VZCZCXRO4654
RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHNO #0266/01 1140744
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 240744Z APR 07
FM USMISSION USNATO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0768
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 USNATO 000266 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/24/2017 
TAGS: PREL PARM KCFE NATO RS
SUBJECT: HLTF MEETING MARCH 22, 2007 
 
REF: STATE 034686 
 
Classified By: Political Advisor Stuart Seldowitz, reasons 1.4 (b and d 
) 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY.  Despite determined efforts by the U.S. and 
many other Allies, Germany derailed agreement at the March 22 
High-level Task Force (HLTF) on the text of a NATO paper on 
cross-group stationing of forces under the CFE Treaty.  Most 
allies, in particular Turkey, Greece, Norway, Bulgaria and 
Romania, considered it essential for NATO to speak with one 
voice on this issue, and discussions continued into the early 
evening.  While the HLTF ended without an agreed text, the 
German representative's (Groening) unwillingness to 
acknowledge his minority (of one) position, and his readiness 
to allow individual Allies to face Russian questions without 
firm Alliance support on the issue, had the effect of 
infuriating most Allies and the International Staff.  This 
set the stage for subsequent discussions at NATO and in 
capitals, which resulted in placing the original, 
U.S.-friendly text under silence and getting it agreed by COB 
March 28. 
 
¶2.  (C) On other issues, the HLTF reached agreement on key 
themes to stress with Russia in the NATO Russia Council (NRC) 
and NRC Ambassador Arms Control meetings (NRC (ACE) 
discussion reported septel); provided the basis for the 
International Staff to place under silence an instruction to 
Vienna delegations for responding to Russia's three CSBM 
proposals; and agreed to continue work on the "positive 
agenda" paper.  The HLTF decided to set aside (as a reference 
document that has not been agreed and cannot be used outside 
the Alliance) the German-originated "matrix" on the status of 
the Istanbul commitments.  In keeping with U.S. suggestions 
at the February HLTF regarding the need to develop priorities 
for HLTF work, Germany advanced a paper on new ideas for HLTF 
work.  The German paper received a mixed welcome.  The U.S. 
also met on the margins with Turkey, Greece, and Norway to 
move forward on finalizing the CFE flank entitlement 
transfers (which subsequently finalized on April 5).  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) The HLTF Chair, NATO Assistant Secretary General 
Martin Erdmann, opened the March 22 meeting by summarizing 
his recent meeting on February 21 with Russian DFM Alexander 
Grushko in Moscow.  In that meeting the following issues were 
discussed: how new NATO members fit into CFE; how to achieve 
more security with less means; the current arms control 
regimes; a proposal for a new NRC (ACE) agenda; and the 
anniversary activities associated with the NATO-Russia 
Founding Act and the NATO-Russian Council. 
 
Status of the Istanbul Commitments 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Fulfillment of Istanbul Commitments and the 
"matrix."  The Chair (Erdmann) noted that the Alliance could 
not agree to the "Matrix" paper (HLTF-N(2006)0031-REV2 dated 
16 January 2007), and asked Allies how we to address the 
Russian Federation since the Alliance was not in agreement. 
Erdmann noted that Moldova had stated at the Annual 
Implementation Assessment Meeting in Vienna that the Russian 
Federation had no legal status for its troop presence in 
Moldova and that Russian troop presence is in contravention 
to the Moldovan constitution.  Moldova had also stated its 
preference for a multinational peacekeeping force (PKF) to 
replace current PKF.  U.S.HLTF representative DAS Karin L. 
Look commented hat the views of the Moldovan government 
should b reflected in the Matrix.  Host nation consent was 
the core issue.  Others noted that they agreed wth the 
Moldovan government.  German rep Groening noted that NATO 
should have its own position on what constituted fulfillment 
of the Istanbul commitments; this was not a matter for the 
Moldovans to decide for us.  Look, noting the continuing 
differences amongst Allies, asked that the Matrix be set 
aside and added to the agenda only as required.  France, 
Turkey, Italy, and Germany commented on the utility of Matrix 
when discussing the Istanbul Commitments, but none challenged 
Look's assessment that it cannot be "agreed."  The Chair 
decided that we should keep the Matrix as a living document 
that is not regularly on the agenda.  He also noted the 
support for an international PKF to replace the current 
Russian force in Moldova.  Regarding Georgia, Erdmann 
acknowledged the need for Russia to renew progress regarding 
Gudauta. 
 
Cross-Group Stationing 
---------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) In what turned out to be the most divisive issue of 
the meeting, Allies struggled to reach agreement on the 
 
USNATO 00000266  002 OF 004 
 
 
"Consolidated  International Staff Paper 
(HLTF-N(2006)0023-REV8)," concerning cross-group stationing. 
Agreement did not prove attainable, despite more than two 
hours of discussion in the morning session, and an additional 
two-hour session after the HLTF reconvened at 5:30 pm, 
following the NRC (ACE).  At Erdmann's request, HLTF Deputies 
Chairman, Mike Miggins recounted the Deputies many fruitless 
efforts to find a way forward on paragraph 5 of the text, 
which a majority of Allies could accept as written; one ally 
insisted that a portion of that text be deleted.  Thus 
agreement was not possible at the Deputies level. 
 
¶6.  (C) Apparently catching Erdmann by surprise, the U.S., 
Turkey, Romania, Norway, Czech Republic, Greece and Bulgaria 
all said that this paper was the crucial issue for the March 
22 HLTF, that it was essential to have a strong unified 
Alliance position when Russia asked questions about this 
issue in Vienna and at the upcoming NRC Ambassadorial. 
Turkish rep Gun made clear that for those Allies involved in 
transfers of CFE entitlements to the U.S., this issue was 
urgent.  All emphasized that cross-group stationing was 
neither prohibited by the Treaty nor was it a security issue 
for Russia.  Erdmann asked whether Allies could agree to the 
current text of: 
 
REV8 of the Consolidate paper: 
"5.  Notwithstanding the Alliance's 1997 policy statement 
concerning additional permanent stationing of substantial 
combat forces, the deployment of some forces by Allies on the 
territory of other members of the Alliance, within the limits 
of national entitlements, is not incompatible with the text 
of the Treaty.  (There is no provision of the Treaty that 
prohibits stationing of forces of one member of a group of 
States Parties on the territory of a member of the other 
Group of States Parties) as long as the group ceilings are 
not violated and there is host State consent to the 
stationing.  The Adapted CFE Treaty, which reflects the new 
security environment in Europe, explicitly allows such 
deployments.  This is another factor that underscores the 
importance of achieving entry into force of the Adapted 
Treaty as soon as possible after remaining Istanbul 
Commitments have been fulfilled." 
 
-- Germany, supported by France, said they could not accept 
that text with the bracketed language included. 
 
¶7.  (C) German rep Groening's arguments were not always easy 
to follow and sometimes contradicted themselves.  But the 
upshot of his line was clear:  unlike other Allies, Groening 
made the case that it is not permitted under the current CFE 
Treaty to station forces from one group on the territory of 
another group of States Parties.  On the other hand, Groening 
also argued that this was a political issue, not a legal one. 
 Germany's view was that while the CFE Treaty may not 
prohibit cross-group stationing, it also doesn't allow it 
explicitly.  This was, he said, perfectly reasonable given 
that at the time the Treaty was signed, there was little 
thought about cross-group stationing.  Look and other Allies 
argued in return that the Treaty was clear on its face, 
establishing a system of unitary sub-zones that were not 
geographically bifurcated.  An equipment entitlement that 
pertained to the central zone could be located anywhere 
within that zone (whether on the territory of an eastern 
group or western group member), provided other Treaty 
requirements, including for host state consent, were met. 
Look stressed that this was an Alliance issue:  if the German 
interpretation were accepted, PFP field activities would be 
all but impossible.  New Allies and old Allies would not be 
able to train together using their own equipment. 
 
¶8.  (C) After nearly two hours of discussion, the U.S. 
circulated a proposed text which keyed off of language 
provided by Groening and HLTF rep Biontiono to the U.S. in 
Berlin.  This U.S. proposal was similar to one of the options 
the U.S. had discussed with concerned Allies two weeks 
earlier, but it tracked almost exactly with German ideas. 
 
"5.  Notwithstanding the Alliance's 1997 policy statement 
concerning additional permanent stationing of substantial 
combat forces, the stationing of forces of one member of a 
Group of States Parties on the territory of a member of the 
other Group of States Parties, within the limits of national 
entitlements, is compatible with the Treaty, as long as the 
group ceilings are not violated and there is host State 
consent to the stationing.  The Adapted CFE Treaty, which 
reflects the new security environment in Europe, explicitly 
allows such deployments.  This is another factor that 
underscores the importance of achieving entry into force of 
the Adapted Treaty as soon as possible after remaining 
Istanbul Commitments have been fulfilled." 
 
 
USNATO 00000266  003 OF 004 
 
 
¶9.  (C) The UK immediately stated that it had no problems 
with the text, France thought it was a good basis.  Bulgaria, 
Canada, Netherlands, Norway, Czech Republic, Romania, Turkey, 
Greece, and Latvia stated they could accept the U.S. tabled 
revised text as written at this meeting.  The Chair, noting 
the emerging consensus, stated that either a silence 
procedure or another meeting of the Deputies was needed to 
reach an agreement.  The German rep asked for a short break 
to consider the U.S. text, but then rejected it after the 
break.  Ultimately, the Chair decided to suspend the meeting 
until after the NRC(ACE) meeting which immediately followed 
the HLTF meeting. 
 
¶10.  (C) When the HLTF reconvened later that afternoon, 
Groening pushed for language that represented this view of 
cross-group stationing as one held only by "concerned" 
Allies; that is, it would be a position held by some, but not 
all, NATO allies.  He also sought to limit the application of 
the cross-group stationing principle so it would not apply to 
the stationing of Western group forces in Georgia. 
 
¶11.  (C) Trying to square the circle, the Canadian rep 
offered language that met some German desiderata but not 
others.  That language was hard to read, but all Allies 
recognized it as presenting a position held by all NATO 
Allies, not just a few, and could thus have been acceptable. 
 
"5.  Notwithstanding the Alliance's 1997 policy statement 
concerning additional permanent stationing of substantial 
combat forces, the deployment of some forces by Allies on the 
territory of other members of the Alliance, including the 
stationing of forces of one member of a group of States 
Parties on the territory of a member of the other Group of 
States Parties, within the limits of national entitlements, 
and conforming to the stated position taken by the NATO 
member States Parties to the CFE Treaty, is compatible with 
the Treaty, as long as the group ceilings are not violated 
and there is host State consent to the stationing.  The 
Adapted CFE Treaty, which reflects the new security 
environment in Europe, explicitly allows such deployments. 
This is another factor that underscores the importance of 
achieving entry into force of the Adapted Treaty as soon as 
possible after remaining Istanbul Commitments have been 
fulfilled." 
 
¶12.  (C) Groening's rejection of the final attempt at 
compromise ended the HLTF but also set the stage for the 
reversal that followed, over the next few days.  Look pleaded 
that this was an important issue concerning which NATO Allies 
should speak with one voice.  She said her most serious worry 
was that on this sensitive political issue, one the Russians 
were certain to pursue, some Allies were willing to allow 
others to face that questioning alone without the support of 
the NATO Alliance.  Romanian HLTF rep Vasiu delivered the 
same message more pointedly, "this is not why we joined NATO." 
 
¶13.  (C) Following exchanges on the margins among Ambassadors 
at NATO and bilaterally in capitals, on Tuesday, March 27, 
Germany agreed that the original text of para 5, rev 8, with 
the bracketed text included, should be placed under silence 
until COB March 28.  Silence was not broken and the text was 
agreed. 
 
Other issues 
 
¶14.  (SBU) The Positive Agenda paper (HLTF-N(2006)0032-REV7) 
will continue to be worked by Deputies as most Allies agreed 
to the importance of this paper for future meetings with the 
Russian Federation at NATO and OSCE forums. 
 
¶15.  (C) The 2007 Work Program and Strategic Orientation of 
the HLTF.  At the February 1, 2007, meeting of the HLTF the 
U.S. proposed that the HLTF take a serious look at goals and 
priorities for the HLTF, so as to be able to be more 
proactive in its work.  The Chair and most allies vigorously 
supported that proposal.  Following up on that, at this 
meeting, Germany introduced its food-for-thought paper by 
stating that conventional arms control continues to have a 
vital role play in Europe and that the Alliance needed to pay 
more attention to these issues.  Germany (Groening) offered 
that the I.S. should take his paper and rewrite it as a NATO 
paper.  Many agreed that this was a good basis to start 
discussion, however there are red lines we needed to observe. 
 Those ideas presented by Turkey, Canada, U.S., UK, Czech 
Republic, Italy and Romania were: not opening Vienna Document 
1999; the EU should discuss this in the agreed framework; 
asymmetrical threats are too broad; and no duplication of 
work in other forums.  France noted that it has some 
reservations.  The Chair announced that the issue would 
continue to be addressed in the next HLTF. 
 
 
USNATO 00000266  004 OF 004 
 
 
¶16.  (SBU) Russian Proposed CSBMs. The Chair in his 
introduction stated that the International Military Staff had 
written an analysis of the Russian proposal of information on 
Multinational Rapid Reaction Forces.  Vienna had asked for 
additional guidance.  Look opined that we should provide 
Vienna with more guidance and include the military analysis 
that had been conducted both in November and now. 
 
-- U.S. was open to discussion.  But we should ensure that 
any measures are even handed, not duplicative of work in 
other forums nor cherry-pick the Adapted CFE Treaty, and  be 
militarily significant and verifiable, as appropriate. 
 
-- Canada noted that the security of our troops is paramount, 
and that it was totally against adopting a CSBM measure that 
was in the adapted CFE Treaty. 
 
-- France stated that it was against naval CSBMs. 
 
-- Netherlands called the first two CSBMs CFE look-alikes, 
wanted Russia to explain its security concerns, liked the 
SHAPE analysis on RRF which provided more room for 
maneuvering during discussions, and like France, it was 
against naval CSBMs to include ground units. 
 
-- Germany was vague in its response.  It called for a 
balanced response to the Russians, wanted discussions to stay 
in Vienna rather than in a NATO or EU forum, and emphasized 
that we (the HLTF) should not try to micro-manage Vienna. 
 
-- Greece agreed with Canada about CSBMs that are covered in 
the adapted CFE Treaty and recalled that a decision was taken 
in Madrid at the OSCE Ministerial that applied specific 
criteria to new CSBMs (military significance, verifiability, 
and reciprocity). 
 
-- Turkey highlighted that the Alliance did not need to talk 
about sub-regional issues that would disrupt the Alliance 
solidarity. 
 
In summation of the discussion, the Chairman would draft a 
response to the Russian CSBM proposals as Vienna requested. 
It would basically say that NATO was not interested in 
discussing the first two Russian proposals but would welcome 
discussion on the Rapid Reaction Force proposal. 
 
¶17.  (SBU) NRC(ACE) Preparation and Meeting.  In the short 
time available to prepare for the NRC (ACE), Allies agreed to 
try to offer a broadly cooperative message to Russia 
regarding the expanded agenda of the group.  Germany agreed 
to speak on the "strategic importance of arms control;" the 
U.S. (and others) would comment on the Istanbul Commitments, 
and next steps needed in Moldova; France would offer to 
provide a briefing on a new weapons system under the agenda 
item on new security concerns; and all Allies would try to 
send a common message cautioning the Russians that while we 
were open to discussion of new CSBMs (Look mentioning that 
the U.S. was open to the idea of a CSBM seminar this fall, in 
Vienna), CSBMs were not the only way to address security 
concerns.  Allies were open to negotiate measures, but to be 
acceptable those had to be even-handed, not duplicative of 
Adapted CFE provisions, and militarily significant and 
verifiable, as appropriate. 
 
¶18.  (SBU) Next meetings:  The U.S. proposed that in 
preparation of the NRC Anniversary activities scheduled for 
June, it would be best to have a meeting in mid-May in 
preparation and if needed in late June before the summer 
vacation season begins.  Others who spoke supported this 
proposal.  However, due to other scheduling constraints since 
this meeting, the next HLTF meeting has been set for May 3. 
NULAND