VZCZCXYZ0021
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHRL #1019/01 1381708
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 181708Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8325
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 8265
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 1806
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 1043
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 8802
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0528
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 1470
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
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RHMFIUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

UNCLAS BERLIN 001019 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR ISN, EUR, WHA, CAN, EAP/J 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM MNUC PREL ETTC GM JA RS CACM UK FR IT
SUBJECT: THIRD G-8 NONPROLIFERATION DIRECTORS' GROUP (NPDG) 
MEETING IN BERLIN, MAY 14, 2007 
 
REF: A. BERLIN 834 
     ¶B. BERLIN 791 
     ¶C. BERLIN 376 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: The third G-8 Nonproliferation Directors' 
Group (NPDG) meeting under the German G-8 Presidency took 
place May 14 in Berlin.  The delegates reviewed a 
German-produced draft statement on nonproliferation for the 
June G-8 Summit in Heiligendamm but were unable to reach 
consensus on the wording of the text.  The delegates 
essentially did agree on language concerning Iran's and North 
Korea's nuclear programs and on India's efforts to strengthen 
its nonproliferation regime.  The delegates agreed to a 
number of changes in the draft text, many of which were 
requested by the U.S.; but consensus was not reached on key 
U.S. priorities, specifically the U.S. proposal to extend and 
expand the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons 
and Materials of Mass Destruction (GP), and language 
maintaining the G-8 moratorium on the transfer of enrichment 
and reprocessing (ENR) technology.  The delegates did not 
reach consensus on the EU's desire to be included in the 
Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.  Because 
consensus was not reached on these and other issues at the 
meeting, the German Chair offered to revise the German draft 
with bracketed language as necessary and re-circulate it. 
(Note: the follow-on draft was circulated May 15.  End note.) 
The German Chair suggested that the G-8 Sherpas or possibly 
even ministers would have to forge consensus language on the 
key outstanding issues.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) German Chair Ruediger Luedeking, MFA Deputy 
Commissioner for Arms Control and Disarmament, began the 
meeting by asking for input on the draft Heiligendamm 
Statement on Nonproliferation.  After delegates voiced 
complaints or made suggestions concerning the first few 
paragraphs, the U.S. delegate, DAS Andrew Semmel, stated the 
U.S. proposal to extend the GP for an additional 10 years 
beyond 2012, to commit an additional USD $20 billion for the 
10-year extension, to expand the GP geographically to 
countries other than Russia and Ukraine, and to expand the 
scope of projects to address new and emerging WMD and missile 
threats globally.  British Delegate Paul Arkwright said the 
UK supports "some elements" of the U.S. proposal and urged 
that the G-8 Summit Declaration on Nonproliferation 
acknowledge that the threats posed by materials of mass 
destruction will continue beyond the GP's final year of 2012 
and that the G-8 will address the threats beyond that date. 
Russian Delegate Anatoliy Antonov repeated Russia's argument 
that the G-8 should not consider GP extension and expansion 
until all the current commitments to destroy Russia's 
chemical weapons stocks, to finish dismantling Russia's 
decommissioned nuclear submarines, and to secure radiological 
materials in Russia are fulfilled.  Antonov reiterated 
Russia's complaint that only a small percentage of the 
pledged funds have actually been spent on GP projects in 
Russia and said that more needs to be done to make the 
process more efficient.  Because the other delegates failed 
to support all elements of the U.S. language on the GP's 
extension and expansion and because the G-8 Sherpas and the 
GPWG had not reached consensus on the U.S. proposal, the 
German chair said he would not include the language in the 
new draft of the Nonproliferation Statement that he was 
producing. (Note: The text of the U.S.-proposed language on 
the Global Partnership was included in Luedeking's cover 
letter circulated with the text of the revised statement May 
¶15.  End note.) 
 
¶3. (SBU) DAS Semmel observed that several other G-8 partners 
were sympathetic to the idea of expanding the GP 
geographically and programmatically and that the U.S. 
proposal was divisible into its component parts.  DAS Semmel 
notified the other delegates that he expected Secretary Rice 
to issue a ministerial letter on GP expansion during the week 
of May 21 and then make the proposal at the May 30 G-8 
Ministerial Meeting. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The delegates discussed the recently completed 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Preparatory Committee 
meeting in Vienna, observing that Iran hijacked much of the 
time by arguing over procedural matters.  Nevertheless, the 
 
NPDG delegates wished to stress that the NPT PrepCom meeting 
concluded successfully, paving the way for a productive 2010 
Review Conference later in the year. 
 
¶5. (SBU) In the paragraph on ENR transfers, other delegates 
did not agree to the U.S. attempt to insert language 
effectively retaining the moratorium agreed to in previous 
G-8 Summit statements.  Canadian Delegate Michael Blackmore 
stated that he was under strict instructions not to agree to 
a continuation of the moratorium.  He suggested that the 
longer the moratorium continued, the more it began to look 
like a ban and that this is unacceptable in the case of 
states that strictly adhere to their nonproliferation 
obligations.  The German Chair and Japanese Delegate Takashi 
Nakane also stated that their governments could no longer 
support a continuation of the moratorium. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Delegates agreed on most of the language to deplore 
Iran's failure to meet its obligations under UNSC Resolutions 
1696, 1737, and 1747.  In addition, delegates essentially 
agreed to insert language supporting the Six-Party Talks 
concerning North Korea's nuclear program and condemning its 
October 2006 detonation of a nuclear device.  DAS Semmel 
persuaded the delegates to drop Japanese language to condemn 
North Korea's record of abductions, arguing that although the 
U.S. and the G-8 are sympathetic to Japan's position, such an 
issue is out of place in a statement on nonproliferation and 
could complicate further the six-party deliberations. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Luedeking repeated his suggestion that the U.S. and 
Russia allow EU institutions to join the Global Initiative to 
Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GI), at least as observers.  He 
inserted bracketed language in his text to request EU 
institutions to join.  His argument was that the EU is not an 
international organization but a supranational organization 
over the member states; therefore, to admit it into the GI 
would not set a precedent for other international 
organizations to join.  EU Council Delegate Annalisa 
Giannella echoed Luedeking's comments, and EU Commission 
Delegate Lars-Erik Lundin noted that the Commission signed 
the IAEA Additional Protocol on behalf of the EU because some 
EU member states lacked the competency to sign it on their 
own.  The EU delegates suggested that the same principle 
should apply for the GI.  Japanese Delegate Nakane said if 
Russia's and the USG's goal is to increase participation in 
the GI, then they should accept EU institutions.  Russian 
Delegate Antonov responded that Moscow and Washington wanted 
each EU member state to agree to the GI Statement of 
Principles first before the two would consider allowing EU 
institutions to join, and then only as observers.  Luedeking 
responded that some EU members could not join the GI on their 
own because they cannot fulfill the conditions in the absence 
of EU membership.  DAS Semmel repeated the concept behind the 
GI is that sovereign states -- but not international 
organizations -- will participate in activities jointly.  He 
requested the EU Commission finish its paper on GI 
participation and said it needed to be submitted to 
Washington and Moscow for study before any other action could 
be taken. 
 
¶8. (SBU) The German Chair ended the meeting by suggesting a 
mid-November date for the next NPDG meeting.  He also said he 
would revise the draft and circulate it May 15 for review. 
After receiving input from the delegates, he will rewrite the 
draft for submission to the G-8 Sherpas.  If the NPDG-level 
delegates are unable to reach consensus, then the Sherpas may 
be able to, Luedeking noted. 
 
¶9. (U) This cable was coordinated with DAS Semmel subsequent 
to the delegation's departure. 
TIMKEN JR