VZCZCXYZ0003
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBS #1157/01 0950834
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 050834Z APR 07
FM USEU BRUSSELS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC

S E C R E T USEU BRUSSELS 001157 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2032 
TAGS: CVIS PTER BE EUN
SUBJECT: UPDATE ON EU AND MEMBER STATE LOOKOUT SYSTEMS 
 
REF: A. 06 BRUSSELS 04123 
     ¶B. 06 BRUSSELS 01839 
 
Classified By: Senior Consular Representative Paul Fitzgerald 
for reasons 1.4 (b) & (d) 
 
¶1.  (S)  Summary. A recent survey of the European Union and 
Member States' terrorist and immigration lookout systems 
revealed a situation still in a state of flux (see reftels). 
While the EU develops its updated Schengen Information System 
II (SIS), and pursues an interim system (SIS One-4-All) that 
will allow new Member States to meet Schengen border control 
standards sooner, there is still nothing planned that would 
be analagous to either the NCTC or TSC databases.  However, 
the EU and national authorities are focused on making their 
linked systems as seamless as possible given their financial, 
operational and legal constraints.  This cable uses the 
Belgian system as one example of how a Member State 
integrates its lookouts with the EU system.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (S) Belgium uses two concurrent databases to screen 
travelers at ports of entry: a national-level database called 
the National Judicial Database and the European Union-managed 
Schengen Information System (SIS).  Belgium's primary 
screening tool, the National Judicial Database, is available 
at  utilizes optical characte` flatbed scanners to captu`ation 
in the machine-reports.  The bearer's if birth, paspport 
num through Belgian and SIS wa`ive wants or warrants. 
 
st is incorporated intoicial Database as a "nal 
copy", updated twiceIS server in Strasbourg,np h`@cdpwatchlist 
request.  tirely user-driven, relyiiles sent via e-mail; insion 
of "hits" at ports Typical response tim%hours. 
Belgian authoh is the lingua franca isQnce. 
 
¶5. (S) Legal consQvel data hinder the 
 immigration systems. to EU privacy laws, thr 
storing entry and exiQ information for EU citizens.  Only 
after a pQrson is watchlisted will their travel begin to be 
monitored and reported from the SIRENE syQtem.  Should a 
suspected terrorist be identifQed ex post facto to being 
watchlisted, it wou,d be impossible to reconstruct that 
individual's travel history without contacting the airline 
directly. 
 
¶6. (S) An SIS record can be etered by any participating 
Schengen country, Qut only updated or removed by the nation 
origQnally creating that record.  In Belgium, an SIS record 
can be introduced by Belgian intelligence and police 
services.  The SIS contains complete, actionable records on 
lost and stolen passports, stolen car alerts, individuals 
with arrest warrants, immigration violators, missing persons, 
and witness appearances.  SIS does not contain any case 
information, rather is a hit/no hit database with specific 
action codes assigned to each record.  There are three basic 
action codes that can be attached to a record, including: 1) 
discreet surveillance (silent hit) in which a positive 
encounter occurs and the Schengen country that created the 
record is notified of the encounter 2) overt inspection 
(secondary inspection) in which an individual that registers 
as a hit against the SIS is rigorously inspected and 3) 
arrest, where an individual that registers as a hit is 
immediately arrested by the local authorities.  SIS records 
expire in 5 years but can be re-entered. 
 
¶7. (S) While no Belgian system tracks entries and exits, 
hotels are required to collect information on 
guests-including name and passport number-that could be used 
to track travel.  In the past, a special unit within the 
Belgian police collected this information on a weekly basis, 
but manpower constraints have limited this actvity in recent 
years.  Belgian police now maintain liaison with the major 
hotels whom they call on an as-needed basis for information 
(Note: Recordkeeping at small hotels and guest houses, such 
as the flophouses around the Gare du Midi train station, may 
be lacking and police may have less ability to track 
suspicious travelers who may be staying in this kind of 
accomodation). 
 
¶8. (S) Belgian Federal Police (BFP) officials have noted a 
qualitative difference between records entered into the 
domestic Belgian watchlist and SIS.  A higher threshold for 
inclusion is typically employed for the SIS, such as 
requiring a complete name and date of birth, as lookouts can 
trigger extraterritorial law enforcement action.  For 
example, a wanted criminal in Belgium could be detained or 
arrested in Italy based on the contents of an SIS record. 
The use of SIS for targeting criminals has expanded 
considerably since the introduction of the European Arrest 
Warrant in 2004. 
 
¶9. (S) Belgian officials decide on a case by case basis, when 
there is complete information, whether to introduce a lookout 
into the SIS.  Although SIS is an EU-level system, threshold 
for inclusion into SIS is decided on a national level, as 
regulated by current EU law.  A result of this EU policy is 
that some countries enter more records than others-creating a 
disparity in the number of lookouts introduced, even among 
nations with similar populations.  The EU is aware of this 
problem, but will not address it until three years after the 
full implementation of SIS II, which is scheduled to be 
operational by 2008/2009. 
 
¶10. (S) However, lower thresholds apply to the National 
Judicial Database where police choose to include "softer" 
information such as subjects of preliminary investigations or 
unsubstantiated threat reporting.  Informally, Belgian Police 
note an institutional reluctance of police and intelligence 
services from inputting terrorist-related lookouts in SIS 
because of operational sensitivities.  Additionally, there 
are no categories within SIS for listing suspected 
terrorists/extremists.  Instead, terrorist/extremist suspects 
must be listed within SIS under an existing category, such as 
an immigration violation or criminal offense.  Belgian police 
provided no specific examples to corroborate this assertion. 
 
¶11. (S) Neither the National Judicial Database or the SIS 
collect biometrics at this time.  The European Commission, as 
part of its effort to deploy the Visa Information System 
(VIS) throughout the Schengen countries, proposed 
fingerprinting all VIS applicants at both the time of 
application and at the port of entry.  Under this scheme, the 
VIS would be a de facto database storing the travel history 
of non-Schengen nationals that require a visa to enter the 
European Union.  Should this arrangement be approved by the 
European Parliament later this year, it would prove a vast 
improvement for tracking the arrival and departures of third 
country nationals. 
 
McKinley 
.