VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBUL #1578/01 1301420
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 101420Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7969
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 1378
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 6706
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

S E C R E T KABUL 001578 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/A (S.INGRAM), S/WCI (S.HODGKINSON), L/PM 
(E.PELOFSKY), WHA/CAN (F.HERNANDEZ), S/CT, AND EUR/RPM 
NSC FOR A.HARRIMAN 
CENTCOM FOR CJTF-82, POLAD, CSTC-A 
DOD FOR OSD (A.RICCI) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/05/2017 
TAGS: KWAC MARR NATO PTER PHUM AF
SUBJECT: ISAF DETAINEES:  CANADIANS CONCLUDE NEW AGREEMENT 
WITH GOA 
 
Classified By: Carol A. Rodley, Counselor for Political-Military Affair 
s; reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (S/NF) Summary:  It is NATO policy that ISAF partner 
nations should transfer detainees to GoA custody within 96 
hours, or release them.  While NATO's policy originally did 
not identify a particular Afghan agency to receive the ISAF 
detainees, an ISAF HQ order (FRAGO) issued March 30 
designated the Afghan National Directorate of Security (NDS) 
as the receiving agency.  The FRAGO, however, recognizes that 
this may not always be practicable, and commanders retain the 
discretion to transfer to Afghan National Security Forces 
(ANSF) instead of the NDS, if the situation dictates. 
According to ISAF HQ, between October 2006 and May 3, ISAF 
partner nations transferred 230 detainees to GoA custody. 
While NATO policy and the ISAF FRAGO provide the general 
framework for ISAF partner nations in the handling of 
detainees, a number of ISAF partner nations -- most notably 
Canada, the UK, the Netherlands, and Australia -- have 
concluded agreements with the GoA or other partner nations 
that go beyond the basic ISAF framework.  The original 
detainee transfer agreement that the Canadians signed with 
the GoA in December 2005 had no provision to ensure that 
Canada would have continued access to detainees once they had 
been transferred to GoA custody.  Recent reports in the 
Canadian press of alleged torture of detainees after their 
transfer from Canadian Forces to GoA custody have put 
Canadian detainee practices in Afghanistan under intense 
scrutiny.  This scrutiny has been further amplified by an 
attempt by Amnesty International Canada to seek a court 
injunction against any further transfers of detainees from 
Canadian Forces to GoA custody.  On May 3, the Canadian 
government concluded a new, "supplementary" detainee transfer 
agreement with the GoA that ensures continued access by 
Canadian officials to detainees transferred by Canadian 
Forces to the GoA.  End Summary. 
 
-------------------- 
ISAF DETAINEE POLICY 
-------------------- 
 
¶2. (S/REL ISAF) It is NATO policy that ISAF partner nations 
should transfer detainees to GoA custody within 96 hours, or 
release them.  (Note:  This policy applies to U.S. Forces, 
except for a minority operating under a separate OEF mandate. 
 End Note)  While NATO's policy originally did not identify a 
particular Afghan agency to receive the ISAF detainees, an 
ISAF HQ order (FRAGO) issued March 30 designated the Afghan 
National Directorate of Security (NDS) as the receiving 
agency.  The FRAGO, however, recognizes that this may not 
always be practicable, and commanders retain the discretion 
to transfer to Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) instead 
of the NDS, if the situation dictates. The NDS is the Afghan 
security service with internal and external responsibilities. 
 In addition to its intelligence functions, the NDS has its 
own prosecutors empowered to investigate and prosecute 
individuals under Afghanistan's "Law on Crimes against 
Internal and External Security."  The NDS runs detention 
centers around the country. 
 
¶3. (S/REL ISAF) The ISAF FRAGO directs partner nations ("if 
time, safety considerations, and circumstances permit") to 
transfer detainees to NDS custody at the closest of three NDS 
regional headquarters in Kabul, Kandahar, or Jalalabad.  The 
ISAF FRAGO provides detailed guidance regarding the provision 
of information and physical evidence associated with each 
detainee to the NDS, to facilitate NDS processing and 
prosecution of the transferred individuals.  The ISAF FRAGO 
also designates the ISAF Regional Command (RC) Provost 
Marshals as the local points-of-contact for detention matters 
and directs the RCs to establish relationships with local NDS 
headquarters to facilitate close coordination.  ISAF HQ 
designated the NDS as the GoA receiving agency in large part 
because the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 
previously had indicated to ISAF HQ that the NDS maintained 
the most orderly Afghan government custodial facilities and 
 
offered relatively good access to the ICRC.  ISAF partner 
nations are supposed to notify the ICRC when they take 
detainees, including detainees who subsequently are 
transferred to the GoA. 
 
----------------------- 
ISAF DETAINEE PRACTICES 
----------------------- 
 
¶4. (S/NOFORN) ISAF HQ has maintained statistics on detainees 
taken by ISAF partner nations since October 2006, when ISAF 
assumed regional responsibility for all of Afghanistan 
following the Stage IV Transfer of Authority (TOA) over 
RC-East from CFC-A to ISAF.  According to ISAF HQ, between 
October 2006 and May 3, ISAF partner nations transferred 230 
detainees to GoA custody.  The following list provides the 
numbers of detainees transferred to the GoA by various ISAF 
partners: 
 
US:  87 
Canada:  68 
UK:  41 
Netherlands:  21 
Germany:  7 
Belgium:  3 
Norway:  2 
Italy:  1 
 
¶5. (S/NOFORN) While NATO policy and the ISAF FRAGO provide 
the general framework for ISAF partner nations in the 
handling of detainees, a number of ISAF partner nations -- 
most notably Canada, the UK, the Netherlands, and Australia 
-- have concluded agreements with the GoA or other partner 
nations that go beyond the basic ISAF framework.  In fact, of 
the four ISAF nations with the highest number of ISAF 
detainees to date, the USG is the only nation that does not 
have a separate agreement with the GoA that further 
elaborates humanitarian and/or security assurances for 
detainees captured and transferred to the GoA under ISAF 
rules of engagement (ROE).  (Comment:  Although the GoA's 
August 2005 Diplomatic Note on detainee transfers does not 
specifically rule out application to detainees transferred 
under ISAF ROE, it was developed in the context of preparing 
for the prospective transfer of detainees already in U.S. 
custody at the Bagram Theater Internment Facility and 
Guantanamo, i.e., detainees not taken under ISAF ROE.  End 
Comment.) 
 
¶6. (S/NOFORN) The original detainee transfer agreement that 
the Canadians signed with the GoA in December 2005 had no 
provision to ensure that Canada would have continued access 
to detainees once they had been transferred to GoA custody. 
Canadian Embassy contacts (protect) report that they have no 
firm information regarding the disposition of most of the 
detainees transferred by Canadian Forces to the GoA.  In 
contrast, the UK concluded a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) with the GoA in 2005 that explicitly provides for 
continued access by UK military and diplomatic personnel to 
the detainees the UK Forces transfer to the GoA, as well as 
access for representatives of the ICRC and the Afghan 
Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC).  The agreement 
obliges the GoA to maintain accurate records on the 
disposition of the transferred detainees and to report to the 
UK when there is a change in the detainee's disposition.  It 
also states that transferred detainees will not be subject to 
the death penalty.  The Dutch concluded a nearly identical 
MOU with the GoA in 2006.  The Australians have an 
arrangement with the Dutch, whereby detainees taken by 
Australian Forces are transferred to the Dutch, who then 
treat them as their own detainees within the framework of the 
ISAF FRAGO and Dutch MOU with the GoA. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
PRESS REPORTS ALLEGE ABUSE IN GOA CUSTODY 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (S/NOFORN) Recent reports in the Canadian press of alleged 
torture of detainees after their transfer from Canadian 
Forces to GoA custody have put Canadian detainee practices in 
Afghanistan under intense scrutiny.  This scrutiny has been 
further amplified by an attempt by Amnesty International 
Canada to seek a court injunction against any further 
transfers of detainees from Canadian Forces to GoA custody. 
Canadian Embassy contacts (protect) have informed us that 
they believe there is reason to conclude that there is 
substance to some of the allegations of torture that have 
been reported in the Canadian press.  They have informed us 
that a Canadian team that recently visited the NDS detention 
facility in Kandahar heard allegations of torture from two 
detainees.  Those detainees made their claims in front of the 
local NDS guards, which the Canadians take as an indication 
of the credibility of the allegations.  (Note:  One of the 
detainees claimed that he had been taken to a basement in the 
guest house of Kandahar Governor Khalid, and that the 
Governor himself had tortured him with electric shocks. 
Canadian Embassy contacts -- protect -- tell us they have 
heard some other similarly ominous reports of such abuses by 
Governor Khalid.  End Note) 
 
-------------------------------- 
CANADIANS CONCLUDE NEW AGREEMENT 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (S/NOFORN) According to Canadian Embassy contacts, when 
confronted by the press allegations of torture of detainees 
after their transfer from Canadian Forces to the GoA, the 
Canadian government initially argued that the ICRC was 
supposed to monitor and ensure the welfare of the detainees 
in GoA custody.  The ICRC subsequently announced publicly 
that its long-standing policy is to inform only the detaining 
authority -- i.e., the GoA -- and that it has no 
responsibility or authority to inform the governments that 
transferred the detainees to GoA custody.  Canadian Embassy 
contacts report that the Canadian government's fallback 
argument was that the AIHRC had agreed to provide monitoring 
and to ensure the welfare of the transferred detainees. 
However, even as Canadian government officials were making 
this argument, the Canadian press was publishing interviews 
with AIHRC officials who claimed that they lacked the 
resources to perform such a monitoring role, and that the NDS 
in any case did not allow them the necessary access.  Our 
Canadian Embassy contacts tell us it then became clear that 
they would need another agreement with the GoA, and obtaining 
such an agreement became their highest priority. 
 
¶9. (S/NOFORN) On May 3, the Canadian government concluded a 
new, "supplementary" detainee transfer agreement with the 
GoA.  The key elements of the agreement are: 
 
-- Canadian government officials and AIHRC representatives 
"will have full and unrestricted access to detention 
facilities where detainees transferred by Canadian Forces are 
held"; during such access Canadian government officials and 
AIHRC representatives "will be permitted to interview 
detainees in private, without Afghan authorities present;" 
 
-- the GoA "will hold detainees transferred by Canadian 
Forces in a limited number of facilities;" 
 
-- the GoA "will investigate allegations of abuse and 
mistreatment and prosecute in accordance with national law 
and internationally applicable legal standards...and will 
inform the Government of Canada, the AIHRC and the ICRC of 
the steps it is taking to investigate such allegations and 
any corrective actions taken;" 
 
-- the GoA and Canadian government "will cooperate closely to 
maximize capacity building activities directed towards 
improving the Afghanistan corrections and justice systems." 
 
¶10. (S/NOFORN) Canadian Embassy contacts inform us that 
Defense Minister Wardak signed the agreement on behalf of the 
E 
 
GoA.  Asked why Wardak signed, rather than the NDS, which 
will have custody of the detainees according to the ISAF 
FRAGO, Canadian Embassy contacts note that the original 2005 
agreement was with the MOD.  They also tell us that it was 
easiest to bring quick pressure to bear on the MOD (via the 
Palace).  They commented that Wardak was very concerned when 
he learned that Canadian Forces assessed they would need to 
halt their combat operations in Afghanistan if the Canadian 
Federal Court were to uphold the injunction against detainee 
transfers to the GoA that Amnesty International Canada had 
filed.  Wardak reportedly signed the new agreement with 
Canada, but, according to Canadian Embassy contacts, appeared 
quite unhappy in doing so.  Following the Canadian 
government's announcement of the new agreement on May 3, the 
Canadian Federal Court suspended the hearing regarding the 
Amnesty International injunction request. 
 
¶11. (S/NOFORN) Canadian Embassy contacts tell us that they 
still have a number of implementation details to work out 
under the agreement.  Current thinking is that a Canadian 
diplomat will be assigned to Kandahar and have 
responsibility, along with assistance from Canadian Forces 
Provost Marshal personnel, for monitoring the welfare of 
detainees transferred by Canadian Forces to NDS facilities 
there.  (Note:  This arrangement will be similar to current 
Dutch practice, which, we understand, is to transfer 
detainees to the NDS detention facility in Kabul where Dutch 
officials are better able to monitor their well-being.  End 
Note) 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶12. (S/NOFORN) This story is still developing as the UK, 
Netherlands, and others quietly review their own detainee 
transfer arrangements with the GoA.  While the presumption is 
that the NDS will prosecute the transferees from ISAF 
detaining forces, UK Embassy contacts report, for example, 
that more than 90% of the detainees they have transferred to 
the NDS subsequently have been released.  We have heard 
informally that some ISAF partners may be revisiting the 
question of whether ISAF should seek to establish its own 
detention facility. 
 
¶13. (S/NOFORN) U.S. Forces operating under the ISAF mandate 
normally conduct missions together with ANA Forces, and it is 
frequently those ANA forces that take custody of detainees. 
In those cases where U.S. Forces operating under ISAF alone 
detain individuals, they turn these over to local NDS 
officials or to ANA Forces.  When the ANA receives detainees 
from ISAF partners operating under ISAF policy, or the ANA 
captures detainees itself, it turns over such detainees to 
the NDS as soon as possible. 
WOOD