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DE RUEHWN #0573/01 1292141
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P 092141Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4689
INFO RUCNCOM/EC CARICOM COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 1714
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 0091
RUEHCV/USDAO CARACAS VE PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0111
RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM J2 MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM J5 MIAMI FL PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRIDGETOWN 000573 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA/CAR 
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/07/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR EAID AC DO GJ IS VC VE XL
SUBJECT: (C) GRENADA PM MITCHELL ON CHAVEZ'S BAD LIST? 
 
REF: A. BRIDGETOWN 509 
     ¶B. 06 BRIDGETOWN 315 
     ¶C. 06 BRIDGETOWN 294 
 
Classified By: DCM Mary Ellen T. Gilroy for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C)  Summary:  In a somewhat tense mid-April meeting with 
Charge, Grenada's Keith Mitchell shared his fears that 
strongly leftist Caribbean leaders, led by St. Vincent's 
Ralph Gonsalves, had persuaded Hugo Chavez that the 
pro-American Grenada government should not receive further 
Venezuelan assistance.  Mitchell bewailed the non-receipt of 
some two-thirds of the USD 30 million Chavez had apparently 
promised Grenada (timeframe unclear).  In an indirect apology 
for Grenada's lack of convergence with the U.S. on UN and OAS 
voting, Mitchell claimed he could not control his ambassadors 
and requested that Charge send him demarches directly.  The 
PM also mentioned that Israel had offered him a state visit, 
presumably in exchange for Grenada's support in multilateral 
fora.  Mitchell has a history of running to U.S. diplomats 
when he is in trouble (reftels).  His overriding focus, like 
that of his Eastern Caribbean colleagues across the 
ideological spectrum, is keeping resources flowing in to 
ensure his political survival.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) Charge d'Affaires Karen Jo McIsaac met with Grenada 
Prime Minister Keith Mitchell on April 19 at his request. 
Mitchell expressed his happiness with the April 13-15 visit 
to Grenada of CODEL Engel (ref A).  After a long 
recapitulation of his relationship with Cuba's Fidel 
Castro--generally good--and with Venezuela's Hugo 
Chavez--uncertain--Mitchell arrived at the message he wanted 
to pass to the USG:  he is convinced that "Ralph is dirtying 
me with Chavez," referring to PM Ralph Gonsalves of St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines (SVG).  Mitchell continued that 
"he (Gonsalves) is carrying Roosevelt (PM Roosevelt Skerrit 
of Dominica) and possibly Baldwin (PM & MFA Baldwin Spencer 
of Antigua) with him" in damaging Mitchell's standing with 
Chavez. 
 
PERFORMING FOR DON FIDEL AND DON HUGO 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Reaching back to a public event in Cuba that probably 
took place in early 2006, Mitchell described his discomfort 
at appearing on the podium after SVG PM Gonsalves delivered a 
fiery anti-American tirade.  Mitchell could not match the 
rhetoric as the PM assured Charge that he values Grenada's 
relationship with the United States and will not jeopardize 
it by engaging in public denunciations.  Mitchell said he 
could tell Castro was not happy with his (Mitchell's) more 
measured intervention, the first time Mitchell has felt such 
disapproval from the Cuban leader. 
 
¶4. (C) According to PM Mitchell, Venezuela had promised USD 
30 million in assistance to Grenada but the country has only 
received USD 9 million.  Given what happened in Cuba, 
Mitchell said he is convinced Grenada will not see any more. 
Chavez promised to visit Grenada, but has never asked to 
come, though he has visited St. Vincent and St. Lucia.  For 
the first time, Mitchell provided a breakdown of expected 
Venezuelan assistance, in U.S. dollars (Charge has tried to 
get this before without success): 
 
- USD 10 million:  hospital construction 
- USD 10 million:  construction of low-income housing 
- USD  4 million:  youth development 
- USD  5 million:  material assistance to low-income 
Grenadians 
- USD  1 million:  youth rehabilitation 
 
Mitchell is convinced that Gonsalves, and perhaps the other 
Eastern Caribbean leaders he mentioned, are behind 
Venezuela's failure to deliver on further installments of its 
promised assistance. 
 
¶5. (C) Mitchell characterized Gonsalves as very close to "my 
political opponents, all of whom are strongly 
left-of-center."  Grenada's Prime Minister added that he is 
convinced that, if he takes a strong stance against Chavez, 
Gonsalves will fund the Grenadian opposition in a big way, or 
"more than he already may be doing."  In response to a 
question about campaign financing laws, Mitchell said there 
is no law against taking money from non-Grenadians, only the 
anti-money laundering laws requiring the reporting of imports 
of large amounts of money. 
 
MULTILATERAL CHALLENGES 
----------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Having finished with Venezuelan assistance, Mitchell 
moved on to UN and OAS votes.  He told Charge that he was 
speaking as a friend, but wanted to point out U.S. errors in 
trying to garner Eastern Caribbean support in multilateral 
fora.  In particular, he spoke about the 2005 vote for the 
OAS Secretary General when the United States supported El 
Salvador's former President Francisco Flores.  Mitchell said 
that if we had asked him first, he could have told us Flores 
would not get Caribbean support.  Charge accepted the 
criticism but pointed out that we do engage Grenada's 
ambassadors in Washington and New York on issues of 
importance to the United States at the UN and the OAS all the 
time.  She suggested that Grenada's ambassadors may not be 
serving the country well if they are not communicating what 
the U.S. tells them to the GOG.  In one case, Charge was 
aware that Grenada's ambassador at the UN appeared to be 
deliberately avoiding the U.S ambassador charged with 
briefing Caribbean ambassadors.  In addition to U.S. 
diplomats demarching Grenada's ambassadors in New York and 
Washington, Charge added, the Embassy in St. George's 
provides the information to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and International Trade, generally via diplomatic note, but 
when the issue is really urgent, by telephone as well. 
 
¶7. (C) In a burst of candor, Mitchell admitted that he had 
trouble controlling his ambassadors, particularly Ruth Rouse, 
who was at the UN until recently.  She was recalled several 
months ago and replaced by Angus Friday.  Rouse was very 
close to the opposition National Democratic Congress (NDC) 
and Mitchell did not trust her not to tell NDC leaders in 
advance about actions he wanted taken.  In one instance, 
Mitchell said, when he asked Rouse why she voted a particular 
way, she told him she had talked to other CARICOM member 
ambassadors about how they were voting and followed their 
lead.  (Note:  During the CODEL's visit, Grenada's Ambassador 
to the U.S. and the OAS since 1995, Denis Antoine, told 
Charge that he was "appalled" when he saw Grenada's UN and 
OAS voting record.  His remark seems disingenuous, as though 
he was suddenly noticing what we have complained about for 
years--and that he had nothing to do with it.  End Note.) 
 
¶8. (C) Mitchell said he wants to improve Grenada's relations 
with Israel and asked that Charge let the GOG know of votes 
coming up where it would be "easy for Grenada to support 
Israel."  Israel has apparently offered Mitchell a state 
visit.  Charge reiterated that we provide lots of information 
about votes during UNGA and other UN and OAS meetings.  The 
Prime Minister asked that Charge fax them to his office 
directly when they are important.  Charge agreed to do so. 
Mitchell concluded by saying he does not want Grenada to be 
too robotic in its voting. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶9. (C) Mitchell appeared to have trouble getting to the point 
in the conversation, going over ground he has covered in 
multiple other conversations with Charge as well as with the 
Ambassador and other U.S. officials (reftels).  There were 
several moments when Charge thought he was not going to 
actually say anything significant, an unusual hesitancy for a 
very skilled public speaker and thorough politician.  At 
times the Prime Minister appeared to be in physical pain, 
squirming in his seat, squinting, and not finding anyplace to 
rest his hands.  When at last he blurted out Gonsalves' name, 
he seemed relieved, flopping back in his chair limply, arms 
outspread, and resting his head against the back.  Once 
through that point, the conversation turned brisk and 
matter-of-fact. 
 
¶10. (C) Mitchell may have gotten the message about USG 
disappointment with Grenada's voting record in multilateral 
fora, although Venezuela's lack of follow-through on 
assistance may be what has finally driven him to look 
elsewhere for support.  With about 20 percent of homes in 
Grenada still suffering from some level of damage from 
 
Hurricanes Ivan (2004) and Emily (2005), the PM is clearly 
thinking about maintaining his razor-thin political edge (one 
vote in parliament) over the opposition.  This is the first 
crack Charge has seen in the close relationship between 
Grenada and Venezuela.  We have an opportunity to gently peel 
Grenada away from the Eastern Caribbean pack if we move 
carefully.  CODEL Engel gave Mitchell hope that the United 
States may be prepared to engage again, which may have helped 
him get over his obvious reluctance to air internal Eastern 
Caribbean dirty laundry. 
OURISMAN