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O 221247Z MAY 07
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7478
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 002095 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2017 
TAGS: PREL FR EUN ECON SENV PGOV NATO IZ IR AF TU
SUBJECT: THE DEPUTY SECRETARY'S MAY 15 MEETING WITH FRENCH PRESIDENT SARKOZY'S DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR JEAN-DAVID LAVITTE 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Craig Stapleton for reasons 1.4 (B & D). 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  The Deputy Secretary met informally May 15 
with President-elect Sarkozy's Diplomatic Advisor-designate, 
Jean-David Levitte, to explore the U.S.-French foreign policy 
agenda in advance of Sarkozy's assumption of office on May 
¶16.  Levitte cautioned against expecting dramatic changes in 
French foreign policy, although there would be a change in 
tone, while stressing that Sarkozy's top priorities would 
include climate change and Darfur and reiterating Sarkozy's 
opposition to Turkish EU membership.  Levitte affirmed that 
Sarkozy would want to pursue a stronger U.S.-French 
relationship; that Sarkozy's comments on Afghanistan were 
made in the context of wanting to help free a French hostage, 
and did not represent a change in French policy toward its 
NATO/ISAF commitments; and, that he would keep an initial 
distance from Russia.  Levitte confirmed his own expanded 
mandate (to include African Affairs) as the President's 
Diplomatic Advisor and Bernard Kouchner's selection as 
Foreign Minister.  In a May 16 meeting, prominent French 
international affairs analysts did not believe Sarkozy's idea 
of a Mediterranean Union would become a reality anytime soon, 
especially if there is no progress on the Western Sahara, and 
they predicted Sarkozy would show less "Gallic embarrassment" 
on missile defense.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) The Deputy Secretary, accompanied by the 
Ambassador, held an initial meeting May 15 with 
President-elect Sarkozy's Diplomatic Advisor-designate (and 
National Security Advisor-equivalent) Jean-David Levitte to 
discuss France's probable foreign policy orientation under a 
Sarkozy presidency.  The meeting took place at the 
Ambassador's residence, given that Levitte was meeting with 
the Deputy Secretary in an unofficial capacity (Sarkozy was 
officially installed as President on May 16).  On May 16, the 
Deputy Secretary exchanged views over lunch with noted former 
Mitterrand advisor and Sarkozy friend Jacques Attali, 
strategic affairs specialist Francois Heisbourg, and 
Americanist Nicole Bacharan. 
 
EXPECT CONTINUITY IN FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY 
------------------------------------------ 
¶3.  (C) Levitte cautioned the Deputy Secretary at the outset 
of the meeting against expecting dramatic changes in French 
foreign policy under a Sarkozy presidency, although there 
would be a change in tone.  He hastened to add that he had 
yet to hold extensive consultations with Sarkozy about his 
foreign policy views.  Levitte said he had had two meetings 
with Sarkozy, but that they had focused primarily on 
organizational issues rather than policy questions.  Levitte 
confirmed press reports that his mandate would be broader 
than that of his predecessor, to include supervision of the 
Presidency's Africa cell.  Confirming that Bernard Kouchner 
would be named as Foreign Minister, Levitte said he would 
need to broaden his horizons beyond running an NGO (Medecins 
sans Frontieres); both he and the MFA bureaucracy would 
require a little time to adjust to one another. 
 
U.S.-FRENCH RELATIONS 
--------------------- 
¶4.  (C) Indicating that his own pro-U.S. orientation was 
already well known, Levitte assured the Deputy Secretary that 
Sarkozy was eager to work with the United States.  That said, 
France would insist on being treated as an equal partner, and 
should be consulted as such. 
 
CLIMATE CHANGE 
-------------- 
¶5.  (C) Levitte indicated that climate change would be a top 
domestic and international priority for Sarkozy, perhaps his 
top priority.  The Deputy Secretary defended the U.S. record 
on climate change, with the Ambassador pointing out a number 
of technological advances the U.S. was making to reduce 
emissions, or at a minimum the rate of growth of emissions, 
despite our non-ratification of Kyoto.  The Deputy Secretary 
and the Ambassador stressed USG willingness to work together 
with the Sarkozy government in a way that would further both 
our interests. 
 
AFGHANISTAN 
----------- 
¶6.  (C) The Deputy Secretary requested a clarification of 
Sarkozy's views on continuing French engagement in 
Afghanistan, given the statements he had made to the effect 
that France would not remain in Afghanistan permanently. 
Levitte responded by acknowledging that France had interests 
in Afghanistan, including two French-language schools, and 
agreed with the U.S. on the continuing Taliban threat.  He 
explained that Sarkozy's statement should be understood 
within the context of the government's then-ongoing efforts 
to secure the release of French hostages, and did not 
represent any change in French policy. 
 
PARIS 00002095  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
IRAQ 
---- 
¶7.  (C) The Deputy Secretary stressed the important role the 
ongoing regional conferences on Iraq could play in building 
up international support for a sovereign Iraq.  Levitte 
promised that France would continue to participate in such 
conferences at a suitably high level.  He added that a 
precipitate U.S. withdrawal from Iraq also was not in 
France's interest.  He did not offer any specifics as to how 
France might increase its support. 
 
DARFUR 
------ 
¶8.  (C) Levitte emphasized the importance of doing more on 
Darfur.  He added that this was likely to be a very high 
priority for incoming Foreign Minister Kouchner, in part 
because it would give Kouchner, on an issue he personally 
cares about, an opening to make an immediate impact on the 
international stage.  Levitte noted French deployments in 
Chad and the C.A.R. as evidence of France's engagement and 
stressed the potential for spillover. But it would be 
difficult to do more militarily, as French forces were 
stretched thin.  For that reason, French efforts would focus 
primarily on diplomatic action. 
 
EU, TURKEY, RUSSIA 
------------------ 
¶9.  (C) In response to a question from the Deputy Secretary, 
Levitte reviewed briefly Sarkozy's strategy for working with 
the UK and Germany to push forward the idea of a simplified 
treaty that could be ratified by member states without 
recourse to a referendum.  The Deputy Secretary asked about 
Sarkozy's opposition to Turkey, reviewing the strategic 
reasons behind U.S. support for eventual Turkish membership. 
Levitte indicated that it would be very difficult to change 
Sarkozy's views on Turkey.  The Deputy Secretary urged the 
French to keep an open mind and refrain at least from closing 
the door completely.  Levitte commented in passing that 
Sarkozy would also take a tougher line on Russia, adding that 
Sarkozy would not be in a hurry to visit Putin anytime soon. 
 
MEETING WITH INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS ANALYSTS 
------------------------------------------- 
¶10.  (SBU) The Deputy Secretary's meeting covered the French 
political scene as well as foreign policy issues.  The Deputy 
Secretary reviewed U.S. thinking on Iraq stabilization, the 
 
SIPDIS 
Middle East peace process, Iran, Syria, and Latin American 
free trade agreements.  The international affairs analysts 
noted Sarkozy's decision to strengthen the mandate of his 
Diplomatic Advisor, subordinating not only the role of the 
Africa cell, but also that of the President's military 
advisor.  This obviated the need to create a separate NSC 
structure, an idea which has been apparently discarded. 
Heisbourg described Kouchner and Sarkozy as "compatible" with 
respect to their "interventionist" approach to international 
humanitarian and human rights crises.  Attali and Heisbourg 
were skeptical that Sarkozy would change his hard-line views 
on Turkish EU membership, and they predicted that Sarkozy's 
vision of a Mediterranean Union would not progress given 
political realities on the other side of the Mediterranean, 
noting specifically Moroccan-Algerian relations, which would 
not improve until a solution was found on the Western Sahara. 
 Heisbourg recommended U.S. efforts with Algeria, given 
increasing American influence there.   Heisbourg also 
suggested that Sarkozy would be less afflicted by "Gallic 
embarrassment" than his predecessors in dealing with issues 
such as missile defense. 
 
¶11.  (U) This message was cleared by the Deputy Secretary's 
party. 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
 
STAPLETON