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O R 060223Z APR 07
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 SHANGHAI 000195 
 
SIPDIS 
 
USDOC 
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SIPDIS 
 
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USDA FOR FAS/ITP AND FAS/FAA 
USDOC FOR 4420/ITA/MAC/MCQUEEN 
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E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PHUM PGOV SOCI EAGR EINV CH
SUBJECT: FUZHOU ACADEMIC SEES DPP PUSHING INDEPENDENCE BUTTON IN 
ELECTION RHETORIC 
 
 
SHANGHAI 00000195  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
IMPORTANT NOTE - THIS IS A GUANGZHOU TELEGRAM 
- - - - - - -    ONLY TRANSMITTED BY SHANGHAI 
 
 
(U) This document is sensitive but unclassified.  Please protect 
accordingly. 
 
 
¶1. (U) SUMMARY:  A renowned scholar of Taiwan believes that the 
upcoming presidential election will see Chen Shui-bian and other 
Democratic Progress Party (DPP) candidates continue to advocate 
independence and consciously stir up ethnic confrontation on the 
island during their campaigns.  Voters in southern Taiwan, 
despite their dissatisfaction with the DPP administration, 
remain solid in support of the party for largely historical 
reasons associated with their opposition to the Kuomintang and 
the divide in allegiances North and South.  In any case, he does 
not foresee significant change in Taiwan's mainland policy, 
regardless who wins the presidency.  Beijing is concerned about 
the DPP going too far, but will try to avoid conflict while 
promoting civil cross-strait exchanges.  History is ultimately 
on the side of the mainland, he believes.  END SUMMARY 
 
¶2. (U) At a March 27 meeting with the Consul General and 
Consulate staff, Professor Wu Nengyuan, Director of the Taiwan 
Research Institute at the Fujian Social Science Academy, said 
that over the course of the past 14 years, he has visited Taiwan 
a dozen times since 1993 and spoken with his friends in Taiwan's 
political, academic, and business circles, including members of 
the Democratic Progress Party, have discussed with him recent 
political developments as well as the DPP's use of the 
independence issue.  For his part, Professor Wu elaborated on 
concerns about recent political developments, and near future 
trends in Taiwanese politics. 
 
------------------------------ ------------------- 
Confrontation between Northern and Southern Taiwan 
------------------------------ ------------------- 
 
¶3. (U) Professor Wu believes that the crux of the Taiwan issue 
is a confrontation between north and south Taiwan.  After the 
Kuomintang (KMT) government relocated to Taiwan in 1949, most of 
its efforts were oriented toward developing the north; few 
resources were devoted to the South, which remained rural and 
agrarian.  Only in the 1970's did the KMT recognize the divide 
created by the ensuring income gap and seek to locate large 
industrial projects in the rural south.  As a result, southern 
farmers and workers continue to resent the KMT and will remain 
DPP supporters despite their disappointment with the Chen 
Administration's handling of government affairs, including the 
economy and relations with mainland China. 
 
--------------- ------------------------------- 
DPP Uses Ethnic Confrontation as Political Tool 
--------------- ------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (U) Professor Wu observed that some of Taiwan's political 
parties, especially the DPP, have used ethnic issues to make up 
for their administrative failings and to improve their standing 
in elections.  While Wu admitted that the island's "complex 
history" has left some ethnic Taiwanese bitter, the DPP has 
exacerbated the situation by promoting ethnic confrontation and 
shaping cross-straight relations into a debate of "unification 
versus independence." 
 
--------------- ---------------------------- 
The Curse of an Independence Driven Ideology 
--------------- ---------------------------- 
 
¶5. (U) Wu remarked that during the DPP's seven years in power 
its leaders have shown a great deal of inconsistency in their 
positions on cross-strait relations.  While some have taken a 
strict pro-independence stance, others promote integration with 
the Mainland.  He gave three examples: Frank Hsieh, a key DDP 
leader under Chen Shui-bian and former mayor of Kaohsiung, 
wanted to visit the Mainland to push the "big three-links."  Su 
Tseng-chang, a presidential candidate, once proposed new 
 
SIPDIS 
policies favoring the "three-links" and economic openness toward 
the Mainland economy after he became Premier.  Even Chen 
Shui-bian, at the start of his presidency, wanted to adopt a 
 
SHANGHAI 00000195  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
"new central line" policy.  Wu believes these inconsistencies 
resulted from constraints embedded in the DPP's independence 
ideology and referred to the "curse of an independence 
ideology." 
 
------------------------------ 
The Next Presidential Campaign 
------------------------------ 
 
¶6. (U) According to Wu, the presidential campaign period, 
September 2007 through March 2008, will be a critical time for 
cross-strait relations and poses serious risks.  He believes 
that Chen Shui-bian will try his best to amend the Republic of 
China's (ROC) Constitution and that Chen Shui-bian is determined 
to push the amendment issue to preserve his influence in 
Taiwan's political circles by showing independence 
fundamentalists that "he will do something."  The plan might 
garner support from some KMT legislators since it also involves 
internal reforms such as adopting a cabinet-system and changing 
the number of seats in the Legislative Yuan. The plan thus 
serves the interests of many opposition legislators who might 
not vote against it at the last minute. 
 
¶7. (U) Despite previous promises not to lead Taiwan toward 
independence, Professor Wu pointed out that Chen Shui-bian's 
recent announcement of "four wants and one no" is exactly 
contrary to the positions he declared during his presidential 
inauguration.  Chen Shui-bian has now affirmed: "Taiwan needs to 
become independent, needs to correct its name, needs to make a 
new constitution, and needs to develop.  There is no left or 
right line issue in Taiwan, but just the problem of unification 
versus independence." 
 
¶8. (U) While some believe that KMT control of the Legislative 
Yuan precludes any moves toward independence, Wu believes that 
Chen might seek alternative methods of ratification such as a 
referendum.  In fact, Wu felt strongly that the DPP has no 
choice but to move further towards a "deep green" ideology.  He 
based this on the fact that when the DPP was making a bid for 
the presidency, it campaigned on a promise to be a clean and 
quality government.  In his opinion, the party has failed to 
keep this promise, failed to manage foreign and internal affairs 
and suffered from several corruption scandals involving Chen 
Shui-bian's family.  Therefore, he concluded that the only card 
the DPP has to play is to further stir up ethnic confrontation 
and raise the independence issue.   As evidence, Wu cited the 
recent television debate held on March 24th among Frank Hsieh, 
Yu Shyi-kun and Su Tseng-chang.  Wu found that each of the three 
trying to prove that he was "greener" than the other. 
 
------------------ 
Beijing's concerns 
------------------ 
 
¶9. (U) Wu did not directly respond to the Consul General's 
question about whether Chen Shui-bian's "four wants and one no" 
had "crossed the line for Beijing," but he acknowledged that 
Beijing is very concerned about the aggressiveness of Chen and 
the DPP.  Beijing's current top priority is to seize the rare 
opportunity of a stable global environment to solve many of the 
Mainland's internal development problems.  He asserted that 
Beijing understands unification with Taiwan will be a very long 
and difficult process, but it would take action if the DPP 
crossed its "bottom line" as set out in the Anti-Secession Law. 
Currently, however, Beijing's Taiwan strategy is to promote more 
economic, social and cultural exchanges between the people 
across the strait. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Taiwan's post-Chen mainland policies 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶10. (U) If the KMT wins the 2008 election and Ma Yingjeou 
becomes the next president, Wu predicts that Ma will not make 
many changes to Taiwan's mainland policy.  Rather, Ma is likely 
to promote continued economic exchanges and the "three big 
links."  However, Wu believes Ma will face great pressure from 
DPP "deep green" politicians in implementing his policies. Among 
the four DPP candidates - Frank Hsieh, Annette Lu, Yu Shyi-kun 
and Su Tseng-chang - Wu thinks that Hsieh and Su have better 
 
SHANGHAI 00000195  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
chances than Yu and Lu because the latter do not have good 
relations with other DPP members.  Regardless who the DPP leader 
is, Wu predicted that the party would be unable to break free 
from its ideological constraints and would remain staunchly 
pro-independent.  In Wu's personal opinion, Su Tseng-chang is a 
politician who compromises quickly, citing Su's position on 
"name change" as an example.  (The "name change" refers to 
replacing the characters for "China" with "Taiwan" in the titles 
of government agencies and state-run enterprises.)  Professor Wu 
said that Su did not really support the change but buckled under 
party pressure. 
 
---------------------------------- ------------------ 
COMMENT: Let Matters Lie if Taiwan Does not Cross Lines 
---------------------------------- ------------------ 
 
¶11. (U) Beijing has two major internal goals: to continue 
economic and social development on the mainland and to regain 
Taiwan to restore China's territorial integrity.  Since Beijing 
cannot resolve both simultaneously, it has chosen to focus on 
the former and maintain the status quo on the latter with the 
hope of a future resolution, without giving up ground to 
incremental moves by Taiwan toward independence.   The upcoming 
election poses risks for China of rhetorical excesses by 
pan-Green candidates and disappointments that there will be no 
new initiatives from a KMT presidential winner.  Whether Beijing 
has any policy other than to continue maintaining the status quo 
in the face of little or no change after 2008 is unclear, but 
from this conversation, at least, it looks more and more as 
though China does not have a whole lot of options to consider or 
cards to play. 
JARRETT