VZCZCXRO2974
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK
DE RUEHDIR #0036/01 1421520
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 221520Z MAY 07
FM IRAN RPO DUBAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0124
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHDIR/IRAN RPO DUBAI PRIORITY 0117
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI PRIORITY 0108
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY 0074
RUEHAD/USDAO ABU DHABI TC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 IRAN RPO DUBAI 000036 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  5/22/2017 
TAGS: PINR PGOV PREL IR
SUBJECT: IRANIAN PERCEPTIONS OF TALKS WITH THE US (C-NE7-00968) 
 
RPO DUBAI 00000036  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Jillian Burns, Director, Iran Regional Presence 
Office - Dubai, Department of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (d) 
 
1.(C) Summary:  While we have not heard anything outside of 
press reporting regarding Iran's goals and strategies for the 
upcoming May 28 meeting with the US on Iraq, we have had some 
discussions with contacts regarding interlocutors and some 
positive and negative reactions to the idea of talks.  The 
choice of interlocutor will be a good indicator of who is in the 
driver's seat of policy right now.  The arrest of academic Haleh 
Esfandiari may be an effort by some to torpedo talks, although 
there is no sign yet from the Iranian side that they are 
distancing themselves from attending.  Iranian officials seem to 
be making major efforts to publicly justify Iran's 
participation, despite other signs of crackdowns on links to the 
US.  Iran may also see Esfandiari as a bargaining chip against 
the Irbil 5.  End summary 
 
2.A.(S)  WHAT, IF ANYTHING, HAVE IRANIAN OFFICIALS DISCUSSED 
THEY MIGHT BE WILLING TO OFFER OR NEGOTIATE ON DURING BILATERAL 
TALKS WITH THE US?  WHAT WILL THEY BRING TO THE TABLE?  WHAT 
ISSUES WILL NOT BE DISCUSSED OR ARE RED LINES?  WHAT ISSUES WILL 
THEY BROACH WITHOUT HESITATION? WHAT ARE THE PLANNED TOPICS OF 
DISCUSSION FOR THOSE MEETINGS? 
 
-- (U) Iranian official statements have almost uniformly 
asserted that the only topic for discussion with the US is Iraq, 
and the only reason Iran is meeting with the US is at the behest 
of the Iraqi government.  The Supreme Leader said May 16 that 
the talks would be used to "remind Washington of its failed 
duties in the conflict torn country."  He reiterated that Iran's 
policy toward the US has not changed, asking "how can one have a 
dialogue with an arrogant, bullying, expansionist an imperial 
American government, especially with its current, brazen, 
ill-mannered and boastful statesmen?"  In his weekly press 
conference May 20, Foreign Ministry spokesman Hosseini said that 
Iran is not linking the nuclear issue to US-Iran talks in Iraq. 
Official statements continue to assert that Iran will not 
consider discussing other topics than Iraq with the US until the 
US "changes its aggressive behavior" and makes "a gesture of 
goodwill."  It also continues to refuse to meet the precondition 
of suspension of enrichment necessary for talks with the P5-1. 
 
-- (S/NF) Privately, several Iranian contacts have opined that 
these public statements are meant to appease hardliners who 
repeatedly point out that ideologically, nothing has changed 
between the two countries in the last 28 years.  None of our 
sources have claimed any insider knowledge of what Iran is 
likely to raise in the May 28 talks, other than the obvious 
issue of the detained Irbil 5.  An influential source close to 
Rafsanjani reportedly told a contact that he believed that the 
release of the five was a prerequisite to US-Iran talks on Iraq 
at the ministerial level. 
 
¶B. (S)  WHAT TYPES OF DEBATE, IF ANY, ARE OCCURRING IN THE ELITE 
RANKS, THE SUPREME COUNCIL FOR NATIONAL SECURITY, THE EXPEDIENCY 
COUNCIL, OR THE CABINET ABOUT THE TALKS?  WHO IS FOR AND WHO IS 
AGAINST THEM?  AND WHY? 
 
-- (S/NF) Prior to the Sharm el-Sheikh talks, the same source 
close to Rafsanjani told IRPO Director that contact between US 
and Iranian foreign ministers would break a longstanding taboo 
and make other kinds of US-Iran contact easier.  Given that 
there was a degree of exchange in Egypt, albeit not substantive, 
it would appear that such contact had been sanctioned at the 
highest level.  However, the prediction that the taboo would be 
broken has not borne out, as evidenced by the arrest May 8 and 
subsequent charges against Iranian-American academic Haleh 
Esfandiari for working against the Iranian government.  Her 
arrest, as well as other problems facing Iranian-Americans, 
seems designed as a message to scare Iranians off from contact 
with the US.  At the same time, it reflects increased paranoia 
over US intentions toward the regime.  However, it cannot be 
discounted that the Iranian government may try to see Esfandiari 
mostly as a bartering chip for the Irbil 5, a view echoed by 
several contacts.  Another indication of crackdowns on 
interaction with the US, a group of Iranian documentary 
filmmakers planning to travel to the US on an IVLP visit was 
recently hauled into the Ministry of Culture and advised to turn 
down the invitation or face "difficulties." 
 
¶C. (S)  WHO DOES IRAN PLAN TO SEND TO THE TALKS?  WHAT ROLE, IF 
ANY, WILL AHMADI-NEJAD HAVE?  RAFSANJANI?  LARIJANI?  WHO WITHIN 
THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT WILL DETERMINE ATTENDANCE AT THE TALKS? 
 
 
RPO DUBAI 00000036  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
-- (U) The Iranian government has not publicly confirmed who 
will represent Iran in the Baghdad talks.  A May 21 Mehr News 
article claims the Iranian Foreign Ministry intends to send its 
UN PermRep Mohammed-Javed Zarif to lead the talks.  Previous 
Iranian press pieces had speculated that the current Iranian 
Ambassador to Iraq Amir Sa'eed Iravani, Supreme National 
Security Council Undersecretary Mohammed Jafari or former 
Iranian Ambassador to Iraq Kazemi Qomi would head the 
delegation. 
 
-- (C) There appears to be division inside the government over 
who will be the Iranian interlocutor with the US -- as evidenced 
by the delay in the announcement -- which would indicate a power 
struggle over what camp gets the "credit."  In all likelihood, 
the decision will be the Supreme Leader's.  The appointment of 
Zarif would make sense in terms of his experience in dealing 
with the US, but it would be surprising in light of long-term 
efforts by Ahmadi-Nejad to sideline him for being too much in 
the pragmatic camp.  Such a choice would suggest that 
Ahmadi-Nejad has little influence on the decision. 
 
-- (S/NF) We heard more from contacts about the issue of who 
should represent the US in talks at the ministerial level than 
at the ambassadorial level.  One conservative contact close to 
former FM Velayati claimed the reason that there was no 
Secretary Rice-FM Mottaki meeting at Sharm El-Sheikh was because 
 
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it was decided that Mottaki was not the right interlocutor.  The 
contact called Mottaki weak, in contrast to his predecessors FM 
Velayati and Kharrazi who he said were policy advisors as well 
as implementers.  The source claimed that Ahmadi-Nejad had 
chosen Mottaki to be his "puppet." 
 
-- (S/NF) We have heard speculation that Velayati may be 
selected to conduct talks, but it is not clear whether that 
would only be for talks at the ministerial level or also 
ambassadorial.  One source recently returned from Iran said 
there is discussion of creating a new position for Velayati 
within the government, possibly to prepare him to "take over," 
but the source close to Velayati had reportedly told him he was 
doubtful that Velayati would agree to join Ahmadi-Nejad's 
government.  The same source also told IRPO Director that 
Velayati plans to run for president in 2009 but will wait to see 
the results of the 2008 Majles elections before declaring his 
candidacy. 
 
-- (S) One source recently claimed that Supreme National 
Security Council Secretary Larijani is in a relatively weak 
position within the government (and that one of his brothers -- 
not clear which one but presumably Mohammad-Javad Larijani -- 
was more influential than him).  Larijani was described as 
independent from both the Ahmadi-Nejad group and the Rafsanjani 
group. 
 
¶D. (S)  WHAT WILL THEIR MARCHING ORDERS BE?  WHAT DIRECTIVES 
WILL THE PARTICIPANTS BE GIVEN AND WILL THEY HAVE ANY LATITUDE 
TO NEGOTIATE?  WHAT, IF ANYTHING, BESIDES IRAQ ARE 
THE PARTICIPANTS PREPARED TO DISCUSS? WHAT PREPARATIONS FOR 
FOLLOW-ON TALKS, IF ANY, ARE IRANIAN LEADERS MAKING? 
 
--(U) In the only public comment we have seen indicating 
willingness to broaden the agenda, Secretary of the Human Rights 
Headquarters of Iran's Judiciary Mohammad-Javad Larijani said on 
the sidelines of the World Economic Forum in Jordan May 22 that 
it is possible that Iranian and US officials could discuss 
"issues related to Iran" while in Baghdad.  While reiterating to 
IRNA that the talks are being held at the request of Iraqi 
officials on Iraq only, he did not dismiss the possibility of 
broadening the discussions if "Washington shows good will." 
 
¶E. (S)  WHAT ARE IRANIAN LEADERS SAYING ABOUT THEIR GOALS AND 
CONCERNS VIS-A-VIS US ENGAGEMENT?  WHAT ARE THEIR PERCEPTIONS 
ABOUT US INTENTIONS FOR THE TALKS?  WHY ARE IRANIAN LEADERS 
INTERESTED IN HOLDING DIALOGUE NOW? 
 
-- (U) Iranian officials in their public statements are framing 
their agreement to attend the talks as a sign of their good will 
and intentions towards Iraqis and a sign of US weakness.  As 
reported by PressTV, Foreign Minister Mottaki told Jordan's King 
Abdullah May 20 that Iran "will be seeking the correction of 
wrong policies the US has adopted in Iraq when the two countries 
sit down." 
 
--(S/NF) Iranians have long asserted that one of the main 
obstacles to talks with the US is the issue of who will get 
credit for eventual reestablishment of ties.  The contact close 
to Velayati recently claimed to IRPO Director that President 
 
RPO DUBAI 00000036  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
Ahmadi-Nejad's status is weakening and that his only chance of 
being reelected in 2009 is opening relations with the US.  This 
source claimed that Ahmadi-Nejad's personal ambition would 
triumph over his ideological opposition to dealing with the US. 
The same source also claimed Rafsanjani's relative strength has 
grown over the past five months.  Subsequent to this 
conversation, former nuclear negotiator Mousavian was arrested, 
and we heard that his arrest made others, including Velayati and 
Rafsanjani, very nervous.  This would indicate they do not 
believe themselves to be untouchable. 
 
Public perceptions 
------------ 
 
3.(S/NF) At the popular level, prior to the Iraq conference at 
Sharm el-Sheikh, we heard there was lots of excitement in Iran 
about prospects of Rice-Mottaki meeting, with people handing out 
sweets to celebrate.  Regarding the Baghdad talks, people seem 
to believe both governments' statements that the content will be 
restricted to Iraq, but some Iranians say they see these talks 
as a first step toward better relations.  The source close to 
Velayati told IRPO Director that most in the Iranian government 
are dying for a green light from US on engagement, motivated in 
part by the very bad state of economy.  We heard indirectly that 
a major Bazaari leader, reportedly close to the Supreme Leader 
and an informal advisor to Ahmadi-Nejad, said Iran should have 
relations with the US. 
 
4.(C) A negative note about the talks was struck by several 
civil society activists, who indicated to IRPoffs concern that 
if talks led to political deals between US and Iran, the US 
would drop the subject of human rights and democratic reform in 
Iran. 
 
5.(C) Comment:  Facing growing international pressure and 
increased blame by its own population for its economic and 
political problems, the government may see in talks on Iraq with 
the US a way to deflect domestic and international criticism and 
project a more pragmatic image.  It may hope that positive 
traction in talks will help forestall stepped-up UNSC sanctions 
against it.  It may also genuinely hope that such talks will 
lead to broader engagement.  However, the charges against 
Esfandiari could indicate an effort by opponents in Iran to 
torpedo any kind of engagement with the US.  The arrest very 
likely indicates Iran will continue its internal crackdown on 
civil society and view with suspicion any links with the US -- 
other than any in which it directly participates. 
 
 
 
 
DAVIS 
BURNS