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RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHLA RUEHMRE RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHNO #0227/01 0940958
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R 040958Z APR 07
FM USMISSION USNATO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0708
INFO RUCNCFE/CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE COLLECTIVE
RUCNOSC/ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY COOPERATION IN EUROPE
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USNATO 000227 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/12/2017 
TAGS: PREL PARM NATO OSCE KCFE
SUBJECT: NATO-RUSSIA COUNCIL ARMS CONTROL DISCUSSION, MARCH 
29, 2007 
 
Classified By: DCM Richard G. Olson for reasons 1.4 (b/d). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  In the NATO-Russia Council arms control 
discussion on March 29, 2007, Russian Ambassador Totskiy 
claimed that Russia "did not know what it needs to do" to get 
NATO to ratify the Adapted CFE (A/CFE), and asked for a list 
of outstanding Russian "debts" related to ratification. 
Allies urged Russia to fulfill its Istanbul commitments as 
the only path to ratify the A/CFE.  Ambassador Totskiy 
suggested that if a Russian force is not acceptable in 
Transnistria, it should be replaced by an OSCE force, if 
Tiraspol would agree. End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) SYG de Hoop Scheffer opened the discussion by noting 
that it was timely for NRC Ambassadors to follow up the 
discussions held by NRC arms control experts (NRC/ACE) on 
March 22.  He highlighted the importance of the CFE Treaty to 
all present and noted that Russia still needs to meet its 
Istanbul Commitments before we can move forward with the 
A/CFE.  He suggested that nothing was "off the table" and 
opened the floor for what he hoped would be a constructive 
discussion. 
 
¶3.  (C) German PermRep Duckwitz was first to speak, clearly 
recognizing the importance of arms control to European 
security and suggesting that the topic needed more visibility 
(in the NRC).  Noting the strategic value of the interlocking 
framework provided by the combination of CFE, the Vienna 
Document 1999, and the Open Skies Treaty, he pointed to the 
need to bring arms control regimes in line with the current 
security situation ) and the A/CFE is the way to do that. 
Czech PermRep Fule and Canadian PermRep Juneau were quick to 
reinforce these points, stating that their countries were 
ready to ratify A/CFE once Russia met its Istanbul 
commitments.  They added that any new CSBMs to be considered 
in the OSCE must be based upon the 1993 Madrid mandate: 
verifiable, politically binding, and balanced (i.e., 
reciprocal).  Juneau also noted that it would not consider 
any measure that sought to apply the benefits of A/CFE before 
the treaty entered into force. 
 
¶4.  (C) Spanish PermRep Benevides, citing Spain's role as 
OSCE CiO, wanted to promote progress in the pol-mil dimension 
and to address the frozen conflicts.  He said Spain sees 
ratification of A/CFE as a significant step in achieving 
this.  With regard to new CSBMs for the OSCE, he suggested 
that there were a number of tools already in place that were 
not being used and might be tapped, rather than creating new 
ones.  Representatives from Belgium, France, Romania, Italy, 
Slovenia, and the Netherlands were all equally clear in 
calling for Russia to meet its Istanbul commitments and 
expressing their willingness to engage in discussions on new 
CSBMs (for the OSCE) that met the Madrid mandate. 
 
¶5.  (C) Russian Ambassador Totskiy welcomed the discussion on 
arms control, but felt the NRC should address the topic in a 
broader manner, not just focus on CFE, Open Skies and the 
Vienna Document.  After complaining about the "difficulties" 
Russia faced with the current CFE Treaty, he commented that 
he felt A/CFE would most probably not be allowed to be 
ratified.  Noting this had also been done in Vienna, he asked 
for a list of outstanding Russian "debts" related to 
ratification, adding that Russia "did not know what it needs 
to do" to get NATO to ratify A/CFE.  Once such a list is 
provided, Russia is willing to discuss it.  Raising another 
familiar question, he asked for a definition of "substantial" 
military forces as indicated in the Founding Act.  With 
regard to Gudauta, he noted that Russia had left the base 
five years ago, but that they are still expected to guarantee 
the security of an OSCE mission in order for an inspection to 
ensure that all actions had been completed.  Totskiy did not 
know how this could be accomplished.  With regard to Moldova, 
he suggested that if a Russian peacekeeping force for 
Transnistria was not acceptable, then we should look at an 
OSCE force ) but only after Tiraspol gave a green light. 
 
¶6.  (C) Drawing from guidance, U.S. Deputy PermRep Olson 
highlighted the value of CFE as a political tool for building 
cooperative security, and reiterated that the A/CFE could not 
be ratified until all remaining Istanbul commitments had been 
fulfilled.  Olson also noted that this was not a position of 
convenience since it would be more convenient to NATO if 
A/CFE were already in force.  He also cited NATO's deliberate 
decision in 1997 not to define substantial military forces, 
and said that we would not support reopening that discussion. 
 Noting that Presidents Bush and Putin had spoken on March 28 
about missile defense, amongst other subjects, Olson stressed 
that NATO would like to work with Russia in a positive 
 
USNATO 00000227  002 OF 002 
 
 
manner, including fulfillment of Istanbul commitments, making 
the NRC's 10th Anniversary a NATO-Russia success story. 
 
¶7.  (C) UK Deputy PermRep Kidd rounded out the discussion, 
reinforcing many of the points already made.  He specifically 
responded to Russia's request for a list for ratification, 
noting that the required steps have been clear for years and 
have not changed.  With regard to the Russian CSBMs proposals 
in Vienna, he welcomed the effort to address the new security 
situation, noting that proposals should not only meet the 
Madrid mandate, but must also take us forward in some way. 
He suggested that the proposal on information exchange for 
rapid reaction forces appeared to do this and merited careful 
study. 
NULAND