VZCZCXYZ0031
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNO #0265/01 1131711
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 231711Z APR 07
FM USMISSION USNATO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0766
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 5671
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 000265 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/05/2017 
TAGS: NATO PREL CZ PL RU
SUBJECT: MISSILE DEFENSE: A/S ROOD CONSULTS WITH CZECH, 
POLISH, FRENCH, AND GERMAN COUNTERPARTS 
 
REF: A. USNATO 263 
     ¶B. USNATO 264 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Victoria Nuland for reasons 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY:  On the margins of the April 19 meetings at 
NATO HQ on Missile Defense (reftels), Assistant Secretary 
Rood briefed his Czech, Polish, French and German 
counterparts on his April 17 meetings in Moscow and the U.S. 
offer of Cooperation across the full spectrum of missile 
defense activities with Russia.  Polish Under Secretary of 
State Waszcykowski laid down markers in advance of the start 
negotiations on placement of missile defense interceptors, 
pressing for additional U.S. security guarantees to accompany 
any agreement to build a site in Poland and arguing for 
additional defense cooperation or hardware for Poland to 
provide security at the site.  Czech Deputy FM Pojar praised 
the U.S. offer of cooperation to Russia and said Russia was 
trying to weaken the transatlantic relationship. German 
Political Director Brandenburg noted concerns about Russia,s 
reaction and floated the idea of an inspection/verification 
regime with Russia.  French MFA Director of Strategic Affairs 
Carre said France would not oppose a U.S. system, supported 
NAC and NRC discussion, agreed on the threat, but might have 
concerns about the "NATO-ization" of the U.S. system.  End 
summary. 
 
¶2. (C) Assistant Secretary for International Security and 
Nonproliferation Rood briefed his Czech, Polish, German, and 
French counterparts in separate meetings on April 18 and 19 
in Brussels on the U.S. offer of MD cooperation given to 
Russian DFM Kiselyak and LTG Buzinskiy in Moscow on April 17. 
 He said his visit to Moscow was a follow-up to the March 28 
phone between Presidents Bush and Putin.  A/S Rood told them 
that the USG offered the "full spectrum of cooperation" to 
the Russians in a two page non-paper (non-paper reported 
septel).  Rood explained that this was not a detailed 
proposal and that further discussion would be necessary to 
flesh out projects should Russia show interest in any of the 
specific areas proposed by the U.S.   A/S Rood said we did 
not expect the Russians to immediately accept our offer, and 
noted that even if they turned down the offer it would still 
be beneficial to mitigating Russian criticism and 
demonstrating U.S. sincerity in attempting to build trust and 
cooperation.  He told the four Allies that we plan to 
distribute the non-paper in both the NRC/R and NAC/R on April 
19, but do not plan to release it to the press. 
 
--------------- 
PERSISTENT POLE 
--------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Undersecretary of State Witold Waszcykowski praised 
our "pragmatic approach" toward the Russians, but cautioned 
that MD was not a technical issue for the Russians, it was 
political.  The location of the two planned sites in Central 
Europe was still highly sensitive to them.  Ten interceptors 
were no threat to Russia.  He said Russia could influence 
policy in Western European capitals, but Moscow had no sway 
with new NATO members.  A/S Rood told him that it was 
important to reach out to the Russians and this could help 
reduce Russian wedge-driving; however, we would never give 
Russia a veto over the project. 
 
¶4. (C) Wascykowski referred to the stationing of U.S. 
interceptors in Poland as a "test" of whether it was truly a 
full member of NATO.  He lamented Poland's "second-class 
status" in NATO and expressed a hope for a more solid 
security guarantee directly from the U.S.  A/S Rood strongly 
countered that there should never be any doubt of American 
commitment to Article 5, and that we clearly viewed Poland as 
a full member of NATO and not a "second-class" member. 
 
¶5. (C) Wascykowski described the interceptor site as a "naked 
base" in need of protection and pressed repeatedly for a 
long-term military cooperation agreement to accompany any 
agreement to build the base in Poland. Wascykowski said this 
must be part of upcoming negotiations on placement of 
interceptors in Poland.  Rood acknowledged that protection of 
the base would be the subject of upcoming negotiations. A/S 
Rood said the U.S. and Poland needed to first assess the 
threat to the interceptor base before we designed 
extraordinary protection for it.  He explained that we did 
not envision a hardened site and have only standard 
protection in our other interceptor bases.  A/S Rood told him 
agreement on a base would be path breaking and could lead to 
political, economic, and military benefits; however, he 
declined Wascykowski,s desire for him to commit in principle 
that Poland would receive enhanced defense cooperation as a 
 
result of accepting an interceptor base before the 
negotiations even begin. 
 
--------------- 
LAID-BACK CZECH 
--------------- 
 
¶6. (C) In sharp contrast to Wascykowski, Czech DFM Thomas 
Pojar was much more subdued.  He said he did not expect a 
positive response from the Russians on the U.S offer of 
cooperation, but the offer would be helpful for the internal 
European debate on missile defense.  Pojar contended that 
Russia had three goals: bash the missile defense plans for 
domestic political consumption; weaken the transatlantic 
relationship; and be treated with respect by the United 
States. 
 
------------------ 
FRENCH AND GERMANS 
------------------ 
 
¶7. (C) German Deputy Political Director Ulrich Brandenburg 
said that 10 interceptors did not represent a threat to the 
Russian strategic force.  He praised the U.S. offer of 
cooperation as a sound strategy, even if the Russians did not 
immediately seize upon it.  He asked if the U.S. would be 
willing to accept the stationing of Russians officers at the 
site or submit to Russian inspections at short notice.  A/S 
Rood explained that the sites are not located on U.S. 
territory and this was a sensitive issue in Poland.  In 
addition, such a proposal reinforced the outdated concept of 
a strategic balance between NATO and Russia that we were 
trying to move beyond. 
 
¶8. (C) French MFA Director of Strategic Affairs Phillipe 
Carre told A/S Rood that France had concerns about potential 
"NATO-ization" of the U.S. system.  France was fine with a 
U.S. system, supported discussions in NATO and the NRC, and 
agreed that there was a threat, but was probably not ready 
for a NATO system.  He suggested that a NATO system might 
somehow undermine the independent French nuclear deterrent 
although he said this was his personal opinion.  He tried to 
explain that France could not be dependent on NATO MD and 
still be truly independent.  He asked the U.S. not to seek a 
NATO blessing for the U.S. system in Oslo and to encourage 
the Czechs and Poles to be quiet on this subject. 
NULAND