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DE RUEHFR #2286/01 1511717
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O 311717Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7782
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1262

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 002286 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR MARCHESE/SINGH/ABRAMS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/30/2017 
TAGS: PREL FR LE PGOV
SUBJECT: JOHNNY ABDO TELLS THE LAF NOT TO PLAY INTO SYRIA'S 
HANDS 
 
REF: PARIS 1307 
 
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: On May 29, former Lebanese Military 
Intelligence Chief Johnny Abdo said he recently advised LAF 
Commander Michel Suleiman not to play into Syria's hands in 
resolving the crisis in the Nahr al-Bared refugee camp.  Abdo 
said Syria's strategy was to goad the LAF into a pitched 
battle with the Palestinians.  Consequently, he advised 
Suleiman instead to limit the LAF to a supporting role while 
letting friendly Palestinian forces take down Fatah 
al-Islam's militants.  Abdo despaired of the Christian 
community's ability to rally behind a presidential candidate 
other than Michel Aoun, said he was advising Saad Hariri not 
to become Prime Minister, and indicated he would not be 
surprised if the Sarkozy government were to intensify its 
contacts with Syria.  End summary. 
 
Beating Syria at its Own Game 
----------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Johnny Abdo, who served as Lebanon's Chief of Military 
Intelligence during the Lebanese civil war, told us May 29 
that he called LAF Commander Michel Suleiman (with whom he 
rarely speaks) on or about May 25 to offer advice on handling 
the crisis in the Nahr al-Bared refugee camp.  Abdo said he 
was fully convinced that Fatah al-Islam was a Syrian 
surrogate, and that Syria's aim in nurturing Palestinian 
extremist groups was to goad the LAF into a pitched battle. 
Such a battle would demonstrate that the Palestinians (not 
Hizballah) were the source of Lebanon's instability, and 
would likely spill over into the other refugee camps and 
quickly overwhelm the LAF's military capabilities and 
political cohesion -- thus setting the stage for a return of 
Syrian control. 
 
¶3. (C) Abdo told Suleiman that he must not fall into the trap 
Damascus had set for the LAF.  Rather than committing the 
army to a frontal assault on Nahr al-Bared, Suleiman should 
resolve the stand-off through an "intelligence operation" in 
which 300 or so friendly Palestinian fighters would slip into 
the camp and neutralize the Fatah al-Islam militants.  The 
LAF would play a supporting role as needed. 
 
¶4. (C) Abdo said he subsequently spoke to Druze leader Walid 
Jumblatt, who told him that Suleiman had greatly appreciated 
Abdo's advice.  Nevertheless, Abdo told us he remained 
worried about the potential for disaster, not least if the 
GOL becomes paralyzed by indecision.  He criticized the GOL 
for saying that it would take a cabinet decision to authorize 
the LAF to enter the camp.  "They should have declared it a 
military zone and authorized the army to take all necessary 
action," said Abdo, adding that time is not on the army's 
side.  "The army is less confessional than other institutions 
in Lebanon, but it is still confessional.  Any military 
operation that lasts longer than three days will start to rip 
the army apart (along confessional lines)," Abdo observed 
darkly.  Abdo singled out current military intelligence chief 
George Khoury as an impediment to a successful resolution of 
the crisis, saying that Khoury remained loyal to Damascus. 
Finally, Abdo noted wryly that Michel Suleiman was not 
entirely pleased that the U.S. had been so forthcoming in 
meeting the LAF's ammunition needs (including those of 
Lebanon's Gazelle helicopters), inasmuch as the rapid 
resupply effort had deprived Suleiman of an excuse for 
inactivity. 
 
March 14's Image Problem 
------------------------ 
 
¶5. (C) Turning to the political fortunes of the March 14 
majority (which he supports), Abdo said he remained convinced 
(reftel) that March 14 is slowly surrendering to the 
Syrian-backed opposition.  "If anything, it has gotten worse" 
said Abdo, who decried the Christian community's inability to 
produce, and rally behind, an alternative to Michel Aoun in 
the upcoming presidential election.  Abdo skewered several 
potential contenders, saying Samir Geagea failed to convince 
anyone that he had turned over a new leaf, whereas Central 
Bank Governor Riad Salameh probably could not be elected 
without a constitutional amendment (for which there was no 
political appetite, given the unfortunate precedent with 
Lahoud). 
 
¶6. (C) The underlying problem, according to Abdo, is that 
 
PARIS 00002286  002 OF 002 
 
 
most Lebanese equate March 14 with Saad Hariri and the Sunni 
community.  Consequently, any candidate backed by March 14 
will be seen as a Sunni stooge.  In an effort to give March 
14 a face-lift, Abdo said he had repeatedly urged Saad to 
name a Christian as the movement's secretary-general, but to 
no avail.  Admitting that his influence on Saad was limited 
(Saad similarly brushed off Abdo's advice that he not try to 
become prime minister, and may have been annoyed when Abdo 
advised him not to launch a Sunni political party), Abdo 
contrasted the young Hariri to his late father: "Rafik had a 
gift -- when he spoke to you, he always made you feel needed. 
 With Saad, when you look him in the eyes you get the feeling 
that he's thinking to himself: 'I talk to Chirac, Putin, 
etc., so why do I need you?'" 
 
French-Syrian Relations 
----------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) With regard to the future of French-Syrian relations 
under President Sarkozy's new government, Abdo said he would 
not be surprised to see stronger ties between Paris and 
Damascus.  He noted that during the final months of the 
Chirac presidency, Syrian military intelligence chief Assef 
Shawqat made multiple trips to Paris.  When Abdo tipped off 
Nazek Hariri to one of Shawqat's visits, Nazek raised it with 
Chirac, who was "stunned and furious" to discover that 
Shawqat was in Paris at the invitation of French 
intelligence.  "Chirac had no idea what they (his 
intelligence services) were doing . . . one of my contacts in 
French intelligence told me that France had interests that 
were more important than Chirac's friendship with the 
Hariris.  But I think Sarkozy, who was Minister of the 
Interior at the time, knew exactly what was going on," said 
Abdo.  In addition, Abdo claimed that French intelligence 
passed a message in 2006 to Lebanese President Emile Lahoud 
telling him that it was ok to criticize Chirac, but not 
France; Lahoud's assumption, Abdo added, was that the message 
originated with Sarkozy. 
 
¶8. (C) Comment: Abdo's web of contacts and his close 
connection to Nazek Hariri provides him with an intriguing, 
if necessarily remote, perspective on Lebanese events.  As 
always, we defer to Embassy Beirut as to the accuracy of his 
analysis. 
 
 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
 
 
STAPLETON