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RR RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHGI RUEHJS RUEHKUK RUEHLH RUEHMA
RUEHPA RUEHPW RUEHROV
DE RUEHNM #0742/01 1501604
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 301604Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3537
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUCNISL/ISLAMIC COLLECTIVE
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0546

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 NIAMEY 000742 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT. FOR AF/W AND INR/AA; PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PHUM SOCI NG
SUBJECT: ALIVE AND WELL: PROFILES OF TRADITIONAL 
CHIEFTAINCY IN RURAL NIGER 
 
REF: A. NIAMEY 128 
     ¶B. 06 NIAMEY 1190 
     ¶C. NIAMEY 739 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1.  During recent travel Poloff examined the role of 
traditional chiefs in Niger. Characterized since colonialism 
by a highly-centralized state that often undercut traditional 
rulers, Niger has recently embraced a system of political 
decentralization based on democratically elected local 
governments. While on paper, these "commune" governments have 
taken over some of the functions of the chiefs and the 
central government administrators, the reality is more 
complex. While chiefs are agents of the state, government 
control over the chiefs varies in practice, as do chiefs' 
conceptions of their role. Chiefs often dominate the locally 
elected commune governments, and are in a position to dictate 
their success or failure. Chiefs usually enjoy more popular 
support than local or national politicians. Their presence 
can make local democracy awkward in practice. Their role 
vis-a-vis modern judicial and governmental institutions 
invites criticism from the secular civil society. Yet, in the 
world's least developed country, where better than eighty 
percent of the people live in rural areas, traditional chiefs 
remain a major source of authority for most Nigeriens. While 
some chiefs complicate efforts to promote democracy and the 
rule of law, the institution serves as a break on radical 
Islam, a viable mechanism for cross-border and local conflict 
resolution, and an essential -- if often un-tapped -- partner 
and guide for development interventions. END SUMMARY 
 
------------------------------------ 
"DIRECT RULE" AND CHIEFS' LEGITIMACY 
IN COLONIAL AND POST-COLONIAL NIGER 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶2. Colonial resistance to the French was organized by chiefs 
(like Amadou Kourandaga, Sultan of Damagaram) and noblemen 
(like Kaocin of Agadez), who are still heroes in contemporary 
Niger. Unlike the British in Nigeria, the French followed 
conquest with a system of direct rule that reduced 
traditional rulers to implementing agents of the state. The 
French also developed clear lines of authority (and physical 
borders) between chiefs via a cascading system of 
responsibility. At the summit of Nigerien chieftaincy are the 
Sultans of Damagaram (Zinder) and the Air (pronounced 
"aye-air"), or Agadez. In Maradi and Dosso Regions, the 
highest chiefs are the Provincial chiefs of Gobir and Katsina 
(Maradi), and Dosso. Below Sultans and Province Chiefs are 
Canton Chiefs. At the lowest level are village and urban 
"neighborhood" chiefs (reftel A). Under French rule, Nigerien 
chiefs collected taxes and meted out local justice, but at 
the behest of French Prefects and Governors. The French 
policy of subordinating chiefs to civil administrators, 
changing boundaries between traditional kingdoms and cantons, 
and deposing resistant chiefs in favor of docile or 
French-speaking candidates weakened chieftaincy as an 
institution and lessened popular reverence for it. 
 
¶3. In an important departure from colonial policy, 
independent Niger has largely allowed local communities and 
noblemen to select chiefs for themselves via a 
quasi-democratic mechanism described reftel (A). 
Consequently, the quality of individual chiefs is often high, 
and the institution's legitimacy has re-bounded since the 
colonial period. Otherwise, the Nigerien state has retained 
the centralized character of its colonial predecessor, and 
seems to allow traditional rulers less autonomy, on paper, 
than neighboring Nigeria does. Niger's chiefs answer to the 
Ministry of the Interior, which supervises their election and 
provides them with a modest subsidy. Their role in tax 
collection, dispute resolution, Islamic civil law disputes, 
and the local administration of justice is governed by the 
law and by the local Prefect. Since the election of new 
commune councils in 2004, many chiefs have surrendered their 
tax collection authority to municipal tax assessors and 
collectors know as receveurs, though in communities without 
receveurs, chiefs still perform this role. Represented on 
local councils by ex-officio members (usually close relatives 
or other members of the court) Niger's chiefs have a modest 
formal voice in local governance, tax policy, and development 
planning. While chiefs' formal authorities are circumscribed 
by law, their informal role is often much greater in 
practice, and gives them authority over many of the most 
important issues facing ordinary Nigeriens. 
 
NIAMEY 00000742  002 OF 005 
 
 
 
--------------------------------- 
THE SULTAN OF ZINDER AND CONFLICT 
RESOLUTION 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶4. In rural Niger, farmer / herder disputes are the principal 
source of deadly conflict. Since 2004, more than seventy 
Nigeriens have been killed in such conflicts, more than in 
any other type of civil disturbance. While these disputes 
often assume an ethnic dimension (Hausa or Djerma farmers vs. 
Fulani herders) they also divide farmers and pastoralists of 
the same community. Most Nigerien farmers live within 100 
miles of the Nigeria border, and these conflicts often pit 
nationals of one state against the other. Instances of farmer 
/ herder conflict are among the most important issues facing 
Niger's chiefs, and one which they are uniquely equipped to 
resolve. 
 
¶5. While traditional rulers may refer any case to civil 
courts, the courts' poor reputation among ordinary Nigeriens 
(who are also inhibited by a sense of shame from bringing a 
personal or village level dispute before a formal court) 
means that most seek the chief's intervention first. In 
Zinder Region judges have to travel widely in rural areas to 
resolve property and land conflicts but the GON does not 
provide them with gas money. Judges either seek gas money and 
other support from litigants or refrain from "riding circuit" 
at all. Aside from his legitimacy in the eyes of ordinary 
people, the chief offers expeditious, free justice based on a 
code derived from Islam and African tradition that most 
people can intuitively understand and accept. 
Misapprehensions about modern law and courts, the expense and 
difficulty of hiring a lawyer (none maintain a permanent 
presence outside of Niamey; notwithstanding the presence of a 
Court of Appeals in Zinder, the city has no lawyers), and 
habit all support the traditional system of chiefly justice. 
 
¶6. The Sultan of Zinder's docket is an especially prominent 
and busy venue for conflict resolution. On any given day the 
Sultan may hear five cases. Excluding farmer / herder 
conflicts, these include  land-tenure disputes (often the 
most difficult to untangle), inheritance, marriage and 
divorce issues, and disputes between neighbors. Such are the 
daily conflicts of most Nigeriens. Sultan Mahamadou Moustapha 
of Zinder, a former gendarme, has recently mediated some 
sensitive disputes. In a May 9 meeting with the Sultan's 
court, Emboffs heard details of a dispute between nomadic 
Arabs and Toubous. Both groups need to be handled with care. 
Nomadic Arabs faced expulsion from Niger in 2006, as the GON 
sought to respond to local aggravation over their assertion 
of grazing rights (reftel B). Toubous conducted a rebellion 
against the GON in the 1990s. Both groups have reason to be 
wary of Nigerien justice, but both were willing to accept 
mediation by the Sultan. 
 
¶7. The Sultan brought chiefs from the two communities 
together and negotiated a solution over time. All signed off 
with a Koranic oath, and conflict between the two groups has 
since been averted. The Sultan's court described his 
jurisprudence as a blend of Shari'a, Koranic insights, and 
common sense. While such an informal system may not yield 
consistent rulings, it has the advantage of flexibility and 
community acceptance. 
 
¶8. As part of his response to cross-border farmer / herder 
conflicts, the Sultan of Zinder has revived traditional 
relationships with royal neighbors to the south. The Sultan 
maintains "ambassadors" at the royal courts of Kano and 
Daura. These contacts enable traditional rulers to mediate 
cross-border disputes informally, without a time-consuming 
process of referral to their countries' respective capitals. 
Locals seek and accept this form of organic justice. The 
Nigerien state, which authorizes traditional rulers to 
maintain such "foreign relations" seems to agree. 
 
¶9. The Sultan of Zinder goes on the radio once a week with a 
broadcast that addresses conflict resolution and avoidance. 
Targeting the Hausas of southern Zinder region (the 
historical region of "Damagaram," where the Zinder Sultans 
ruled), the program is supported by the GON's rural radio 
network. It therefore takes its place alongside other content 
that the GON regards as essential for rural audiences: 
Koranic readings, proceedings of local commune councils, 
weather and crop information, and health messages. 
Recognizing the Sultan's hold on the popular imagination, the 
GON gives him the space to address community conflict issues 
as only he can. 
 
NIAMEY 00000742  003 OF 005 
 
 
 
-------------------------------- 
PARTY POLITICS AND THE CHIEF: 
CASE OF THE TOUNTOUMA OF KANTCHE 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶10. Chiefs' power to resolve conflicts and manage civil 
disputes derives from their legitimacy among ordinary 
Nigeriens, but there are factors that undercut that 
legitimacy. Aside from the institutional constraints imposed 
on chiefs by the GON, which have largely been assimilated and 
diffused over time, political discord over the manner of 
chiefs' selection and allegations of corruption taint some 
chiefs' rule. 
 
¶11. After the 2004 death of Amadaou Issaka, Canton Chief of 
Kantche since 1954, two of his sons were among the candidates 
to the throne. Abdoul Kadre, a twenty-something, and his 
older brother were both contenders, though the latter had 
overwhelming popular support and was seen as the prospective 
chief. Abdoul Kadre, however, was supported by his uncle Alma 
Oumarou, a rich businessman and ruling party heavyweight in 
Niamey. Alma allegedly used his political influence on behalf 
of Abdoul Kadre. He was said to have purchased the votes of 
most of the village chiefs that made up the electoral college 
to secure his nephew's victory. The "Kantche street" erupted 
after Abdoul Kadre was proclaimed chief. It took several 
weeks and intervention by GON security forces to restore 
order. Apparently, due to a lack of popular support, the 
chief has difficulties in asserting his authority over the 
collection of taxes and vis-a-vis the local council. During a 
May 12 meeting with Poloff, the young chief complained about 
the "politicization" of the local population, in an audience 
chamber strangely devoid of courtiers. The controversy in 
Kantche underscores the importance of the chieftaincy to both 
ordinary and elite Nigeriens, but also the ways in which this 
venerated institution can be corrupted. 
 
-------------------------- 
CIVIL SOCIETY CRITICISM OF 
CHIEFS 
-------------------------- 
 
¶12. Situations like the one in Kantche fuel a critique of 
chieftaincy by Niger's small but vocal secular civil society. 
In meetings with the Zinder and Maradi representatives of 
Nigerien human rights NGO ANDDH, Poloff heard some 
representative civil society critiques of traditional 
leadership. 
 
¶13. Citing a "culture of impunity" around traditional 
authorities, a Zinder ANDDH contact  stressed the potential 
for legal abuses by chiefs. Traditional chiefs, he alleged, 
do as they please and meet out traditional justice without 
any legal oversight, even going so far as to throw people in 
jail for sorcery in towns like Magaria and Goure. Chiefs, he 
alleged, will often respond to local farmers' demands by 
kicking nomads out of grazing areas. Some chiefs still act 
like independent rulers rather than agents of the state. They 
expropriate land and take a percentage of the tax revenues 
that they are charged with collecting. When chiefs make 
decisions at variance with the law, Prefects and the Ministry 
of the Interior often fail to correct them. 
 
¶14. In Magaria, a border town south of Zinder, Poloff met 
three rural commune mayors. They noted that early on in the 
process of decentralization the local chiefs had caused real 
problems for the newly elected council. Interpreting the 
process as an assault on their traditional prerogatives the 
chiefs withheld the revenue they collected (as is often the 
case for rural communes, these communities lacked receveurs) 
and mobilized popular resistance to the council. Once the 
Prefect of Magaria intervened, things changed. The Prefect 
helped the chiefs to understand the process, their new role 
in it, and the GON's commitment to it. All three mayors 
argued that this intervention had helped. The village chiefs 
have learned to cooperate with the councils and are 
surrendering the tax money. In some other cases, things have 
not worked out so well. In the city of Agadez, an elected 
mayor was removed from power by the council after he incurred 
the wrath of the Sultan. Significantly, that mayor had also 
lost the support of his regional Governor. 
 
¶15. In Maradi, an ANDDH contact spoke of chiefs' chauvinism 
and their tendency to ignore the GON's rural code in favor of 
traditional judgment. He claimed that even highly educated 
and modern "intellectual" among the chiefs routinely 
dispensed whatever justice they saw fit, using Islamic 
 
NIAMEY 00000742  004 OF 005 
 
 
jurisprudence and their own discretion. Their conciliation 
efforts, while successful, likewise ignored the stipulations 
of the rural code. In many cases, the ANDDH rep argued, 
chiefs were well aware of what the code said, but simply 
declined to implement it. He criticized a prominent local 
chief -- the Province Chief of Gobir -- for refusing to 
accept the extension of Maradi's public water system to his 
suburban seat. The chief's refusal was allegedly based on his 
"province's" historical rivalry with the traditional province 
from which the water would come. 
 
----------------------------- 
THE UN-RECONSTRUCTED CHIEF: 
HISTORY AND POLITICS WITH THE 
SERKIN GOBIR 
----------------------------- 
 
¶16. If there is one chief in Poloff's experience who ascribes 
to the traditionalist world-view that elicits the ire of 
civil society activists, it is the Serkin Gobir of Maradi 
region -- he of the municipal water rivalry. A well-educated 
Francophone and former sales manager for Niamey's Toyota 
dealership, the Honorable Abdou Bala Marafa appears a 
"modern" Nigerien. Yet, even though he has only been on the 
throne since 1998, he speaks with as much traditionalist 
conviction as someone who never left the sanctum of the 
chief's palace. The Serkin Gobir is one of Niger's three 
"Province" chiefs; the prominence of his house is suggested 
by the fact that its seat is a village known only as "Serkin 
Hausa," (Hausa king). His status affords him suzerainty over 
a number of subsidiary canton and village chiefs in Maradi 
and Tahoua regions. 
 
¶17. At the outset of his meeting with Poloff on May 13, the 
Serkin Gobir launched into a long recitation of the history 
of Ousmane Dan Fodio, the early 19th century Fulani cleric 
and "jihadist" who founded the Sokoto Caliphate. Two-hundred 
years on, this chief still expressed indignation that Dan 
Fodio, who had grown up in Gobir, had launched a crusade 
against its royal house and those of surrounding kingdoms. 
"He didn't have the right to call his political war a 
'jihad'," argued Marafa, "it was fraud, lies!" He criticized 
Dan Fodio's efforts to impose a strict, textualist version of 
the faith on Hausaland. The chief noted that Hausas had 
always favored moderate Islam, and that his province was 
still a bastion of tolerance. "We were pushed around by Dan 
Fodio and that is why we are secular today; secular and 
tolerant." The chief noted that different Islamic orders were 
competing for the right to place their Imam in a large new 
mosque near the chief's palace. Asserting that he alone had 
the right to choose who would preach there, the chief said 
that he would never consent to an Izala Imam (a 
fundamentalist sect common in Maradi and northern Nigeria). 
As both a temporal and spiritual leader, Marafa views his 
role as the preservation of Nigerien Islamic moderation in 
the face of Nigerian fundamentalism. 
 
¶18. Turning to farmer herder conflict, Marafa questioned the 
importance of ethnicity in such disputes. He noted that 
conflicts in Gobir were just as likely to be between Hausas, 
even Hausa farmers, than between nomadic Fulanis and 
sedentary Hausas. He has seen many cases where a farmer's 
livestock run across the field of another farmer. In an 
ironic contrast to his tirade against Ousmane Dan Fodio some 
minutes earlier, Marafa noted that "the Hausa / Fulani 
tensions of Dan Fodio's period are over now." NOTE: Gobir, in 
southern Maradi, is a comparatively rich and fertile region 
in which many Hausa farmers are also significant livestock 
owners -- minimizing the ethnic distinction that usually 
colors relations between the two groups in Niger. END NOTE. 
 
¶19. Marafa's views on political decentralization, democracy, 
and the importance of chieftaincy all suggested how deeply 
even a modern Nigerien could be invested in the concept of 
chieftaincy and its prerogatives. Noting at the outset of our 
meeting that he had not been informed of our coming by the 
local mayor, he claimed cuttingly that communications between 
his court and the commune government were "problematic." 
Later, when the elected commune mayor entered the chief's 
hall, he performed an elaborate sequence of  bows and 
honorifics before submitting to a dressing down by the chief 
over the protocol slip. "What is decentralization,' asked 
Marafa, 'since 1953 there has been a decentralized canton 
here." Referring to his election by "the nine of Gobir," (a 
hereditary group of elders believed to have magical powers of 
divination who serve as an electoral college for the Serkin 
Gobir), Marafa noted that "we have had democracy here for 
centuries. It is organic, it works, why change it now." He 
 
NIAMEY 00000742  005 OF 005 
 
 
noted that at his election in 1998 there were 28 other 
candidates, including some former GON ministers. He was 
chosen over older, richer, and more politically powerful 
candidates. Comparing the durability and desirability of 
modern and chiefly forms of government, Marafa claimed that 
even President Tandja would resign his office and move to 
Gobir to take up the chieftaincy, were he chosen for it. 
 
---------------------------- 
THE CHIEF AS CIVIL SERVANT: 
CASE OF THE SERKIN KATSINA 
---------------------------- 
 
¶20. Five miles away, at the palace of Marafa's traditional 
antagonist, the Serkin Katsina, former diplomat turned chief 
Ali Zaki presented a sharp contrast. He stressed his role as 
an agent of the state, to the extent of reciting GON talking 
points about the virtues of President Tandja's "special 
program," for rural development. Unlike Marafa, Zaki did not 
affirm a traditional right to regulate religion -- only that 
actually afforded him by modern laws (reftel C). Above all, 
he stressed the role that the GON, civil society, and 
traditional rulers all seem to agree is most essential to the 
chief -- that of a neutral conflict mediator for the 
community. To that end, Zaki maintains an "ambassador" at the 
court of Katsina, Nigeria (formerly part of his kingdom). 
 
¶21. A devoted Francophone (for many years assigned to the 
International Cultural and Technical Organization, and its 
successor, the Francophonie, Zaki lived for eight years in 
Paris) he attributed Niger's successes to the French colonial 
legacy and system of government. Far from considering himself 
the final arbiter in civil and religious affairs in his 
community, he stressed his partnership with local GON 
officials and support for religious freedom. Just as the 
Serkin Gobir seems to have over-assimilated his role as a 
traditional ruler, the Serkin Katsina still seems to relish 
the role of civil-servant more than the turban and throne. 
 
------------------------------------- 
COMMENT: RECONCILING TRADITIONAL RULE 
AND MODERN TIMES; GETING CHIEFTAINCY 
RIGHT IN 21st CENTURY NIGER 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶22. With such divergent approaches to the role of chief, it 
is difficult to generalize about the strengths or weaknesses 
of traditional leadership in Niger. What is evident, however, 
is the chiefs' importance in mitigating conflict and enabling 
local government. Neither task can be easily performed 
without them. While some appear to have little use for 
decentralization, others have bought-in once the process and 
its objectives were made clear to them. Uneven supervision by 
the local faces of the GON -- the Prefects and Governors who 
regulate the chiefs -- may be the cause of some of the 
rulers' habits. While mission contacts argue that some 
Prefects and Governors are themselves no fans of 
decentralization, interventions by them have reconciled many 
chiefs to decentralization, turning them from powerful 
antagonists to powerful partners. Since French colonial 
times, central authorities have called the shots for even the 
most independent of chiefs. If the GON reins in some of the 
outliers, while respecting ordinary people's belief in 
traditional chieftaincy, it can help to make a venerated 
institution work for 21st century Niger. 
ALLEN