VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHAS #0637/01 1281608
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 081608Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3571
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1601
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 8551
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT 5943
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 2173
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 1753
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 6587
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0412
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0449

C O N F I D E N T I A L ALGIERS 000637 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/08/2017 
TAGS: PREL PBTS PHUM AG MO WI
SUBJECT: POLISARIO AMBASSADOR ON TALKS WITH MOROCCO 
 
Classified By: DCM Thomas F. Daughton; reasons 1.4 (b, d). 
 
¶1. (C) The Polisario was generally satisfied with UNSCR 1754, 
Polisario Ambassador to Algeria Mohamed Beissat told DCM May 
7, but took issue with the resolution's praise for Morocco's 
"serious and credible" autonomy proposal.  Such language 
would embolden Morocco, Beissat said, to approach the 
negotiations from a position of confidence that it had U.S. 
backing, and was also inconsistent with the search for the 
solution providing for Sahrawi self-determination described 
in the resolution.  Beissat was also disappointed that the 
resolution referred to "the parties" and not to Morocco and 
the Polisario specifically.  He preferred the wording about 
the parties in the UNSYG's report to the Council.  Beissat 
said ultimately only the Polisario and Morocco were parties 
to the dispute, even though he took the DCM's point that one 
aim of the resolution was to involve neighboring countries in 
efforts to find a lasting solution. 
 
¶2. (C) Turning to the process by which UNSCR 1754 was 
adopted, Beissat suggested that the Friends played too great 
a role in determining the language of the resolution.  DCM 
noted in response that the approach was not an unusual one 
and served to expedite reaching a final draft, but Beissat 
grumbled that it was "undemocratic."  Beissat further 
expressed the Polisario's disappointment that the United 
States did not support efforts to make the Sahrawi people's 
right to self-determination a primary aim of the resolution. 
Fortunately, he said, the final resolution included the 
principle.  He added that the Polisario also felt betrayed by 
Spain, whose actions with respect to the resolution did not 
reflect the positions that Spanish officials had outlined to 
the Polisario in the lead-up to it.  Nonetheless, Beissat 
made clear, the Polisario was generally satisfied by the 
resolution and would approach dialogue with the Moroccans in 
good faith.  He opined, however, that the Moroccans were 
unlikely to take the discussions seriously, having already 
been "armored" by strong U.S. support. 
 
SPECULATION ABOUT THE MEDIATOR 
------------------------------ 
 
¶3. (C) Beissat said it was "well known" that the Polisario 
did not think highly of UN Secretary General's personal envoy 
on the Western Sahara, Peter Van Walsum.  Polisario Secretary 
General Mohamed Abdelaziz had communicated that view, he 
said, to Ban ki-Moon.  Beissat said the Polisario would 
attend the talks with the Moroccans regardless of the 
mediator the UNSYG selected, but he implied that their 
preference would be for a Scandinavian.  While the Polisario 
had historically been most comfortable with an American 
mediator like James Baker, Beissat said, this was now out of 
the question given the U.S. alignment with Moroccan views. 
Likewise, the Polisario no longer desired to hold the talks 
in the U.S.  He said the Polisario would not object to a 
non-European mediator, but stressed that the mediator needed 
to be of sufficient international stature and immune to 
corruption by Morocco.  Beissat explained that having a 
mediator of stature was important so that neither party could 
walk away from the talks without consequences on the 
international stage. 
 
CHOOSING SIDES 
-------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Beissat said the Polisario leadership would select its 
delegation to the talks after consultations in May with UN 
officials.  That said, he believed that Mohamed Khaddad and 
Ahmed Boukhari (Polisario representatives to MINURSO and to 
the UN in New York respectively) would "definitely" be part 
of the delegation.  He observed that Mohamed Abdelaziz had 
special confidence in Khaddad in these matters.  Beissat was 
unsure if the three other Polisario delegates to the Baker 
Plan talks -- Brahim Ghali, Rhadi Sgheir Bachir and Brahim 
Mokhtar -- would participate, but appeared to think it 
likely.  As for the Moroccan side, Beissat stated a clear 
Polisario preference for a senior Moroccan delegation 
including individuals close to King Mohammed VI.  He also 
asserted strongly that the Polisario did not want to see on 
the Moroccan delegation any "converts" -- former Polisario 
members who had gone over to the Moroccan side -- or members 
of CORCAS.  The personal dynamics of the discussions would be 
far better, he said, if no Moroccans with direct ties to the 
Sahrawis or Western Sahara participated. 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶5. (C) Beissat invited us to meet with him and was clearly 
probing for information on two specific issues: whether the 
U.S. has a particular agenda it plans to pursue with respect 
to the Polisario-Morocco negotiations (especially as regards 
backing the Moroccan autonomy plan); and whether we have a 
specific mediator/facilitator in mind.  We told him we had no 
reason to believe that Washington had made any decisions in 
either respect.  Overall, he was noticeably less belligerent 
than during our last meeting before the vote on UNSCR 1754, 
and confined his warnings to remarks about the need for the 
U.S. not to back the autonomy plan openly.  It may be 
noteworthy that Beissat in this discussion referred 
repeatedly to a "popular consultation" as the outcome the 
Polisario desired for the Sahrawis, rather than specifically 
a "referendum."  When we questioned him about that, he seemed 
to equate the two, but it was a departure from his usual 
rhetoric. 
 
¶6. (C) Although Beissat caveated his views as those of a 
"junior diplomat," he noted that most every matter of 
significance to the Polisario leadership was on his radar 
screen given the importance of the Polisario's relationship 
with Algeria.  Listing the activities his embassy was 
required to support, Beissat even mentioned military training 
provided by the Algerians to the Polisario.  At another loose 
moment, Beissat mentioned that Mouloud Said, the Polisario 
representative in Washington, had been assuring the Polisario 
leadership until late in the process that the U.S. would 
maintain its express support for self-determination.  When 
the U.S. draft resolution omitted mention of 
self-determination, Abdelaziz had been unpleasantly 
surprised.  Beissat noted, perhaps jokingly, that Mouloud 
Said might not be in Washington much longer. 
FORD