VZCZCXRO1522
RR RUEHPA
DE RUEHBP #0587/01 1511634
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 311634Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAMAKO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7496
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0329
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/COMSOCEUR VAIHINGEN GE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAMAKO 000587 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/31/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM ML
SUBJECT: REBEL LEADER IYAD AG GHALI ON BAHANGA, ALGIERS 
ACCORDS AND AQIM 
 
REF: A. BAMAKO 00544 
     ¶B. BAMAKO 00582 
     ¶C. 06 BAMAKO 01243 
 
Classified By: Political Officer Aaron Sampson, Embassy Bamako, for 
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1.(C)  Iyad ag Ghali, the leader of the Tuareg rebel Alliance 
for Democracy and Change (ADC), met with the Ambassador on 
May 30 to discuss the case of Ibrahim Bahanga, the status of 
the "special" military units, security in the north, and ag 
Ghali's planned departure from Mali.  Soft-spoken and 
reserved, ag Ghali showed nothing of the cold-blooded warrior 
persona created by the Malian press.  Seemingly tired, he 
said President Amadou Toumani Toure had already accepted his 
request for an assignment to the Malian Embassy in either 
Egypt or Saudi Arabia.  Ag Ghali said the GOM viewed fugitive 
rebel Ibrahim Bahanga as a "lost cause" following Bahanga's 
May 11 battle with the Malian military.  He hinted, however, 
that he was nevertheless keeping up with Bahanga's 
whereabouts.  He reported that the GOM had agreed in 
principle to create three "special" military units in 
accordance with the Algiers Accords, but planned to stand up 
only one unit for the time being.  Discussions over the 
unit's commander - either Hassan Fagaga or Moussa Bah or 
others - are still on-going.  Ag Ghali said Tuaregs were 
willing to accept an increased Malian military presence in 
the north and also requested greater U.S. involvement.  He 
said that while few if any northern Malians agreed with 
AQIM's extremist ideology, AQIM was determined to remain in 
Mali.  He recommended "targeted special operations" that 
could disturb AQIM operations in the north, but noted that 
such operations may not be sufficient to remove AQIM 
completely from Malian territory.  End Summary. 
 
------------------ 
Ag Ghali Wants Out 
------------------ 
 
2.(C)  Iyad ag Ghali, the Tuareg rebel leader and head of the 
Alliance for Democracy and Change (ADC), visited the Embassy 
on May 30 to meet with the Ambassador and poloffs.  The 
wide-ranging meeting lasted slightly more than an hour. 
Contrary to the image of a cold, calculating opportunist 
advanced by the Malian press and members of the Malian 
government, ag Ghali appeared soft-spoken and unassuming.  He 
said he traveled with his family from Kidal to Bamako in May 
to "re-establish" his contacts with Malian authorities and 
accelerate the implementation of the Algiers accords.  He is 
also attending meetings of the High Council of Collectivities 
(HCCT), to which he was recently re-elected. 
 
3.(C) Ag Ghali confirmed rumors of his plans to depart Mali, 
saying he was tired of the problems in the north and tired of 
being blamed for them each time they arose.  He said he 
intends to step back from his role in the ADC and that 
President Amadou Toumani Toure (ATT) has already accepted, in 
principle, his request to be assigned to a position without a 
portfolio at the Malian Embassy in Egypt or Saudi Arabia.  Ag 
Ghali was vague on the ADC's future following his departure. 
He suggested the ADC could be converted into a political 
association which was, he said, the ADC's original intention. 
 
------------------- 
Bahanga's Rebellion 
------------------- 
 
4.(C)  Ag Ghali said continued mistrust between the GOM and 
Tuaregs is the main factor hampering the implementation of 
the Algiers accords.  He reported that this mistrust eased 
somewhat following the ADC's quick condemnation of Ibrahim 
Bahanga's May 11 battle with Malian forces in the northern 
town of Tinzawatene (ref A).  Ag Ghali confirmed previous 
reports that ADC leaders had put Bahanga's name forward as 
one of Kidal's eight representatives to the HCCT in March in 
hopes of providing Bahanga with a fresh start (ref B).  "He 
needed," said ag Ghali of the notoriously unpredictable 
rebel, "a new occupation." 
 
5.(C)  Ag Ghali felt Bahanga appeared to take to the idea of 
being an elected official rather than a rebel, saying he even 
campaigned in Kidal for the HCCT elections.  Indications of 
Bahanga's restiveness, however, materialized prior to Mali's 
April 29 presidential election when Malian troops apparently 
searched Bahanga's camp in Tinzawatene.  Ag Ghali attributed 
 
BAMAKO 00000587  002 OF 003 
 
 
Bahanga's actions to a personality conflict between Bahanga 
and the Malian military officer Ali Gamou.  Malian soldiers 
commanded by Gamou apparently had another confrontation with 
Bahanga in Tinzawatene in early May, prior to the battle on 
the 11th.  According to ag Ghali, Bahanga believed the Malian 
military was singling him out for harassment.  Nigerien 
Tuaregs associated with the Mouvement des Nigeriens pour la 
Justice (MNJ) apparently encouraged Bahanga to fight back. 
 
6.(C)  Ag Ghali said 13 Malian Tuaregs had fled to Niger with 
Bahanga, in addition to the Nigerien members of the MNJ. 
When asked if he knew Bahanga's current whereabouts, ag Ghali 
said Bahanga was, as of three or four days ago, near the 
Malian border in Niger.  Although he didn't openly say it, ag 
Ghali appeared to be keeping up with Bahanga's movements.  Ag 
Ghali felt that, as far as the Malian government was 
concerned, Bahanga was a "lost cause."  He indicated 
disappointment with Bahanga's decision-making, but did not go 
so far as to indicate whether he had also given up on 
rehabilitating his mercurial ADC colleague.  He did say that 
Bahanga did not share ideological ties to AQIM Algerian 
Salafists operating in northern Mali, but could turn to AQIM 
for tactical reasons if he finds himself cornered.  Ag Ghali 
said he was not overly concerned about adventuresome young 
Tuaregs joining up with Bahanga but admitted that the risk 
remained. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
"Special" Units Still Under Construction 
---------------------------------------- 
 
7.(C)  Ag Ghali said he hoped his presence in Bamako would 
accelerate the creation of the "special" military units 
created by the Algiers accords.  He said the GOM was hesitant 
to stand up the units due to fears that re-integrated Tuareg 
soldiers would use the training and equipment provided to 
re-play the 23 May 2006 attacks on military outposts in 
Menaka and Kidal.  Ag Ghali said he was working with Malian 
authorities to allay these concerns. 
 
8.(C)  According to ag Ghali, the GOM is moving forward with 
the creation of one "special" unit, of Tuaregs and others, to 
be based in Tin-essako.  He said the GOM and Tuaregs were in 
the process of deciding who would command this unit.  One 
potential scenario under consideration involves naming Col. 
Hassan Fagaga as the overall commander of the "special" 
units.  Because Fagaga is widely regarded as unreliable by 
the Malian military (based on a hand gesture he made at this 
juncture in the conversation, Ag Ghali seemed to indicate he 
joined the Malians in this assessment), he would likely be 
restricted to Kidal and play little to no operational role. 
A second, operational commander based in Tin-essako would 
actually lead the unit.  Moussa Bah, another ADC leader, is a 
potential candidate for this post. 
 
9.(C)  Stumbling blocks include the role of the "special" 
units within the Malian military, the level of resources and 
training allotted to the units, and the selection of unit 
commanders.  ADC members are apparently concerned that the 
GOM is minimizing the "special" units' role within both the 
Malian military and northern Mali.  Ag Ghali noted that the 
GOM currently intends to provide the first "special" unit 
with only three vehicles. 
 
------------------------------- 
AQIM Influence in Northern Mali 
------------------------------- 
 
10.(C)  Ag Ghali said one of AQIM's weak points was that not 
many people in northern Mali buy into its extremist ideology. 
 He said that the ADC and northern Tuaregs had repeatedly 
asked AQIM (then known as the GSPC) to leave northern Mali in 
2006, even going to the point of encouraging the Algerian 
Salafists to take advantage of the amnesty program offered by 
the Algerian government.  AQIM refused, arguing that the 
territory it occupied belonged to neither Mali, nor the ADC, 
nor the Tuareg people, but to God.  Ag Ghali said that after 
the two fire-fights between the ADC and AQIM in October 2006 
(ref C), AQIM tried to undermine the ADC with an information 
campaign that distributed Arabic language leaflets describing 
AQIM's doctrine and goals to local nomads. 
 
11.(C)  Ag Ghali estimated that the AQIM had little to no 
support amongst the native populations of northern Mali, but 
that dislodging the group remained difficult.  He repeatedly 
 
BAMAKO 00000587  003 OF 003 
 
 
said that, in his view, the only way to impact AQIM was 
through "targeted special operations."  He said that while 
surgical strikes could seriously disrupt AQIM, defeating AQIM 
would be difficult due in large part to the vast area of 
empty space they inhabit. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Security and Economic Development 
--------------------------------- 
 
12.(C)  Ag Ghali outlined three security challenges facing 
northern Mali: banditry, discontented rebels like Bahanga, 
and AQIM.  He said the "special" units could handle the first 
problem on their own but that Bahanga and the Nigerien MNJ 
complicated matters.  We need, he said, the Malian government 
to handle Bahanga and AQIM.  Ag Ghali reported that Tuaregs 
were prepared to accept an expanded Malian military presence 
in the north.  He also requested U.S. assistance for the new 
"special" units. 
 
13.(U)  Ag Ghali raised the need for increased economic 
development in northern Mali several times.  He described the 
continued lack of economic development as northern Mali's 
most pressing challenge and urged the U.S. to undertake more 
training and job creation programs for Tuareg youth. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
Comment: A Few Positives but More Unknowns 
------------------------------------------ 
 
14.(C)  The ADC appears committed to the idea of mixed Tuareg 
and non-Tuareg "special" units attached to the Malian 
National Guard.  They also are amenable to expanding the 
Malian military's footprint in northern Mali - long a serious 
point of contention between northern populations and the 
central government.  Ag Ghali's request for increased U.S. 
involvement in northern Mali is also noteworthy.  The 
discussion also revealed several points of concern.  The GOM 
appears to have made little progress toward implementing the 
Algiers accords since the March 23-24 Kidal development 
forum, having been consumed instead with preparing for the 
April 29 presidential elections.  Further progress likely 
depends on the composition of President Toure's new 
government, which may not be named until late August or early 
September.  As a result, the accords implementation process 
is stalled, the steering committee overseeing the 
implementation process is in disarray and the Algerian 
Ambassador who brokered the deal and served as the key 
mediator has returned to Algiers to serve in a new position. 
Ag Ghali said that tells his ADC colleagues to wait until 
after the elections - apparently meaning both the April 29 
presidential election and the July 1 and July 22 legislative 
elections.  The patience of many ADC members, however, is 
clearly wearing thin.  Another area of concern is life after 
Iyad.  While some believe ADC spokesperson Ahmada ag Bibi is 
ag Ghali's most likely successor, others doubt whether ag 
Bibi can hold the ADC together.  One would expect that Fagaga 
and Bahanga have their own views on who should lead the ADC 
once ag Ghali is gone. 
McCulley