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PP RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHGH RUEHHM RUEHNH RUEHVC
DE RUEHCHI #0092/01 1380832
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P 180832Z MAY 07
FM AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0477
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0046
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY 0002
RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI PRIORITY 0524
RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 0017
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 0010
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0018
RUEHUM/AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR PRIORITY 0005
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0010

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 CHIANG MAI 000092 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  5/18/2017 
TAGS: PREF PGOV PREL PHUM TH KN CH
SUBJECT: NORTH KOREAN REFUGEE FLOW INTO THAILAND SURGES 
 
REF: A. BANGKOK 2404, B. 06 CHIANG MAI 79, C.CHIANG MAI 50 
 
CHIANG MAI 00000092  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: John Spykerman, Political Officer, CG Chiang Mai, 
Department of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY. The ever-increasing North Korean refugee flow 
into Thailand is disrupting the RTG's ability to handle the wave 
of those seeking to use Thailand as a conduit to resettlement in 
a third country. Many sources believe the new RTG plan to 
process resettlement cases with Republic of Korea (ROK) at the 
point of detainment without involvement of the United Nations 
High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) will eventually break down 
under the pressure of thousands of North Koreans reportedly 
waiting in southern China for their chance to slip into 
Thailand.  If the path to South Korean resettlement becomes 
rockier, more refugees may seek assistance outside of this 
process, opening the door to more requests for resettlement to 
other countries and exposing the refugees to greater trafficking 
and health risks as their stopover in Thailand becomes longer 
and less controlled. END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (C) PolOff visited Chiang Rai in mid-May to assess recent 
changes in RTG policies regarding the processing of North Korean 
refugees for resettlement in South Korea (ref A). The new policy 
directs the resettlement process to occur at the point of entry 
and eliminates UNHCR's facilitating role in the North Koreans' 
resettlement requests. Under the agreement, local police arrest 
refugees after they enter Thailand, the local courts then charge 
and convict the refugees with illegally entering the country, 
refugees pay a fine or serve a few days in a local jail, and are 
then sent to the Immigration Detention Center (IDC) in Mae Sai 
for resettlement processing by ROK officials. Under the previous 
system, refugees were held at the Mae Sai IDC only until a large 
enough group was ready to be sent to the Bangkok IDC for 
processing by the UNHCR and ROK. The new system is supposed to 
reduce the number of days refugees are under RTG care -- often 
more than 30 days under the previous system -- although it is 
not apparent local facilities or budgets are able to house ever 
increasing numbers of North Koreans, or whether the time served 
under detainment will actually be any shorter. 
 
Some 700 Refugees Likely to Be Detained This Year 
 
¶3. (S) The number of North Korean refugees entering Thailand has 
grown dramatically in recent years, now averaging 60 new 
detainees in Chiang Rai province each month. Thai border 
enforcement caught 40 refugees crossing the Mekong River into 
Thailand in all of 2003. By 2006, the number of refugees 
surrendering to police in Chiang Rai had increased to 367. In 
the first four months of 2007, immigration officials at the Mae 
Sai border crossing say they processed some 235 North Korean 
refugees, with another 58 people currently housed at the local 
detention center. Officials expect to detain more than 700 North 
Koreans by year's end. In addition to these, an unknown number 
of North Koreans have made directly for Bangkok, where they 
either turn themselves in to immigration police there or seek 
shelter at safe houses run by missionaries. Sources vary widely 
on how many North Koreans are in China preparing to seek 
resettlement via Thailand. Some media reports tag the number at 
up to 100,000, but Consulate General Chengdu notes the ROK CG in 
Chengdu pegged the figure at closer to 4,000 in Yunnan Province. 
 
¶4. (C) Despite this growth, refugee demographics remain 
consistent. Refugees are overwhelmingly female and aged 25-55, 
with small numbers of older men and children. Chiang Rai 
officials involved in the detainment process say most are from 
rural areas in North Korea, but appear to be at least modestly 
educated. Sources familiar with refugee trafficking networks 
explain that women are better able to find employment and 
occasionally husbands during their long trek through China and 
thus able to support the costs of travel, while many working-age 
males cannot escape military and farming commitments in North 
Korea. Immigration officials say most refugees arrive with only 
minor health concerns, such as malnourishment or dehydration, 
although they monitor children and the elderly for further signs 
of illness. 
 
A Better Understanding of the Causes, But Not Much Progress on 
the Solutions 
 
CHIANG MAI 00000092  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶5. (C) In a similar trip to Chiang Rai last year, PolOff noted 
that provincial officials were perplexed at why they were 
dealing with refugees from a country that does not border 
Thailand (ref B). This year, in contrast, everyone from the 
governor down to mid-level immigration officers is well-informed 
about the path North Koreans follow on a months-long trek across 
China and eventually into Thailand. Many officials express a 
rueful sense of pride that North Koreans single out Thailand as 
an oasis of compassionate understanding in a region of 
unsympathetic governments that would likely push the refugees 
back, even though this compassion (or rather, lack of overt 
hostility) is what drives more refugees to come here and cause 
headaches for Thai bureaucrats. 
 
¶6. (C) However, this greater understanding has not led to 
noticeably better solutions. Although the new policy requires 
ROK processing to occur at Mae Sai (along with another detention 
center in central Thailand for those detained in and around 
Bangkok), many Chiang Rai officials have not had contact with 
ROK Embassy representatives. In fact, local police officers are 
still at a loss on how to cope with the language barrier, mostly 
relying on local Korean expats who charge up to $20 USD per hour 
for translation, or how to handle increased food and 
transportation expenses for arresting the refugees. Chiang Rai 
officials say their border security budgets must absorb these 
additional costs, while last year's promises of increased ROK 
interpretation and dietary assistance have yet to materialize. 
 
¶7. (C) There is also a disconnect between a process that 
encourages more refugees to enter Thailand and the approach 
preferred by local police and military officers, especially in 
the Third Army, who would deny more refugees entry. Chiang Rai's 
police chief even speaks longingly of U.S. anti-illegal 
immigration tactics used on the Mexican border. Police told 
PolOff they are aware of a number of South Korean expats and 
religious organizations in northern Thailand -- nominally 
serving on missions to ethnic minority groups -- that are likely 
bases of support for traffickers, but that Bangkok is not 
interested in a more confrontational investigation of the 
organizations' operations. Police likewise see little hope of 
working with Lao and Burmese border officials to better monitor 
incoming refugee groups. Officials in those two countries prefer 
to ignore the refugees and allow them to continue on downriver 
to Thailand, recognizing that to detain them would be to become 
responsible for them. 
 
An Already Crowded Detention Center 
 
¶8. (C) The Mae Sai IDC is ill-prepared to house large numbers of 
refugees, despite RTG assurances otherwise. Formerly used as a 
stop for illegal Burmese migrant workers who would be deported 
the next day, the IDC is now home to dozens of North Koreans who 
spend weeks at a time there. The two detention rooms, separated 
by gender, are located on the second floor of the IDC. Each room 
is about 100 square meters and, according to immigration 
officials, able to hold 100 people. This stated capacity, 
however, is unrealistic for holding detainees over long periods 
of time under humane conditions. On the day PolOff visited, both 
rooms were packed with 48 North Korean women and children housed 
on one side, while 10 North Korean males were in the other room 
with a large group of ethnic Shan migrant workers from Burma 
detained for the day. On the women's side, detainees took turns 
sleeping on the floor, while others huddled together or tended 
to the half-dozen toddlers crawling over their resting mothers. 
Refugees receive three meals a day, but must spend their entire 
period of detention in these unfurnished (except for a toilet 
and sink) rooms. Immigration sources say if the IDC becomes more 
crowded they will house some detainees off-site. With most North 
Koreans hoping for a quick exit from Thailand, officials 
anticipate little flight risk at these low-security, improvised 
detainment centers. Of greater concern for them is where to find 
the budget to establish these overflow sites. 
 
Security and Safety Concerns Emerging 
 
¶9. (C) Local officials recognize that even with on-site 
resettlement processing, any further increase in refugees will 
overwhelm their system. Chiang Rai's police chief said that 
completion of the R3A highway connecting China and Thailand 
through Laos later this year will lead to far greater numbers of 
 
CHIANG MAI 00000092  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
refugees, who now make the 400-km trip mostly by riverboat (ref 
C). With few options for housing detainees beyond the IDC and 
word spreading quickly about the undesirable conditions there, 
officials expect more refugees will try to make their own way to 
Bangkok or seek assistance and shelter from organizations 
throughout the country, instead of immediately turning 
themselves in to police at the border as most do now. Claiming 
that the U.S. policy of resettling ethnic Hmong from Laos 
encouraged more Hmong to enter Thailand illegally, Chiang Rai 
Gov. Amorapun Nimanandh predicted that more North Koreans will 
look to the United States if refugees encounter problems with 
the current resettlement processing. 
 
¶10. (C) Police also highlighted several areas of concern for 
refugees' safety in the event that greater numbers overwhelm the 
system. With the ROK offering thousands of dollars to resettled 
refugees, more profit-oriented individuals are getting involved 
in trafficking operations and charging a cut of this allotment 
as repayment for their services. If the processing operation 
breaks down or faces significant delays, many North Koreans will 
find themselves stuck in Thailand facing significant debts -- 
opening the door to further trafficking-in-persons risks. Chiang 
Rai's police chief also worried that the ability to distinguish 
legitimate refugees from people with other motives would 
diminish if immigration officials become even more pressed for 
resources. 
 
Comment: More Refugees, More Headaches 
 
¶11. (C) The recent tweaking of RTG refugee procedures to process 
resettlement cases at the border may keep the problem out of 
sight in the capital, but the larger issue at stake is that this 
program designed to handle a few dozen cases at a time ignores 
the thousands of North Koreans reportedly waiting for their turn 
to come down the Mekong River. Those who have spoken with the 
refugees say South Korea remains their preferred resettlement 
choice due to three factors: family connections between the two 
Koreas, the financial incentive of the ROK's resettlement 
payment, and the for-now endurable RTG arrest and detainment 
process. However, if conditions worsen in terms of the length of 
detainment and crowding in IDC cells, refugees will likely seek 
out new routes and head to Bangkok or elsewhere, overwhelming 
RTG border security and creating headaches for UNHCR offices and 
foreign missions anyway. 
CAMP