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O 300824Z MAY 07
FM AMCONSUL HONG KONG
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1778
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 HONG KONG 001447 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR DENNIS WILDER 
DEPT FOR EAP/CM 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/30/2032 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR PREL SOCI CH HK MC
SUBJECT: HONG KONG DEMOCRATIC PARTY INVESTIGATES PRC 
INFILTRATORS 
 
REF: HONG KONG 458 
 
Classified By: Acting E/P Chief Jeff Zaiser.  Reasons: 1.4(b,d). 
 
¶1. (S) Summary:  Democratic Party (DP) legislator James To 
(strictly protect), who is chair of the Hong Kong Legislative 
Council (Legco) Security Panel, warned us in early February 
2007 that infiltrators from Beijing had successfully 
penetrated the DP and put it in a "dangerous position" (ref). 
 At that time, To said the DP had identified several 
infiltrators from Beijing who had "challenged the stability 
of the party."  In early May, the Falun Gong newspaper "Epoch 
Times" reported that a DP "special panel" had conducted an 
eight-month investigation to assess the infiltration 
allegations and provide recommendations to strengthen the 
party's defenses against political sappers.  The special 
panel's key findings, based largely on oral interviews and 
analysis of emails submitted by DP members, included: a) 
Chinese personnel had provided or attempted to provide many 
DP members with benefits; b) Chinese personnel had extensive 
contacts with DP members and tried to influence them, buy 
their loyalty, guide their speeches, plot their behaviors, 
intervene with the party's operations, affect party unity, 
and weaken the party's capabilities; c) DP members had 
deliberately tried to "plant votes"; d) members who had close 
contacts with Chinese personnel had formed a faction within 
the party to spread false information, foment discord, and 
generally create internal discord to undermine the party's 
credibility and image; e) some staff personnel failed to 
report their close contacts with Chinese personnel, got 
involved in "planting votes" and factional activities, and 
spread false information and messages. To date, the contents 
of the report have not been made public.  End Summary. 
(Note:  Paragraph 2 below includes excerpts from the first 28 
pages of Chinese-language text in the report.  The entire 
report, once translated, will be posted in Chinese and 
English languages for broader USG consumption.  End note.) 
 
PRC Infiltrations of Hong Kong's Democratic Party 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶2. (S) The DP special panel, including Cheung Yin Tung 
(convener), Chan Ka Wai, Martin Lee, Szeto Wah, and Tsui Hon 
Kwong, expressed broad concern that DP staff personnel had 
become the targets of infiltration.  Their proposals were 
based on five primary concerns that resulted from the 
investigation, which follow below.  (Note:  Excerpts from the 
report, as translated from Chinese to English, are provided 
in lightly edited form.  In the same report, the term 
"Chinese personnel" was defined to include:  (1) state 
leaders and personnel who have close contacts with the 
mainland government; (2) official organizations such as 
Xinhua News Agency, Office of the Central Liaison Department, 
the Office of Hong Kong and Macao Affairs, the United Front 
Department, the National Security Department, the Public 
Security Department, and provincial governments; (3) academic 
organizations, including university institutes and institutes 
of all descriptions; and (4) business organizations, 
including those operated with Chinese funds.  End note.) 
 
a) The special panel learned from talks with DP members that 
Chinese personnel had provided or attempted to provide many 
Democratic Party members with benefits.  Because the special 
panel did not have investigative authority, it could only 
entertain information voluntarily provided by participating 
members.  The party was concerned that Chinese personnel also 
would attempt to provide benefits to other members, that some 
members already had accepted their benefits, or that some 
members had been bribed by Chinese personnel and infiltrated 
the party. 
 
b) The special panel learned from talking to members that 
large numbers of so-called middlemen, communicators and 
information collectors of China have had constant contacts 
with lawmakers of the party, Central Committee Standing 
Committee members, party members and the party's staff 
workers, but that some of these people had not reported their 
contacts according to the party's report system.  Then, when 
the special panel requested the personnel concerned to 
provide information, they would either conceal the 
information or provide false information.  Meanwhile, quite a 
number of Chinese personnel had often advised the members 
with whom they had contacts not to report these contacts to 
the party.  The panel was concerned whether, if party members 
had regular and extended contacts with Chinese personnel, or 
had accepted their benefits and had hidden the contacts from 
the party, the DP would know and whether the party's system 
had loopholes that Chinese personnel could exploit in order 
 
HONG KONG 00001447  002 OF 002 
 
 
to gradually influence party members' minds, buy their 
loyalty, tell them what to say and plot their actions, 
thereby intervening the party's operations, affecting the 
party's unity, dividing the party and weakening the party's 
capabilities. 
 
c) The panel learned that some members, with the deliberate 
attempt to plant votes, had recommended a large number of 
people to become new members.  The panel expressed concern 
that such members, instead of paying attention to whether the 
applicants were people who identified with the party's 
beliefs or whether they would take part in the activities of 
the party and only pay attention to increasing the number of 
new members so that they can play "human-head politics" 
during the party congress and party elections.  The panel 
noted concerns over the party's current "liberal" membership 
system and its "loopholes," including opportunities for 
members to be bribed, infiltrated into and divided.  The 
report also expressed concern that "the scheme plotted for 
quite sometime" could change the DP's support for democracy 
and other objectives prescribed in its charter, thereby 
changing the party's stand, political platform and basic 
nature. 
 
d) The special panel held that "a healthy phenomenon" had 
resulted from the different views within the party, through 
exchanges and debates, that lead to competition and "rotation 
of leading hierarchies."  However, the panel learned that 
certain members who had close contacts with Chinese personnel 
had formed factions within the party and then, through 
disseminating misinformation and through provocations, 
including divisive activities, instigations and abusing 
authority, attacked members of other factions, causing 
internal dissensions, struggles and scandals, thereby 
undermining the party's credibility, tarnishing the image of 
the party, and exhausting the party's operational capability. 
 
 
e) The special panel learned from the information provided by 
members that some paid staff workers of the DP took an 
"active part" in activities such as:  having contacts with 
Chinese personnel, planting votes, and participating in 
factional activities.  The panel noted its concern about 
those staff workers who are in control of the party's 
information, and even classified information, would become 
"objects susceptible to infiltration." 
 
¶3. (S) Several events probably sparked, or exacerbated 
interest in, the DP's investigation.  First, the DP 
historically, but especially following the historic July 1, 
2003 pro-democracy rally, increasingly has grown concerned 
about mainland monitoring of its activities and membership. 
Also, since early 2006 there has been a widening rift between 
mainstream and reformist factions, intensifying internal 
struggles among party members.  In May 2006, the so-called 
"Real Brother" incident, involving the discovery on the 
Internet of confidential email exchanges criticizing DP 
leaders, further fanned charges of infiltration and internal 
party struggles.  In June 2006, the legal requirement under 
Hong Kong's Companies Ordinance for all political parties to 
publish their membership lists increased pressure on the DP. 
(Note:  The DP registered as a company, similar to other 
major political parties in Hong Kong, when it was launched in 
¶1994.  End note.)  As a result, a few dozen members resigned 
from the party, in part due to concerns that their safety or 
business on the mainland would be jeopardized.  Finally, in 
July-August 2006 consideration and passage of new covert 
surveillance legislation further intensified concerns over 
communications security, including among political parties 
such as the DP and Civic Party. 
 
¶4. (S) Comment: In his remarks to us in early February, James 
To claimed that "the U.S. Government needs to know what is 
happening to the Democratic Party, because it is the only one 
who can put a stop to infiltrations from the mainland." 
Through that statement and his subsequent provision of the 
DP's investigative report, To may have sought to influence 
rather than inform the USG; however, the level of detail 
included in the report, as well as potential repercusions 
arising from his rather transparent collusion with the USG -- 
including an open email with the report attached -- seem to 
suggest that its contents and purpose are genuine.  End 
comment. 
Sakaue