VZCZCXRO2678
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHLA RUEHMRE RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHMO #2201/01 1311535
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 111535Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0165
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUCNOSC/OSCE POST COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 002201 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/11/2017 
TAGS: PREL KCFE OSCE PARM MARR NATO RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA AND A CFE "MORATORIUM" 
 
REF: A. STATE 57275 
     ¶B. MOSCOW 1932 
     ¶C. DTRA-OSES DTG 271428Z APR 07 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons 1.4 (B/D). 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  Deputy Foreign Minister Kislyak reviewed 
with the Ambassador Putin's April 26 call for a moratorium on 
Russia's compliance with the Conventional Forces in Europe 
(CFE) Treaty and his insistence that all NATO Allies ratify 
the Adapted Treaty without linkage to the 1999 Istanbul 
commitments.  For now Russia will comply with the terms of 
the treaty, including inspections and data exchanges.  The 
GOR would look to upcoming meetings in Brussels for Allies to 
show flexibility in addressing long-standing Russian concerns 
and then make a permanent decision regarding a moratorium. 
Putin's gambit surprised the MOD and MFA bureaucracies, whose 
officials believe this position plays well domestically and 
will be difficult to walk back.  Kislyak called for a 
"creative approach" on the Istanbul commitments, especially 
Moldova -- well aware that the Moldovans are offering to let 
the Russians stay in return for progress on the Transnistria 
conflict.  One option of a creative approach could involve 
internationalization of the PKF under an OSCE umbrella.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------------- 
MORATORIUM SOON BUT NOT QUITE YET 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Putin's April 26 remarks to the Federal Assembly on a 
possible CFE moratorium touched off a round of mixed signals. 
 The MFA told us that the moratorium would not go into effect 
until the issue had been discussed at the NATO-Russia Council 
(NRC).  However, First Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Ivanov 
told the media May 3 that the moratorium was already in 
effect.  General Buzhinskiy of the International Treaties 
Department in the Ministry of Defense (MOD) made similar 
remarks to visitors last week. 
 
¶3.  (C)  DFM Kislyak outlined to the Ambassador May 4 the 
GOR's likely next steps.  Kislyak said Putin was serious 
about what he viewed as an outmoded treaty that imposed 
unilateral restrictions on Russia.  Kislyak pointed to US 
agreements with Bulgaria and Romania on military facilities 
as an additional factor.  He said Moscow would wait to see 
whether the US and Europeans take into account Russian 
concerns in the next month.  Western reactions at the May 10 
NATO-Russia Chiefs Of Defense meeting and the May 23 NRC 
meeting would be a factor in Russia's decision on whether to 
suspend compliance with the treaty.  If Russian concerns were 
not taken seriously in the next month, Putin would issue a 
document that would require the GOR to suspend compliance; no 
formal presidential decree was required. 
 
¶4. (C) The Ambassador urged the GOR to walk back the threat 
of withdrawal from the CFE, noting the importance of the 
treaty to European security and of Russia's Istanbul 
commitments.  Kislyak reprised Russia's rejection of any 
linkage between the Istanbul commitments and NATO members' 
ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty.  Russia was moving 
ahead with its force withdrawals from Georgia (Russia 
accelerated its withdrawal in response to last September's 
tensions with Georgia over the arrest of four Russian 
military personnel).  On withdrawal of troops and munitions 
from Moldova, Kislyak called for a more creative approach 
that distinguished between Russian peacekeepers in 
Transnistria and those forces guarding the Colbasna weapons 
depot.  (As we and others have reported, the Moldovan draft 
for a package agreement between Moldova and Russia -- which 
Moldovan negotiators have been pressing vigorously -- 
explicitly calls for Russian troops to remain in 
Transnistria.  Kislyak in essence viewed this as an argument 
to persuade us not to be more Moldovan than the Moldovans.) 
 
 
---------- 
MFA ON CFE 
---------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Anton Mazur, the Foreign Ministry's chief CFE expert, 
amplified Kislyak's views to us May 8.  Russia would continue 
to accept inspections and exchange data pending a final 
decision on whether to impose a moratorium.  Ratification by 
all Allies including the Balts was Putin's bottom line. 
Otherwise, the Ministry's Legal Department had determined 
that the treaty's withdrawal provisions implicitly allowed 
 
MOSCOW 00002201  002 OF 003 
 
 
for "less significant" steps, including a moratorium or 
suspension.  For the moment, Mazur said, Russia was 
considering only a moratorium.  Putin's moratorium call was 
not linked directly to concerns about deployment of a US 
missile defense. 
 
¶6. (C) Mazur reiterated that Russia had complied fully with 
the Istanbul Commitments.  Troop withdrawal from Georgia is 
on track, with a full pull-out expected no later than the end 
of 2008.  Russian peacekeepers would remain.  (The CIS 
peacekeeping force itself has never been an Istanbul 
Commitment issue, but the PKF's continued use of the base at 
Gudauta -- to be closed under Istanbul -- is considered by 
Georgia to be a violation.)  Moldova was a more complicated 
situation that would probably not be resolved until 
Transnistria's status was settled, Mazur continued.  In the 
meantime, the treaty allowed for the stationing of six 
battalions in Moldova; at the moment, the Operational Group 
of Forces-Transnistria consisted of only two rotating 
battalions (peacekeepers) and one security battalion 
(guarding Soviet-era weapons facilities).  In any case, 
Russia had little confidence that the Allies would move 
forward on ratifying the Adapted Treaty even if Moscow pulled 
all of its forces out of Moldova and Georgia tomorrow. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
DOMESTIC POLITICS COULD BE COMPLICATING FACTOR 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶7.  (C) Respected defense analyst Aleksandr Golts told us 
that Putin's statement on CFE was "absolutely political" and 
had nothing to do with real military issues.  Golts' military 
contacts had been puzzled by the President's statement (MOD 
contacts told us the same).  Independent defense analyst 
Pavel Felgengauer concurred that, in addition to concerns 
over U.S. Missile Defense deployments, domestic politics was 
a factor in the moratorium call.  Felgengauer speculated that 
Putin had made it at the instigation of hard-liners in the 
Presidential Administration or First Deputy PM Sergey Ivanov. 
 The MFA was not happy with Putin's remarks because it would 
now be hard for the GOR to reverse policy or to accept 
anything less than full ratification of the Adapted Treaty by 
all Allies, which was unlikely. 
 
----------------------- 
TOWARDS A U.S. RESPONSE 
----------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) The GOR might have painted itself into a corner on 
CFE suspension, sparking a dispute that will excite European 
concern at a time when Russia has sought to create divisions 
in the Alliance.  Our response needs to be one that will 
maintain NATO unity -- recognizing that: 
 
-- some of our European diplomatic colleagues here, notably 
the Germans, have echoed de Hoop Scheffer's contention that 
there is no Alliance consensus on whether Russian 
peacekeepers in Transnistria are covered under the Istanbul 
Commitments; and 
 
-- the Moldovan draft agreement on relations with Russia, 
with its provision for the Russians to remain, is close to 
being in the public domain. 
 
Rather than allow Russia to probe for fissures in the 
Alliance, or for daylight between us and Moldova, we should 
use this opportunity to consider all options that will 
advance our objectives, recognizing that our course will not 
be easy and will require careful examination. 
 
¶9. (C) Moldova:  The U.S. has held some discussions in 
internationalizing the peacekeeping force in Transnistria. 
One option is to move forward on this, proposing to the 
Russians that we internationalize the peacekeeping force 
under an OSCE mandate -- since such forces are exempt from 
CFE limitations and therefore from the Istanbul Commitments. 
We should recognize that a significant Russian component will 
remain in the internationalized force -- a basic 
Transnistrian as well as Russian demand -- but giving it an 
OSCE umbrella would make the force transparent to the 
international community and could, with an appropriate OSCE 
mandate, provide the opportunity not only for troops from 
other countries, such as Ukraine, but also for military 
observers from a wide variety of countries, potentially 
including the U.S.  Giving the internationalized OSCE force 
the mandate to monitor and guard the Colbasna facility would 
facilitate the removal of Russia's 14th Army troops, which 
 
MOSCOW 00002201  003 OF 003 
 
 
all Allies agree are covered under the Istanbul Agreements. 
 
¶10. (C) Georgia:  The overall poor tone of Russian-Georgian 
relations has made all dialogue problematic, but the issue of 
Gudauta is not insoluble.  Our understanding is that the 
agreement between Georgia and Russia on closing Gudauta 
outlined which parts of the former base were permissible for 
PKF use.  The extant Joint Fact-Finding Group, which 
investigated the March 11 Kodori incident, could be a vehicle 
for ensuring and certifying that PKF use of the base is 
within the guidelines set down in the Georgian-Russian 
agreement.  Likewise, the Quadripartite Talks, which the 
Russians have recently pushed to resume in the village of 
Chuburkhinja with UNOMIG in the chair -- the other 
participants are the Georgians, Abkhaz, and PKF -- could also 
involve information exchanges which, under UN auspices, could 
serve to reassure Allies that the Russians are fulfilling 
their Istanbul commitments with regard to Gudauta. 
 
¶11. (C) Putin's tough language on CFE was a typical 
enunciation of non-negotiable demands followed by a call for 
negotiations.  The first part is a clear non-starter, since 
no NATO Ally will be ready to cave in to a Russian ultimatum. 
 But by dismissing the rhetoric and turning to the call for 
negotiations, we can advance our own agendas -- in areas such 
as internationalizing the Transnistria PKF -- while providing 
the Russians with a face-saving way of climbing down at no 
cost to us. 
 
BURNS