Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 251287 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AEMR ASEC AMGT AE AS AMED AVIAN AU AF AORC AGENDA AO AR AM APER AFIN ATRN AJ ABUD ARABL AL AG AODE ALOW ADANA AADP AND APECO ACABQ ASEAN AA AFFAIRS AID AGR AY AGS AFSI AGOA AMB ARF ANET ASCH ACOA AFLU AFSN AMEX AFDB ABLD AESC AFGHANISTAN AINF AVIATION ARR ARSO ANDREW ASSEMBLY AIDS APRC ASSK ADCO ASIG AC AZ APEC AFINM ADB AP ACOTA ASEX ACKM ASUP ANTITERRORISM ADPM AINR ARABLEAGUE AGAO AORG AMTC AIN ACCOUNT ASECAFINGMGRIZOREPTU AIDAC AINT ARCH AMGTKSUP ALAMI AMCHAMS ALJAZEERA AVIANFLU AORD AOREC ALIREZA AOMS AMGMT ABDALLAH AORCAE AHMED ACCELERATED AUC ALZUGUREN ANGEL AORL ASECIR AMG AMBASSADOR AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL ADM ASES ABMC AER AMER ASE AMGTHA ARNOLDFREDERICK AOPC ACS AFL AEGR ASED AFPREL AGRI AMCHAM ARNOLD AN ANATO AME APERTH ASECSI AT ACDA ASEDC AIT AMERICA AMLB AMGE ACTION AGMT AFINIZ ASECVE ADRC ABER AGIT APCS AEMED ARABBL ARC ASO AIAG ACEC ASR ASECM ARG AEC ABT ADIP ADCP ANARCHISTS AORCUN AOWC ASJA AALC AX AROC ARM AGENCIES ALBE AK AZE AOPR AREP AMIA ASCE ALANAZI ABDULRAHMEN ABDULHADI AINFCY ARMS ASECEFINKCRMKPAOPTERKHLSAEMRNS AGRICULTURE AFPK AOCR ALEXANDER ATRD ATFN ABLG AORCD AFGHAN ARAS AORCYM AVERY ALVAREZ ACBAQ ALOWAR ANTOINE ABLDG ALAB AMERICAS AFAF ASECAFIN ASEK ASCC AMCT AMGTATK AMT APDC AEMRS ASECE AFSA ATRA ARTICLE ARENA AISG AEMRBC AFR AEIR ASECAF AFARI AMPR ASPA ASOC ANTONIO AORCL ASECARP APRM AUSTRALIAGROUP ASEG AFOR AEAID AMEDI ASECTH ASIC AFDIN AGUIRRE AUNR ASFC AOIC ANTXON ASA ASECCASC ALI AORCEUNPREFPRELSMIGBN ASECKHLS ASSSEMBLY ASECVZ AI ASECPGOV ASIR ASCEC ASAC ARAB AIEA ADMIRAL AUSGR AQ AMTG ARRMZY ANC APR AMAT AIHRC AFU ADEL AECL ACAO AMEMR ADEP AV AW AOR ALL ALOUNI AORCUNGA ALNEA ASC AORCO ARMITAGE AGENGA AGRIC AEM ACOAAMGT AGUILAR AFPHUM AMEDCASCKFLO AFZAL AAA ATPDEA ASECPHUM ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ETRD ETTC EU ECON EFIN EAGR EAID ELAB EINV ENIV ENRG EPET EZ ELTN ELECTIONS ECPS ET ER EG EUN EIND ECONOMICS EMIN ECIN EINT EWWT EAIR EN ENGR ES EI ETMIN EL EPA EARG EFIS ECONOMY EC EK ELAM ECONOMIC EAR ESDP ECCP ELN EUM EUMEM ECA EAP ELEC ECOWAS EFTA EXIM ETTD EDRC ECOSOC ECPSN ENVIRONMENT ECO EMAIL ECTRD EREL EDU ENERG ENERGY ENVR ETRAD EAC EXTERNAL EFIC ECIP ERTD EUC ENRGMO EINZ ESTH ECCT EAGER ECPN ELNT ERD EGEN ETRN EIVN ETDR EXEC EIAD EIAR EVN EPRT ETTF ENGY EAIDCIN EXPORT ETRC ESA EIB EAPC EPIT ESOCI ETRB EINDQTRD ENRC EGOV ECLAC EUR ELF ETEL ENRGUA EVIN EARI ESCAP EID ERIN ELAN ENVT EDEV EWWY EXBS ECOM EV ELNTECON ECE ETRDGK EPETEIND ESCI ETRDAORC EAIDETRD ETTR EMS EAGRECONEINVPGOVBN EBRD EUREM ERGR EAGRBN EAUD EFI ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ETRO ENRGY EGAR ESSO EGAD ENV ENER EAIDXMXAXBXFFR ELA EET EINVETRD EETC EIDN ERGY ETRDPGOV EING EMINCG EINVECON EURM EEC EICN EINO EPSC ELAP ELABPGOVBN EE ESPS ETRA ECONETRDBESPAR ERICKSON EEOC EVENTS EPIN EB ECUN EPWR ENG EX EH EAIDAR EAIS ELBA EPETUN ETRDEIQ EENV ECPC ETRP ECONENRG EUEAID EWT EEB EAIDNI ESENV EADM ECN ENRGKNNP ETAD ETR ECONETRDEAGRJA ETRG ETER EDUC EITC EBUD EAIF EBEXP EAIDS EITI EGOVSY EFQ ECOQKPKO ETRGY ESF EUE EAIC EPGOV ENFR EAGRE ENRD EINTECPS EAVI ETC ETCC EIAID EAIDAF EAGREAIDPGOVPRELBN EAOD ETRDA EURN EASS EINVA EAIDRW EON ECOR EPREL EGPHUM ELTM ECOS EINN ENNP EUPGOV EAGRTR ECONCS ETIO ETRDGR EAIDB EISNAR EIFN ESPINOSA EAIDASEC ELIN EWTR EMED ETFN ETT EADI EPTER ELDIN EINVEFIN ESS ENRGIZ EQRD ESOC ETRDECD ECINECONCS EAIT ECONEAIR ECONEFIN EUNJ ENRGKNNPMNUCPARMPRELNPTIAEAJMXL ELAD EFIM ETIC EFND EFN ETLN ENGRD EWRG ETA EIN EAIRECONRP EXIMOPIC ERA ENRGJM ECONEGE ENVI ECHEVARRIA EMINETRD EAD ECONIZ EENG ELBR EWWC ELTD EAIDMG ETRK EIPR EISNLN ETEX EPTED EFINECONCS EPCS EAG ETRDKIPR ED EAIO ETRDEC ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ERNG EFINU EURFOR EWWI ELTNSNAR ETD EAIRASECCASCID EOXC ESTN EAIDAORC EAGRRP ETRDEMIN ELABPHUMSMIGKCRMBN ETRDEINVTINTCS EGHG EAIDPHUMPRELUG EAGRBTIOBEXPETRDBN EDA EPETPGOV ELAINE EUCOM EMW EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM ELB EINDETRD EMI ETRDECONWTOCS EINR ESTRADA EHUM EFNI ELABV ENR EMN EXO EWWTPRELPGOVMASSMARRBN EATO END EP EINVETC ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID ELTRN EIQ ETTW EAI ENGRG ETRED ENDURING ETTRD EAIDEGZ EOCN EINF EUPREL ENRL ECPO ENLT EEFIN EPPD ECOIN EUEAGR EISL EIDE ENRGSD EINVECONSENVCSJA EAIG ENTG EEPET EUNCH EPECO ETZ EPAT EPTE EAIRGM ETRDPREL EUNGRSISAFPKSYLESO ETTN EINVKSCA ESLCO EBMGT ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EFLU ELND EFINOECD EAIDHO EDUARDO ENEG ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EFINTS ECONQH ENRGPREL EUNPHUM EINDIR EPE EMINECINECONSENVTBIONS EFINM ECRM EQ EWWTSP ECONPGOVBN
KFLO KPKO KDEM KFLU KTEX KMDR KPAO KCRM KIDE KN KNNP KG KMCA KZ KJUS KWBG KU KDMR KAWC KCOR KPAL KOMC KTDB KTIA KISL KHIV KHUM KTER KCFE KTFN KS KIRF KTIP KIRC KSCA KICA KIPR KPWR KWMN KE KGIC KGIT KSTC KACT KSEP KFRD KUNR KHLS KCRS KRVC KUWAIT KVPR KSRE KMPI KMRS KNRV KNEI KCIP KSEO KITA KDRG KV KSUM KCUL KPET KBCT KO KSEC KOLY KNAR KGHG KSAF KWNM KNUC KMNP KVIR KPOL KOCI KPIR KLIG KSAC KSTH KNPT KINL KPRP KRIM KICC KIFR KPRV KAWK KFIN KT KVRC KR KHDP KGOV KPOW KTBT KPMI KPOA KRIF KEDEM KFSC KY KGCC KATRINA KWAC KSPR KTBD KBIO KSCI KRCM KNNB KBNC KIMT KCSY KINR KRAD KMFO KCORR KW KDEMSOCI KNEP KFPC KEMPI KBTR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNPP KTTB KTFIN KBTS KCOM KFTN KMOC KOR KDP KPOP KGHA KSLG KMCR KJUST KUM KMSG KHPD KREC KIPRTRD KPREL KEN KCSA KCRIM KGLB KAKA KWWT KUNP KCRN KISLPINR KLFU KUNC KEDU KCMA KREF KPAS KRKO KNNC KLHS KWAK KOC KAPO KTDD KOGL KLAP KECF KCRCM KNDP KSEAO KCIS KISM KREL KISR KISC KKPO KWCR KPFO KUS KX KWCI KRFD KWPG KTRD KH KLSO KEVIN KEANE KACW KWRF KNAO KETTC KTAO KWIR KVCORR KDEMGT KPLS KICT KWGB KIDS KSCS KIRP KSTCPL KDEN KLAB KFLOA KIND KMIG KPPAO KPRO KLEG KGKG KCUM KTTP KWPA KIIP KPEO KICR KNNA KMGT KCROM KMCC KLPM KNNPGM KSIA KSI KWWW KOMS KESS KMCAJO KWN KTDM KDCM KCM KVPRKHLS KENV KCCP KGCN KCEM KEMR KWMNKDEM KNNPPARM KDRM KWIM KJRE KAID KWMM KPAONZ KUAE KTFR KIF KNAP KPSC KSOCI KCWI KAUST KPIN KCHG KLBO KIRCOEXC KI KIRCHOFF KSTT KNPR KDRL KCFC KLTN KPAOKMDRKE KPALAOIS KESO KKOR KSMT KFTFN KTFM KDEMK KPKP KOCM KNN KISLSCUL KFRDSOCIRO KINT KRG KWMNSMIG KSTCC KPAOY KFOR KWPR KSEPCVIS KGIV KSEI KIL KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KQ KEMS KHSL KTNF KPDD KANSOU KKIV KFCE KTTC KGH KNNNP KK KSCT KWNN KAWX KOMCSG KEIM KTSD KFIU KDTB KFGM KACP KWWMN KWAWC KSPA KGICKS KNUP KNNO KISLAO KTPN KSTS KPRM KPALPREL KPO KTLA KCRP KNMP KAWCK KCERS KDUM KEDM KTIALG KWUN KPTS KPEM KMEPI KAWL KHMN KCRO KCMR KPTD KCROR KMPT KTRF KSKN KMAC KUK KIRL KEM KSOC KBTC KOM KINP KDEMAF KTNBT KISK KRM KWBW KBWG KNNPMNUC KNOP KSUP KCOG KNET KWBC KESP KMRD KEBG KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KPWG KOMCCO KRGY KNNF KPROG KJAN KFRED KPOKO KM KWMNCS KMPF KJWC KJU KSMIG KALR KRAL KDGOV KPA KCRMJA KCRI KAYLA KPGOV KRD KNNPCH KFEM KPRD KFAM KALM KIPRETRDKCRM KMPP KADM KRFR KMWN KWRG KTIAPARM KTIAEUN KRDP KLIP KDDEM KTIAIC KWKN KPAD KDM KRCS KWBGSY KEAI KIVP KPAOPREL KUNH KTSC KIPT KNP KJUSTH KGOR KEPREL KHSA KGHGHIV KNNR KOMH KRCIM KWPB KWIC KINF KPER KILS KA KNRG KCSI KFRP KLFLO KFE KNPPIS KQM KQRDQ KERG KPAOPHUM KSUMPHUM KVBL KARIM KOSOVO KNSD KUIR KWHG KWBGXF KWMNU KPBT KKNP KERF KCRT KVIS KWRC KVIP KTFS KMARR KDGR KPAI KDE KTCRE KMPIO KUNRAORC KHOURY KAWS KPAK KOEM KCGC KID KVRP KCPS KIVR KBDS KWOMN KIIC KTFNJA KARZAI KMVP KHJUS KPKOUNSC KMAR KIBL KUNA KSA KIS KJUSAF KDEV KPMO KHIB KIRD KOUYATE KIPRZ KBEM KPAM KDET KPPD KOSCE KJUSKUNR KICCPUR KRMS KWMNPREL KWMJN KREISLER KWM KDHS KRV KPOV KWMNCI KMPL KFLD KWWN KCVM KIMMITT KCASC KOMO KNATO KDDG KHGH KRF KSCAECON KWMEN KRIC
PREL PINR PGOV PHUM PTER PE PREF PARM PBTS PINS PHSA PK PL PM PNAT PHAS PO PROP PGOVE PA PU POLITICAL PPTER POL PALESTINIAN PHUN PIN PAMQ PPA PSEC POLM PBIO PSOE PDEM PAK PF PKAO PGOVPRELMARRMOPS PMIL PV POLITICS PRELS POLICY PRELHA PIRN PINT PGOG PERSONS PRC PEACE PROCESS PRELPGOV PROV PFOV PKK PRE PT PIRF PSI PRL PRELAF PROG PARMP PERL PUNE PREFA PP PGOB PUM PROTECTION PARTIES PRIL PEL PAGE PS PGO PCUL PLUM PIF PGOVENRGCVISMASSEAIDOPRCEWWTBN PMUC PCOR PAS PB PKO PY PKST PTR PRM POUS PRELIZ PGIC PHUMS PAL PNUC PLO PMOPS PHM PGOVBL PBK PELOSI PTE PGOVAU PNR PINSO PRO PLAB PREM PNIR PSOCI PBS PD PHUML PERURENA PKPA PVOV PMAR PHUMCF PUHM PHUH PRELPGOVETTCIRAE PRT PROPERTY PEPFAR PREI POLUN PAR PINSF PREFL PH PREC PPD PING PQL PINSCE PGV PREO PRELUN POV PGOVPHUM PINRES PRES PGOC PINO POTUS PTERE PRELKPAO PRGOV PETR PGOVEAGRKMCAKNARBN PPKO PARLIAMENT PEPR PMIG PTBS PACE PETER PMDL PVIP PKPO POLMIL PTEL PJUS PHUMNI PRELKPAOIZ PGOVPREL POGV PEREZ POWELL PMASS PDOV PARN PG PPOL PGIV PAIGH PBOV PETROL PGPV PGOVL POSTS PSO PRELEU PRELECON PHUMPINS PGOVKCMABN PQM PRELSP PRGO PATTY PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PGVO PROTESTS PRELPLS PKFK PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PARAGRAPH PRELGOV POG PTRD PTERM PBTSAG PHUMKPAL PRELPK PTERPGOV PAO PRIVATIZATION PSCE PPAO PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PARALYMPIC PRUM PKPRP PETERS PAHO PARMS PGREL PINV POINS PHUMPREL POREL PRELNL PHUMPGOV PGOVQL PLAN PRELL PARP PROVE PSOC PDD PRELNP PRELBR PKMN PGKV PUAS PRELTBIOBA PBTSEWWT PTERIS PGOVU PRELGG PHUMPRELPGOV PFOR PEPGOV PRELUNSC PRAM PICES PTERIZ PREK PRELEAGR PRELEUN PHUME PHU PHUMKCRS PRESL PRTER PGOF PARK PGOVSOCI PTERPREL PGOVEAID PGOVPHUMKPAO PINSKISL PREZ PGOVAF PARMEUN PECON PINL POGOV PGOVLO PIERRE PRELPHUM PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PBST PKPAO PHUMHUPPS PGOVPOL PASS PPGOV PROGV PAGR PHALANAGE PARTY PRELID PGOVID PHUMR PHSAQ PINRAMGT PSA PRELM PRELMU PIA PINRPE PBTSRU PARMIR PEDRO PNUK PVPR PINOCHET PAARM PRFE PRELEIN PINF PCI PSEPC PGOVSU PRLE PDIP PHEM PRELB PORG PGGOC POLG POPDC PGOVPM PWMN PDRG PHUMK PINB PRELAL PRER PFIN PNRG PRED POLI PHUMBO PHYTRP PROLIFERATION PHARM PUOS PRHUM PUNR PENA PGOVREL PETRAEUS PGOVKDEM PGOVENRG PHUS PRESIDENT PTERKU PRELKSUMXABN PGOVSI PHUMQHA PKISL PIR PGOVZI PHUMIZNL PKNP PRELEVU PMIN PHIM PHUMBA PUBLIC PHAM PRELKPKO PMR PARTM PPREL PN PROL PDA PGOVECON PKBL PKEAID PERM PRELEZ PRELC PER PHJM PGOVPRELPINRBN PRFL PLN PWBG PNG PHUMA PGOR PHUMPTER POLINT PPEF PKPAL PNNL PMARR PAC PTIA PKDEM PAUL PREG PTERR PTERPRELPARMPGOVPBTSETTCEAIRELTNTC PRELJA POLS PI PNS PAREL PENV PTEROREP PGOVM PINER PBGT PHSAUNSC PTERDJ PRELEAID PARMIN PKIR PLEC PCRM PNET PARR PRELETRD PRELBN PINRTH PREJ PEACEKEEPINGFORCES PEMEX PRELZ PFLP PBPTS PTGOV PREVAL PRELSW PAUM PRF PHUMKDEM PATRICK PGOVKMCAPHUMBN PRELA PNUM PGGV PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PBT PIND PTEP PTERKS PGOVJM PGOT PRELMARR PGOVCU PREV PREFF PRWL PET PROB PRELPHUMP PHUMAF PVTS PRELAFDB PSNR PGOVECONPRELBU PGOVZL PREP PHUMPRELBN PHSAPREL PARCA PGREV PGOVDO PGON PCON PODC PRELOV PHSAK PSHA PGOVGM PRELP POSCE PGOVPTER PHUMRU PINRHU PARMR PGOVTI PPEL PMAT PAN PANAM PGOVBO PRELHRC

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 07PARIS1938, UK READOUT OF BLAIR-SARKOZY MEETING

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07PARIS1938.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07PARIS1938 2007-05-15 09:13 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Paris
VZCZCXRO5285
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHFR #1938/01 1350913
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 150913Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7188
INFO RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN IMMEDIATE 6574
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 001938 
SIPDIS 
SIPDIS 
EO 12958 DECL: 01/01/2017 
TAGS PREL, FR, EUN, PGOV, ETRD, UK, GM, TU, PINR 
SUBJECT: UK READOUT OF BLAIR-SARKOZY MEETING 
Classified By: PolMC Josiah Rosenblatt for reasons 1.4 (B & D).
1. (C) SUMMARY: UK PM Blair’s May 11 meeting with French President-elect Sarkozy focused primarily on next steps on the EU constitutional treaty in advance of Sarkozy’s May 16 meeting with German Chancellor Merkel, according to UK DCM Hitchens; the UK hope is that the Blair, Sarkozy and Merkel will reach a quiet agreement on the way forward. He said French and UK positions were close on avoiding new referenda, qualified majority voting, and no social charter, but they differed on establishing an EU “President.” On Turkey, Blair had stressed the importance of not interrupting Turkey’s accession negotiations, with Sarkozy not clear on his intentions. There was little discussion of trade issues and none of European defense. Hitchens surmised that Sarkozy’s operating style within the EU would seek to make deals with major capitals above the heads of the smaller states, and saw Sarkozy’s Mediterranean Union as a way for France to deal with the Turkish question. He said it remained to be seen whether Sarkozy intended to act on his campaign rhetoric criticizing the European Central Bank. Personal chemistry between Blair and Sarkozy was excellent; the relationship with Brown will take time to build, not least because he speaks no French. Blair also had a short and unremarkable meeting with Chirac. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) POL M/C and Deputy met May 14 with UK Embassy DCM Tim Hitchens for a readout of UK PM Tony Blair’s May 11, late-afternoon meeting with French President-elect Nicolas Sarkozy. This was President-elect Sarkozy’s first meeting with a foreign visitor following his May 6 election; he had met with Saad Hariri the previous day. His first official meeting as President will occur May 16 in Berlin with German Chancellor Angela Merkel, following the transfer of power ceremony earlier that same day in Paris with outgoing President Jacques Chirac. The press has speculated that the focus of both meetings is on overcoming the EU’s current loss of momentum following the French rejection in 2005 of the EU constitutional treaty. (Incoming Presidential Diplomatic Advisor and National Security Advisor-equivalent Jean-David Levitte confirmed this in a conversation with POL M/C re scheduling for the Deputy Secretary.)
MOVING THE EU FORWARD
--------------------- 
3. (C) Hitchens confirmed press reports that the discussions focused primarily on how to overcome the EU’s current blockage on institutional reform. Blair’s main objective, he said, was to ensure that the way forward toward a new constitutional treaty would not require a referendum in the UK. The mood of the discussions was positive, and UK experts would be meeting with their French counterparts in the next day or so to try to close the distance between French and UK positions to the greatest extent possible in advance of Sarkozy’s May 16 meeting with Merkel. While Sarkozy would not arrive in Berlin with a French-UK “common position,” the idea was that Sarkozy would have an understanding of UK red lines. The hope was that, by the end of the week there would be a clear sense in London, Paris, and Berlin about what might be possible.
4. (C) POL M/C asked if Merkel would be speaking for the 18 countries that have ratified the current draft constitutional treaty. Hitchens responded that Merkel would want a deal by the end of her presidency, and the tradition was that the Presidency was forced to settle for less than it ideally wanted. (Comment: Hitchens demurred when asked whether the Germans were running a less “neutral” Presidency than had the British. End comment.) If all went well, the German presidency would end with a mandate for intensive negotiations on a document to be approved by the end of the Portuguese presidency, leaving ratification for 2008. He thought it would be difficult for Portugal and Slovenia, as small countries, and France, as the country that had rejected the EU constitutional treaty, otherwise to reach a deal.
FOUR UK CONCERNS; SARKOZY CLOSE ON THREE
---------------------------------------- 
5. (C) On substance, Hitchens described four UK “conditions” for reaching an agreement, on three of which he believed that the UK and France could succeed in narrowing their differences. First, the UK would insist on an amending treaty rather than a new constitutional treaty, in order to avoid a referendum; Sarkozy appeared to agree. Second, the UK wanted less qualified majority voting than did France, but Hitchens judged the differences as bridgeable. Third, the UK said the UK did not favor symbols which gave the impression that the EU was a state, and therefore does not support an EU “foreign minister.” Similarly, the UK was concerned by a new Sarkozy proposal for an “EU President” that would go beyond the rejected draft constitutional treaty. (Comment: This is the first we have heard of this idea. End comment.) On
PARIS 00001938 002 OF 003
reflection, Hitchens speculated that Sarkozy was using the idea as a negotiating ploy that would please his French domestic audience. Finally, the UK was not in favor of a social charter. Hitchens said they believed that Sarkozy also was not keen on the idea, but that this was a high priority for Merkel.
TURKEY THE TOUGHEST NUT
----------------------- 
6. (C) On Turkey, Hitchens described Blair’s position as wanting to ensure that Turkey’s accession negotiations would continue uninterrupted, as the UK viewed the negotiations as virtuous in themselves. Hitchens acknowledged that Sarkozy was a fierce opponent of Turkish membership, which he had made clear right away. Hitchens said the UK hoped that Sarkozy did not perceive a political reason to cause trouble in advance of the June 26 EU decision whether to open new chapters for negotiation, or that, if he chose to do so, he would make waves only in Paris and not Brussels. POL M/C asked whether Sarkozy’s idea of a Mediterranean Union was intended as a face-saving way out. Hitchens affirmed that the initiative was primarily aimed at Turkey, notwithstanding claims to the contrary. He added it was typical of Sarkozy to take a strong position on a subject, and simultaneously offer an escape route. Hitchens agreed that France also saw a benefit in a Mediterranean vocation as a way to balance Germany’s ties in Eastern Europe.
LITTLE ON TRADE
--------------- 
7. (C) Hitchens said there was no in-depth discussion of trade. He said the UK supported the role of EC Commissioner Mandelson, whereas Sarkozy had argued that it was illegitimate for an unelected Commissioner to negotiate on behalf of Europe. Otherwise the discussion was unsurprising; or it was surprising only in the sense that Sarkozy presented a “normal” French position, i.e., consistent with what Chirac would have said. He allowed that the UK had been hoping for signs of more flexibility, and suggested that the UK would want to revisit this topic once a new government was formed.
NO ESDP
------- 
8. (C) On European defense, Hitchens noted that, surprisingly, there had been no discussion.
SARKOZY AND EUROPE
------------------ 
9. (C) Asked about the impact of Sarkozy on Europe more generally, Hitchens expressed hope for a better UK-French working relationship, although he hastened to add that UK-French relations would never threaten to overtake the Franco-German tandem. Indeed, the UK hoped for good trilateral cooperation between Europe’s main powerhouses. Hitchens thought there was a risk that Sarkozy would make deals with “other major” interlocutors such as the UK or Germany, without taking adequate account of the views of the smaller states; he described Sarkozy as “not good at dealing with unimportant people.” Hitchens said Sarkozy would discover that he did not like European diplomacy with its emphasis on process and consensus. The UK was waiting with bated breath to see what kind of attitude Sarkozy would take toward the European Central Bank now that the election campaign was over. On a more “political” Europe, Hitchens predicted that Sarkozy would want above all to put France back at the heart of European decision-making, although the UK’s main priority was that the French economy do better. While a more successful France might mean a more difficult France, this was still unquestionably preferable to an unsuccessful France.
ORIGINS OF MEETING
------------------ 
10. (C) Hitchens said the idea of a meeting came up during one of Blair’s and Sarkozy’s phone conversations, with Blair offering to meet Sarkozy at a venue to be determined. Once it became clear that it would be Paris, Blair also arranged a meeting with President Chirac. The British were frankly surprised that Sarkozy agreed to see Blair before Merkel, although Sarkozy’s trip to Berlin would be his first official visit. Noting that it was a pity that French and British timing were not in synch -- Blair would be leaving as Sarkozy arrived -- the meeting also made sense as a way for the British to make up for the fact that their government would change in a few weeks, and thus would “fall behind” other European countries in engaging with the new French government. Sarkozy was accompanied at the meeting by likely PM Francois Fillon and Sarkozy’s chief of staff, David Martinon (to be the Presidential spokesman). The interpreter who came was not needed: as is customary, theirmeeting was entirely in French.
PARIS 00001938 003 OF 003
SARKOZY-BLAIR, -MERKEL, -BROWN
------------------------------ 
11. (C) Hitchens said the chemistry between Blair and Sarkozy was good, much because they related to each other as politicos. Over the years, they have enjoyed comparing notes on party organization, how to work with labor and business, and how to appeal to the extremes. (Note: The suggestion was that Sarkozy may have learned quite a little from Blair on this score.) Hitchens noted that Sarkozy also traveled frequently to London with his wife for personal reasons. Hitchens suggested that, while Blair and Merkel talked frequently, their different personalities (she was far less outgoing) made for a more distant relationship. But Blair had great respect for her, based on the “brilliant hand” she had played during the EU’s budget discussions. Hitchens hinted that Sarkozy would not immediately get on as well with Brown as he had Blair, if only because Brown did not speak French.
MEETING WITH CHIRAC
------------------- 
12. (C) Hitchens described Blair’s meeting with Chirac as uneventful. Chirac spoke as an old friend, noting that the UK and France sometimes differed while praising their cooperation on climate change and Africa. Hitchens noted that Blair and Chirac would probably continue to cross each other’s paths in the future, as both of them were setting up foundations to deal with these same issues.
Please visit Paris’ Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
STAPLETON