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P 180449Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
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INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNSOM/SOMALIA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA PRIORITY 0012
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 001507 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF AND AF/E 
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER 
CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/17/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR KPKO SO ET BY
SUBJECT: SOMALI AMBASSADOR TO ETHIOPIA HIGHLIGHTS NEED FOR 
POWER-SHARING WITH HAWIYE 
 
REF: ADDIS ABABA 1500 (NOTAL) 
 
Classified By: DEPUTY POL-ECON COUNSELOR ERIC WONG.  REASON: 1.4 (B) AN 
D (D). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY.  In a May 16 meeting with ORA analysts and 
deputy pol-econ counselor, Ambassador Abdulkarim Farah, the 
Transitional Federal Government of Somalia's (TFG) Ambassador 
to Ethiopia and PermRep to the African Union, offered his 
frank perspectives on TFG relations with the Hawiye clan, as 
both the TFG's representative in Addis Ababa, and as a 
prominent leader of the Hawiye/Hawadle sub-clan.  Farah 
highlighted the need for power-sharing with the Hawiye, 
noting that five recent ambassadorial appointments were all 
Darod clan members, including the likely ambassador-designate 
to the United States.  As Ethiopia exerted limited control 
over President Yusuf, external intervention by other parties 
to press Yusuf for greater political accommodation of Hawiye 
could be "very effective," but needed to occur long before 
the June 14 National Reconciliation Conference (NRC).  Farah 
defended the recent appointment of a former Hawiye warlord as 
police commissioner, asserting that he had improved security 
in Mogadishu.  Farah expressed concern that National 
Governance and Reconciliation Committee Chairman Ali Mahdi 
Mohamed (recently named an MP) could replace Ali Mohammed 
Ghedi as TFG Prime Minister (both are from the same 
Hawiye/Abgal sub-clan); that lack of a specific timetable 
risked making the NRC an open-ended process lasting years; 
and that the TFG parliament could decide to extend the TFG's 
mandate beyond October 2009.  Farah highlighted the need for 
the TFG to provide basic social services and to encourage 
skilled Somali expatriates to return to Somalia.  On 
security, Farah reported that TFG militia currently numbered 
7,000, with another 3,500 in training; that the TFG would 
likely continue to rely on Ethiopian intelligence assets even 
after the bulk of Ethiopian troops withdrew; and that Burundi 
was ready to contribute two French-trained battalions to the 
AU peacekeeping operation in Somalia, but lacked strategic 
lift.  END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
HAWIYE CLAN CONCERNED ABOUT NUMBER OF DAROD APPOINTEES 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶2. (C) Farah said that just as he had played a major role in 
promoting Ethiopian and AU engagement on behalf of the TFG, 
he now sought to help make the TFG "a sensible government." 
"The problem of Somalia is (the) Hawiye," he added.  As TFG 
President Abdullahi Yusuf had "no authority" to determine 
Hawiye clan positions, a conference among Hawiye was urgently 
needed prior to the National Reconciliation Conference, in 
order to clarify and unify Hawiye positions.  Tensions 
between the Hawiye clan, who controlled a majority of 
southern Somalia, and Yusuf's Darod clan, had existed since 
the 1960s and were not a recent phenomena, Farah said. 
However, recent actions by Yusuf, including government 
appointments of Darod, had frustrated Hawiye leaders: 
-- Power-sharing with Hawiye needed improvement.  Yusuf was 
the most trusted person in the TFG, Farah said, but Hawiye 
were not included in Yusuf's "political machinery."  The TFG 
had switched foreign ministers (from the Dir clan) three 
times in the last six months.  While a Hawiye (Hassan 
Qeybdiid) had been appointed national police commissioner, 
five Darod had been appointed as generals.  President Yusuf's 
14-person entourage was comprised entirely of members of his 
Darod/Majerteen sub-clan.  The office of the president should 
be the office of the Somali government, not "monopolized by 
one tribe," Farah said. 
-- The TFG had appointed ambassadors to India, Korea, 
Tanzania, and the United Arab Emirates in the previous week; 
all four were Darod. 
-- Within the next 3-4 days, Yusuf intended to name the son 
of Abdirashid Ali Shermake (former president of Somalia until 
his assassination in 1969) as TFG ambassador to the United 
States; he was also a Darod. 
 
¶3. (C) Farah expressed concern that he could replaced by a 
Darod, despite having built Ethiopian and AU support for the 
TFG during three years in Addis Ababa.  Ironically, Farah 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00001507  002 OF 003 
 
 
noted, the Council of Islamic Courts (CIC) had placed a USD 5 
million bounty on his head (septel), considering him a Hawiye 
turncoat co-opted by the Darod.  Yusuf had to share power 
with loyal Hawiye leaders who believed in Somali nationalism, 
Farah said, not with the CIC. 
 
¶4. (C) Farah said external intervention to raise the issue of 
political accommodation with Yusuf could be "very effective" 
in overcoming "the current deadlock," but needed to occur 
immediately, as much had to be done before the NRC.  Such 
intervention, if known by Somali clan leaders, could also 
encourage greater Hawiye support for the TFG, he said. 
According to Farah, the GOE's control over President Yusuf 
was limited: Yusuf had been summoned 3-4 times to Addis 
Ababa, but Yusuf "doesn't always listen." 
 
¶5. (C) Defending the recent appointment of Hawiye leaders 
Mohamed Dhere and Hassan Qeybdiid (as Governor of 
Benadir/Mayor of Mogadishu and National Police Commissioner, 
respectively), Farah rejected the contention that their 
appointment meant the TFG was "bringing back warlordism." 
Even Yusuf could be said to be a warlord, Farah countered. 
Farah said Qeybdiid, who had replaced a Darod, had improved 
security in Mogadishu by taking control of Bakara market 
(which had been renowned for arms smuggling), and by allowing 
business leaders (who had formerly supported the CIC) to 
retain and legally display firearms, once they had been 
registered by the police. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
ALI MAHDI MAY REPLACE GHEDI AS TFG PRIME MINISTER 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶6. (C) Farah observed that TFG Prime Minister Ali Mohammed 
Ghedi's family was now the most powerful in Mogadishu, as 
members of the Hawiye/Abgal/Warsangeli sub-clan who had long 
been associated with the Hawiye/Habr-Gedir/Ayr and with 
Mogadishu businessmen.  Newly appointed Mayor of Mogadishu 
Mohamed Dhere was Ghedi's cousin, according to Farah. 
 
¶7. (C) Nevertheless, Farah highlighted the possibility of 
National Governance and Reconciliation Committee Chairman Ali 
Mahdi Mohamed replacing Ghedi as TFG Prime Minister, noting 
that both were from the same Hawiye/Abgal sub-clan.  Farah 
observed that as the 1960 Somali constitution allowed former 
presidents to serve as MPs, Ali Mahdi would soon be made a 
member of parliament.  This, in turn, could be a precursor to 
a ministerial appointment, Farah said. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
CONCERN THAT TFG MAY SEEK EXTENSION BEYOND 2009 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶8. (C) Questioned about preparations for the June 14 National 
Reconciliation Conference (NRC), Amb. Farah said some 3,000 
participants were expected.  However, he added, without a 
specific timetable for deliberations, the NRC risked becoming 
an open-ended process lasting for years, akin to the 
2002-2004 Mbagathi process that led to the TFG's formation. 
Lack of funding was another concern, especially with 
conditionality imposed by donors like the EU.  Farah outlined 
two competing visions of the TFG's role in the NRC:  one 
asserted that the NRC should be independent of the TFG, and 
that the TFG should accept the NCR's recommendations; the 
other called for the TFG to be part of the NRC.  The TFG was 
concerned about the former scenario, he said. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
TFG MUST PROVIDE BASIC SOCIAL SERVICES 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Farah expressed concern about the "real possibility" 
that the TFG, by parliamentary vote, could seek to extend its 
mandate beyond October 2009.  The TFG needed to avoid such a 
"dangerous situation" and, instead, should campaign to build 
popular support.  The next priority was providing what the 
people needed: health, education, and sanitation services, 
including schools, hospitals, and paved roads which could not 
be mined.  Recognizing that PM Meles faced pressure to 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00001507  003 OF 003 
 
 
withdraw from Somalia, Farah said the TFG should not have to 
"depend on Ethiopian firepower."  Asked about the prospect of 
Ethiopian civil service advisors coming to Mogadishu to 
provide temporary assistance to TFG ministries (as proposed 
by Ethiopian State Minister Tekeda; see reftel), Farah said 
training for TFG capacity-building was already underway in 
Addis Ababa, but would be welcomed in Mogadishu once allowed 
by security conditions. 
 
¶10. (C) Citing the problem of illiterate MPs, Farah said 
Somali diaspora should be urged to return to Somalia and 
contribute their expertise.  However, there was no mechanism 
to incorporate diaspora into the 275-person TFG.  "There is 
no room for them in the TFG, and we are not making room for 
them in the TFG," Farah opined. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
TFG MILITIA: 7,000-STRONG; ANOTHER 3,500 IN TRAINING 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶11. (C) Questioned about TFG militia, Farah said the TFG had 
trained nearly 7,000 militia in Baledogle who were now 
patrolling throughout Somalia, from Kismayo to Puntland. 
Another 3,500 militia were undergoing training.  Farah said 
that on May 18 he would travel to his hometown of Beled Weyne 
to establish a militia training camp there, at the 
instruction of President Yusuf.  Farah estimated that 
approximately 60 per cent of the militia were Darod, 30 per 
cent were Hawiye, and the remaining 10 per cent were from 
other clans; the majority of security forces in Mogadishu 
were Darod.  He underscored that the TFG had not sought to 
exclude Darod from the militia, and attributed the imbalance 
to Hawiye having primarily supported the Council of Islamic 
Courts (CIC).  The TFG aimed to have a total of 40,000 
security forces (including military, police, intelligence, 
and prison officials), Farah said. 
 
¶12. (C) "Ethiopia will never completely withdraw from 
Somalia," Farah said.  Ethiopia would withdraw tanks and 
heavy weapons, as well as uniformed forces, but would 
maintain intelligence assets within Somalia.  Ethiopia would 
also keep the bulk of its troops in Ethiopia but near the 
border with Somalia, Farah added, as they were needed to 
provide a "safety valve" for the African Union Mission in 
Somalia (AMISOM).  (NOTE: Farah's assessment is consistent 
with statements from Ethiopian PM Meles.  END NOTE.)  Farah 
hailed Ethiopian intelligence's ability to assess the 
situation in Somalia and to operate effectively in Mogadishu. 
 As Somali-speakers, "they are invisible," he said. 
 
¶13. (C) While Ethiopia needed an exit strategy, Farah said he 
objected to the second phase of AMISOM deployment, which 
called for stationing AMISOM troops in Beled Weyne and 
Kismayo.  Instead, AU troops should be concentrated in 
Mogadishu for force protection.  He noted that Burundi was 
ready to contribute two French-trained battalions to AMISOM, 
but the new French administration had reneged on former 
President Chirac's pledge to provide strategic lift.  Farah 
concluded by expressing appreciation for current U.S. policy 
toward Somalia, and U.S. support of the TFG, especially in 
light of the killing of U.S. troops in Mogadishu in 1993. 
 
¶14. (C) COMMENT: TFG Ambassador Farah touched on similar 
themes in a candid meeting the previous day with Special 
Envoy for Somalia-designate Amb. John Yates (septel).  As 
both the TFG's long-serving PermRep to the African Union and 
Ambassador to Ethiopia, and a Hawiye/Hawadle, Farah is 
uniquely qualified to present both the TFG "party line" and a 
Hawiye insider's perspective of Hawiye-Darod relations. 
Farah has served as the TFG's representative in Addis at a 
critical time: not only building AU consensus on the need to 
deploy AMISOM, but also succeeding in having the AU affirm 
the TFG's legitimacy and forgive Somalia's arrears to the AU. 
 Farah's possible departure and replacement by a Darod with 
less experience could impair the TFG's ability to engage 
Ethiopia and the AU effectively.  END COMMENT. 
YAMAMOTO