VZCZCXRO5950
RR RUEHCN RUEHGH
DE RUEHGH #0247/01 1150617
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 250617Z APR 07
FM AMCONSUL SHANGHAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5749
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1011
RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG 0592
RUEHGZ/AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU 0567
RUEHCN/AMCONSUL CHENGDU 0586
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 0693
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 0468
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC 0141
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEHGH/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 6138

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 SHANGHAI 000247 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PASS FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD FOR JOHNSON/SCHINDLER; SAN 
FRANCISCO FRB FOR CURRAN/GLICK/LUNG; NEW YORK FRB FOR 
CLARK/CRYSTAL/MOSELEY 
STATE PASS CFTC FOR OIA/GORLICK 
CEA FOR BLOCK 
USDOC FOR ITA DAS KASOFF, MELCHER AND OCEA/MCQUEEN 
TREASURY FOR OASIA - DOHNER/CUSHMAN 
TREASURY FOR IMFP - SOBEL/MOGHTADER 
NSC FOR KURT TONG 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EFIN ECON PREL CH
SUBJECT: CFETS UPDATE ON FX AND BOND MARKET DEVELOPMENTS 
 
REF: A. A) 06 SHANGHAI 7096 
     ¶B. B) 06 SHANGHAI 7091 
     ¶C. C) 06 SHANGHAI 2384 
 
(U) This cable is sensitive but unclassified and for official 
use only.  Not for distribution outside of USG channels. 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  China Foreign Exchange Trading System (CFETS) 
President Xie Duo told Embassy ECON M/C Robert Luke on April 19 
that CFETS continued to carry out policies to make China's 
foreign exchange (FX) trading system more market-based and 
efficient, including: increasing the number of over-the-counter 
(OTC) spot FX market makers from 15 to 22; updating the formula 
for calculating the opening price (central parity rate) of the 
RMB; launching a new Reuters-designed trading platform; and 
revising CFETS' fee schedule to adhere more closely to 
international norms.  A bank in Tianjin was being allowed to 
hold net open positions shorting the USD on an experimental 
basis.  The People's Bank of China (PBOC) was promoting the use 
of Shanghai Interbank Offering Rate(SHIBOR)-based products, 
launched in January, to develop a domestic benchmark and yield 
curve.  The interbank bond market was now "very large for a 
developing market," but the corporate bond market was still 
underdeveloped. CFETS' application with the U.S. Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) to offer Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange (CME) products in China had run into regulatory 
hurdles, making its hoped-for June 2007 launch unlikely.  End 
summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) CFETS President Xie Duo and Vice General Manager Song 
Jianqi told visiting Embassy ECON M/C Robert Luke on April 19 
that, over the past year, CFETS had carried out many 
"interesting changes" in order to meet PBOC's "simple objective" 
of "including more market-based elements" in China's foreign 
exchange system.  Xie said PBOC was not involved in CFETS' daily 
operations or overtly setting the price of the RMB, but that it 
was still able to "indirectly intervene."  The RMB appreciated 
to a new high against the dollar on April 20, closing at 7.7165. 
 This represented a total appreciation of 7.26 percent since 
July 21, 2005. 
 
------------------------------- 
RMB FX Volume: Still Not Saying 
------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) As in past visits (Ref A), Xie declined to answer a 
direct question about the total volume of FX trade through the 
CFETS system.  The PBOC had not yet publicly announced trading 
data since it was worried that such information could prompt 
"misunderstandings and market speculation," he said.  According 
to Xie, the volume of FX turnover was two times more in 2006 
than it had been in 2005.  Xie added that more than 90 percent 
of spot trades were OTC, and that market makers now accounted 
for more than 80 percent of the OTC trade volume. CFETS FX 
derivative markets had continued to develop, but swaps were now 
more popular than forwards since they allowed investors to 
manage both exchange rate and interest rate risk.  The forwards 
market, introduced in August of 2005, had diminished in 
importance and now averaged only about USD 100 million per day. 
The swap market, introduced in April 2006, had taken off and now 
accounted for about USD 1 billion per day (Ref A). 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
Market Makers Increase in Number and Importance 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶4. (SBU) There were now 22 market makers in the OTC spot market 
(up from the original 15), with seven more banks added in 
December 2006.  Of these, four were Chinese banks -- China 
Minsheng Banking Corp., Hua Xia Bank Co., China Everbright Bank, 
and China Development Bank -- and three were foreign banks -- 
Deutsche Bank, Tokyo-Mitsubishi and Sumitomo Mitsui Banking 
Corp.  (Note: These banks began acting as market markers on 
December 18.  Of the 22 market makers, 13 were Chinese and nine 
 
SHANGHAI 00000247  002 OF 004 
 
 
were foreign.  See Ref B for market makers' views on FX 
developments.  In addition to the three listed above, the other 
foreign market makers are: HSBC, British Standard Chartered, 
Citibank, ABN-AMRO, Credit Agricole, the Bank of Montreal.  In 
addition to above-listed four new members, the original Chinese 
market makers were: Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, 
Bank of China, Agricultural Bank of China, China Construction 
Bank, CITIC, Bank of Communications, Shanghai Pudong Development 
Bank, China Industrial Bank, and China Merchants Bank.  End 
note.)  Xie explained that the market maker banks engaged in 
trading of renminbi debt (interbank repo and bond) instruments 
differed from those involved in FX trading although there was 
some overlap.  He noted that a few foreign banks were active in 
this trade as well.  For example Citibank Nanjing branch was 
active in the renminbi debt market, although not in the FX 
market. 
 
¶5. (SBU) The trading volume of foreign bank market makers, 
particularly HSBC, Citi, ABN AMRO and Bank of Montreal, had 
increased because they generally offered the best prices.  Xie 
attributed this success to foreign banks having better trained 
staff, and more skilled and highly compensated traders than at 
Chinese banks. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Xie said that CFETS methodology for calculating the 
daily central parity price had not undergone any changes, but 
that the weights assigned to each of the market makers (Ref C) 
in calculating the opening trading price had changed based on 
their respective trading volumes.  He said that the Bank of 
China now only accounted for about 15 percent of OTC FX trades 
and that its weight had been adjusted downwards accordingly, but 
did not disclose any additional specifics on the "black box" in 
which the calculation was made. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
"No Idea" How Central Bank Intervenes in FX Market 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶7. (SBU) Xie said PBOC did intervene indirectly in the FX market 
in order to achieve its policy objectives, but he "had no idea" 
of the mechanism that the PBOC used to accomplish this 
intervention.  There was, he said, "no direct link between PBOC 
and the Bank of China."  Though PBOC was not a CFETS member, Xie 
acknowledged that it had relationships with what he deemed 
"premium dealers" and that it made its trades through these 
dealers.  In addition, Xie said PBOC was still concerned with 
excess liquidity, inflation and overheating and "was clearly 
determined to control inflation through market measures rather 
than administrative measures" whenever possible. 
 
----------------------------- 
New Trading Platform Launched 
----------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) CFETS launched its new trading platform (ref A) in 
March 2007 to adhere more closely to international norms and to 
create a platform for more FX derivative products.  Xie said 
that its cooperation with Reuters in designing the software had 
been very successful and that the software was "running on 
American computers."  Xie said that the new software system 
played to the strengths of the foreign bank market makers who 
"were very good at trading currency."  The new platform allowed 
for spot, forward and swaps to trade on the same platform, with 
the screen listing only the best price offered. 
 
¶9. (SBU) During a tour of CFETS' operations center, Luke 
observed CFETS employees monitoring spot and swap trading of the 
RMB as well as the Shanghai Interbank Borrowing Rate (SHIBOR) 
and bond trading.  Three large screens dominated the room.  One 
screen showed the RMB-USD trading price, one showed the SHIBOR 
rate, and the third showed the status of CFETS' computer network 
overlaid on a map of China.  Song told Econoff that CFETS' staff 
had grown by 60 in 2006. 
 
SHANGHAI 00000247  003 OF 004 
 
 
 
---------- 
Lower Fees 
---------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) Xie noted that CFETS had implemented a new fee 
structure on April 6.  These fees were 30 times less than it had 
charged previously.  For example, where fees had been USD 3 for 
every USD 10,000 exchanged, it now only cost USD 10 for every 
USD 1 million exchanged.  Xie also said that the fees declined 
on a sliding scale based on the maturity or size of the trade. 
(Note: More information on the fees can be found in Chinese on 
CFETS' webpage: 
http://download.chinamoney.com.cn/content/onl ine2002/URLCon 
tent/gonggao/2007_80.doc  End note.)  According to Xie, CFETS also 
charged prices consistent with international practice for 
hard-currency to hard-currency trades.  Volume for this type of 
trade was only about USD 15 billion per year and represented a 
fraction of CFETS workload.  Only small banks lacking 
international relationships of their own needed this kind of 
service, he said. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
Agreement "in Principle" for Additional Liberalization 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Xie said that PBOC and the State Administration of 
Foreign Exchange (SAFE) had agreed "in principle" to: 1) allow 
banks to hold net open positions shorting the dollar (or longing 
the RMB); and 2) widen the daily USD/RMB trading band from its 
current .3 percent limit.  This would be in alignment with its 
stated goal of "adding more market principles."  Initially, Xie 
said he expected this to occur in the next six months, then he 
qualified his remarks by saying, "I don't know when or whether." 
 He added that, given the "oversupply of USD" in the market, 
widening the band now would "have no effect." 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Experimenting with Two-Way Net Open Positions 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) One bank, located in Tianjin, had been designated by 
CFETS to experiment with two-way net open positions; i.e. 
holding positions that either longed or shorted the dollar, to 
allow CFETS to "gain experience and understanding" on how to 
manage such a policy change.  Luke speculated out loud that the 
bank selected was Bohai Bank.  Xie refused to comment.  (Note: 
Bohai Bank is not one of CFETS market makers, but is a CFETS FX 
trading bank.  Aside from the bank in Tianjin, all other banks 
in China are still prohibited from holding net open positions 
that short the dollar (or long the RMB), a policy that traders 
says operates as a one-way constraint on China's development of 
its FX system (Ref B).  End note.) 
 
------ 
SHIBOR 
------ 
 
¶13. (SBU) Xie said PBOC had encouraged the development of 
financial tools and products, such as SHIBOR and the domestic 
bond market to help develop China's banking and FX markets. 
SHIBOR's January 2007 launch had created a domestic benchmark 
and yield curve that would allow PBOC more ability to use 
interest rates in carrying out macroeconomic policies and would 
provide the necessary conditions to develop China's FX and 
derivatives markets. (Note: During the tour of the operations 
center, the screen displaying SHIBOR rates showed a yield curve 
for different maturities with short-term rates exceeding 
longer-term rates.  End note)   At an April 13 PBOC conference 
Xie had attended in Beijing, PBOC stated its intent to gradually 
deregulate China's lending and deposit interest rates as its 
confidence with SHIBOR developed.  Xie said there were currently 
16 commercial banks acting as SHIBOR market makers.  (Note: Four 
 
SHANGHAI 00000247  004 OF 004 
 
 
of the SHIBOR market maker banks are Chinese:  Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China, Bank of China, China Construction 
Bank, and CITIC Bank.  The other 12 are foreign banks: Credit 
Agricole, HSBC, Citibank, Deutsche Bank, ABN AMRO Bank, ING 
Bank, Bank of Montreal, Royal Bank of Scotland, Standard 
Chartered Bank, ANZ Bank, UBS Bank, and Mitsubishi Bank of 
Tokyo.  End note.) 
 
¶14. (SBU) Xie said that, in March, the interbank bond/repo 
market turnover was RMB 9 trillion (USD 1.2 trillion), "very 
large for a developing market."  The longest bond offered was a 
30-year Treasury bill.  The interbank bond market had no 
maturity restrictions and bonds were sold by public auction. 
Other bonds included policy bank bonds, commercial bank bonds 
and OTC bonds.  The corporate bond market, however, was very 
small, with trading volume in March of only about RMB 100 
million (USD 12 million.) 
 
----------------- 
Problems with CME 
----------------- 
 
¶15. (SBU) CFETS' goal of becoming a super clearing member of 
CME, eligible to sell CME products in China, continued to await 
CFTC approval.  As Xie understood the problem, because of its 
structure, CFETS was unable to meet CFTC's capital requirements. 
 While CFETS generated "lots of money" every year, this all went 
to PBOC.  CFETS was an institutional organization (shiye danwei) 
of PBOC and had no independent capital.  Xie expressed concern 
that CFTC did not understand the Chinese organizational 
structure and said, "If I make a mistake, I can be arrested or 
even killed -- but as an institution, CFETS could never go 
bankrupt."  Xie said that CFETS had even tried to get permission 
from PBOC to be established as an independent company in order 
to meet the capital requirements, but the Ministry of Finance 
had refused.  Xie said it was unlikely that CFETS would meet its 
previously announced deadline of June 2007 to begin offering CME 
products. 
 
¶16.  (SBU) Note:  Consulate has subsequently conveyed Xie's 
remarks to CFTC.  CFTC understands CFETS' organizational 
structure and the Chinese concerns and is currently considering 
its application. 
JARRETT