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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NIAMEY 000636 
 
SIPDIS 
 
C O R R E C T E D  C O P Y - SIPDIS CAPTION ADDED 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/04/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS EMIN CASC PINR NG
SUBJECT: NIGER: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH INTERIOR MINISTER 
 
REF: (A) NIAMEY 625 (B) NIAMEY 607 (C) NIAMEY 483 (D) 
     NIAMEY 401 
 
NIAMEY 00000636  001.4 OF 002 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Bernadette M. Allen, reasons 1.4 (b/d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  Interior Minister Abouba hinted that the GON 
was negotiating with dissident Tuaregs, but he largely 
dismissed their grievances. He feared alliances developing 
involving the Tuareg rebels, drug traffickers, AQIM and the 
Nigerian Taliban.  He did not appear to be particularly 
seized with the recent student unrest.  We suspect that the 
GON may be in discreet talks with the Tuareg rebels, but 
perhaps only to buy time while it prepares for a military 
offensive against them.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (C) Biographic note: Albade Abouba was named Minister of 
State in charge of the Interior and Decentralization on March 
¶1.  He has extensive experience in security matters, having 
previously served as Interior Minister (2002-2004), as well 
as President Tandja's National Security Advisor (2005-2007) 
and Special Advisor (1999-2002).  He is familiar with the 
north and east from having served in various government posts 
in Diffa, Bilma and Arlit, as well as working as a mining 
engineer for the majority French-owned SOMAIR uranium mine. 
He is a Fulani from Tahoua and a member of the ruling MNSD 
party. 
 
¶3. (C) Abouba began the meeting with Ambassador Allen and the 
DCM by complaining that he was not sure what was behind 
recent student unrest (ref c).  If the issue was between 
students and professors over grades, he said he saw no role 
for the government.  Similarly, disputes over university 
services was an issue between students and the university 
administration rather than a governmental responsibility. 
One of the student grievances was the reinstatement of a 
student who had been expelled, but Abouba said that the 
student had been caught burning down a professor's house. 
 
¶4. (C) The Ambassador expressed concern about recent security 
incidents in the north (refs b and d), which had prompted the 
Embassy to warn Americans against traveling north of Agadez. 
She asked if the GON was negotiating with the dissident 
Tuareg group, the Mouvement des Nigeriens pour la Justice 
(MNJ), to resolve the issue.  Abouba spent the rest of the 
meeting carefully avoiding giving a direct answer to the 
question. 
 
¶5. (C) Abouba said the problems began in the context of 
increased interest in mining in the north by Canadian, 
Australian, French, Chinese and South African companies, as 
well as the long-standing drug trafficking networks from 
Morocco through Algeria, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad and 
Egypt to Europe.  Nigeriens are not involved in the 
trafficking, he said, but sometimes act as guides and escorts 
for the traffickers. 
 
¶6. (C) Abouba said the drug trafficking issue flared up in 
March when traffickers clashed with the army, leaving several 
traffickers dead.  That same week, an MNJ web site appeared 
listing the MNJ's grievances (FYI: he is presumably referring 
to http://m-n-j.blogspot.com).  Abouba said he knows the MNJ 
leadership well.  None of them are capable of putting 
together two consecutive sentences in correct French, and 
therefore could not have authored the grievance message.  The 
author must be someone outside of Niger, perhaps a Tuareg in 
California, Abouba speculated.  The real issue, he said, was 
who has an interest in drug trafficking turning into a 
rebellion? 
 
¶7. (C) Aboubou reviewed the four elements of the agreement 
ending the rebellion of the early 1990s: 
 
-- Integration.  He said 3,015 ex rebels were integrated into 
the security services. 
 
-- Reinsertion.  Donors have supported programs aimed at 
economic and social reinsertion of the ex-rebels. 
 
-- Security and development in the north.  A Saharan security 
corps consisting of three companies was formed to provide 
security in the north.  Abouba added that the Nigerien 
military had worked with neighboring countries against the 
GSPC. 
 
-- Decentralization.  Abouba reviewed the GON actions to form 
local councils and elect members to them. 
 
¶8. (C) These elements contributed to the end of the rebellion 
and the dissolution of the various rebel fronts, Abouba said. 
 
NIAMEY 00000636  002.4 OF 002 
 
 
 Many leaders of the rebel fronts were given good government 
jobs.  One reason for the current problems is that the front 
leaders packed the lists of ex-combatants with family and 
friends, and omitted some true front members.  Some of the 
current rebels were those left off the lists who therefore 
did not receive benefits due them.  Overall, however, 
Nigerien Tuaregs have it much better than their counterparts 
in Mali, Aboubou said, citing the difference in development 
between Iferouane (Niger) and Kidal (Mali).  He claimed that 
some Nigerien Tuaregs will never be content. 
 
¶9. (C) Dancing around the Ambassador's question about whether 
the GON is negotiating with the MNJ, Abouba said there are 
lots of opportunities for dialogue in Niger because everybody 
knows each other.  For example, he said MNJ leader Alambo 
called on him after he was named minister.  There is no 
desire for violence in Niger, and MNJ political demands are 
not really a problem.  The GON has invested a lot in the 
north, although the mining companies should do more.  He 
dismissed complaints about environmental issues associated 
with the uranium mines, saying an international group 
monitors the mines to ensure that they meet international 
standards.  Besides, he claimed, the GON has no incentive to 
cover up environmental problems. 
 
¶10. (C) Implicitly addressing MNJ complaints that Tuaregs are 
underrepresented in the mining workforce, Abouba claimed that 
90 percent of the 250 Areva workers at a particular site are 
from the region. The problem is within the professional 
ranks.  The mining companies would like to hire engineers and 
geologists from the region, but they cannot find them.  He 
attributed this to the low value put on education by the 
traditional nomadic tribes such as the Toubou, Arabs, Fulani 
and Tuaregs.  He conceded that the Chinese companies were 
reluctant to hire even laborers locally, but said they would 
have to. 
 
¶12. (C) Abouba ended the meeting by expressing his fear that 
AQIM or the Nigerian Taliban would link up with drug 
traffickers.  The GON therefore needed help to fight 
trafficking, although Aboubou said he recognized that the 
drug issue was of much more concern to the Europeans than to 
the United States. 
 
¶13. (C) Comment: We believe that the GON may indeed be 
negotiating with the MNJ, but suspect that the GON's strategy 
may be to use the negotiations to buy time while it prepares 
for a large scale offensive. 
MINIMIZED CONSIDERED 
ALLEN