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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000773 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/MARCHESE/HARDING 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/31/2017 
TAGS: IS LE PGOV PREL PTER SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON:  CODEL LEAHY MEETS WITH PM SINIORA 
 
 
BEIRUT 00000773  001.3 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By:  Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman.  Reason: Section 1.4 (b) 
. 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1.  (C)  On 5/31, PM Siniora conveyed to CODEL Leahy his 
sincere gratitude for U.S. leadership in yesterday's UN 
Security Council vote for resolution 1757, which will 
establish the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.  He said the June 
10 sunset clause was almost irrelevant because Speaker Berri 
will continue to block Lebanon's parliament from meeting. 
Although Siniora believes Syria will try to respond with acts 
of political violence, the establishment of the tribunal 
means their ability to act in Lebanon with impunity is 
finally nearing its end.  The Prime Minister informed Senator 
Leahy and his colleagues that although the GOL desires a 
negotiated end to the presence of Fatah al-Islam (FAI) in the 
Nahr al-Barid refugee camp near Tripoli, his government will 
not hesitate to employ the army to eliminate the terrorist 
organization.  Siniora believes without a doubt that the 
Syrian regime has funded and is now directing FAI.  If the 
Lebanese army attacks FAI, Siniora does not believe unrest 
will spread to Lebanon's 11 other Palestinian refugee camps. 
Finally, Siniora urged the U.S. and its international allies 
to understand that the recently renewed Middle East peace 
proposal put forth by Saudi Arabia is the best means to not 
only solve the long-standing Palestinian issue, but is the 
key to ensuring Israel's long-term security and peace.  End 
summary. 
 
¶2.  (C)  Prime Minister Fouad Siniora met with Senators 
Patrick Leahy, Thad Cochran, Chuck Hagel, Ken Salazar, 
Benjamin Cardin, Representative Peter Welch, and the 
Ambassador at the Grand Serail on May 31.  The Prime Minister 
was assisted by senior advisor Rola Nouraddine.  The 
ubiquitous Siniora advisor, Ambassador Mohamed Chatah, was 
not present since he was returning from New York following 
his lobbying efforts on behalf of UN Security Council 
Resolution 1757.  PM Siniora was in an expansive mood, 
expressing great satisfaction with yesterday's developments 
and was hopeful that the worst days for Lebanon's struggling 
democracy were now past. 
 
IMPACT OF THE TRIBUNAL 
---------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C)  PM Siniora expressed great relief and satisfaction 
to his visitors that the Special Tribunal is now a reality, 
despite "the best efforts of Syria" to destabilize Lebanon 
and destroy the court.  He emphasized the "absolutely 
essential" leadership role played by the U.S. in the UN 
Security Council and said he would be speaking with the 
Secretary and the President at the earliest opportunity. 
 
SIPDIS 
Concerning Speaker Berri's almost immediate criticism of the 
new UN resolution, Siniora maintained that despite his public 
statements, Berri is actually "relieved" that he no longer 
bears the primary responsibility for blocking progress toward 
the tribunal.  Concerning the resolution's provision for a 
June 10 grace period for possible action by Lebanon's 
parliament, Siniora indicated Berri would not be able to take 
advantage of the opportunity.  Siniora said he supported the 
late modification because it was one more gesture of goodwill 
to the opposition, but in actuality, Berri was "too fearful" 
of his Syrian masters to act independently. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Despite the "considerable step forward" that had 
been achieved by yesterday's action in New York, Siniora was 
fairly certain Syria would react, and probably with violence. 
 He explained that the "now angry" Syrian regime was very 
capable of mobilizing any of their many proxies still active 
in Lebanon.  Despite the dangers, however, the embattled 
Siniora emphasized his belief that the worst days for Lebanon 
were now over and with wisdom and continued support from the 
international community continued progress could be made 
toward sovereignty, prosperity, and stability.  He postulated 
that Syria and Iran were both angry and anxious that a 
democratic, moderate, tolerant Lebanon could survive and 
prosper, and had directed considerable resources to drag 
Lebanon back under their control.  But, he emphasized, the 
establishment of the tribunal meant the end of an era of 
impunity for assassins and Lebanon would now never turn back. 
 He noted it was particularly important that witnesses, who 
previously were fearful of how their testimony would be used, 
would now come forward more readily due to the international 
 
BEIRUT 00000773  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
protection that UN sponsorship promised. 
 
LAF AND NAHR AL-BARID 
--------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C)  Turning to the LAF, Siniora said it was slowly, but 
steadily emerging from its decades-long domination by Syrian 
authorities.  Once again recognizing the significance and 
speed of recent U.S. security assistance, Siniora said that 
with perseverance, the army would soon assume its full 
constitutional responsibilities to protect the nation and its 
citizens, and preserve its stability.  Although it was not 
truly ready, and was already stretched thin by its successful 
deployment ot the south, it appeared the army was now going 
to be severely tested in Tripoli. 
 
¶6.  (C)  Siniora described how the Fatah al-Islam terrorist 
group had split off from the Syrian-controlled Fatah 
al-Intifada extremist group last year -- with Syria's 
blessing.  He argued convincingly that FAI was merely a 
violent extremist group, despite its protestations that it 
was defending Islam.  Siniora countered, "They are the 
antithesis of Islam in that their murder of innocent life is 
condemned by the Islamic faith."  He contended that FAI's 
genesis from Fatah al-Intifada, as well as the timing of 
their unprovoked murder of LAF soldiers last Sunday in the 
run-up to Chapter VII, were clear indications of direct 
Syrian control.  As further proof, Siniora spoke of the 
confessions of FAI operatives who bombed commuter busses in 
Ain Alaq in early February and the subsequent bank robberies 
to fund additional destabilizing activities. 
 
¶7.  (C)  In his view, it was essential to remove this new 
threat as soon as possible.  Siniora stated that his 
government was not seeking armed confrontation with the group 
and would accept their surrender in accordance with norms of 
justice, but was adamant that FAI had to be eliminated from 
Lebanon.  Siniora said his government was working hard with 
Palestinian authorities to reach a resolution, but he was not 
confident this was possible.  And although the negotiations 
were probably ill-fated, Siniora wanted to ensure that 
Lebanon's Palestinian population did not view the coming 
fight as aggression against Palestinians in general.  In his 
estimation, approximately 10 percent of Nahr al-Barid's 
original refugee population of 30,000 refugees still remained 
in the camp and every effort would be made to minimize 
civilian casualties.  But he reminded his visitors that FAI 
terrorists had murdered off-duty soldiers without warning or 
mercy, and that the fight to remove their presence would most 
likely be difficult and costly. 
 
MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS 
------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C)  Whatever the outcome of the impending action in Nahr 
al-Barid, Siniora asked the congressmen to recognize the 
source of this new wave of extremism in the region, and if 
possible to address it.  In particular, he urged the U.S. to 
seriously consider the re-vitalized Saudi peace initiative, 
which was first introduced in 2002, but was given new 
validation by this year's Arab Summit.  While recognizing the 
significant challenge to undo decades of strife, Siniora said 
that if the U.S. could persuade Israel to seriously negotiate 
on the basis of the Saudi proposal, it could conceivably win 
at the table what it could never win through war, namely, 
peace with 130 million Arabs and acceptance by 1.3 billion 
Muslims. 
 
¶9.  (C)  Siniora cautioned that if this "very real" 
opportunity was missed, the situation would simply become 
more intractable and more threatening to everyone.  And it 
would give considerable momentum to extremists in the region 
and all that entailed.  Siniora emphasized that the statement 
from the Arab Summit was genuine and, if approached with 
vision and commitment, could finally provide a way out of a 
60-year old cycle of useless violence. 
 
THE SHEBAA REFRAIN 
------------------ 
 
¶10.  (C)  As he has with nearly every visitor since last 
summer's conflict, PM Siniora asked the Senators and 
Congressman to consider the status of Shebaa Farms.  The 
Prime Minster acknowledged the sensitivity of the issue for 
Israel and the initial UN decision of 2000 that the area was 
 
BEIRUT 00000773  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
Syrian territory, but countered that it was 45 square 
kilometers of nearly worthless -- in both economic and 
strategic terms -- land that could completely change the 
calculus concerning Hizballah's powerful and destabilizing 
arms.  Siniora maintained that his government now had 
Hizballah in a corner and could completely cut them off if 
Shebaa could be placed under UN custodianship, until such 
time as Syria and Lebanon could work out the issue in later 
negotiations. 
 
¶11.  (C)  In Siniora's scenario, it was a win-win situation 
in that Israel would not lose any strategically important 
territory, Hizballah could not claim it had gained territory, 
and the Lebanese government and people could demand that 
Hizballah relinquish its arms now that no Lebanese territory 
was "occupied."  But even more important that Hizballah's 
long-sought disarmament, Siniora said that imperialistic Iran 
would lose its window on the Mediterranean -- a possession 
that Persia has coveted "since the times of Darius."  Siniora 
also implied that such a move could also lead to normalized 
relations between Israel and Lebanon because it would help 
complete implementation of the "7 Points" peace plan, which 
in turn would allow a renegotiation of Lebanon's 1949 
Armistice Agreement with Israel.  He concluded by admitting 
it would not be easy, but of all the steps that Israel could 
make, the relinquishment of Shebaa into UN hands would bring 
considerable gain at negligible cost. 
 
¶12.  (U)  This cable was not reviewed by CODEL Leahy prior to 
release. 
FELTMAN