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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 NIAMEY 000739 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT AF/W FOR BACHMAN 
DEPT INR/AA FOR BOGOSIAN 
PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER 
PASS TO USAID FOR AMARTIN AND KTOWERS 
EUCOM FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/29/2017 
TAGS: EAID KDEM PGOV PINR PTER SOCI KISL NG
SUBJECT: ISLAM IN NIGER (4): ATTITUDES TOWARD IZALA IN 
HAUSALAND 
 
REF: A. 06 NIAMEY 1193 
     ¶B. NIAMEY 76 
     ¶C. NIAMEY 123 
     ¶D. INR BRIEF 11/14/00 
     ¶E. NIAMEY 713 
     ¶F. NIAMEY 714 
     ¶G. NIAMEY 703 
 
NIAMEY 00000739  001.2 OF 007 
 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL OFFICER ZACH HARKENRIDER FOR REASON 1.4 (D) 
 
¶1. (U) NOTE: This is the fourth in a series of cables 
(reftels A,B,C) reporting on the changing nature of Islam in 
Niger. END NOTE 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶2. (C) Previous cables in this series examined the rise, in 
Niger, of a Wahhabist-inspired form of Islamic fundamentalism 
from the Shari'a states of northern Nigeria. This edition 
examines the reasons why Nigeriens -- particularly the 
country's Hausa majority -- embrace or reject it, and 
assesses its future here by assessing it in its heartland. 
Izalat'bid'a - "the exclusion of all that is superfluous" 
(Izala for short), is strongest in Niger's "Hausaland." In 
the Hausa cities of southern Niger, elites have embraced 
Izala and many ordinary Nigeriens have rallied to its 
lavishly endowed mosques and social services. Middle-Eastern 
money and the rise of new elites, it seems, are enabling the 
importation of an ideology variously described as 
"anti-western modernization," "Islamic globalization," and 
"de-Africanization" of the faith. Each of these is a fair 
description of Izala's effects, and each label describes an 
important change in contemporary Niger. Yet, Poloff's 
examination of Hausaland attitudes toward Izala over time and 
during recent travel suggests some important limits to its 
growth, political influence, and long-term prospects. 
 
¶3. (C) The Government of Niger (GON) is hostile to divisive 
ideologies, and has the means and inclination to control 
them. While Izala produces tensions elsewhere, in Maradi, 
where it first entered Niger and is strongest, traditional 
leaders appear either comfortable with it or dismissive of 
it. Many parishioners and patrons are attracted to Izala less 
by genuine belief than by various opportunities for material 
gain. Many traditional Nigerien Muslims, having flirted with 
Izala, drift back into their old sects, no more radical for 
the experience. Many of northern Nigeria's Izalists have gone 
from being the revolutionaries and radicals of the 1980s to 
the establishment figures of today. In Nigerien Hausaland, 
which lags behind metropolitan Nigeria, Izala still seems 
radical to many, but it may already be past its prime in 
Niger. Izala's association with a small segment of an already 
narrow commercial elite, and ordinary Nigeriens' ambivilent 
reactions to the sect may contain its radicalizing potential 
until time and familiarity entirely defuse it. END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------- 
AT HOME IN HAUSALAND: 
IZALA'S GEOGRAPHY 
--------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) While most of Niger's Hausa (fifty-three percent) 
majority lives in the southern regions of Maradi, Tahoua, and 
Zinder, Hausas also dominate northern cities like Agadez and 
Arlit. Hausa ethnic identity and Izalist practice seem to 
correlate strongly, although some minority groups are 
attracted by the practices of their Hausa neighbors (reftel 
C). The southern "Hausaland" states are home to roughly half 
of the country's population. They contain cities of 
historical and cultural importance like Zinder, and major 
commercial centers like Maradi and Birni N'Konni. The Nigeria 
border and trade routes heading north across the Sahara 
define Hausaland. Wealth derives from commerce and 
trans-shipment. As much as goods and persons, ideas flow up 
from Kano, Katsina, and Sokoto. Niger watchers have long felt 
that Nigerian Izalat'bid'a and its divisive politics could 
infect Niger's Hausa belt. Fundamentalist-inspired riots over 
a fashion show and attacks on Christian churches in Maradi 
 
NIAMEY 00000739  002.2 OF 007 
 
 
earlier in this decade (reftel D) suggested that Niger's 
Hausaland was starting to suffer some of the religious 
violence common south of the border. Theory and practice 
suggested that "it could happen here." 
 
----------------------------- 
IZALA'S EFFECTS (1) IN THEORY: 
BEING MODERN IN MARADI 
----------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) In Poloff's meetings with traditional Islamic clergy 
and chiefs in Hausaland we asked what sort of people followed 
Izala. Responses clustered around two descriptions: 
"intellectuals," (meaning better-educated Nigeriens with jobs 
in the formal sector), and "those who value or have money." 
Accustomed to thinking of Izala's allure as being strongest 
for the disenfranchised (like unemployed young people), we 
wondered why the system's comparative winners would opt out 
of traditional religious practice. 
 
¶6. (U) Academic analysis and Emboffs' observations of the 
Nigerien scene offer some answers. In a 2004 "Africa Today" 
article, Northeastern University political scientist William 
F.S. Miles, a Niger expert, characterized fundamentalist 
practice as a "de-Africanization" of African Islam. He also 
cited other sources which described Izala as a form of 
"anti-western modernization," or a compelling "global brand" 
of Islam with a strong Middle Eastern flavor. These academic 
labels appear valid when one examines the demographics of 
Nigerien Izala. 
 
¶7. (U) Local contacts' descriptions and our experience of 
Izala and its followers suggest who the "global brand's" 
consumers are. Upwardly mobile Nigeriens generally come in 
two flavors: fonctionnaires (civil servants) and commercants 
(traders). Both are uniquely positioned to profit in the 
world's least developed country, though for different 
reasons. The fonctionnaire class has led Niger since 
independence. Teachers and civil servants, executives in 
para-statal enterprises, they got where they were by virtue 
of being among the few who had access to modern education. 
While many remain on the top, this elite's intake is limited. 
With the collapse of Nigerien public education in the 1990s 
and the degradation of the civil service through budget cuts 
and the elevation of political appointees, entry into this 
class was shut off and its remunerations and prestige were 
greatly lessened. The boubou-clad commercant replaced the 
safari-suited fonctionnaire as the image of success, and 
commercial acumen replaced Francophone liberal education as 
the road to wealth. 
 
¶8. (U) Superficial differences aside, wealthy fonctionnaires 
and commercants both face a common enemy in tradition. The 
Hausa practice of gift giving and societal expectations that 
a successful member of a family will provide for multiple 
relatives and loosely defined "cousins," militate against 
capital formation. Massive expenditures on baptisms, 
marriages, and dowries, and various expectations for "zakat" 
beyond the literal Koranic tithe constrain successful 
Nigeriens. Yet, these practices have more to do with African 
cultural traditions than with Islam. Izala, by denying a 
theological basis for such expenditure and welfare 
arrangements, frees successful Nigeriens from them. 
 
¶9. (U) Modernity is as much a preoccupation as money. The 
popularization of Hadj travel (a status symbol for Nigeriens 
who have arrived economically) and commercial voyages to 
Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E have exposed a large number of 
Nigeriens to more developed and affluent Muslim societies. 
Hadjis and Saudi-trained clerics return to Niger with an 
expanded view of the world and a more contemptuous view of 
"backward" local Islamic practice. By adopting Izalist 
practice, these Nigeriens buy into what Miles describes as a 
"more advanced and mature version of Islam, as practiced 
internationally." Modern technology finds the same customers 
as "modern" theology. The expansion of satellite TV (usually 
via brands that feature Arab channels) is another symptom and 
agent of modernization in Niger. Arabic TV shows (watched for 
their song and dance routines and glitz even by non-Arabic 
speakers) glamorize the "modern" Islamic powerhouses of the 
 
NIAMEY 00000739  003.2 OF 007 
 
 
Middle East. Nigerien elites' embrace of the new, global 
"Brand Islam" manifests itself in different ways. More veils, 
beards, and public events begun and concluded with prayers 
are suggestive developments. 
 
¶10. (C) "Being modern" in commercial towns like Maradi 
involves a complex blending of technology, travel, and 
religiosity. Affluent Nigerien Izalists are connected with a 
larger Islamic identity that allows consumption of western 
goods, while shielding them from impiety by a rejection of 
western mores. Individualistic in practice, Izala frees its 
adherents from traditional financial obligations to the 
community and deference to the Imam and the chief. According 
to Izalists, the Koran can be translated into Hausa, and 
every Muslim can read and understand it, and seek divine aid 
without clerical intermediation. Accepting Izala is a way for 
young people and individualistic businessmen to throw off the 
social and financial constraints imposed by elders and 
traditional authorities. Izala provides a window onto a world 
of Middle-Eastern glamour, and a channel by which Arab funds 
can flow to Nigeriens. It facilitates commerce with Arab and 
northern Nigerian adherents, and places no limits on personal 
consumption. It is a sect for society's winners. 
 
------------------------------- 
IZALA'S EFFECTS (2) IN PRACTICE: 
TRADITION AND TENSION IN ZINDER 
------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) In the court of the Tidjaniyya Sultan of Zinder, 
Poloff found little respect for Izala. Meeting with twenty 
courtiers, associated religious leaders, and sub-chiefs on 
May 9, Poloff listened to their attitudes toward a sect 
described as "troublemakers" and, again, "intellectuals." The 
Izalists consider other Muslims to be animists, and deny the 
authority of traditional preachers and chiefs. An Imam noted 
that the Sultan does not have anything to do with the 
Izalists, and that the latter "don't even dare to come to 
this house." Our interlocutors stressed that the 
traditionalist majority in Zinder would not "rise to the 
provocations offered by the fanatics," but noted that if they 
did "there would be war." The court further claimed that all 
fundamentalists got their teachers and materials from the 
Middle East, and attributed the rise of Izala to Nigeriens 
who took religious instruction in Arab countries. In a common 
Hausaland refrain, the traditionalists denounced Izala as a 
religion for the young and those who sought material wealth. 
They noted that Izala was led by educated, modern middle 
class adherents and rich businessmen, but that it sought to 
attract foot-soldiers by offering material aid and small jobs 
to unemployed youth. 
 
¶12. (C) Imam Mounirou Issoufou, a traditional Tidjaniyya 
cleric and Koranic educator in Zinder, built on this. He 
again claimed that Izala appealed to "intellectuals," who 
used its teachings as a pretext to withdraw from the 
common-life of the community. Izalists do not honor 
traditional African ceremonies, or show sufficient deference 
to elders, Mounirou claimed. While he noted Izala's small 
size in Zinder -- one mosque out of eleven principal houses 
of worship in the city, and even that usually half-full -- 
Mounirou noted that Izalists gained at least superficial 
acceptance through philanthropy. Mounirou particularly 
condemned Izalists for their refusal to dialogue with other 
religions, and for their expectation "that everyone will live 
like in Prophet Mohammed's time." 
 
--------------------------------------- 
MITIGATING FACTORS (1): SURVEILLANCE AND 
CONTROL; RADICAL RELIGION UNDER THE 
"ETAT DIRIGISTE" 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶13. (C) Across Hausaland secular and religious contacts cited 
the role played by the GON in policing religious expression. 
Several comments were typical: referring to the Nigerian 
preachers who sometimes come to their town, clergy in Birni 
N'Konni noted that they are ready to "call out to the 
authorities" to prevent subversive preaching that "raises 
social and ethnic tensions." The Prefect of Magaria (a border 
 
NIAMEY 00000739  004.3 OF 007 
 
 
town between Zinder and Kano) told Poloff that, in spite of 
Nigeria's proximity, there was no Islamic fundamentalism in 
his town. The GON was opposed to it, he noted, and "Nigerians 
don't come here to preach." When Nigerian Imams come to Niger 
they risk expulsion unless they have their papers in order 
and a clear destination and sponsorship. Maradi police chief 
Boube Souley said that Izala benefactor Rabi Dan Tchadoua 
dutifully brings foreign preachers he invites to Niger to the 
police station to be examined and registered. Souley noted 
that "'(Dan Tchadoua)' knows that as a commercant the state 
could get him at any time." NOTE: Souley noted that more than 
fifty Saudi and Pakistani preachers passed through Maradi in 
2006, heading into the interior to preach. END NOTE Maradi 
Provincial Chief Ali Zaki, who seemed generally tolerant of 
Izala, stated to Poloff on May 13 that the GON and the chiefs 
would not tolerate any preaching that inspired violence or 
hatred. His counterpart Abdoul Kadre Amadou Issaka, Canton 
Chief of Kantche (Zinder), was more explicit in a May 12 
meeting: Nigeriens returning from studies in Nigeria must 
abide by traditional rules, he said. Izala preaching is not 
allowed. Though he had not yet had occasion to do so, the 
Chief of Kantche noted that he would ban Izala preaching or 
refer it to GON authorities if he heard of it. 
 
¶14. (C) Traditional chiefs in Niger are agents of the state. 
Since the colonial period they have acted as eyes, ears, and 
local enforcers for national authorities. Under the military 
governments of Seyni Kountche (1974-1987), and Ali Saibou 
(1987-1991) the state monitored religious practice for signs 
of radicalism just as it monitored all other sectors of 
society. The Association Islamique du Niger (AIN) -- Niger's 
only Islamic association prior to 1991 -- was established by 
the military regime to keep tabs on the content of preaching 
and Koranic teaching. Old habits die hard. The military 
regimes' legacy of infiltration, exploitation, and monitoring 
of religious sects and practices persists to this day. 
Traditional chiefs still assert the right to control local 
religious expression (reftel C), either on their own behalf 
or that of the government. The Chief of Kantche spoke for 
many traditional rulers when he noted that "not a brick '(of 
a new mosque)' can be laid without the chief's permission." 
He claimed that his court would investigate the sources of 
funding for new mosques, the background of their donors and 
proposed Imams, and how the construction money was spent. 
Only then would a mosque be authorized to open. With the 
creation of an Islamic Council in 2006 and the establishment 
of a Ministry of Religious Affairs on March 1 (reftel E), 
secular authorities too seem ready to clamp down on radical 
Islam in a style reminiscent of Kountche. 
 
¶15. (C) COMMENT: The GON is neither secular (the Constitution 
officially declares the state to be "non-confessional"), nor 
particularly liberal. Most of Niger's leadership class is 
composed of conservative and traditional Tidjaniyyas (reftel 
A). But the GON's opposition to inflammatory preaching is 
part and parcel of a determination to avoid ethnic or 
religious incitement in general. This determination has been 
central to every post-independence government and has 
manifested itself in occasional limitations on freedom of 
expression and the press. While many of its sources lie in 
the politics of 1960s Niger (when a government led by 
minority Djermas faced threats from a Hausa-led political 
movement), it also derives from the French-colonial tradition 
of "direct rule," and is one of the country's most durable 
political traditions. END COMMENT 
 
----------------------------------- 
MITIGATING FACTORS (2): BORDERS AND 
IDENTITY IN HAUSALAND 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶16. (U) Just as the border between Nigerien and Nigerian 
Hausas yields two different systems of government and two 
different reactions to Izala Islam, it defines Hausa identity 
to a surprising extent. Post will examine the effect of the 
border on Hausa identity septel. With respect to religion, it 
is relevant in so far as Hausas perceive Izala as a foreign 
import rather than a genuine Nigerien belief system. While 
Tidjaniyya and Quadiriyya's respective Algerian / Senegalese 
and Iraqi origins (Tidjaniyya's spiritual head until 1975 was 
 
NIAMEY 00000739  005.3 OF 007 
 
 
Sheik Ibrahim Niasse of Senegal) make them "foreign" as well, 
no one has ever described them as such to Poloff. Everyone 
describes Izala as "foreign," meaning either Nigerian or Arab 
in inspiration and patronage. Indeed, if Izala's linkages to 
foreign money and foreign images of success help to sell the 
sect to a small number of upwardly mobile Nigeriens, those 
same foreign associations also raise suspicions among a far 
greater number of average folks in insular Niger. 
 
------------------------------------ 
ENDING WHERE IT BEGAN?: ACCOMMODATING 
IZALA IN MARADI AND KONNI 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶17. (C) Poloff's interactions with another royal court 
offered a very different perspective from the hostile and 
threatened reactions of Zinder clergy and nobles. Birni 
N'Konni is a Hausa town and trade-hub three kilometers north 
of the Nigerian border and ninety kilometers north of Sokoto. 
On May 8, Poloff met the Alkali (religious judge), Grand 
Mosque Imam, and other community notables associated with the 
court of the traditional chief of Konni Canton. Sitting on an 
animal skin rug and writing in a Harry Potter notebook, the 
Alkali described religious relations in Konni as cordial. 
Izalists and traditional Muslims pray together in the same 
mosques (although in slightly different style) and interact 
comfortably. Among the dozen persons in the room, the Imam 
noted that he was a Quadiriyya, the Alkali a Tidjaniyya, and 
another (bearded) participant, an Izala. The court of the 
chief was non-sectarian. While everyone attends Izala 
mosques, our interlocutors admitted that Izalists will not 
usually attend other sects' mosques. Beyond that, there was 
no talk of tension. 
 
¶18. (C) Maradi's Provincial Chief, Ali Zaki, is a former 
diplomat. His characterization of sectarian relations was 
likewise diplomatic. Zaki stressed his role as a moderator 
and guide for all groups. Izalists and traditional orders 
alike respect his authority and come to him for judgment and 
reconciliation. Though he stated that "we will not accept 
problems in our province'...'preaching here cannot insult or 
provoke," he did not direct his comments specifically toward 
Izala or single it out for condemnation. Nor did he claim 
broad power or desire to stamp out Izala. In fact, Zaki noted 
that his role in coordinating mosque construction was based 
on non-theological considerations, such as physical distance 
between mosques and the number of parishioners that a new 
mosque might serve. He claimed that these powers derived 
entirely from the new GON created Islamic Council. He claimed 
no other precedent for control of mosque construction, Imams, 
or sermon content. 
 
¶19. (C) Not all of our contacts in Maradi were so accepting, 
but even those critical of Izala tended to treat it 
dismissively, rather than as a threat. Maradi's Grand Mosque 
Imam, the Tidjaniyya cleric Imam Moustapha Antoma, described 
Izala Islam as weak in intellectual grounding and noted that 
its advocates were routinely out-debated by traditional 
Muslims. It won itself few friends in the early years when it 
adopted a confrontational approach to inter-faith relations. 
That rubbed most locals the wrong way, but Izala appears to 
have matured. Antoma noted that many Izalists now come to his 
mosque as they respect his preaching and Islamic scholarship. 
Local Izalists have learned from experience to be team 
players. 
 
¶20. (C) Antoma questioned Izala's size and influence in 
Maradi. He credited the sect with no more than five percent 
of Maradi's Muslims. He noted that Izala patron and local 
businessman Rabi Dan Tchadoua was funding the construction of 
a third Izala mosque, but doubted that the they would be able 
to fill it. Antoma described Dan Tchadoua as "rich but 
lacking in Islamic knowledge." Antoma claimed that Izala 
initially attracted parishioners because it gave them money 
and had glamour, but its resources are now declining and many 
erstwhile parishioners are jumping ship. He noted that those 
who give money and social services can easily attract a crowd 
in Niger, but money in the absence of genuine belief is weak 
glue. 
 
 
NIAMEY 00000739  006.4 OF 007 
 
 
¶21. (C) This view was shared by most secular observers. 
Mahaman Laouali, a local representative of Niger's largest 
human rights NGO, noted that Maradi's people are "pragmatic 
mercantilists, who take advantage of what Izala offers and, 
two or three years later, come out of it and go back to their 
old ways." Izala, he argued, was not deeply anchored: "people 
don't really believe in it, it is against their traditions." 
Maradi's police chief, Boube Souley, advanced an interesting 
theory. He said that rich Izala commercants were trying to 
win hearts and minds through philanthropy as a prerequisite 
to seeking political power. He also stressed the Izala's 
popular appeal derived from largesse, not conviction, noting 
that "in Africa, ninety-eight percent of belief is food." 
 
------------------------- 
IZALA AND RELIGIOUS FRAUD 
------------------------- 
 
¶22. (C) Religious and secular observers suggested other 
material incentives for following Izala. Antoma shared the 
view that commercants embrace Izala because its theology 
enables them to dodge costly social obligations imposed by 
the traditional sects. Some, like Dan Tchadoua, also enjoy 
more direct financial benefits. Antoma alleged that Dan 
Tchadoua and other Izala leaders were able to steal 
substantial quantities of Arab or Nigerian money sent to them 
for mosque construction and proselytization. The Secretary 
General of the Chamber of Commerce, Abdou Hassane, noted that 
materials destined for mosque construction could be imported 
duty free. Often, he argued, Maradi commercants would use 
this provision to bring in materials sufficient for a small 
Izala mosque (which they could build without authorization 
and control by the local chief) -- and for a palatial house 
as well. Secular NGOs and the civil society advise people to 
look at what Izala Imams do and how they live. 
 
------------------------- 
COMMENT: SHOULD WE WORRY? 
------------------------- 
 
¶23. (C) Academics like Miles rue the passage of African 
tradition and its replacement by Izala's global "Brand Islam" 
for aesthetic reasons. The security and political 
implications of Izalist expansion in Niger are harder to 
discern. So too are the sect's real prospects in Niger. 
Ousmane Dan Fodio's shadow still falls on Hausaland. People 
recount stories of his 1804--1812 jihad against un-Islamic 
syncretism, and the eventual institutionalization of the 
revolutionary jihadis in the Sokoto Caliphate. Looking south 
of the border today, Nigerien Hausas see Izala in a similar 
process of institutionalization and moderation. There is a 
perception that, as Izala radicals become "the man" even the 
adoption of Shari'a has changed little (reftel F). NOTE: A 
USAID funded "Northern Nigeria Muslim Outreach Assessment 
Desk Study," published in draft form on May 26, 2006, 
describes the co-optation and infiltration of the Izala sect 
by traditional elites and the Nigerian state in the early 
1990s. The study notes that some Izalas then united with 
other radicals like the Muslim Brothers (or Ikhwan) in 
continuing opposition to the state. At present, Post is 
unaware of any Ikhwan presence in Niger. END NOTE. 
 
¶24. (C) As the "Izalist jihad" loses steam in Nigeria, it 
seems to have even dimmer prospects in Niger. Hostility from 
the central government, resistance from locals, its foreign 
(though Hausa) origins, and association with corruption and 
opportunism limit Izala's appeal. So too does the small size 
of the Nigerien elite, from which Izala seems to draw most of 
its devotees. Ordinary Nigeriens, drawn in temporarily by the 
promise of material gain, do not seem to stick or buy into 
the theology. Without their support, the movement stands 
little chance of obtaining political power or radicalizing 
the Nigerien state. Even among its elite supporters, the 
incentives for following Izala seem more material than 
theological. While some Izala commercants are major 
contributors to political parties, they seem to be cashing in 
their political chips for lucrative government contracts 
rather than Shari'a. The prospects for an Izala-inspired 
political party appear nil. For their part, Nigerien 
politicians' relations with Izala seem just as pragmatic and 
 
NIAMEY 00000739  007.3 OF 007 
 
 
mercenary as those of most ordinary people. They will take 
Izalists' money, but crack down if "national unity," seems 
threatened. Meanwhile, many of the public manifestations of 
faith that Izala would impose -- veils, beards, public 
prayers, Koranic education, and opposition to gender equity 
-- are already here and endorsed equally by Izalists and 
traditional orders (reftel G). Some foreign observers of 
Izala argue that the sect is just laying low until its 
numbers increase, at which point it will shoot for political 
power. In Poloff's judgment, it is just as likely that Izala 
reached its high water mark here some time ago. END COMMENT 
 
MINIMIZED CONSIDERED 
 
ALLEN