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DE RUEHRO #1029/01 1360922
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FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8020
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFF COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHFL/AMCONSUL FLORENCE PRIORITY 2377
RUEHMIL/AMCONSUL MILAN PRIORITY 8638
RUEHNP/AMCONSUL NAPLES PRIORITY 2535

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ROME 001029 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/08/2017 
TAGS: PREL PHUM PGOV EU CU VZ IT
SUBJECT: ITALY REAFFIRMS CUBA TWO-TRACK APPROACH TO DAS 
MADISON, INQUIRES ABOUT POSADA CARRILES 
 
REF: STATE 52623 
 
ROME 00001029  001.3 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: Political Military Counselor Jonathan R. Cohen for reaso 
ns 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  In May 7 meetings with Italian officials, 
DAS Madison highlighted concerns about rising repression in 
Cuba and GOC efforts to create divisions in the international 
community, and hailed the Unity for Freedom statement.  She 
called for the international community to focus on the 
release of political prisoners.  The Italians said that Italy 
believed in dialogue with the GOC and engaging the 
opposition.  FM D'Alema had spoken clearly and at length on 
human rights with visiting FM Perez Roque.  Italy thought 
suspended sanctions served no purpose, and that the two-track 
approach had allowed for better understanding of internal GOC 
dynamics.  Italian opposition to language on Cuba in the 
U.S.-EU declaration stemmed from concerns that including Cuba 
and Venezuela in a list of war situations or serious 
terrorism was inappropriate.  Italy viewed Moratinos' Havana 
visit as a problem and recognized the domestic politics in 
Spain's policy.  Italy was interested in U.S. efforts to have 
Posada Carriles extradited.  The Chamber's Human Rights 
Committee was focused on Cuba, and believed dialogue was 
important, as was pressure on the Vatican.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (U) May 7 WHA DAS Kirsten Madison met with Italian MFA 
Under Secretary for Latin America Donato Di Santo and 
Director General for the Americas Claudio Bisogniero and, 
separately, with Deputy Pietro Marcenaro, Chairman of the 
Chamber of Deputies Human Rights Committee. 
 
¶3. (C) Raising U.S. concerns about aggressive GOC outreach to 
create divisions within the EU and between the U.S. and EU, 
Madison urged Italy not to let the Cuban regime block efforts 
to facilitate a peaceful transition.  While we assessed that 
repression was rising, the opposition Unity for Freedom 
statement was an important positive development.  Madison 
highlighted the declaration in the opposition's statement 
that Cuban's human rights were not subject to negotiations 
between the GOC and another government, which she saw as a 
response to Spanish FM Moratinos' visit to Havana (reftel) 
and an expression of the desire of Cuba's opposition to open 
a dialogue with their government on these issues.  Madison 
argued that the release of political prisoners and the end of 
the practice of holding political prisoners should be the 
focus of the international community.  As long as the state 
continued to repress political discourse, real dialogue among 
Cubans, which was essential for transition, was not possible. 
 
¶4. (C) Di Santo responded that dialogue with the GOC was 
impossible without also engaging the opposition.  He would 
not make judgments on Moratinos' visit, but noted that 
Italian FM Massimo D'Alema's Rome meeting with Cuban FM 
Felipo Perez Roque focused quantitatively and qualitatively 
on human rights.  Di Santo emphasized that D'Alema clearly 
and explicitly affirmed the GOI's position on the need for 
respect for human rights and the release of political 
prisoners, and called for a reversal of the GOC's current 
stance.  According to Di Santo, D'Alema practically quoted 
Assistant Secretary Shannon in the meeting, calling for 
conditions in Cuba that would allow the Cuban people to 
decide their own future. 
 
¶5. (C) The GOI was aware of the Cuban regime's efforts to 
create divisions, and took those efforts into account, Di 
Santo said.  He thought EU suspended sanctions served no 
purpose with respect to the GOC.  The two-track EU common 
policy had allowed for a better understanding of elements of 
the Cuban regime.  Di Santo argued that the international 
community had a responsibility to not foster cohesion of 
Cuban leaders around a common interest, but to seek out 
differences within the Communist Party.  Italy's policy was 
to work toward this end, while keeping an emphasis on respect 
for human rights: firm on principles, but elastic on 
political terms.  Di Santo noted that it would be helpful if 
Cuba became less of a domestic issue for some countries. 
 
¶6. (C) Italy wanted to have a dialogue with the GOC on human 
rights and the transition, according to Di Santo.  However, 
if the GOC decided to apply the death penalty to the would-be 
airplane hijackers, Italy would take the decision very 
seriously and would act accordingly.  Italy wanted to avoid 
"bureaucratically" motivated mention of Cuba in documents 
like the EU-U.S. declaration and the EU Cuba paper.  Any 
mention of the situation should take new developments into 
account. 
 
ROME 00001029  002.3 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶7. (C) Madison responded that the Cuban-American community, 
while active, did not drive U.S. policy.  She noted that the 
USG had made clear in its public statements that enduring 
change in Cuba can only be accomplished by Cubans on the 
island and that the U.S. would not support people's homes 
being arbitrarily taken away from them.  The U.S. goal was to 
bring Cuba back into the mainstream of the Inter-American 
system, Madison said.  A democratic, free, and sovereign Cuba 
returned to the Inter-American fold would have a positive 
affect on the entire region.  Madison registered U.S. 
puzzlement over Italy's opposition to including human rights 
language on Cuba in the U.S.-EU statement, emphasizing that 
we did not want the issue to drop off the agenda.  EU 
sanctions, though suspended, send an important message and 
their removal would send the wrong signal to those in the 
regime who might support change, would undercut the 
democratic opposition at a time when they were being more 
active, and would be perceived as acceptance of a de facto 
succession, Madison argued. Di Santo indicated that he had 
taken note of our views. 
 
8 (C) On the Moratinos visit, the U.S. had been careful in 
any public comments and did not want to contribute to 
divisions within the EU, but felt the visit left the 
opposition more vulnerable.  Madison noted that the U.S. has 
raised with Madrid directly our view that maintaining 
outreach to the opposition was essential.  Given Havana's 
track record, the U.S. was skeptical of the human rights 
mechanism--Perez Roque had already declared it would not 
address internal issues.  Madison noted she was surprised 
during her visit to Spain by the extent to which Cuba was a 
domestic political issue and the impact that had on Spain's 
policy. 
 
¶9. (C) The disagreement on the EU-U.S. declaration language 
was not related to human rights issues, Di Santo responded. 
Italy supported human rights language whenever necessary, but 
believed human rights needed to be discussed in universal 
terms.  In the case of the declaration, Italy was concerned 
about the appropriateness of explicitly citing the cases of 
Cuba and Venezuela in a document where only war situations or 
serious terrorism were discussed.  Di Santo said including 
the language would have been a mistake, and would have 
backfired rather than stimulating a solution. 
 
¶10. (C) Di Santo acknowledged that the Moratinos visit was a 
problem; Cuba was a domestic politics issue for Spain.  On EU 
political sanctions, Di Santo indicated that he had taken 
note of the concerns raised by Madison.  He hoped U.S. 
officials would reflect on the lack of results from the 
embargo, and on how to take advantage of the current 
situation considering the possible practical impact.  Di 
Santo noted that the island was not divided into two 
blocks--there were many viewpoints, and even within the PCC 
there were differences.  It was up to the international 
community to encourage a situation that would bring these 
differences out. 
 
¶11. (C) Madison agreed that Cuban society contained many 
players whose viewpoints we needed to look at, including the 
military, church, and others.  The U.S. was not focused on a 
GOC/opposition duality, but believed that the opposition was 
reflective of a broader desire for change in Cuba, a desire 
the opposition was articulating on behalf of many Cubans. 
She emphasized that we are always looking strategically at 
U.S. policy and policy tools, and that changes in our policy 
would be driven by changes on the island. 
 
--------------- 
Posada Carriles 
--------------- 
 
¶12. (C) Di Santo asked for an update on the Luis Posada 
Carriles case, noting that COM Michael Parmly had briefed on 
the issue in a meeting with EU Ambassadors in Havana. 
Madison explained that the U.S. had contacted a number of 
governments who might have evidence to prosecute Posada 
Carriles on terrorism charges.  The only charges we had been 
able to file were on immigration violations, and Posada 
Carriles was under house arrest pending trial.  Madison noted 
the issue was further complicated by a U.S. immigration 
judge's finding that Posada Carriles would most likely be 
tortured if sent to Venezuela.  Madison noted past Italian 
responses that they would not be interested in prosecuting 
Posada Carriles, but stated that the U.S. would be interested 
in learning if that view had changed.  Di Santo said that 
 
ROME 00001029  003.3 OF 003 
 
 
Italy, like the U.S., had an independent judiciary, but that 
he would take a look at the issue.  Note:  Post will report 
subsequent developments septel.  End note. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
Parliament: Human Rights Committee Focused on Cuba 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶13. (C) In a separate meeting with Marcenaro, Madison 
explained the U.S. view that the human rights situation in 
Cuba was worsening, and concerns regarding the closing of 
Vitral, while highlighting the Unity for Freedom document as 
a positive development.  Marcenaro explained that he had 
traveled to Cuba three times, once for an "illegal" 
conference organized by the opposition, and personally knew 
several prominent dissidents, including Vladimiro Roca. 
Under his chairmanship, the Human Rights Committee was taking 
up the issue of Cuba, looking at ways to support dialogue. 
 
¶14. (C) Marcenaro said his committee believed communication 
was important to create an opening, but acknowledged that 
dialogue with the GOC was difficult.  In exchanges with Cuban 
government leaders, Marcenaro said he had emphasized the need 
for greater openness, arguing that any future regime that 
failed to generate it would be dead on arrival.  He also 
noted the importance of the Catholic church.  Its decision on 
how to respond to the current situation was unclear, but 
Marcenaro thought the Vatican could be pressed to be more 
active on human rights. 
 
¶15. (C) Madison explained that while the U.S. had been 
working hard on human rights issues broadly, we were 
conscious of the need to do more to emphasize economic and 
labor rights and the GOC's use of economic repression. 
Marcenaro agreed that freedom for workers to organize was 
important and that the international community needed to 
speak out.  Note: May 15 Marcenaro participated in a day-long 
international conference on Labor Rights and the Social 
Responsibility of Companies in Cuba, organized by the 
International Group for Social Corporate Responsibility in 
Cuba and Italy's Radical Party.  End note.  Marcenaro assured 
Madison his Human Rights Committee was fully engaged in the 
struggle for democracy in Cuba. 
 
¶16. (U) This cable was cleared by DAS Madison. 
Spogli