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DE RUEHLB #0611/01 1211504
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O 011504Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8060
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1060

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000611 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/MARCHESE/HARDING 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/01/2027 
TAGS: PREL UNSC PTER LE SY
SUBJECT: SINIORA ON CABINET INITIATIVE, TRIBUNAL 
 
REF: USUN 338 
 
Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1.  (C)  In a 5/1 meeting with the Ambassador, PM Siniora 
underscored his belief that the Special Tribunal for Lebanon 
must be established by the UNSC, as Lebanon's constitutional 
process is blocked.  But he resisted sending a stronger, 
specific message requesting Chapter VII now.  In what quickly 
became a chicken-or-egg debate, Siniora said that, given the 
risks to the March 14 majority should a strong GOL push fail 
to persuade the UNSC to act, he needed to be sure of success 
at the UNSC before taking a strong and controversial stand on 
Chapter VII.  The Ambassador countered that the success 
Siniora craves depends on actions that Siniora needs to take 
now.  The Ambassador questioned the timing of Siniora's 
renewed offer of a 17-13 cabinet (based on an agreed cabinet 
program), noting that some UNSC members may seize upon a 
17-13 discussion to argue that the Council should not act 
while a Lebanese process is underway.  Siniora said that his 
re-launched 17-13 initiative was intended to corner and 
embarrass the March 8-Aoun bloc.  Separately, Minister of 
Communications Marwan Hamadeh told us that MP Saad Hariri is 
tired of Siniora's cautious approach vis-a-vis the timing of 
UNSC action on the tribunal.  Hamadeh said that Hariri would 
return to Beirut soon with the draft of a letter cleared by 
the French and Saudis that Siniora will send to UN 
Secretary-General Ban.  Siniora also said that he was 
 
SIPDIS 
comfortable with the Sharm al-Sheikh conference later this 
week, asking us to make sure to emphasize publicly and 
privately that any discussions between the U.S. and some of 
Iraq's neighbors would not come at Lebanon's expense. 
Siniora subsequently called to express his satisfaction with 
his telephone conversations with the Secretary on these 
subjects.  End summary. 
 
SINIORA "COMFORTABLE" 
WITH SHARM AL-SHEIKH TALKS 
-------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C)  PM Siniora told the Ambassador on 5/1 that he was 
"comfortable" with the reports and planning regarding the 
Sharm al-Sheikh conference later this week.  He wishes the 
Secretary success and noted that he believed that contact 
 
SIPDIS 
between the U.S. and the Syrians and Iranians had the 
potential to be good for the region.  He said that he knows 
that the Sharm talks will not come at Lebanon's expense, for 
he knows that U.S. support for Lebanon's independence is not 
changing.  But, he cautioned, the U.S. needed to emphasize 
"publicly and privately" that its Lebanon policy remains firm 
and that any contacts in Sharm al-Sheikh with the Syrians and 
Iranians are about Iraq, not Lebanon.  We should expect, 
Siniora said, that Syria's allies in Lebanon will use the 
Sharm conference to argue that the U.S. resolve in Lebanon is 
evaporating, "and we need to be prepared to counter them." 
(Two hours later, the PM called the Ambassador report his 
satisfaction with the phone call from Secretary Rice 
regarding the Sharm conference.  "I want the Secretary to be 
sure that I support her efforts," he emphasized.) 
 
MOVEMENT ON TRIBUNAL ONE WAY 
TO SIGNAL SYRIA NOT OFF THE HOOK 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C)  The Ambassador noted that, besides public and 
private USG statements, action in New York on the Special 
Tribunal on Lebanon is another way to signal that Syria is 
not off the hook regarding Lebanon.  Siniora agreed.  The 
Ambassador emphasized the importance of UN Legal Counsel 
Nicolas Michel's briefing of the UNSC on 5/2.  He noted with 
dismay that Michel's intended factual report (reftel) might 
not be sufficiently persuasive to get all UNSC members on 
board for Chapter VII approval.  What we need, the Ambassador 
said, is for PM Siniora to make it expressly clear to the UN 
that all Lebanese domestic channels to establishing the 
tribunal are blocked, that Lebanon requests Chapter VII 
approval, and that Lebanon accepts the obligations that such 
UNSC action would impose.  Recognizing that the PM needs 
cabinet approval to send a letter, the Ambassador urged PM 
Siniora to call UNSYG Ban today and schedule a cabinet 
meeting on a new letter as soon as possible. 
 
SINIORA SAYS YES ON CHAPTER VII 
BUT DRAGS HIS FEET ON THE REQUEST 
 
BEIRUT 00000611  002 OF 003 
 
 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C)  PM Siniora agreed that Chapter VII was the only way 
forward for the tribunal.  But the USG needs to understand 
the risks of a high-profile, specific request for Chapter VII 
that will be controversial in Lebanon.  The pro-Syrians 
succeeded in planting in the Lebanese mind that Chapter VII 
is akin to treason.  So a letter from the PM will be seen as 
inviting breaches of Lebanese sovereignty, "proof" that 
Siniora is a willing pawn in the international community's 
desire to impose a foreign mandate on Lebanon.  Once the GOL 
moves in the direction of a specific Chapter VII request, 
then the GOL must know that the strategy will succeed. 
Otherwise, everything will be lost.  If the UNSC fails to act 
on Chapter VII, the Siniora cabinet and the March 14 movement 
more generally will "suffer a shameful collapse."  He himself 
will feel obliged to resign if he stakes everything on 
Chapter VII and then the UNSC delivers a "humiliating blow." 
 
¶5.  (C)  The Ambassador noted that, because success in New 
York is not assured, Siniora's requests take on that much 
more importance.  Siniora's requests will greatly increase 
the chances of the success that Siniora wants.  The 
Ambassador and Siniora continued in a chicken-or-egg-type 
debate for sometime, with Siniora seemingly unconvinced of 
the need to call Ban today (5/1).  Siniora said that he would 
prefer to wait until after Nicolas Michel's briefing to the 
UNSC on 5/2, to be better able to "gauge the mood" of UNSC 
members, before acting.  The Ambassador noted that Michel's 
briefing would be stronger, and thus help build a positive 
mood in the Council, if Siniora would make it clear now that 
all domestic roads to establishing the tribunal are blocked 
and that, therefore, he wants Chapter VII action. 
 
17-13 CABINET PROPOSAL INTENDED 
TO CORNER MARCH 8-AOUN BLOC 
------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C)  The Ambassador asked Siniora about his 17-13 cabinet 
initiative, noting that the timing for a re-launch has also 
complicated the debate in New York.  It is hard for Nicolas 
Michel to argue that all domestic means to establish the 
tribunal are established when Siniora takes the initiative to 
push a solution to Lebanon's cabinet crisis, which in theory 
could lead to domestic approval of the tribunal.  Siniora 
claimed that it was wrong to link his cabinet initiative with 
timing in New York; each should be pursued independently. 
His 17-13 initiative is intended to give the offensive back 
to March 14/GOL forces.  The proposal -- which is generating 
increasing amounts of media attention -- appears reasonable 
to most Lebanon, makes March 14/GOL forces appear flexible, 
and addresses the big issues facing Lebanon.  "If we keep 
talking about 19-11 or 19-10-1 we look stupid," Siniora 
argued; "we look as though we are willing to destroy the 
country for one minister." 
 
¶7.  (C)  Siniora acknowledged that "there is no way" that the 
March 8-Aoun forces, despite the promise of a large cabinet 
share (more than the "blocking minority" they seek), will 
accept his initiative because of the cabinet program it 
includes:  agreement to implement Siniora's seven points from 
the summer 2006 war with Israel and the four points agreed 
upon in last year's national dialogue.  To name only one 
example, Syria's Lebanese allies will not accept the logic of 
the seven points that the government has the monopoly on 
arms.  "They know that leads to Hizballah's disarmament." 
Thus, at some point, it will become clear that the March 14 
majority is willing for a cabinet compromise, whereas the 
pro-Syrians are blocking it.  Yes, the Ambassador said, but 
in the meantime the push in New York could be thwarted by 
those who say that the UNSC needs to await the outcome of the 
17-13 discussions in Lebanon.  That is why the PM's specific 
requests to the UN are so important.  Siniora noted that he 
is very aware that "the other side is playing for time," and 
he insisted that he is not falling into their trip. 
 
HARIRI TO BRING CHAPTER VII 
TO SINIORA TO SEND TO UN 
--------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C)  In a separate 5/1 meeting with the Ambassador, 
Minister of Communications Marwan Hamadeh said that he had 
been in touch with MP Saad Hariri by secure phone.  Hariri is 
now back in Saudi Arabia, carrying a draft letter that was 
cleared with the French and that Hariri will now discuss with 
the Saudis.  The letter is the text that Hariri expects 
Siniora, with cabinet approval, to send to the UN with a 
 
BEIRUT 00000611  003 OF 003 
 
 
specific Chapter VII request.  Nodding when the Ambassador 
underscored the utility of sharing the text with the USG in 
advance as well, Hamadeh said that Hariri would be back in 
Beirut in a day or two, at which point Hamadeh said that he 
will get a copy of the letter for us. 
 
¶9.  (C)  In terms of timing to submit such a letter, Hamadeh 
said that Hariri expressed considerable frustration at what 
he saw as an overly leisurely approach by Siniora.  He knows 
Siniora is fully committed to the tribunal and convinced that 
Chapter VII approval is the only option still possible. 
Thus, Hariri finds it "impossible to accept" that Siniora's 
letter, "which both you and the French have said you need," 
be subject to endless delays.  "I shouldn't say this," 
Hamadeh said, counseling the Ambassador to stop writing 
notes.  "But Saad said that he wonders if Fouad has forgotten 
that he is in office only because of the blood of Rafiq 
(Hariri)."  Hamadeh could not explain the timing for the 
re-launch of Siniora's 17-13 cabinet initiative.  "He didn't 
ask us," Hamadeh said, noting that what could have been an 
excellent move, now, because of clumsy timing, complicates 
the action in New York. 
 
¶10.  (C)  In a subsequent meeting, the Ambassador then 
compared notes with UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon Geir 
Pedersen.  Pedersen shared UN thinking on the tribunal that 
mirrored USUN's reporting (reftel).  Noting that he had 
perceived a considerable hardening of Hizballah positions 
since Nicolas Michel's trip to Beirut, Pedersen said that he 
agreed that the tribunal would "never" be established by 
Lebanese domestic means.  But, he said, Siniora's 17-13 
initiative "is a problem."  Even though he knows that 
Hizballah will never accept it, it is "impossible" now to say 
that there are no serious options on the Lebanese domestic 
table.  The Ambassador suggested that Pedersen might want to 
counsel Michel, so that Michel understands in advance of his 
5/2 UNSC briefing why the 17-13 discussions will not lead to 
a solution regarding the tribunal. 
 
FELTMAN