VZCZCXRO4429
RR RUEHPA
DE RUEHBP #0554/01 1431706
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 231706Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAMAKO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7437
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0326
RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 0293
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAMAKO 000554 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/22/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV ML
SUBJECT: UPDATE ON MAY 11 ATTACK AT TINZAWATENE 
 
REF: A. BAMAKO 00505 
 
     ¶B. BAMAKO 00524 
     ¶C. BAMAKO 00369 
 
Classified By: Political Officer Aaron Sampson, Embassy Bamako, for 
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1.(C)  Summary:  Tuareg sources close to Alliance for 
Democracy and Change (ADC) dissident Ibrahim Bahanga provided 
further information on Bahanga's May 11 attack against Malian 
military forces in Tinzawatene (refs A and B).  Kidal based 
sources report 4 Malian government soldiers killed and 13 
wounded.  Bahanga reportedly lost 6 men along with 5 wounded. 
 If these numbers are correct, the Malian military suffered 
greater losses on May 11 than it did on May 23, 2006, when 
the ADC attacked military outposts in Menaka and Kidal.  On 
May 21 ADC leaders again condemned Bahanga's actions, and the 
ADC also reportedly issued an order to its often 
unpredictable number two, former army deserter Col. Hassan ag 
Fagaga, to act "responsibly" during the aftermath of the 
Tinzawatene attack.  While ADC leaders Iyad ag Ghali and 
Ahmada ag Bibi have publicly distanced themselves from 
Bahanga, Fagaga's sentiments remain unclear. End Summary. 
 
------------------------------- 
Aftermath of Tinzawatene Attack 
------------------------------- 
 
3.(C)  According to sources based in Kidal, four Malian 
government soldiers were killed in the attack along with 13 
wounded.  Many of these were apparently ethnic Tuareg.  The 
wounded are reportedly in Kidal.  One serious case was 
evacuated to Point G hospital in Bamako.  On May 23 the 
Malian military's Director of Public Affairs said he was 
unsure of the number of military casualties but suggested 
that three Malian soldiers had been killed.  Of these, one 
was an ethnic Tuareg, another an ethnic Arab/Moor and a third 
was from southern Mali.  Kidal sources said six of Bahanga's 
men were killed along with five wounded.  Reports indicate 
that all of Bahanga's wounded were from Niger rather than 
Mali and were transported to the Algerian town of Tamanrasset 
and are now in the custody of the Algerian military, who are 
providing medical treatment.  After the May 11 skirmish, 
Bahanga and his group, which is believed to include 12 to 15 
individuals, fled to the Nigerien town of Assamakka and then 
to the Air mountains.  The Malian military reportedly 
followed Bahanga as far as Assamakka.  Malian Tuareg sources 
claim that Bahanga has linked up with members of the 
Mouvement des Nigeriens pour la Justice (MNJ), including 
Agali Alambo and Captain Cherif Mohamed. 
 
4.(C)  Prior to the attack, Bahanga was reportedly attempting 
to set up a personal fiefdom in Tinzawatene, the home of his 
in-laws, to control the local smuggling trade.  ADC spokesman 
Ahmada ag Bibi reiterated to the Embassy on May 21 that the 
ADC condemned Bahanga's actions and said Bahanga had isolated 
himself from other Malian Tuaregs.  Ag Bibi stated that ADC 
leader Iyad ag Ghali also condemned the attack.  Less clear 
is the reaction of former army deserter and fellow ADC leader 
Col. Hassan Fagaga.  According to ag Bibi, the ADC has 
instructed Fagaga to act "responsibly" - in other words, not 
to follow Bahanga's lead or attempt to incite further unrest 
in the north. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
Comment: ADC Condemns Attack, Tells Fagaga to Behave 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
5.(C)  If casualty figures of 4 dead and 13 wounded Malian 
soldiers are correct, the Malian military paid a heavier 
price during its battle with Bahanga than it did during the 
ADC's May 23, 2006, attack on military outposts in Menaka and 
Kidal.  We have not received any clear indications of how, or 
if, the Malian government intends to respond.  One 
possibility suggested by some Tuaregs in Kidal is the 
deployment of all-nomad military units (called for by the 
Algiers accords) to frontiers with Algeria and Niger to 
prevent Bahanga or any of his men from re-infiltrating Malian 
territory.  It is unclear, however, whether any all-nomad 
units, when and if they are created, will be sufficiently 
equipped or organized to undertake border patrols. 
 
6.(C)  Despite Bahanga's March 18 election as one of Kidal's 
eight representatives to Mali's largely ceremonial High 
Council of Territorial Collectivities (ref C), many in 
southern and northern Mali regard Bahanga as a criminal and a 
bandit.  The battle on May 11 likely cemented this 
perception.  If there is a positive side to the attack, it is 
that Bahanga appears to have isolated himself from fellow 
 
BAMAKO 00000554  002 OF 002 
 
 
Kidal Tuaregs.  On the other hand, Tuareg sources are 
hesitant to write Bahanga off as a political player and note 
that Col. Hassan Fagaga, who is officially the ADC's second 
in command, was also regarded as isolated when he deserted 
from the Malian army prior to the May 23 attacks in Menaka 
and Kidal.  After he deserted, however, Fagaga remained in 
Mali.  It is difficult to envision Bahanga having much 
influence on Kidal Tuaregs when he is several hundred 
kilometers away in Niger.  This could make Fagaga, once 
again, the man to watch.  The ADC's warning to Fagaga to 
remain calm suggests that ADC leaders have made similar 
calculations. 
McCulley