VZCZCXRO5841
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #1498/01 1241420
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 041420Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1019
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHBC/REO BASRAH PRIORITY 2198

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001498 

SIPDIS 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/03/2017 
TAGS: PREL PINR PNAT PINS MARR MOPS IZ
SUBJECT: UK DEFENSE SECRETARY SAYS BASRAH TO TRANSFER BY 
AUGUST 

BAGHDAD 00001498 001.2 OF 002 


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Daniel V. Speckhard for reasons 1.4 (b 
) and (d). 

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On April 30, UK Secretary of State for 
Defense Des Browne told the Ambassador that August is a key 
month for UK forces in Basrah. If all goes as HMG plans, 
Multi National Division-Southeast will transition Basrah to 
provincial Iraqi control (PIC) and hand the Basrah Palace 
keys over to a GOI-entity, preferably the 10th Division 
Commander. Browne said the plan takes into account USG 
palace evacuation and security requirements. The Ambassador 
cautioned that the transition should neither make a mockery 
of the PIC process nor leave the Palace open for a JAM 
takeover and/or looting. Browne said Basrah, despite its 
troubling instability, was on the path to meeting PIC 
conditions by August. He argued that keeping UK forces at 
their current strength beyond August was not feasible given 
British military commitments to the NATO mission in 
Afghanistan. He also stressed that keeping UK forces in 
Basrah would not solve Iraq's grim political situation. 
Browne and the Ambassador agreed Maliki and his government 
must immediately make demonstrable progress on national 
reconciliation. They said that the window of opportunity for 
Iraqi political leaders was closing as ethno-sectarian views 
within Iraq were hardening, Sunni government leaders were 
losing all faith in the process, and D.C.'s patience was 
waning. END SUMMARY. 


UK's Basrah transition plan 
--------------------------- 

¶2. (C) On April 30, UK Secretary of State for Defense Des 
Browne told the Ambassador that HMG intended to transfer 
Basrah to provincial Iraqi control (PIC) by August, adding 
that London intended to also transfer control of the Basrah 
Palace to the GOI at the same time. Browne gave assurances 
that UK forces would continue providing security to USG 
personnel in the Palace until they completed their move to 
the Basrah Air Station. He cautioned, however, that 
providing support after early August would become 
increasingly difficult due to London's military commitments 
to the NATO mission in Afghanistan. He said the UK force 
buildup plan for Afghanistan hinged on the August transition. 
The Ambassador stressed that for a successful and legitimate 
transition, the Coalition must ensure that Basrah first meets 
the conditions for transferring security to provincial Iraqi 
control, as defined by the Joint Committee for the Transfer 
of Security Responsibility. He also said that Iraqi 
authorities needed to be sufficiently capable to guard Basrah 
Palace against a JAM takeover and/or looting spectacle. 
Browne was confident that Basrah was on track to meet the PIC 
conditions by August, adding that the UK was working closely 
with the GOI to find a tenant for the palace that could 
properly protect it. Browne said they are strongly 
recommending to the GOI that the Palace be turned over to the 
Iraqi Army's 10th Division. 

According to Browne: Tale of Woe with Few Glimmers of Hope 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 

¶3. (C) Browne described the Basrah situation as depressing 
and incomprehensible. He doubted a continued large UK force 
presence could change the situation. The violence against UK 
forces and innocent citizens is increasingly 'chilling' and 
the political system is nonexistent. He questioned how 
Basrah became one of the most unstable areas of Iraq when it 
does not suffer from the two major threats to Iraq: Al Qaeda 
and sectarian divisions. The Ambassador said he was hopeful 
that Prime Minister Maliki would carry out his recent pledge 
to restore security to Basrah, but recognized that this was 
only part of a larger political solution that was needed to 
bring Basrah stability. Browne said he was hopeful that 
Najaf's marjaiyah would apply pressure to provincial 
political leaders to correct the situation. The Ambassador 
and Browne surmised that SCIRI/Badr Corps might be the only 
force capable of cleaning up the province. Browne expressed 
a bit of optimism, pointing to a few successes in Basrah, 
such as the thriving Umm Qasr port and the professionalism 
and growing competency of the navy and army in the area. 
Nonetheless, he reiterated his argument that Basrah's complex 
political problems could not be solved militarily, and 
certainly not by the UK's forces. He lamented that Basrah in 
August might be 'as good as it gets' for some time. 

Reconciliation 
-------------- 


BAGHDAD 00001498 002.2 OF 002 


¶4. (C) Browne said he thought the window of opportunity for 
reconciliation was closing, particularly given the 
environment of terrorism and the flaws and weaknesses in the 
Maliki government. The Ambassador said he was concerned with 
what appeared to be a hardening of sectarian views among 
Iraqi leaders, as well the diminishing loss of whatever faith 
Sunni leaders such as Vice President Hashimi may have had in 
the Shia-dominated government. He acknowledged that Iraqis 
were on a slower timeline than the Coalition. Nevertheless, 
he said that he remained optimistic and was encouraged by a 
few recent developments, such as Anbaris joining the Iraqi 
Security Forces to fight Al Qaeda and the recognition by 
Tawafaq and other prominent Sunni leaders that Al Qaeda is 
their real enemy. The Ambassador said that in his 
conversations with the PM on the subject, Maliki comes across 
as supportive of reconciliation. Browne agreed that he had 
witnessed some of Maliki's "Mandela moments." However, 
Browne said he was not entirely convinced that Maliki does 
not see all Sunnis as Bath'ists or Al Qaeda collaborators. 
The Ambassador said Maliki may revert to this thinking when 
there are spectacular attacks on Shia, but otherwise Maliki 
seems to judge Sunnis as individuals. Both the Ambassador 
and Browne agreed that it was critical that they continue 
pressing Maliki to move forward with reconciliation, 
stressing to him that he should act while he and his Shia 
government are in such a strong position and have maximum 
Coalition support. 
SPECKHARD