delegation. 
 
---------------------- 
REVIEW OF OSLO MEETING 
---------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Japan believes there is a definite need to engage in 
the Oslo Process, explained Shimbo, and for that reason MOFA 
Conventional Arms Division Director Ryuichi Hirano led a 
delegation to the meeting held February 23-25.  However, 
Japan did not support the declaration made at the conference 
and noted that Britain, France, and Germany all seem to 
prefer to deal with the CM issue through the CCW process. 
Japan agreed that it is best to attach great importance to 
the CCW process but, nevertheless, will continue to engage 
with other forums such as the Oslo process where the CM issue 
is discussed.  Tokyo fears, said Shimbo, that failure to do 
so will concede this issue to the more radical elements who 
are driving the Oslo agenda. 
 
¶4. (C) DAS Ruggerio replied the United States shares the 
humanitarian concerns of the Oslo countries.  However, we 
believe that any discussion concerning the use of CM must 
take place in a forum that balances humanitarian with 
military concerns.  The CCW is the best forum.  It is 
important for the U.S. and Japan to work together on this, he 
said, as restrictions on the use of CM might very well have 
an impact on how the United States meets our treaty 
obligations and engages in the defense of our friends. 
 
-------------- 
JAPAN'S STANCE 
-------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Japan does not actively support the Oslo Declaration 
because Tokyo believes it prejudges the process and direction 
of discussions on the use of CM without fully discussing the 
various aspects of the issue, including security and 
technical aspects. Japan understands that the original aim 
was to create a treaty on CM to prevent or minimize civilian 
casualties owing to unexploded sub munitions.  However, Tokyo 
is concerned that some countries that have no need to rely on 
CM for their own defense will push for a total ban.  If the 
process moves forward without the participation of major 
producers or possessors, such as China and Russia, any treaty 
agreed upon will not ensure effective action to reduce 
civilian casualties.  Japan therefore believes it is 
necessary to foster a balanced discussion that takes into 
account both humanitarian and security aspects, and steps 
should be taken to prevent the Oslo process from resulting in 
a premature or ineffective treaty. So even though Japan does 
not agree with the goal of the Oslo process, it believes it 
is important to participate so as not to concede this issue 
to others. 
 
-------------------------- 
THE ROLE OF PUBLIC OPINION 
-------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Public opinion is playing a role in Japan's 
participation in the Oslo process, Shimbo explained. 
Although Tokyo has explained its position the use of CM to 
the media, some outlets are pushing the issue and, if Japan 
is not part of Oslo, the public is likely to ask why their 
government is not participating in an effort to promote 
humanitarian concerns.  The worst case, said Shimbo, would be 
for Japan to not participate in the process and then be 
forced into it by public opinion too late to influence the 
outcome. 
 
¶7. (C) The United States understands the role public opinion 
plays in this issue, replied DAS Ruggerio, noting European 
public pressure in particular and asked whether this was the 
case in Japan.  Shimbo replied that the pressure has not been 
as great, and that the government has not been forced to 
change its policies on CM yet.  However, Mainichi ) Japan,s 
third largest circulation daily newspaper - has begun a 
campaign to outlaw CM and is running articles and editorials 
about this on a frequent basis.  In addition, the opposition 
Social Democrats and Communists - and even some Democratic 
Party of Japan Diet members - are beginning to ask why Japan 
is not taking a more proactive position toward banning CM. 
He said that many critics are ignorant of the facts and 
falsely confuse CM with anti-personnel landmines (APL). 
Critics ask if APLs have been banned, why shouldn't the same 
be done to CM.  Shimbo concluded that these factors also make 
it better for Japan to participate in the Oslo process and 
hopefully added that so far Japan has been able to contain 
public pressure. 
 
------------ 
LIMA MEETING 
------------ 
 
¶8. (C) Shimbo asked whether the United States has received an 
invitation to attend the follow up meeting in Lima May 23-25, 
and whether there has been consultation about this with 
others.  Ruggerio replied the United States has not received 
an invitation, nor has it sought one.  Shimbo said he was 
disappointed Japan had received an invitation and that public 
pressure will make it necessary for Japan to attend.  No 
decision has been made on the level of the delegation to be 
sent, but it is possible it will be upgraded from the one 
sent to Oslo. Tokyo is waiting to see what others will do 
while also considering public opinion. 
 
--------------------------- 
THE ROLE OF THE CCW PROCESS 
--------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) The role that progress on the CM issue played in the 
CCW process is an interesting question, said Shimbo.  If the 
CCW makes progress on the CM question it could take the wind 
out of the sails of the more radical elements driving the 
Oslo process.  It is clear the British, French and Germans 
would all prefer to see this handled through CCW, but at the 
same time it will be impossible to derail the Oslo process. 
Even if progress is made in CCW, Oslo will likely continue to 
exist possibly in an oversight role. 
 
----------------- 
SECURITY CONCERNS 
----------------- 
 
¶10. (C) There is a disparity between the way European 
countries and Japan see their own security needs and, with 
them, the need for CM, explained Kawamura.  In Europe, the 
threat of invasion by the USSR no longer exists, making the 
public believe there is no longer a need to deploy CM in 
their arsenals.  However, in Northeast Asia, the countries 
that neighbor Japan still maintain large ground and 
amphibious capabilities, and the potential threat of hostile 
landings on Japanese territory still exists, even if the 
possibility has been lessened.  Accordingly, Japan must rely 
heavily on CM as a means to neutralize an invading force as 
quickly as possible. 
 
¶11. (C) USFJ Deputy Commander Major General Larsen confirmed 
the potential use of CM is vital for the defense of Japan. 
Japanese and U.S. forces discuss and train together about how 
these munitions will be used, and most of the scenarios we've 
gamed together envision the use of these assets.  MOD Chief 
of Defense Plans and Policy Colonel Shunji Izutsu, a former 
F-4 pilot, echoed the necessity of CM for the defense of 
Japan.  Both MajGen Larsen and Col Izutsu highlighted there 
were occasions where CM employment is more effective, more 
discriminate, and creates less collateral damage than other 
munitions.  Precision is vital, but JDAM or pinpoint weapons 
are not enough to defend our nation, emphasized Col Izutsu. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE CCW 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶12. (C) At the GOJ,s prompting, DAS Ruggiero reiterated the 
U.S. position that International Humanitarian Law covers CMs 
in terms of being discriminant and preventing unnecessary 
suffering.  He also expressed the U.S. willingness to discuss 
) in principal - a negotiating mandate for the June CCW, but 
reserved the final U.S. position until that time.  Shimbo was 
heartened to hear this flexibility in U.S. policy and stated 
that without it, Japan would be under pressure to support 
Oslo-driven restrictions. 

 
¶13. (C) Shimbo added that there is a good possibility many 
moderate nations will abandon Oslo if CCW takes hold of the 
issue and shows progress.  If Japan is to be under any 
restriction, Shimbo pointed out, Russia and China must also. 
For this, CCW is key. Shimbo stated Japan supports the CCW 
government group of experts (GGE) meeting in June to give 
recommendations to government leaders in order to achieve the 
goal of having a negotiating mandate in November.  Kawamura 
tempered the need to cooperate in an international 
negotiating mandate with the need to cooperate with the U.S. 
for the vitality of the alliance. 
 
------------------------------ 
MOVING TOWARD A VIABLE MANDATE 
------------------------------ 
 
¶14. (C) DAS Ruggiero shared that the US has initiated a 
review of the future use and types of CM to determine what a 
CM mandate should include--i.e. usage, technical parameters, 
impact on the alliance and coalition.  It is already U.S. 
policy that future CM procurements have a ninety-nine percent 
function rate.  It would be cost prohibitive to address 
existing stockpiles, thus it would be important for any 
agreement on CM to have a robust transition period. 
 
¶15. (C) Shimbo asked how we can gain a negotiating mandate, 
proposing the U.S. and Japan combine forces to demarche other 
countries with a similar message.  Having spoken with Russia, 
China, Israel, Germany, and France, Hirano confirmed they are 
seriously considering a negotiating mandate on CM.  Kawamura 
asked if the U.S. would participate in an NATO or EU forum on 
the issue.  DAS Ruggiero responded the U.S. is trying to 
negotiate in the CCW forum and is considering how to approach 
the issue in a NATO context.  On the EU, Ruggiero noted that 
Germany has made a joint proposal on establishing a 
negotiating mandate and has broached U.S. support with the 
USG, but we are still considering the proposal. 
 
-------- 
What If? 
-------- 
 
¶16. (C) Shimbo asked what if Japan signed an instrument on CM 
and the U.S. did not?  MajGen Larsen said any instrument that 
restricts Japanese military, civilian, or contractor use or 
handling of CM would adversely impact the alliance.  We have 
worked hard to equal the U.S.-Japan partnership, but if one 
side restricts the use or type of weapons, the relationship 
becomes more one-sided again.  Additionally, more U.S. troops 
would be required to handle the CM, forcing an increase in 
troop levels on the heels of historic negotiations reducing 
the number of U.S. forces in Japan.  MajGen Larsen,s 
comments noticeably set Shimbo and the Japanese delegation 
back on their heels.  Shimbo confirmed from an alliance 
aspect, then, it would be difficult if we end up in different 
international instruments. 
 
¶17. (C) Both sides agreed to consider scheduling another 
meeting in Washington D.C., likely in early June, just after 
the Oslo group meets in Peru.  Japan could share the results 
of the Lima meetings and discuss a way ahead, before the CCW 
experts meeting later in June. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶18. (C) MOFA and MOD understand the critical nature of CM to 
the defense of Japan and want to retain the flexibility to 
employ them.  However, domestic pacifist pressure to address 
humanitarian concerns may outweigh their preferences.  Japan 
also fears isolation from Europe.  An alternative instrument 
on CM via CCW will be instrumental in maintaining their 
support on this issue. 
 
------------ 
PARTICIPANTS 
------------ 
 
¶19. (U) Japan Delegation: 
 
Masatoshi Shimbo, DDG, Foreign Policy Bureau, MOFA 
Osamu Izawa, Director SOFA Division, MOFA 
Ryuichi Hirano, Director Conventional Arms Division, MOFA 
Nobuharu Imanishi, Principal Dep Director Conv. Arms, MOFA 
Nobuki Kawamura, Director Defense Policy Bureau, MOD 
Yukinari Hirose, Director Int,l Policy Division, MOD 
Yukihiro Sukisaki, Dep Director Int,l Policy Division, MOD 
Manabu Mannami, Principal Dep Director Defense Policy, MOD 
Makoto Igusa, Deputy Director Defense Policy, MOD 
Hajime Kitajima, Deputy Director Jp-U.S. Treaty Div, MOFA 
Futoshi Kono, Dep Director Defense Ops Division, MOD 
Keisuke Honda, Dep Director Weapons & Warships Div, MOD 
Colonel Yoshihiko Okimura, Chief Int,l Policy Section, ASO 
Colonel Shunji Izutsu, Chief of Defense Policy Section, GSO 
Major Moriki Aita, Defense Policy Division, MOD 
Takuma Kajita, Int,l Legal Affairs Bureau, MOA 
Satoru Kusayama, SOFA Division, MOFA 
Maiko Tamagawa, Conventional Arms Division, MOFA 
 
¶20. (U) U.S. Delegation: 
 
Frank Ruggiero, DAS PM 
Katherine Baker, PM/WRA Analyst 
Major General Timothy Larsen, USFJ Deputy Commander 
Colonel Danny Melton, USMC Attache 
Lieutenant Colonel Mark Hague, USFJ/J54, Chief Government 
Relations 
Capt Amanda Scoughton, Aide de camp 
Evan Reade, US Embassy Pol-Mil Section (note taker) 
Trevor Rosenberg, US Embassy Pol-Mil Section (Control Officer) 
 
¶21. DAS Ruggiero has cleared this cable. 
DONOVAN