VZCZCXRO9772
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHFR #2004/01 1381345
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 181345Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7311
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1250

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 002004 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR MARCHESE/DORAN/ABRAMS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/14/2017 
TAGS: FR PGOV PREL LE SY MEPP
SUBJECT: ENGAGING SARKOZY'S GOVERNMENT ON THE MIDDLE EAST 
 
REF: PARIS 1844 
 
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Further to the recommendations made reftel on 
engaging President Sarkozy's government on a number of key 
foreign policy issues (including Iraq and Iran), this cable 
provides additional thoughts on how we might strengthen our 
partnership with France on the broad range of our mutual 
interests in the Middle East in the coming weeks. 
Specifically, we recommend: 
 
-- Agreeing on a common approach to Lebanon's presidential 
elections; 
-- Letting Sarkozy drive the anticipated change in France's 
approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
 
In pursuing these objectives, we would also advise engaging 
with Sarkozy on his idea of a Mediterranean Union.  While 
this is not an urgent priority in and of itself, it might 
provide useful cover as we begin a dialogue on more sensitive 
issues.  End summary. 
 
Lebanon 
------- 
 
¶2. (C) Sarkozy's meeting last week with Lebanese majority 
leader Saad Hariri helped solidify expectations that Sarkozy 
will provide continuity on France's Lebanon policy in the 
short term, including by supporting the creation of the 
Special Tribunal through a Chapter VII UNSCR.  According to 
Basile Yared, Hariri's representative in Paris, Chirac 
extracted a personal promise from Sarkozy on this point even 
before the meeting with Hariri. 
 
¶3. (C) Looking beyond Chapter VII, the future of French 
policy in Lebanon becomes somewhat cloudier.  Sarkozy has no 
love for Hizballah, and has been blunt about the need for 
Hizballah to disarm.  However, this is not to say that 
Sarkozy is prepared to rush in where Chirac feared to tread. 
Sarkozy has been cagey on whether he'll push for an EU 
designation of Hizballah as a terrorist entity, indicating 
that such a decision would be based on the totality of French 
interests (including, undoubtedly, the potential 
repercussions on French peacekeepers in Lebanon).  By the 
same token, we expect that Sarkozy would cock a skeptical 
eyebrow at any suggestion that UNIFIL increase the tempo and 
intensity of its operations: he will not want to jeopardize 
his political capital -- which he needs to get his domestic 
reform package enacted -- by getting UNIFIL involved in 
kinetic operations. 
 
¶4. (C) In addition, in their internal discussions during the 
opening weeks of the Sarkozy administration, France's foreign 
policy elite (including some career diplomats at the Quai 
d'Orsay) will be pushing the following arguments, with 
varying degrees of intensity: 
 
-- The intimate alliance between Chirac and the Hariris was 
an embarrassment; France needs to take a less personalized 
approach to Lebanon; 
-- There is no security-driven solution (e.g., tighter 
enforcement of the arms embargo) to Lebanon's political 
crisis -- a political solution is needed; 
-- France needs to take a more neutral approach to Lebanon's 
internal politics (i.e., less overt support for March 14); 
-- France should reaffirm its support for Lebanon's Maronite 
community (its traditional Lebanese client), which will 
inevitably entail reaching an accommodation with Michel Aoun; 
-- France should explore a high-level dialogue with Syria; 
-- France needs to keep a door open to improved relations 
with Iran/Hizballah. 
 
¶5. (C) Our goal should be to prevent such arguments from 
taking root with Sarkozy's team.  The changing of the guard 
at the Quai may help. In any event, as we begin interacting 
with the Sarkozy government at all levels and through all of 
our traditional channels (as well as any new ones which may 
present themselves), we suggest sequencing a series of 
messages to provide the structure for a fruitful dialogue on 
Lebanon.  Our first message could simply underscore our deep 
appreciation for our excellent cooperation with France on 
Chapter VII and express our desire to continue working 
together closely.  Once we have Chapter VII in our pocket, we 
could initiate a conversation on the way forward, beginning 
with an agreed approach to Lebanon's presidential election. 
Given the sensitive optics (the French would likely be 
 
PARIS 00002004  002 OF 003 
 
 
horrified by any proposal that might give the appearance of 
the U.S. and France backing a particular candidate), 
discretion will be essential.  Once we have an agreed 
approach to the presidential elections, we should revisit 
enforcement of the arms embargo/disarmament of Hizballah. 
 
 
Israeli-Palestinian Relations 
----------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Sarkozy's Jewish heritage and affinity for the State 
of Israel are well-known, and became campaign issues for 
Jewish as well as Arab and Muslim voters (although not for 
the broader electorate).  As anticipated, his victory was 
greeted enthusiastically by Israel, rather tepidly by the 
Arab states, and venomously by Islamic extremists.  It will 
not be lost on these quarters that Bernard Kouchner is the 
first Jewish foreign minister in the history of the Fifth 
Republic, and moreover, one who at the outset supported U.S. 
intervention in Iraq.  Yet the conventional wisdom at the MFA 
is that so far as French policy in the Middle East is 
concerned, the impact of Sarkozy's election has been 
overrated by most observers.  According to this narrative, 
which we've heard from several well-placed interlocutors, 
Sarkozy will likely make a symbolic gesture to ostentatiously 
signal his break with France's unabashedly pro-Arab policy. 
He may also argue that this will increase France's and the 
EU's leverage in the Middle East peace process.  However, as 
the narrative also goes, in the aftermath of this gesture he 
will be at pains to reassure the Arab states of France's 
goodwill, and the resultant combination of diplomatic 
necessity, bureaucratic inertia (one veteran Arabist at the 
Quai told us that "France has a certain Arab policy that is 
much more important than Mr. Sarkozy and his government"), 
French commercial interests, and the weight of French elite 
and public opinion (which remains overwhelmingly sympathetic 
to the Palestinians) will prevent his new approach from 
achieving critical velocity.  Together, they will slowly but 
ineluctably pull French policy back to its traditional, 
pro-Arab center of gravity. 
 
¶7. (C) While this is certainly possible, our own view is that 
it is not inevitable.  We neither assume that Sarkozy will be 
content with superficial policy changes, nor doubt his 
ability to impose his will upon the MFA.  To the contrary, we 
believe there is a real possibility that Sarkozy will try to 
lead public opinion toward a more fair-minded approach to the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  This will not happen overnight 
(we're talking about the French foreign policy equivalent of 
plate tectonics), but even a small shift in the intellectual 
bedrock will have seismic consequences. 
 
Approaching the French 
---------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) If Sarkozy is to succeed, he must be seen as the 
driving force behind the new policy approach; he cannot 
appear to be acting under U.S. pressure.  We can make his job 
easier by demonstrating that France's input is valued, and 
that Sarkozy's views are met with respect in Washington.  One 
option would be to invite the French to brief us, at an early 
date, on Sarkozy's vision for a Mediterranean Union, a 
proposal aimed at addressing the inadequacies of the Euro-Med 
dialogue and the Barcelona process.  While we see the 
Mediterranean Union proposal largely as a dodge for avoiding 
Turkey's inclusion in the EU, it clearly goes beyond that: 
Sarkozy envisions a vehicle for regulating migration, 
protecting the environment, and driving economic development. 
 He apparently sees it as an alternative forum for 
approaching problems such as Israel's relations with its 
neighbors and the lack of integration in North Africa 
(although some have suggested that his proposal has no chance 
of success until Moroccan-Algerian relations improve through 
a resolution of the Western Sahara conflict).  Inviting the 
French to explain the proposal in greater depth would provide 
clarity on Sarkozy's thinking, while providing the new 
government with some political cover as it engages with us on 
a range of sensitive issues including Lebanon and 
Israeli-Palestinian relations. 
 
¶9. (C) Alternatively, we could consider engaging Sarkozy's 
government in a strategic (but not necessarily formal) 
dialogue on the Middle East.  The prospects for such a 
dialogue should become clearer as Sarkozy's foreign policy 
team takes shape over the next few weeks. 
 
 
 
 
PARIS 00002004  003 OF 003 
 
 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
 
WHITE