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DE RUEHTC #0946/01 1381353
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O 181353Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9197
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHCH/AMEMBASSY CHISINAU PRIORITY 0115
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 1721
RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI PRIORITY 0109
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 1381

C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 000946 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR VCI, ISN, EUR/RPM, EUR/UBI 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/18/2017 
TAGS: PARM PREL KNNP KCFE CWC NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS: A/S DE SUTTER'S MAY 8 MEETING WITH MFA 
 
REF: THE HAGUE 184 
 
Classified By: CDA Michael Gallagher, reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  During a tour d'horizon discussion at the 
MFA on May 8, Assistant Secretary of State for Verification, 
Compliance, and Implementation Paula A. DeSutter addressed 
Russian President Putin's April 26 remarks and attempts to 
link the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty to 
U.S. ballistic missile defense plans.  She discussed 
post-START talks, funding for the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty Organization (CTBTO), Iran, the completion of U.S. 
chemical weapons stockpile destruction by 2012, and public 
outreach efforts related to nonproliferation fora such as the 
NPT and BWC.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (U) DeSutter met with MFA Director for Security Affairs 
Robert de Groot on May 8.  Also in attendance for the Dutch 
were Deputy Head of Nuclear Affairs and Nonproliferation Joan 
Wiegman and Policy Advisor Walter Wormgoor.  U.S. attendees 
included VCI Technical Advisor Astrid Lewis, and 
political-military officer Jason Grubb. 
 
Adapted CFE Treaty Linkage 
-------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) De Groot began discussion by asking for US views on 
Russian President Putin's April 26 speech that attempted to 
link the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty to 
U.S. ballistic missile defense plans, and suggested Moscow 
may suspend CFE-related activities as a result.  De Groot 
said Putin's remarks "backfired," as NATO Foreign Ministers 
at the Oslo ministerial reacted strongly against Putin -- 
"even the Germans came out publicly against Putin's remarks," 
he said.  DeSutter concurred, and referred to on-going 
discussions to allay Russian concerns in the NATO-Russia 
Council (NRC) and bilateral consultations in Moscow.  She 
said the USG remains committed to the Adapted CFE Treaty, and 
suggested the challenges to persuading Moscow to fulfill its 
remaining Istanbul Commitments are not insurmountable.  That 
said, she referenced her continued discussions with Russian 
MFA Director for Security and Disarmament Anatoly Antonov, 
who is still skeptical that the USG supports the Adapted CFE 
entry-into-force.  DeSutter stated that the Adapted CFE 
Treaty may need modernization, but noted that 
entry-into-force will have to take place first.  De Groot 
noted that he will meet with Antonov on May 23 in Moscow. 
 
¶4. (C) Regarding the 1999 Istanbul Commitments, DeSutter 
raised the alternative peacekeeping force proposal in 
Moldova.  She argued that any peacekeeping force would need 
to include the Russians, and could be organized through NRC 
auspices.  She added that she had hoped we could have managed 
to allow the Russians to announce the creation of the force 
on the anniversary of the NRC.  DeSutter added, however, that 
now some thought would need to be given to avoid the 
perception that NATO was responding to threats from Moscow. 
De Groot asked if such a force required EU consideration; 
DeSutter said the "need to move quickly" suggested EU 
consideration may not be advisable. 
 
¶5. (C) De Groot noted that the Russians have made the 
argument to the Dutch that the A/CFE requires revision, and 
it was not clear if Moscow was pushing first for A/CFE 
entry-into-force or renegotiation.  DeSutter said the 
Russians appear more interested in renegotiating, and have 
made the Germans "jittery" by claiming that the United States 
is not interested.  She reiterated that the USG supports 
A/CFE entry-into-force, and suggested renegotiation would 
present additional challenges. 
 
Missile Defense 
--------------- 
 
¶6. (C) De Groot noted that the Foreign Ministers' responses 
at Oslo to Putin on missile defense (MD) "could not have been 
better."  DeSutter described the Russians as the "most 
consulted people who have allegedly never been consulted." 
She said Moscow adopted this line primarily because the 
United States did not capitulate to Russian demands during 
earlier consultations.  She added that we are trying to 
better understand the Russian argument, and are willing to 
work with the Russians on MD.  She suggested the Plutonium 
Disposition Agreement might allow the sides to move forward 
on the Joint Data Exchange Center (JDEC) and additional 
cooperation with Moscow. 
 
¶7. (C) De Groot asked about next MD steps, especially given 
"jittery" Berlin and possibly including plans for 
verification.  DeSutter pointed to a number of recent 
high-level Washington visitors to Moscow as efforts to 
convince the Russians that the ballistic missile deployment 
will not be offensive in nature.  She expressed concerns 
about the missile defense public debate in Germany; German 
op-eds describe MD as "the end of arms control."  She 
acknowledged the need to make the intellectual argument in 
Berlin that MD provides a third option beyond a pre-emptive 
strike and retaliation.  She suggested convening a MD space 
policy conference in Berlin. 
 
Post-START 
---------- 
 
¶8. (C) De Groot raised post-START plans; DeSutter 
acknowledged discussions with Moscow on post-START scenarios 
such as confidence and security building and transparency 
measures.  She indicated that neither side wants to simply 
extend the START Treaty, but both want some continued 
transparency, and Moscow was pushing for another treaty.  "We 
would like to get to a place with the Russians in which they 
act like other countries and trust us" without feeling the 
need to sign and ratify an agreement, DeSutter said.  De 
Groot asked if the post-START scenario will address U.S. 
missile defense plans; DeSutter said that efforts to include 
our missile defense plans will not work. 
 
CTBTO 
----- 
 
¶9. (C) De Groot noted that the USG was behind in payments for 
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO). 
DeSutter cited conceptual problems with both the treaty and 
the organization.  She said monitoring the globe equally was 
not productive, the CTBT was not verifiable, and the 
organization is not ready to perform on-site inspections and 
susceptible to politicization.  She noted the USG currently 
has a moratorium on testing, while the reliable warhead 
program aims to ensure that our arsenal remains dependable. 
But the USG reserves the right to test, she said, to ensure 
that our weapons are safe and reliable.  De Groot understood 
our position, but could not understand the suspension 
following years of financial support for the CTBTO.  DeSutter 
explained that the USG has continued funding for the 
International Monitoring System (IMS), and not the CTBTO. 
With other competing priorities, including 22 percent funding 
for the OPCW and anticipated funding for IAEA inspections in 
North Korea, it was difficult to prioritize financial support 
for the CTBTO, she said. 
 
Iran 
---- 
 
¶10. (C) DeSutter noted a sizable Dutch trade relationship 
with Iran, and asked if the Dutch considered doing more on 
sanctions.  De Groot said the trade relationship was not as 
much as some of the larger EU members such as France and 
Germany, and almost entirely consists of 1-day old chicken 
exports.  He said the Dutch are viewed within the EU as 
"hard-line supporters" of economic sanctions on Iran, while 
EU members such as France and Germany have far too many 
economic interests to support increased sanctions.  De Groot 
noted that Tehran had recently suggested to the Dutch that 
Iranian airport maintenance efforts be based in the 
Netherlands -- "we have not responded to their offer, and 
continue to be quite tough on Iran," De Groot said.  He noted 
that the Dutch spend 15 million euros per year on a public 
diplomacy media diversity program in Iran (Comment: Per 
reftel, the Dutch parliament has authorized 15 million, and 
the MFA has allocated 13 million.  End comment.) 
 
¶11.  (C) Referring to the upcoming IAEA report to be released 
on May 23, de Groot acknowledged Iran will continue to be a 
"big challenge."  However, he said Iran is "overplaying its 
hand," including recently during the on-going NPT PrepCom in 
Vienna and in the Middle East Peace Process, and has 
underestimated the negative reaction from Riyadh.  De Groot 
added that Iran was "meddling in Afghanistan, and making life 
difficult for all of us" -- the P5 Political Directors have 
never been so united in opposition to Iran, he noted.  That 
said, he thought additional resolutions and sanctions will be 
difficult to obtain.  Responding to a question on new French 
President Zarkozy's position on Iran, de Groot suggested that 
Zarkozy will cooperate, but "will not take the lead" as he 
focuses more on domestic politics. 
 
Chemical Weapons Convention 
--------------------------- 
 
¶12. (C) De Groot asked for U.S. views on the 2012 chemical 
weapon destruction deadline.  Lewis noted that the USG is on 
track for meeting the 45 percent destruction deadline of 31 
December 2007 that was adopted by the Conference of the 
States Parties, and that the USG has opted to tackle 
destruction of "the hard stuff" first.  She explained that 
the USG learning curve for chemical weapon destruction has 
increased, including how to deal with mercury contamination, 
consequences of CW destruction on safety and the environment, 
and subsequent changes to regulations and the changes of 
chemical demilitarization technologies.  She noted 
destruction-related problems with all of the CW possessor 
States Parties. 
 
¶13. (C) Lewis also gave a brief overview of the status of 
U.S. destruction assistance in Libya.  DeSutter suggested the 
Dutch when possible to encourage the Libyans in their 
destruction efforts and give them positive reinforcement 
whenever possible for making their weapons of mass 
destruction elimination decision.  De Groot questioned 
whether there were adequate controls in place to prevent 
proliferation from the Libyan stockpile; DeSutter expressed 
confidence in the OPCW Technical Secretariat. 
 
¶14. (C) De Groot also asked about Lebanon and Syria, and 
their possible accession to the CWC.  Lewis informed the 
group of the OPCW focus on universality and the organization 
interaction with the Middle Eastern countries.  She noted 
that the Lebanese parliament has expressed interest in 
acceding, but currently is preoccupied with internal 
politics, and Syria continues to express the usual concerns 
with Israel.  De Groot mentioned that the Dutch have an 
on-going dialogue with Israel. 
 
¶15. (C) De Groot asked if there was room for the OPCW to do 
more in the area of counterterrorism.  Lewis noted that 
counterterrorism was not in the OPCW's mandate, but both the 
U.S. and the OPCW have been focusing on States Parties to 
fully implement Article VII of the Convention which requires 
States Parties to enact penal legislation to address possible 
impacts of entities and non-State actors that employ or use 
CW on its territories.  She noted that inviting debate on 
amendments in this area might not be the best course of 
action -- focusing on implementation legislation might be a 
better strategy. 
 
¶16. (C) DeSutter raised the need to address investigation of 
alleged use of CW and discussed what the U.S. is doing on 
this issue.  As an example, she cited the number of media 
reports alleging chemical use in Darfur, Sudan, and stated 
the need to get access to the information sooner.  DeSutter 
noted the delays in reporting such incidents and that there 
may be a need to develop a "library" of chemical weapons to 
better track CW use.  She suggested reaching out to NGOs in 
the area of suspected CW use -- not necessarily to collect 
evidence, but as a means to better direct the OPCW's efforts. 
 
NPT/BWC/Public Outreach 
----------------------- 
 
¶17. (C) De Groot said he found a U.S. intervention at the NPT 
PrepCom on the Review Conference "tough," and added that "a 
sense of moving forward" toward the Review Conference would 
be helpful when managing public and parliament expectations. 
From that perspective, he said that the Dutch were pleased 
with the results of the BWC Review Conference.  DeSutter 
asked what more the USG could do from the European and 
especially Dutch perspective to articulate positive elements 
of U.S. positions and provide support to our friends on arms 
control and nonproliferation issues.  De Groot suggested 
"sensitivity" in any U.S. public statement -- "any U.S. 
statement that leads to the perception -- even if it is a 
misperception -- that we are standing still could be 
detrimental," he said.  DeSutter suggested a public outreach 
tour to European capitals by U.S. Ambassador to the 
Conference on Disarmament Christina Rocca; de Groot said such 
a tour had promise and the Dutch would give it some thought. 
 
¶18. (U) A/S DeSutter has cleared on this cable. 
 
ARNALL