VZCZCXYZ0005
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUCNDT #0311/01 1101939
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 201939Z APR 07
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1740
INFO RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE 1217
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 1112
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE 6218
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT IMMEDIATE 0054
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 1013
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE 0849
RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA IMMEDIATE 0470
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 2647

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000311 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/19/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC AG WI MO
SUBJECT: ALGERIAN PERMREP CONFIRMS POLISARIO ACCEPTANCE OF 
DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS 
 
REF: ALGIERS 543 
 
Classified By: Amb. Jackie W. Sanders. E.O 12958. Reasons 
1.4 (B&D) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: In an April 19 meeting with Ambassador 
Sanders, Algerian PermRep Yousfi confirmed that the Polisario 
has agreed to enter into direct negotiations with Morocco 
provided the invitation to negotiations is couched in the 
language of paragraph 47 of the Secretary-General's April 13 
Report on the situation concerning Western Sahara: that the 
Security Council should "call on the parties, Morocco and the 
Polisario Front, to enter into negotiations without 
preconditions, with a view to achieving a just, lasting and 
mutually acceptable political solution that will provide for 
the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara.  The 
neighboring countries, Algeria and Mauritania, should also be 
invited to these negotiations and be consulted separately on 
issues directly affecting them, in accordance with the format 
that was observed during the tenure of (the SYG's) previous 
Personal Envoy, Mr. James A. Baker, III."   Yousfi said that 
Algeria understands Morocco to have accepted the 
Secretary-General's report, including its formula for 
 
SIPDIS 
starting negotiations.  The key, he stressed, is that 
"self-determination" should be mentioned in the invitation; 
absent such a mention, the Polisario would not agree to 
negotiate.  Also, to ensure the opportunity is not lost, 
Yousfi said, careful attention needed to be given to the 
upcoming MINURSO resolution's characterization of the 
proposals presented by the Polisario and Morocco.  The 
Polisario would interpret praise for the Moroccan plan 
without appreciation for the Polisario plan as a Security 
Council precondition meant to ensure that the negotiations 
discuss only of the Moroccan plan.  Assuming appropriate 
language, Yousfi said, the Polisario would be ready to 
negotiate almost immediately.  End Summary. 
 
¶1. (C) Algerian PermRep Youssef Yousfi, accompanied by his 
DCM and a poloff, met at his request with Ambassador Sanders, 
accompanied by Ambassador Ross and Poloff, April 19 to 
preview impending Security Council consideration of the 
MINURSO renewal and efforts to promote a settlement of the 
Western Sahara conflict. 
 
Algeria/Polisario Are For Negotiations; Para 47 
 
 
¶2. (C) Yousfi opened by expressing Algeria's satisfaction 
with the SYG's latest report, which both Algeria and the 
Polisario find to be balanced, and which Morocco accepts as 
well.  Algeria agrees with both the content and 
recommendations of the report, but is now concerned about the 
text of the draft resolution on MINURSO renewal.  For the 
first time, negotiations seem possible.  Both Polisario and 
Algeria agree that negotiations should be held.  To ensure 
that this opportunity is not lost, two important issues need 
careful attention, the wording of the invitation and the 
resolution's characterization of the proposals presented by 
the Polisario and Morocco. 
 
¶3. (C) Yousfi stressed that the invitation to negotiations 
should be couched in the language of paragraph 47 of the 
SYG's report: The Security Council should "call on the 
parties, Morocco and the Polisario Front, to enter into 
negotiations without preconditions, with a view to achieving 
a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution 
that will provide for the self-determination of the people of 
Western Sahara.  The neighboring countries, Algeria and 
Mauritania, should also be invited to these negotiations and 
be consulted separately on issues directly affecting them, in 
accordance with the format that was observed during the 
tenure of (the SYG's) previous Personal Envoy, Mr. James A. 
Baker, III."   It is Algeria's understanding, he said, that 
Morocco accepts this formula.  Algeria for its part has 
convinced the Polisario to enter into direct negotiations, 
but the letter of invitation must state that their purpose is 
to reach a solution that will provide for self-determination. 
 Without mention of self-determination as put forth in 
paragraph 47, the Polisario will not agree to negotiate. 
 
¶4. (C) Turning to how the proposals put forth by the 
Polisario and Morocco will be characterized in the MINURSO 
resolution, Yousfi emphasized that, to give the new 
opportunity a chance, the resolution must give the two 
proposals equal treatment.  If it does not, the Polisario 
 
will refuse to enter negotiations.  On the issue of MINURSO's 
extension, he stated that Algeria has no problem with the 
SYG's recommendation of a six-month extension.  Noting that 
the U.S. has a large role in drafting the MINURSO resolution, 
he asked for our views on what might be expected on the 
various issues he raised. 
 
¶5. (C) Ambassador Sanders noted that our Embassy in Algiers 
recently communicated our position to the Algerian 
Government, so it should come as no surprise.  The draft 
resolution is still under consideration within the USG, so it 
is not yet available more widely.  However, we will propose a 
two-month extension of MINURSO because this shorter extension 
will help to maintain the momentum for a settlement.  MINURSO 
has been in existence since 1991 and, unfortunately, has not 
been able to achieve its purpose.  The U.S. position remains 
that it would be happy to host negotiations without 
preconditions, and the issue of an invitation will be 
carefully addressed in the resolution.  As for the two 
proposals that have recently been put forward, we view 
Morocco's proposal as serious and credible and as something 
new, while we read the Polisario's proposal as essentially a 
repackaging of the Baker plan .  Regrettably, as Ambassador 
Sanders had told Foreign Minister Bejdaoui, even with the 
best of intentions, the approaches of the past have gotten us 
nowhere.  Given the existence of differing views on the 
merits of the two plans, the U.S. believes that proceeding to 
negotiations without preconditions rooted in either plan is 
important. 
 
¶6. (C) Yousfi insisted that the resolution must provide for 
an invitation that makes reference to self-determination in 
the same way as para 47 of the SYG's report.  Without such a 
reference, and with praise for the Moroccan proposal without 
an appreciation of the Polisario's proposal, it will be 
extremely difficult to get the Polisario to go to 
negotiations.  If the Security Council welcomes one plan, but 
not the other, the Polisario will have the feeling that the 
Council has created a precondition and that the negotiations 
are meant to discuss only the Moroccan plan. 
 
¶7. (C)  Ambassador Ross urged the Algerian government to 
focus on the framework of negotiations established by the 
letter of invitation, which we expect will call for 
negotiations without preconditions to seek a mutually 
acceptable solution to the conflict.  Algeria should not get 
caught up in the wording of the MINURSO resolution on the two 
plans and should ensure that the Polisario does not do so, 
since it will be the letter of invitation, and not so much 
the resolution, that frames the basis and purpose of 
negotiations.  Yousfi took the point, but went on to say that 
the wording of the resolution is important as well.  On the 
two proposals and on the invitation to negotiations, it 
should stick closely to the language of the SYG's report, 
which everyone has accepted. 
 
¶8. (C)  Ambassador Ross asked Yousfi to confirm our 
understanding that the Polisario's position on negotiations 
has evolved.  Whereas in previous contacts, Polisario 
spokesmen have asserted that the Polisario will not go to 
negotiations unless they are based on the Baker approach, it 
now appears that it accepts negotiations without 
preconditions.  Yousfi agreed that indeed there has been an 
evolution and that the Polisario is now willing to proceed to 
direct negotiations as long as the letter of invitation 
tracks the language of para 47 of the SYG's report and no 
distinction is made in the resolution's treatment of the two 
proposals now before the Council.  Ross repeated that the 
Polisario and Algeria should focus on the letter of 
invitation and not so much what is in the resolution. 
 
Algerians: No or Equal Mention of Proprosals 
 
 
¶9. (C) Yousfi's DCM affirmed that the best situation would be 
no mention of either plan; next best would be equal treatment 
of both; worst would be praise for the Moroccan proposal 
alone, because this would be viewed as partisan.  Ambassador 
Sanders repeated that we view the Moroccan proposal as 
serious and credible and as a new element, while we see the 
Polisario's proposal as a rehash of old history.  While our 
tactics may have changed, our strategic objective remains the 
same: a mutually accepted political settlement through direct 
negotiations.  Ambassador Ross added that previous plans to 
 
reach a settlement had failed and the Moroccan plan at least 
offers a fresh approach, while, as far as we can see, there 
is nothing new in the Polisario's plan.  Yousfi countered 
that, clearly, the U.S. and Algeria have different 
evaluations of the two plans.  To bless the Moroccan plan is 
to recognize Moroccan sovereignty over the Western Sahara, 
something that no country has done to date.  In any event, 
the Moroccan plan is simply a reformulation of a proposal put 
forward in 2001 that Algeria rejected.  The Polisario, for 
its part, is now proposing implementation of the Baker plan 
through a referendum whose results, whatever they may be, it 
will respect, as well as through enumeration of the 
guarantees and privileges that a Sahrawi state will accord 
Morocco and Moroccans in the Western Sahara in the event 
independence is the outcome. 
 
¶10. (C) Ambassador Ross urged Yousfi to look beyond the 
content of the two plans and the MINURSO resolution and focus 
on what is really important: the opening of direct 
negotiations without preconditions.  Yousfi insisted on 
coming back to the resolution and asked what the U.S. 
objective is in calling the Moroccan plan "serious and 
credible."  Is it just to please the Moroccans?  Whatever the 
case is, saying this will not serve the objective of getting 
to negotiations.  Treating the two plans differently will 
jeopardize this objective, one shared by Algeria and the 
U.S., and it is not worth the risk.  Yousfi asserted that the 
Algerian government is already very nervous about the 
resolution and is torn whether to continue supporting 
negotiations. 
 
¶11. (C) Ambassador Sanders asked in closing how soon after 
issuance of a letter of invitation the Polisario would be 
ready to begin negotiations.  Yousfi replied that ten days 
would be ample time.  He in turn asked how long we think that 
negotiations should last.  Do we expect them to be completed 
in the two-month period we are suggesting for MINURSO 
extension?  Ambassador Sanders replied that, no, we want them 
at least to start during that period. 
 
¶12. (C) COMMENT:  Hours later, the Polisario came in with 
essentially the same message.  Coordination is alive and 
well.  End Comment. 
WOLFF