VZCZCXYZ0015
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUCNDT #0312/01 1131514
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 231514Z APR 07
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1743
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE 1220
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE 6221
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT IMMEDIATE 0057
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE 0852
RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA IMMEDIATE 0473

UNCLAS USUN NEW YORK 000312 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC AG MO WI
SUBJECT: UNSC: CONSULTATIONS ON THE WESTERN SAHARA 
 
REF: STATE 52614 
 
¶1. Summary: In an April 20 briefing on the situation in 
Western Sahara that he shared with Special Representative 
(SRSG) Julian Harston, Personal Envoy Peter van Walsum 
reiterated the Secretary-General's call on Morocco and the 
Polisario Front to engage in "direct negotiations without 
preconditions, with a view to a just, lasting and mutually 
acceptable political solution that will provide for the 
self-determination of the people of Western Sahara."  Van 
Walsum argued that the Security Council's preference for a 
"consensual solution" made this recommendation the only 
reasonable course of action given Morocco's refusal to accept 
the Baker Plan.  On the Moroccan and Polisario proposals that 
had been submitted to the Secretary-General, Van Walsum said 
the MINURSO report had to treat them with formal equivalency 
lest characterizing the Moroccan proposal positively have 
suggested UN support for the Moroccan sovereignty implicit in 
the proposal.  Council members generally agreed that the 
Security Council should not become too wrapped up in the 
discussions about the documents and that the Council should 
encourage the parties to enter negotiations without 
preconditions and with the aim of providing for the exercise 
of self-determination.  Some members counseled that that 
nothing should impede the parties from negotiating -- a 
reference to positive French and U.S. statements on the 
Moroccan proposal and recent Algerian/Polisario lobbying for 
equal treatment of the proposals in the MINURSO renewal 
resolution.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) for 
Western Sahara and Head of the United Nations Mission for the 
Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) Julian Harston and the 
Secretary-General's Personal Envoy for Western Sahara Peter 
 
SIPDIS 
van Walsum jointly briefed the Security Council April 20 on 
the Secretary-General's April 13 "Report of the 
Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara" 
 
SIPDIS 
(Document S/2007/202 available at 
www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep07). In his remarks, SRSG Julian 
Harston highlighted MINURSO's proposal to establish a joint 
military verification commission, a proposal that has been 
welcomed by the Polisario, but not yet addressed by the Royal 
Moroccan Army; underscored the importance of, funding for, 
and dangers attached to MINURSO's demining activities; and 
appealed for continued support for voluntary funding for the 
UNHCR Confidence-building measures program for which MINURSO 
provides logistical assistance. 
 
¶3. Personal Envoy (PE) Peter Van Walsum sought to clarify 
remarks in the April 13 MINURSO report, specifically the para 
47 recommendation that "the Security Council call on the 
parties, Morocco and the Frente Polisario, to enter into 
negotiations without preconditions, with a view to a just, 
lasting and mutually acceptable political solution that will 
provide for the self-determination of the people of Western 
Sahara"; and that "the neighboring countries, Algeria and 
Mauritania, should also be invited to these negotiations and 
be consulted separately on issues directly affecting them..." 
 He noted that the recommendations were not new -- that they 
were the same as those put forth in the October 2006 MINURSO 
report.  Van Walsum explained that the original 
recommendation had been based on the assumption the Security 
Council would not impose a solution for Western Sahara and 
had taken such a position since 1975.  He said that when the 
Green March occurred and Algeria had appealed to the Security 
Council, the Council only "deplored" the march and called on 
Morocco to withdraw its marchers.  That, he said was typical 
Chapter 6 language to which the Council has since adhered. 
Thus, van Walsum said, he had concluded on solid ground that 
the Security Council was committed to a "consensual 
solution."  Van Walsum further argued that, when the Baker 
Plan, supported by the Security Council, was rejected by 
Morocco in 2003 on the grounds that it did not guarantee 
Moroccan sovereignty, the Security Council did not react.  He 
said that it did not have to react because the Security 
Council's support of the Baker Plan in 2003 had been 
conditioned on the agreement between the two parties, which 
no longer pertained. 
 
¶4. These factors, van Walsum concluded, were the only reasons 
the Secretary-General had concluded that only two options 
existed: (1) to call for negotiations without preconditions; 
or (2) to accept an indefinite and prolonged impasse.  In 
both April and October 2006, the Secretary-General had 
suggested the call for negotiations with out preconditions. 
The Security Council had not yet acted on the recommendation, 
van Walsum said, but there have been new developments, namely 
 
the proposals the parties had put on the table.  These 
proposals had been mentioned in the report, although not in 
para 47, a fact that some have regretted. 
 
¶5. On the Moroccan and Polisario proposals, Van Walsum 
observed that the Moroccan proposal had been in process for a 
period of time going back at least to King Mohammed VI's 
November 6, 2006 confirmation of an autonomy proposal and was 
a product of extensive international consultations, while the 
Polisario's April 10 submission seemingly came out of the 
blue. Nevertheless, van Walsum said, for the 
Secretary-General there had to be formal equivalency between 
 
SIPDIS 
the two proposals.  Van Valsum said that both proposals 
contained implicit preconditions.  He reiterated that there 
could not be a "precondition" of Moroccan sovereignty any 
more than there could be a "precondition" of a referendum 
with independence as an option.  Rather, Van Walsum said, the 
Security Council should focus the energies of the parties on 
negotiating during this small window of opportunity. 
Cautioning against excessive enthusiasm for the Moroccan 
effort, van Walsum said that "there may were be an inverse 
relations between giving satisfaction to Morocco and getting 
the Polisario to the negotiating table." 
 
Security Council Members Comment 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶6. All Council members made statements following the MINURSO 
briefing.  There was general agreement that the Council 
should not become too wrapped up in the discussions about the 
documents and how to address them; that it was not up to the 
Council to take a position on the documents; that the Council 
should focus on passing a renewal of the MINURSO mandate; and 
that the Council should encourage the parties to enter 
negotiations without preconditions and with the aim of 
providing for the exercise of self-determination.  Some 
members counseled that that nothing should impede the parties 
from negotiating -- a reference to positive French and U.S. 
statements on the Moroccan proposal and recent 
Algerian/Polisario lobbying for equal treatment of the 
proposals in the MINURSO renewal resolution. 
 
On the Moroccan and Polisario Proposals 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. There was a range of opinion as to how the Moroccan and 
Polisario proposals should be treated.  In their statements, 
South Africa, Panama and Indonesia stressed that the Security 
Council should resist characterizing either of the proposals 
in any way. South Africa said the proposals should be treated 
equally and that the fact that Morocco may have devoted 
months to the preparation of its submission was irrelevant. 
Panama said that both proposals were efforts which should be 
treated equally by the Council.  Panama warned against giving 
greater weight to the Moroccan proposal than to the Polisario 
proposal, which was based on the Council-supported Baker Plan. 
 
¶8. France and the U.S. delivered positive statements on 
behalf of the Moroccan proposal.  France noted that Morocco 
had responded to the Council's call to end the status quo by 
delivering a proposal for autonomy that the Council should 
seriously consider.  It was a plan that had been carefully 
developed, was the product of the commitment of Moroccan 
society and based on broad domestic and international 
consultations.  Moreover, the Moroccan plan respected the 
right of self-determination.  Finally, France argued, the 
proposal was meant to be the basis of negotiation and 
compromise and not a take-it-or-leave-it proposal.  Speaking 
for the U.S., Ambassador Sanders noted that the Moroccan 
initiative represented a serious and credible proposal to 
provide real autonomy for the Western Sahara and represented 
the way out of the stalemate, which should spur talks, not 
preclude them.  She called for direct negotiations as the 
best way forward between the parties without preconditions 
and pledged to support any mutually agreed solution on the 
final status of the Western Sahara. 
 
¶9. Belgium, UK and Italy sought to express support for the 
Moroccan proposal without damaging the prospects for direct 
negotiations.  Saying it was pleased to see fresh movement by 
the parties, Belgium observed that neither of the two 
proposals were necessarily the basis for negotiations, but 
were elements that could be mentioned in negotiations "in a 
slightly differentiated way."  The UK characterized the 
Moroccan proposal as a "serious effort", but cautioned that, 
if the Council wanted to refer to recent developments, the UK 
hoped it would do so in a manner that did not hinder but 
 
instead helped negotiations and did not put one at risk by 
trying to solve problems that did need to be addressed. 
Similarly, Italy said that the Polisario had to be brought 
onboard if negotiations were to be held and that members 
should abstain from doing anything that would discourage 
bringing the Polisario onboard.  Italy said that the Moroccan 
proposal was a positive development, but that it should not 
be the basis for discussion.  Both plans, Italy said, should 
be considered working hypotheses. 
 
Negotiations; Self-Determination, Mutual Acceptability 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶10. There was strong support (South Africa, Slovakia, Congo, 
Italy, Peru, Indonesia) for the Secretary-General's call for 
direct negotiations between the parties in accordance to para 
47 of the MINURSO report.  South Africa pronounced itself 
pleased that the Secretary-General had called for 
negotiations without preconditions to secure 
self-determination for the people of Western Sahara.  Congo 
also saw the primary purpose of negotiations as leading to a 
solution to the problem of self-determination.  Belgium said 
the Council should call for direct negotiations without 
preconditions to discuss mutually acceptable solution that 
incorporated self-determination. 
 
¶11. South Africa, Indonesia and Panama argued that the 
Western Sahara issue remained on of decolonization.  South 
Africa argued that any solution for the Western Sahara had to 
be consistent with the UN Charter: autonomy was not 
self-determination.  South Africa noted that the African 
Union (AU) of which both South Africa and the Sahrawi Arab 
Democratic Republic (SADR) are members adhered to the 
principle and sanctity of inherited colonial borders.  Panama 
said that the process in Western Sahara was a developing one 
that remained one of decolonization: that the Western Sahara 
is a territory of the Sahrawi people represented by the 
Polisario Front but controlled by a Morocco that wants to 
impose autonomy.  Panama said that the Security Council had 
to decide whether it wanted a referendum or a continuation of 
a policy of constructive ambiguity that gave lip service to 
self-determination without specifying how it was to be 
achieved.  For Panama, the only solution was a referendum 
that included independence as an alternative.  Indonesia said 
that the Security Council should not impose any solution and 
that any solution had to have international legitimacy. 
Russia, UK and Congo stressed the importance of "mutually 
acceptable solutions." 
 
¶12. South Africa, Slovakia, Congo, Italy, Qatar, Indonesia, 
Peru and China all supported the Secretary-General's call for 
a six-month extension of the MINURSO mandate. 
KHALILZAD