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Viewing cable 07SHANGHAI315, MORE EAST CHINA LEADERSHIP PERSPECTIVES

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07SHANGHAI315 2007-05-25 09:56 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Consulate Shanghai
VZCZCXRO6554
RR RUEHCN RUEHGH
DE RUEHGH #0315/01 1450956
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 250956Z MAY 07
FM AMCONSUL SHANGHAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5854
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1105
RUEHCN/AMCONSUL CHENGDU 0662
RUEHGZ/AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU 0644
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 0772
RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG 0666
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 0536
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEHGH/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 6255
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 SHANGHAI 000315 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EAP/CM, INR/B AND INR/EAP 
STATE PASS USTR FOR STRATFORD, WINTER, MCCARTIN, ALTBACH, READE 
TREAS FOR OASIA - DOHNER/HAARSAGER/CUSHMAN 
TREAS FOR AMB. HOLMER, WRIGHT,TSMITH 
USDOC FOR ITA/MAC - DAS KASOFF, MELCHER, MCQUEEN 
NSC FOR WILDER AND TONG 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  X1 MANUAL REVIEW 
TAGS: PGOV PNR EINV ECON CH
SUBJECT: MORE EAST CHINA LEADERSHIP PERSPECTIVES 
 
REF: A. SHANGHAI 280 AND PREVIOUS 
 
     B. STATE 58571 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Kenneth Jarrett, Consul General, U.S. Consulate 
Shanghai, Department of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Kenneth Jarrett, Consul General, U.S. Consulate 
Shanghai, Department of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
1.  (C) Summary.  In our latest round of discussions, East China 
contacts reported that the Politburo Standing Committee would be 
shrinking from nine members to seven with several members 
retiring while the Politburo itself would also undergo a major 
shake up.  Unclear, however, was the fate of Vice President Zeng 
Qinghong, who would ostensibly reach the "mandatory" retirement 
age, with one well-placed contact saying Zeng would definitely 
step down.  Also to be decided was who would replace Vice 
Premier Huang Ju, with prospective candidates running the gamut 
from the heads of China's most powerful economic ministries to 
the party secretaries of Hubei and Guangdong and the Beijing 
Mayor.  Up for grabs too was the powerful position of Secretary 
of the Discipline Inspection Commission.  While the untimely 
death of the Minister of Supervision may have disrupted 
succession plans according to one contact, Minister of Public 
Security Zhou Yongkang was now the likely candidate, according 
to a separate contact.  With the Party Congress and National 
People's Congress still months away, President Hu was busy 
filling ministerial seats, some perhaps as symbolic gestures, 
with others apparently designed to give him a political edge in 
the leadership jockeying.  With all of the leadership changes in 
the air, one well-connected contact believed that party elder 
Jiang Zemin retained some influence--more than most 
elders--particularly on personnel issues.  End summary. 
 
-------------------------- 
Politburo Shakeup Expected 
-------------------------- 
 
2.  (C) During a May 14 discussion, Nanjing University Professor 
Gu Su said his contacts in Beijing had told him that the current 
plan was to shrink the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) from 
nine, back down to the pre-2002 level of seven.  According to 
Gu's friends, current PBSC members Li Changchun, Vice Premier 
Huang Ju, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference 
(CPPCC) Chairman Jia Qinglin, Central Discipline Inspection 
Commission (CDIC) head Wu Guanzheng, and Luo Gan would be 
retiring.  The new lineup would include President Hu Jintao, Wu 
Bangguo, Premier Wen Jiabao, possibly Vice President Zeng 
Qinghong, and probably Liaoning Party Secretary Li Keqiang or 
Jiangsu Party Secretary Li Yuanchao. 
 
3.  (C) During a May 14 discussion with the Deputy Principal 
Officer, Hong Kong-based (but Beijing-origin) businessman Tang 
Qiongzhang, a friend of the husband of United Front Work 
Department Head and Hu Jintao protigi Liu Yandong, said he 
likewise expected a major shakeup in the Politburo and the PBSC. 
 He said Liu Yuandong would be promoted to the Politburo as 
would the new Shanghai, Beijing, and Tianjin party secretaries. 
Personnel decisions would be ultimately made this summer and the 
name list would be finalized this fall prior to the Party 
Congress.  Current speculation was that Huang Ju, Jia Qinglin, 
Wu Guanzheng, and Luo Gan would be stepping down.  During a May 
14 discussion with Pol/Econ Section Chief, JP Morgan General 
Manager for Greater China Andrew Zhang said that the argument 
over shrinking the PBSC was really a battle between Hu and 
Jiang.  He repeatedly stressed that "you could be very surprised 
by who will move up." 
 
4.  (C) During a May 11 meeting with Pol/Econ Section Chief, 
Deputy Director of Shanghai's Office of Financial Services Fang 
Xinghai said that the key issue was not the number of people on 
the PBSC, but who the youngest members were.  Fang said that if 
Hu was smart, he would name two younger protigis as PBSC members 
 
SHANGHAI 00000315  002 OF 005 
 
 
and let them compete to see who would emerge the winner.  Fang 
suggested the "two Li's"--Liaoning Party Secretary Li Keqiang 
and Jiangsu Party Secretary Li Yuanchao as two possible 
candidates. 
 
------------------------- 
The Once and Future Zeng? 
------------------------- 
 
5.  (C) Speculation over the future status of Vice President 
Zeng Qinghong was rife, with opinions all across the board. 
According to Professor Gu's Beijing sources, despite having 
reached the ostensible retirement age of 68, Zeng's status had 
not yet been finalized.  Tang, however, was confident that Zeng 
would remain in place despite his age because he was still seen 
as the guardian of Jiang's interests while Jiang was alive, and 
in view of his status as the senior representative of the 
princelings.  Tang explained that the late party elder Chen Yun 
had set down the principle that there must be a certain number 
of the children and grandchildren of senior party leaders in top 
positions within the party to protect the interests of the 
Party.  These princelings would have too much of a personally 
vested interest in the system to ever turn against the party or 
to allow others to undermine the party's primacy.  (Comment: 
Post has also heard this principle ascribed to Deng Xiaoping. 
Regardless of who said it, the sentiment appears to have been 
widely held and effectively implemented by top leaders as 
judging from the name list of princelings to be promoted said to 
be maintained by the Organization Department (Ref A).  End 
comment.) 
 
6.  (C) According to Tang, Jiang Zemin was also supporting 
Zeng's bid to remain on the PBSC.  Jiang had a personal 
obligation to Zeng stemming from early in Jiang's tenure, when 
his position with the military was still very weak.  Zeng had 
once been a Secretary to Marshal (and former Minister of 
Defense) Zhang Aiping.  Zeng worked to convince Zhang to support 
Jiang, and Zhang in turn was instrumental in moving Jiang's 
detractors out of the Central Military Commission and putting 
Jiang in firm command of the military. 
 
7.  (S) During a May 16 discussion with Pol/Econ Section Chief, 
Chief Representative for China of The Carlyle Group Luo Yi was 
equally convinced that Zeng was definitely retiring.  Luo said 
this information came from a source in Beijing who was "very 
close to Zeng."  (Note: although Luo did not specify who his 
contact was, he is known to have connections to relatives at the 
very top of the Chinese leadership, including relatives of Hu 
Jintao and Wen Jiabao.  End note.) 
 
-------------------------------- 
Who Will Represent The Families? 
-------------------------------- 
 
8.  (C) If Zeng were to retire, it would leave the question of 
who would represent the princelings on the Politburo Standing 
Committee.  Andrew Zhang believed that Hu was going to try to 
limit the number of princelings who could move up to senior 
positions.  He wanted more people who had total allegiance to 
him and did not have many "debts" in their past.  That said, 
Zhang expected that Trade Minister Bo Xilai would be promoted to 
the PBSC.  Bo's father was party elder and Deng Xiaoping 
contemporary Bo Yibo. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Huang Ju Replacements Considered 
-------------------------------- 
 
9.  (C) Our contacts offered up several possibilities--some more 
likely than others--for who might replace Huang Ju as Vice 
Premier in charge of financial policy, not necessarily as 
Executive Vice Premier.  During a May 16 discussion, Gaohua 
Executive Director Raymond Yin argued that Trade Minister Bo 
Xilai was the leading contender to take over Huang's slot, with 
Beijing Mayor Wang Qishan also a front runner.  (Note.  Luo also 
had suggested Wang as a front-runner in a prior conversation 
reported septel.  End note.) Other people under consideration 
for the job included Chongqing Vice Mayor Huang Qifen, the 
 
SHANGHAI 00000315  003 OF 005 
 
 
Liaoning Governor, and the National Reform Development 
Commission (NDRC) Chairman Ma Kai.  Yin assessed that if the job 
went to Ma, that would be a negative sign since in Yin's 
opinion, Ma was not a reformer.  Yin also shrugged off People's 
Bank of China (PBOC) Governor Zhou Xiaochuan's prospects, noting 
that while Zhou was good on policy, he lacked the political 
clout needed to secure the position. 
 
10.  (C) Fang assessed that Hubei Party Secretary Yu Zhengsheng 
or Guangdong Party Secretary Zhang Dejiang stood the best chance 
at replacing Huang.  Fang noted that Huang's shoes would be hard 
to fill.  Fang said that although he came to Shanghai after 
Huang had moved to Bejing, there was still strong support for 
Huang and positive memories of Huang's contribution to 
Shanghai's development.  Huang was seen as a "deep thinker" who 
considered the consequences of various policies.  For instance, 
Huang had been the central government leader behind the 
non-tradable share reform.  Currently, with Huang out of action, 
China Security Regulation Commission Chairman Shang Fulin was 
too scared to make difficult decisions and was primarily 
concerned with securing his next position.  Every big decision 
went directly to the State Council.  Premier Wen did not have 
the confidence or expertise on financial policy issues that his 
predecessor Zhu Rongji had so decisions were just not happening. 
 
11.  (C) Andrew Zhang believed that PBOC Governor Zhou, NDRC 
Chairman Ma and Finance Minister Jin Renqing were the leading 
candidates.  Jin was "too old," however, and would be unable to 
stay in position for two terms, which Zhang believed would hurt 
his prospects.  Ma Kai held considerable power as head of the 
NDRC, a "super ministry" with 6 minister-level and 15 
vice-minister level leaders.  Anyone wanting a business deal 
approved in China needed to work with someone from the NDRC. 
(Note: Zhang said that was getting more difficult with recent 
rules that prevented former government officials from lobbying 
their former ministries for at least one year after departing. 
End note.)  However, as the head of such a powerful ministry, Ma 
had also made a number of political enemies and had few strong 
political backers.  Zhang believed that Zhou, seen as a 
technocrat without strong backing, actually stood a better 
chance at Huang's job "than most give him credit."  (Comment: 
Zhou's prospects were virtually nonexistent according to 
previous conversations with other East China contacts.  End 
comment.) 
 
--------------------------- 
And the New CDIC Head is... 
--------------------------- 
 
12.  (C) Gu said that recently deceased Minister of Supervision 
Li Zhilun had been one of the leading candidates to replace Wu 
Guanzheng as CDIC head.  His death had thrown a monkey wrench 
into the current succession planning.  Gu had also heard that 
one of the CDIC vice chairs was a contender for the job.  (Note: 
Gu could not remember the name, he could only remember that the 
person was in his mid-50s and hailed from Qinghai.  End note.) 
During a May 15 discussion, Jiaotong University School of 
International and Public Affairs Executive Dean Hu Wei said that 
he believed Minister of Public Security Zhou Yongkang was the 
likely candidate to move up and take over the CDIC from Wu 
Guanzheng. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Method to the Ministerial Madness 
--------------------------------- 
 
13.  (C) Gu explained that the timing of the recent ministerial 
appointments--five in the past several months--was not 
coincidental.  In most cases, these appointments could have 
waited until the 2008 People's Congress.  However, Hu needed 
more votes on the Central Committee and was trying to pack it 
with his people in a bid to gain support for his personnel and 
policy changes.  Gu speculated that current Minister of 
Education and Jiang Zemin protigi Zhou Ji might be removed soon 
as a product of Hu's ongoing efforts.  Zhou had recently been 
coming under increasing public criticism from NPC 
representatives due to his poor policies and the rampant 
corruption and wasting of funds by the presidents of many of the 
 
SHANGHAI 00000315  004 OF 005 
 
 
universities under the Ministry's control.  Criticisms had 
appeared in the People's Daily and the Southern Weekend 
newspapers.  (Comment: Gu was aware that a ministerial 
appointment did not necessitate a Central Committee appointment, 
but that it often resulted in one.  End comment.) 
 
14.  (C) According to Fang, the last several ministerial 
appointments indicated Hu Jintao's effort to promote technocrats 
due to their substantive expertise rather than simply their 
political connections.  For instance, Foreign Minister Yang 
Jiechi was a graduate of the London School of Economics and had 
spent considerable time in the United States.  MOST Minister Wan 
was also an example of a technical expert-turned minister as 
were the new Ministers of Land and Natural Resources and Water 
Resources--both highly-trained geologists.  The Land Minister, 
Fang noted, also had political connections and had "followed" 
Premier Wen for the past 20 years.  Fang expected that Hu might 
put more of his Communist Youth League cronies out in the 
provinces. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Wan Gang: Loved by Wen, Adored by Germany 
----------------------------------------- 
 
15.  (C) Hu Wei said that newly appointed Minister of Science 
and Technology (MOST) Wan Gang--the first non-Communist Party 
minister in several decades--was chosen, in part, to symbolize 
the party's commitment to multi-party cooperation.  Hu agreed 
with an earlier assessment that Wan's lack of party standing was 
unimportant to his actual authority, stating that what was 
important was his willingness to listen to the central 
government (Ref A).  During a May 16 discussion, People's Daily 
Shanghai Politics and Law reporter Bao Jian said she also 
believed that Wan's promotion was a symbolic gesture.  She 
explained that MOST was largely an unimportant Ministry and that 
Hu could safely install a non-party Minister without taking a 
serious risk.  (Comment: The new Minister of Health Chen Zhu, 
also not a party member, was appointed after we spoke with our 
contacts.  However, we assess that for the most part, the 
appointment did not conflict with our contacts' assessments. 
End comment.) 
 
16.  (C) Hu assessed that Wan was well-liked by Premier Wen 
Jiabao.  While Wan was in Germany working for Audi, he prepared 
a report for the State Council on how to develop China's 
automobile sector.  Wen was so impressed with the report and 
Wan's "cleverness" that he tasked then-MOST Minister Xu Guanhua 
to entice Wan to return to China and help implement the 
suggestions in his report.  Xu personally flew to Germany to 
meet with Wan and, with the support of Wen, helped arrange a 
posting for Wan as Dean of Tongji University's Automotive 
School.  Wen later supported Wan's promotion to Assistant 
President, Vice President, and President of the university, and 
ultimately his transfer to Beijing for his current slot.  Hu was 
impressed at the speed with which Wan shot up through the ranks, 
attaining the post of minister just seven years after returning 
to China. 
 
17.  (C) Hu assessed that Wan had close ties to Germany and the 
German automobile industry that would help pave the way for 
closer cooperation between MOST and the EU in the future. 
Professor Hu believed this was one of the reasons the leadership 
had supported Wan's promotion.  China was pursuing a foreign 
policy of "multi-polarization," or deepening relations with 
other economic and political centers, such as the EU, rather 
than "hang itself from a single tree" in building ties to the 
United States.  Hu said there were many scholars, entrepreneurs, 
and even people within the leadership who believed that war with 
the United States was inevitable and that China needed to have a 
network of friends that it could fall back on when that time 
eventually came.  No one, Hu said, believed that war with the EU 
was a future possibility.  Hu said that multi-polarization did 
not necessarily come at the cost of the U.S.-China relationship, 
adding that U.S. firms had been working for some time to build 
stronger relations with Wan.  GM, for instance, had donated more 
than USD 370 million in software, other intellectual property, 
and facilities to Tongji's Automotive School. 
 
 
SHANGHAI 00000315  005 OF 005 
 
 
18.  (C) Fang was not sure of the significance of Wan's 
appointment since MOST was never a powerful bureaucracy to begin 
with.  Fang believed that without a party member at its head, 
MOST's influence would be even more limited.  Moreover, without 
party rank, Wan would be excluded from MOST party committee 
meetings and would not even have the power to appoint people in 
his own Ministry--a job reserved for the party secretary. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
Elders Not too Important, Except for Jiang 
------------------------------------------ 
 
19.  (C) According to Tang, most party elders were no longer 
very influential in politics or personnel.  Elders Li Peng, Qiao 
Shi, Li Ruihuan and the like all received internal party 
documents for review and were allowed to make suggestions on 
party deliberations, but they had actually very little power or 
authority by themselves.  Tang assessed that if several of them 
were to join forces and present a unified voice on a given 
issue, then Hu Jintao and the rest of the PBSC would have to 
take them seriously.  However, given that many of the 
elders--such as Li Peng, Zhu Rongji, and Qiao Shi--did not get 
along well, it was unlikely that they would put aside their 
differences to work together.  (Comment: Tang's assessment 
implies that there is nothing that the current leadership is 
doing that more than a few party elders find offensive.  End 
comment.) 
 
20.  (C) Most elders exercised influence indirectly through 
their protigis on the Politburo.  For instance, PBSC member Luo 
Gan was Li Peng's protigi, Wen Jiabao was Zhu Rongji's, and Wu 
Guanzheng was Qiao Shi's.  Former Chairman of the Chinese 
People's Political Consultative Conference Li Ruihuan was of a 
different mold than his contemporaries, having earned his 
political break due to his status as a "model worker" and was 
seen by his peers as more of a political lightweight.  Everyone 
on the PBSC represented someone's patronage chain. 
 
21.  (C) Tang believed, however, that party elder Jiang Zemin 
maintained more influence than his peers, particularly over 
personnel issues.  Tang himself was attempting to persuade Jiang 
to support Hong Kong legislator Phillip Huang Yihong in his bid 
to become the token Hong Kong vice chair at the National 
People's Congress (NPC).  Tang thought Jiang would have 
significant say over choosing Hu Jintao's successor.  Tang did 
not believe that Hu had Deng's or even Jiang's political stature 
and would be unable to impose his will on the other PBSC members. 
 
22.  (U) This cable was cleared by Embassy Beijing. 
JARRETT