VZCZCXRO2986
RR RUEHRN RUEHROV
DE RUEHKM #0744/01 1220712
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 020712Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8679
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KAMPALA 000744 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/03/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL SENV UG
SUBJECT: UGANDA: IF A TREE FALLS IN MABIRA FOREST, WHO WILL 
HEAR IT? 
 
Classified By: P/E Chief Kathleen FitzGibbon for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) 
. 
 
¶1.  (C)  Summary: The April 12 and 17 violence associated 
with the campaign to stop the sale of land in the Mabira 
Forest to foreign investors continues to reverberate 
throughout Uganda's political arena.  Five people died after 
frustrations were taken out on Asians during violent 
confrontations.  Uganda's political players are preoccupied 
with their next moves in the wake of the violence.  President 
Museveni and Minister of Security Amama Mbabazi tried to 
reassure the Asian community of its security and continue to 
crack down on dissenters.  Opposition leaders continue to 
seek ways to provoke or embarrass the Executive.  Foreign 
investors are concerned that Uganda's political situation 
could deteriorate if the current trajectory holds.  Embassy 
officials continue to urge restraint and dialogue in our 
interactions with Government and opposition officials.  Even 
if Mabira Forest land is saved, the fall-out from the 
demonstrations has implications for key players and 
institutions.  End Summary. 
 
- - - - - - - 
FOR MUSEVENI 
- - - - - - - 
 
¶2.  (C) The Mabira Forest demonstrations, coming on the heels 
of the High Court siege on March 1, have increased Museveni's 
unease with multipartyism and political dissent, according to 
a wide range of observers.  His speeches reveal deep distrust 
of the opposition, dissenters within the ruling party, and 
the independent media.  On April 19, Museveni stated that the 
Mabira Forest protest was "organized by fascists pretending 
to be democrats."  In other public statements, Museveni 
referred to the protest participants as "criminals." 
Museveni placed the bulk of the blame for the violence on the 
opposition--especially Kizza Besigye and his Forum for 
Democratic Change (FDC)--rather than the criminals that took 
advantage of the protest march to loot and kill.  Museveni's 
focus on opposition parties could be underestimating other 
relevant, and potentially destabilizing factors.  Some 
observers believe that the violence on April 12 and 17 was 
the result of frustration with Museveni and his policies 
which appear to favor regime insiders, including foreign 
businesses, over indigenous investors.  The Asian victims 
became easily identifiable scapegoats. 
 
¶3.  (C) The President's failure to convince Ugandans that the 
key to the country's development was to give away land to 
regime cronies cannot be blamed on the political opposition 
and media alone.  The Executive has ignored a public 
perception that super-wealthy Indian businessmen were 
benefiting from sweetheart business deals in exchange for 
financial support during elections.  These businessmen are 
rumored to be closely connected to the President, his family, 
and historical members of the National Resistance Movement 
(NRM).  The reportedly poor treatment Ugandan workers receive 
at the hands of Indian employers is a source of resentment 
for many Ugandans struggling to earn a meager living.  Added 
to this, the high levels of resentment among the urban 
unemployed boil over in the streets of Kampala during public 
gatherings.  The GOU makes no efforts to seek genuine 
dialogue to alleviate the sources of tension. 
 
¶4.  (C) President Museveni may have to back down on the 
planned forest give-away in the face of widespread public 
opposition.  Various sources tell us that he will likely use 
the Cabinet, which reportedly opposes the give-away, and an 
agreement with the World Bank on the Bujagali Dam that 
requires protection of Mabira Forest to justify his reversal 
on the deal to Mehta Group.  Given the recent New Vision poll 
of parliamentarians that indicated that 72 percent of NRM MPs 
opposed the give-away, Museveni is unlikely to push the issue 
in Parliament.  Nonetheless, publicly, Museveni will continue 
to advocate his belief that Uganda must exploit all of its 
natural resources and support foreign investment to become an 
industrialized country.  While many Ugandans agree that the 
country should maximize the use of its resources, they are 
highly suspicious of deals that appear to favor foreign over 
Ugandan investors. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
FOR THE RULING PARTY 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶5.  (C) The Mabira Forest issue is one of many that is 
widening divisions within the ruling party between the 
"historicals" who have remained in the NRM and the next 
generation of NRM politicians.  The constant references of 
the remaining historicals to accomplishments during the bush 
war and their perceived arrogance have worn thin on the 
 
KAMPALA 00000744  002 OF 003 
 
 
rank-and-file party members.  Museveni's refusal to announce 
that he will not run in the next election and alleged plan to 
extend the presidential term to ten years have created 
opposing camps within the party and spurred jockeying to 
succeed him.  The non-historicals resent the imposition of 
the party discipline mechanism, whereby the NRM 
parliamentarians debate issues freely within the party 
caucus, but must vote along party lines on the floor of 
Parliament.  When contentious issues bubble up in Parliament, 
such as a report questioning Government actions during the 
High Court siege, the NRM historicals have quashed them by 
threatening committee members with financial ruin. 
Nonetheless, Museveni was unable to force MPs to drop their 
demands for cash to buy vehicles in February.  The recent New 
Vision poll indicates that Museveni could suffer a similar 
fate if the Mabira Forest debate goes to Parliament. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - 
FOR THE OPPOSITION 
- - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶6.  (C) The Mabira Forest debate turned into a partisan issue 
for the GOU because the demonstration was organized by 
members of the opposition.  FDC members, in particular, 
seized the Mabira Forest issue as another platform from which 
to challenge the government and capitalize on popular 
sentiment.  The politicization of the issue makes it more 
difficult for Museveni and the security apparatus to back 
down or make concessions.  The violence associated with the 
April 12 and 17 protest bolsters the Executive's argument 
that protests in public places should not be allowed.  Press 
reports indicate that the violence has strengthened the hand 
of intelligence chief, Gen. David Tinyefuza, who has taken 
over coordination of police and security bodies.  This move 
not only stifles voices of moderation within the security 
forces, but portends a deepening of the government crackdown 
on its opponents. 
 
¶7.  (C) The transformation of the issue into a partisan one 
denied the political parties an opportunity to forge a 
unified strategy on an issue of national importance.  Polls 
show that many NRM officials oppose the forest give-away, but 
the interjection of the FDC into the fray, means that 
sympathizers cannot voice their dissent because they fear 
being linked to the President's enemies.  While the FDC's 
confrontational tactics are popular with the party's 
established base, especially urban unemployed with nothing to 
lose, its unyielding militancy hinders the party from 
attracting new members from the growing number of disaffected 
Ugandans, who would have a lot to lose if they went into the 
streets to protest. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
FOR RULE OF LAW...RULE BY LAW 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶8.  (C) The Executive has increased its use of intimidation, 
through the use of the law and other means, to crack down on 
the political opposition in the aftermath of protests over 
the Mabira Forest give-away and the High Court siege.  For 
example, plainclothes security officers surrounded the homes 
of the MPs in the late evening of April 14 even though the 
Government could not arrest them until the Speaker of the 
House was notified the next day.  The GOU's hardliners pushed 
for stiff charges.  However, the Director of Public 
Prosecutions refused to sign the original charge sheet, which 
included terrorism and murder charges.  Several diplomatic 
missions, including this one, told government officials that 
treason, terrorism, and murder charges would appear 
politically-motivated.  Since the protest, twenty persons, 
including five members of parliament and twelve political 
party activists, have been arrested on charges ranging from 
unlawful assembly and incitement to violence to murder. 
 
¶9.  (C) Government intimidation of opposition members, ruling 
party politicians, and judges is increasing, according to 
human rights groups.  Some of those who have spoken out 
against the Executive branch have been followed and 
threatened with financial ruin and/or scandal.  The President 
publicly stated that he and other bush warriors know better 
how to interpret the law than judges and he accused some 
judges of being members of the opposition.  The process is 
underway for the President to hand-pick judges, a move that 
judicial officials argue would curb the independence of the 
judiciary if not based on professional qualifications and 
experience. 
 
¶10.  (C) Another worrisome development over the past two 
weeks was the emergence of the "Kiboko" squad or "stick 
brigade" on April 17 at an opposition rally.  Eyewitness 
accounts, confirmed by the Uganda Police Service's own 
 
KAMPALA 00000744  003 OF 003 
 
 
spokesman, report that police stood by while the kiboko squad 
beat up civilians.  Publicly, government officials are 
denying any involvement with the kiboko squad, but privately 
a Cabinet member told emboffs that the squad was created to 
"fight fire with fire" by teaching Besigye's "paid thugs" a 
lesson.  The squad was seen leaving Central Police 
Headquarters to go to the scene of the demonstration. 
Museveni said "I salute the Ugandans who stood by justice and 
opposed the criminals."  He claimed that the kiboko squad had 
reacted "spontaneously, nobody organized it.  These people 
when they saw these rioters attacking people and shops.  I 
think they are part of a group that rescued many Asian people 
who would have been killed by these criminals." 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
FOR FOREIGN INVESTORS 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶11.  (C) Various foreign investors have told emboffs that 
they are keeping "one foot in Uganda, and one foot outside" 
to guard against the heightened tensions between Museveni and 
his political opponents.  There are indications that the 
Asian community is divided between some of the larger 
investors and smaller Indian and Chinese businesses. 
Longtime contacts are concerned about rising xenophobia and 
the association of the Asian community with the Executive. 
Violent incidents in March and April have raised concerns 
among outside investors about Uganda's long term prospects 
for stability if current trends continue. 
 
- - - - 
COMMENT 
- - - - 
 
¶12.  (C) The Mabira Forest land could be saved from sugarcane 
production if Museveni uses the Cabinet as a way out of the 
situation and other land is found for the Mehta Group. 
Meanwhile, the Executive's crackdown on dissent is unlikely 
to abate and the political space for competing ideas will 
continue to close.  Lacking a focused political platform, and 
resources, and facing internal divisions, the opposition will 
continue to use confrontational tactics to voice its dissent 
and undermine the government. In response, the Executive will 
use the full extent of the law and other types of threats and 
pressure, such as calling in bank loans of its opponents, to 
quell dissent.  We do not see any indications that the 
Executive or the opposition are taking steps to break the 
current cycle of acrimony. 
BROWNING