VZCZCXRO0145
PP RUEHPA
DE RUEHNM #0639/01 1281155
ZNY CCCCC ZZH ZDK CCP
P 081155Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3452
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 3360
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
RUFGCIN/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NIAMEY 000639 
 
SIPDIS 
 
C O R R E C T E D  C O P Y - SIPDIS CAPTION ADDED 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/07/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS MASS FR NG
SUBJECT: NIGER: FRENCH AMBASSADOR ON THE SECURITY SITUATION 
IN THE NORTH 
 
NIAMEY 00000639  001.4 OF 002 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Bernadette M. Allen, reasons 1.4 (b/d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: The French Ambassador to Niger believes a GON 
attempt to defeat Tuareg dissidents risks turning bandits and 
drug smugglers into something much worse, possibly to include 
allies of AQIM.  The Nigerien Armed Forces (FAN) cannot 
defeat the Mouvement des Nigerien pour la Justice (MNJ), but 
they may think they can.  The GON may be involved in indirect 
negotiations with the MNJ through intermediaries, and the 
Libyan and Algerian governments.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) In a May 7 meeting with Ambassador Allen and the DCM, 
French Ambassador to Niger Francois Ponge said the Nigerien 
government was correct in characterizing those responsible 
for recent attacks in the North as bandits and drug 
traffickers, but added that Nigerien government mishandling 
of it could make the situation much worse.  He said that 
President Tandja was personally handling the issue, and was 
siding with the military leadership on the need for a 
military solution.  The Prime Minister was more inclined to 
negotiate. 
 
¶4. (C) Ponge does not believe the FAN is currently in a 
position to defeat the MNJ.  Morale among the FAN rank and 
file is low as they have suffered casualties in the fighting 
and believe that some of their senior officers are getting 
rich through involvement in trafficking.  The FAN is looking 
for materiel from China and elsewhere.  It is particularly 
interested in helicopters. Ponge's fear is that the FAN 
thinks it can defeat the MNJ military, and in trying to do so 
it might create broader Tuareg support for the MNJ. 
Moreover, it risked creating an alliance between AQIM and the 
MNJ.  There may be links to a former FAN officer who had been 
associated with former President Barre.  The officer is not a 
Tuareg, but has been involved in smuggling in the Lake Chad 
area for some time.  The conflict was linked with others in 
the region, including Darfur, Chad and the Central African 
Republic.  Ponge said his government is urging negotiation. 
 
¶5. (C) Ponge dismissed most of the known MNJ leaders as not 
particularly well educated or prominent.  The most prominent 
is Aboubacar Alambo, who does not always get along with his 
younger brother, Agali, also an MNJ member.  Amouman 
Kalakouwa has little education and has never been 
"integrated" in anything.  Cherif is a crook who stole from 
every pot of money to which he had access.  Ponge said that 
none of them could have authored the communique posted on the 
MNJ web site.  Referring to MNJ claims that it has evidence 
linking senior GON officials to corruption, Ponge quipped 
that those claims may help prompt the GON to negotiate. 
Ponge compared negotiating with the Tuaregs to dealing with 
Corsican separatists; nobody speaks for all factions and 
there is a lot of overlap between political and criminal 
motivations. 
 
¶6. (C) Ponge alluded to GON negotiations with the dissident 
Tuaregs through intermediaries.  He also noted Algerian and 
Libyan mediation efforts.  While the GON claims that the MNJ 
is comprised of drug traffickers, Ponge said that a well 
known Algerian drug ring is responsible for most of the drugs 
trafficked through Niger, with Algerian government 
complicity.  Moreover, the Algerian government has largely 
suspended military cooperation with Niger because of a 
Nigerien UN vote (on the Western Sahara).  Libya's role is 
also problematic given its longstanding ties with various 
Tuaregs, but Ponge thought it may be playing a positive role 
now.  He found it interesting the that there were many 
indicators of a Libyan involvement in the initial February 8 
attack on security forces in Iferouane, and speculated that 
another party may have staged it to look like Libya was 
involved to cover its own involvement.  If Algeria or Libya 
are behind the MNJ, they may be creating something they can't 
control. 
 
¶7. (C) Ponge said the MNJ's complaints about how few Tuareg's 
were employed by the uranium mines were accurate, but largely 
the fault of the Tuaregs themselves; Tuaregs initially 
disdained working in the mines, forcing the mines to recruit 
in the south.  Moreover, Tuaregs traditionally put little 
value on education, so there are not many Tuaregs with the 
qualifications necessary for the more skilled mine work. 
Security has been stepped up at the mines, with the 
construction of berms and the deployment of a detachment of 
FNIS (a paramilitary unit under the Interior Ministry) 
troops. 
 
¶8. (C) If the security situation is not resolved, it will 
devastate Niger's tourism industry (based largely in the 
 
NIAMEY 00000639  002.4 OF 002 
 
 
north) next season (beginning around November).  Tourism has 
been good the last two years, and people in the north would 
suffer from a drop in tourists.  (Unlike mining, tourism is a 
sector that employs a disproportionately large number of 
Tuaregs.) 
 
¶9. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. 
ALLEN