VZCZCXYZ0003
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUCNDT #0283/01 1012214
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 112214Z APR 07
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1685

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000283 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/11/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC MO AG WS
SUBJECT: WOLFF-FASSI FIHRI MEETING AND SUBSEQUENT CONTACTS 
 
 
Classified By: Classified by Amb. Alex D. Wolff. E.O 12958. Reasons 1.4 
 (B&D). 
 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: April 11 was a day of intense activity on the 
Moroccan Western Sahara initiative.  In a meeting with 
Ambassador Wolff, MFA Minister Delegate Fassi Fihri requested 
US assistance in helping solidify Moroccan public and 
political party opinion in support of this initiative by 
convincing the SYG to include a positive reference to it in 
his forthcoming report in conjunction with the next MINURSO 
extension and to append its text to the report as an annex. 
Ambassador Wolff agreed to work on both issues, but urged 
Fassi Fihri to prepare to send the text to the President of 
the Security Council for distribution before the SYG's report 
in the event that efforts to get it appended to that report 
did not succeed.  Wolff and Fassi Fihri reviewed the likely 
positions of the various Council members; Wolff noted that 
the submission of a Polisario proposal could well complicate 
matters both with the UN Secretariat, which would want to 
equate the two plans, and with those members of the Council 
most committed to the Baker approach.  Wolff praised the work 
that Morocco had done to date with many Council members, 
urged that it continue, recommended additional efforts with 
states outside the Council, suggested that the Moroccans 
include the SYG's envoy for the Western Sahara in their 
contacts, since he was responsible for producing the first 
draft of the SYG's report and it would be best for a positive 
reference to the Moroccan initiative to be included from the 
beginning, and cited the importance of mounting an intensive 
media campaign in support of Morocco's moves.  Fassi Fihri 
agreed to take these steps and expressed the belief that 
Morocco already enjoyed the support of Qatar, the EU 
countries, Ghana, the Congo, and Indonesia, that it appeared 
to have convinced Russia to be supportive, but that it had 
achieved less success with China. 
 
¶2. (C) SUMMARY CONTINEUD: Since this meeting, the French 
PermRep has suggested to Ambassador Wolff that we convince 
the SYG to transmit the Moroccan text to the President of the 
Security Council under a positive cover note.  Ambassadors 
Wolff and Sanders have pursued the Moroccan requests and the 
French suggestion with the SYG, his Deputy Chief of Staff, 
and other senior members of the Secretariat.  The Deputy 
Chief of Staff reported that the request for a positive 
reference in the SYG's report was under active consideration 
and that he would look into having the SYG transmit the 
report under a positive cover note.  He volunteered that the 
existence of a separate proposal from the Polisario would 
have to be considered; Wolff rejoined that the two documents 
were different -- one new, the other a rehash of old 
positions -- and that the SYG should find a way to address 
this.  Ambassador Wolff has briefed Fassi Fihri on these 
contacts and urged him to have King Mohammed VI call the SYG 
to reinforce the importance of the Moroccan requests.  We 
will continue to press the SYG and the Secretariat.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
¶3. (U) Ambassador Wolff, accompanied by Ambassador Sanders, 
Ambassador (ret.) Chris Ross, and USUN/POL officer Ang, met 
with a Moroccan delegation led by MFA Minister Delegate Taleb 
El Fassi Fihri and hosted by Moroccan PermRep El Mostapha 
Sahel, for one hour April 11. 
 
¶4. (C) Fassi Fihri did all the talking on the Moroccan side, 
opening with a long exposition on Morocco's attempts to 
normalize relations with Algeria, which Algeria rebuffed 
pending resolution of the Western Sahara conflict, its 
subsequent unsuccessful attempts to talk directly to the 
Polisario, and its ultimate resort to "a domestic approach to 
the self-determination principle" which, he stated would 
ultimately be put to a referendum.  He expressed regret that 
Morocco had been denied a chance to present "the new Morocco" 
to the Polisario in the process. 
 
¶5. (C) Fassi Fihri then moved to recent developments on the 
issue; King Mohammad VI had agreed to the word changes 
proposed by U/S Burns, and Ambassador Sahel had presented the 
revised Moroccan proposal to SYG Ban this morning.  However, 
the Moroccan delegation was concerned about what it had heard 
from U/SYG Guehenno and others in the UN Secretariat 
regarding the difficulty of annexing the Moroccan proposal to 
the SYG's impending report in conjunction with consideration 
of another extension of MINURSO.  UN interlocutors had posed 
both technical and political issues, notably that by annexing 
the Moroccan proposal the report would appear to endorse it. 
 
¶6. (C)  This, Fassi Fihri said, was not what Morocco was 
looking for.  It merely wanted some kind of positive 
recognition from the international community and the U.S. to 
validate the King's decision to work on this proposal in the 
eyes of Moroccan public and party opinion.  It was after all, 
"a credible, open-minded, lawful, and constructive proposal 
open to negotiation," even though the Algerian government had 
 
termed it "unilateral and unlawful" and had darkly predicted 
that it would create "a new Darfur." 
 
¶7. (C) Fassi Fihri continued that, last night, the Moroccan 
delegation had heard that the Polisario Front had put 
something forward.  It was nothing new -- the Polisario 
stated that it was ready to negotiate the implementation of 
the Baker Plan.  And it said negative things about Morocco. 
(To buttress his point, Fassi Fihri handed Ambassador Wolff 
the French text of the Polisario proposal.)  This approach, 
he said, looked to the past, while Morocco was looking to the 
future, to the best possible Maghrib, and to the well being 
of the Sahrawis, two-thirds of whom are happy and one-third 
of whom need to be reconciled. 
 
¶8. (C) Fassi Fihri then requested US assistance with the SYG 
to ensure that Morocco's proposal was handled in a way that 
would satisfy public and party opinion in Morocco and the 
Sahrawis in the south that making this "important effort" had 
been worthwhile.  Assuming the correct handling by the SYG, 
the members of the Security Council could then welcome his 
report and agree that a two-month extension of MINURSO was 
reasonable, as the Department had told Fassi Fihri, to 
exploit the current momentum and push for the opening of 
negotiations between Morocco and the Polisario.  U/S Burns 
had made clear that, if in two months the Polisario was still 
refusing to be constructive, the USG would draw the 
conclusion that Morocco's plan was the best solution. 
 
¶9. (C) Fassi Fihri repeated that it was very important to 
have the SYG put Morocco's initiative into his report to the 
Council.  Then, France, Spain, the UK, and the US could 
cooperate to create an international coalition within the 
Council in support.  While Morocco knew that Saudi Arabia and 
Panama were elsewhere on the issue, Qatar and the EU 
countries (Belgium) were supportive.  Ghana and the Congo 
were also supportive, albeit more discreetly; they preferred 
to follow the lead of the US and others on this issue. 
 
¶10. (C) Ambassador Wolff thanked Fassi Fihri for his clear 
and cogent presentation.  He then reviewed the operational 
steps that were required:.   USUN would follow up with the 
SYG's office on his report from two angles -- making the 
Moroccan proposal an annex and ensuring positive treatment of 
the proposal in the body of the report.  He noted that we 
would see what could be done on both issues.  We were agreed 
that some acknowledgment of Morocco's initiative was needed, 
and we hoped it would be positive.  Beyond the text of the 
SYG's report itself, however, the Moroccan delegation should 
remember that it has the right to send its proposal to the 
President of the Security Council for transmission to the 
members.  This being the case, getting the proposal to 
Council members would not be a problem, but the Moroccans 
should be prepared for that contingency. 
 
¶11. (C) Turning to attitudes among the Council members, 
Ambassador Wolff urged the Moroccans not to be too rosy or 
too dark in their assessment.  That said, the makeup of the 
Council was problematic.  Guehenno's reaction was indicative 
in this regard.  Within the UN Secretariat and among certain 
members of the Council, there was significant investment in 
the Baker approach, and getting a different approach blessed 
would not be easy.  In this regard, Morocco's openness to 
discussions with the Polisario without preconditions would 
help the USG work with Council members.  Ambassador Wolff 
confirmed that the time frame for the extension of MINURSO 
that we would propose would be two months.  We would see 
whether the Polisario engaged with Morocco during that period 
and then draw our conclusions.  While we had not yet seen the 
Polisario's plan, the conclusion we drew from press reports 
is the same as Morocco's.  Nonetheless, its mere existence 
would complicate matters with the UN Secretariat, which would 
want to equate the two plans, especially given the commitment 
of some Security Council members to the Baker approach. 
 
¶12. (C) Ambassador Wolff stressed that, in raising these 
concerns, he was not being reticent, but merely realistic. 
The Secretariat would be looking for the easiest way out, but 
we would confront this posture.  As for the members of the 
Council, South Africa's position was well known, and it 
carried weight among the other members.  Morocco's 
discussions with Ghana and the Congo were encouraging.  If 
other undecided members saw other Africans supporting 
Morocco's initiative, South Africa's influence could be 
mitigated.   Indonesia and Panama could be on the fence; what 
was Morocco's understanding of Indonesia's position?  Fassi 
Fihri replied that they had given Foreign Minister Ben Issa a 
commitment to be positive.  Ambassador Wolff asked about the 
Russians and Chinese.  Fassi Fihri affirmed that Morocco had 
convinced Russia that it was worthwhile for Morocco to try to 
create a new dynamic without forcing a choice between Rabat 
and Algiers.  If the Russians felt that there was agreement 
among Washington, Paris, London, and Madrid, they would not 
oppose what would be presented as an attempt to create a new 
 
dynamic and open negotiations, not to impose a solution. 
China, said Fassi Fihri, was more complicated.  The Chinese 
saw the conflict as being very young and suggested that 
Morocco could wait 100 years, but they did know that Morocco 
was ready for negotiations. 
 
¶13. (C) Looking beyond the Council, Ambassador Wolff 
suggested that efforts with the Arab League and others to 
create a foundation of support would buttress US efforts in 
this regard.  Fassi Fihri noted that all members of the Arab 
League, other than Syria, Libya, and Mauritania, recognize 
Morocco's sovereignty over the Western Sahara, but Qadhafi 
was becoming more neutral and Asad had closed the Polisario's 
office in Damascus.  Ambassador Wolff reiterated the need to 
be active in building support, because Algeria would be very 
active on the other side.  Morocco could count on US support, 
and we would work closely with the French in following up 
immediately with the SYG.  Fassi Fihri asked whether the US 
could get a response from the SYG in the next few hours, and 
Ambassador Wolff confirmed that we would push for one. 
 
¶14. (C) Ambassador Wolff suggested that, meanwhile, in 
addition to its previous contacts, the Moroccan delegation 
should talk to Van Walsum, the SYG's envoy for the Western 
Sahara.  Fassi Fihri indicated that Ambassador Sahel had 
already talked to him, but it was not clear where he stood. 
Ambassador Wolff encouraged the Moroccan delegation to keep 
its pressure on him, because he is the drafter of the SYG's 
report and it would be best for him to agree to a positive 
reference to the Moroccan initiative from the beginning, 
before the report when to Guehenno and others for clearance. 
 
¶15. (C) Ambassador Wolff reiterated that the Moroccan 
delegation should be ready to transmit its proposal through a 
letter to the president of the Security Council on Friday, 
April 13, if the issue of annexing it to the SYG's report had 
not been resolved.  A positive reference in the report, 
coupled with transmission to Council members, would give 
Morocco's initiative the political recognition it needed for 
domestic purposes.  Fassi Fihri cautioned that, by Monday, 
April 16, Moroccan public opinion would be looking to see 
whether the SYG's report mentioned the proposal.  If it did 
not, the proposed two-month extension of MINURSO would be 
seen as pressure on Morocco, not the Polisario. 
 
¶16. (C) Ambassador Wolff raised another interim step -- how 
to generate international media coverage of Morocco's 
initiative.  This could be done, not necessarily on the basis 
of the SYG's report, but on the basis of what Council members 
said.  Fassi Fihri agreed that good work in managing public 
opinion could be done in the coming "many days." 
 
¶17. (C) As the meeting ended, Fassi Fihri noted that the 
Secretary had asked Algerian Foreign Minister Bedjaoui to 
 
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help get the Polisario to talk to Morocco about its 
initiative.  It remained to be seen whether Bedjaoui would be 
successful. 
 
¶18. (C) COMMENT: In parallel consultations with the French, 
who are also pressing the Secretariat for a positive 
reference to the Moroccan initiative in the SYG's report, 
Ambassador de la Sabliere suggested that the SYG could also 
transmit the Moroccan text to the Council, perhaps with a 
cover note that took a positive tack.  After a phone call 
with the SYG, Ambassador Wolff went over the Moroccan request 
and French recommendation in detail with Ban's Deputy Chief 
of Staff, Ambassador Kim.  He stressed Morocco's domestic 
need for a positive reference to the Moroccan initiative in 
the SYG's upcoming report and mentioned the possibility that 
the SYG could transmit the Moroccan text to the President of 
the Security Council with a positive cover note.  Kim 
indicated that the Moroccans had already approached him on 
including a reference to their initiative in the report and 
that their request was under consideration.  On having the 
SYG transmit the Moroccan text to the Council with a positive 
cover note, Kim said that he would look into this 
possibility, but gave no commitment.  He then noted that the 
Polisario had submitted its own plan and that this would have 
to be considered.  Ambassador Wolff rejoined that the two 
documents could not be compared -- the Moroccan effort was 
something new; the Polisario effort merely repeated old 
positions, and it would not be appropriate to give them equal 
treatment.   He urged Kim to help the SYG find a way to 
address this difference. 
 
¶19. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: We will continue to press these 
points with the Secretariat at every opportunity.  Ambassador 
Wolff has just briefed the Fassi Fihri by phone on our 
efforts and urged that he consider asking King Mohammed V 
call the SYG to press the importance of a positive welcoming 
reference to their initiative in the SYG's report both for 
Morocco and for the negotiating effort.  Fassi Fihri wanted 
to know whether we could guarantee the outcome of such a 
call.  Our sense is that, in the absence of such a guarantee, 
which is not ours to give, it is unlikely that Fassi Fihri 
will ask the King's to call.  END COMMENT. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WOLFF