VZCZCXYZ0015
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHVJ #0728/01 0921151
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 021151Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5807
INFO RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0019
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 0050
RUEHUP/AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST PRIORITY 0187
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0037
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0123
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUFOAOA/USNIC SARAJEVO PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SARAJEVO 000728 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SECDEF FOR FATA AND BEIN, BERLIN FOR A/S FRIED, DEPT FOR 
EUR (DICARLO), D (SMITH), P (BAME), EUR/SCE (HOH, SAINZ, 
FOOKS), AND EUR/RPM (BROTZEN), NSC FOR BRAUN, USNIC FOR 
WIGHTMAN AND MCLANE, USNATO FOR REID, UNDERWOOD, SHAFFER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/30/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR BK IZ
SUBJECT: BOSNIA: PARLIAMENT CONFIRMS EXTENDED IRAQ 
DEPLOYMENT 
 
REF: A) SARAJEVO 310 B) STATE 11249 C) SARAJEVO 467 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR DOUGLAS MCELHANEY FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) and (D) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary. The Bosnian Parliament voted March 30 to 
confirm the Presidency's decision to extend the mandate of 
the Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) unit in Iraq through 
the end of 2007. The move clears the final legal hurdle to 
the deployment of a fifth EOD rotation in May. Securing the 
extended deployment is a significant success in advancing our 
bilateral security agenda. Political and military leaders 
continue to cite the political opposition to and the lack of 
resources for further deployments this year, and suggest 
Bosnia focus its current efforts on developing niche capable 
units ready for deployment in 2008.  In light of pressing 
needs in Iraq, we will advise when the time and climate is 
better to request further deployments. End summary. 
 
¶2. (C) On March 30, both the Bosnian House of Representatives 
and Peoples confirmed the Presidency's decision to extend the 
mandate of the Bosnian EOD unit in Iraq through the end of 
¶2007.  The actions of both houses fulfill the requirement for 
parliamentary confirmation of the extension, as required by 
the Presidency (reftel A). The next rotation of the EOD unit 
can now depart for Iraq in mid- April, as planned. 
 
¶3. (C) Bosnian political and military leaders continue to 
tell us that it was a wise decision to request an extension 
of the current EOD mission only (see reftel C).  There exists 
a near unanimity that a push to expand the Iraq mission or 
deploy forces to Afghanistan would have generated a 
substantial political backlash that could have jeopardized 
even the current deployment.  Bosnian political leaders, the 
majority of whom are broadly supportive of peace support 
operations, have requested that further deployments be 
addressed at a later date.  For their part, the civilian and 
uniformed defense leadership continues to cite the resource 
and personnel strains that the Ministry of Defense will face 
throughout 2007 as a reason to hold off on further 
deployments.  (Comment. In our assessment, these resource and 
logistical concerns are legitimate.  A good portion of 2007 
will be spent filling out the new force structure of the 
Armed Forces, and it would be difficult to pull individual 
units out of this plan for specialized training and 
deployment.  End comment.) 
 
¶4. (C) During the USG-sponsored NATO tour to Budapest, senior 
officials of the Hungarian Ministries of Defense and Foreign 
Affairs asked members of Bosnia's NATO-PfP Inter-Agency 
Working Group whether Bosnia could deploy in support of the 
Hungarian-led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in 
Afghanistan.  The Hungarian officials, noting that other 
countries in the region, would deploy on the PRT, told the 
Bosnians that they could offer as little as two policemen to 
"put their flag" on the mission.  The Bosnian group, 
consisting of Assistant Ministers and other officials of a 
similar level, pledged to relay the suggestion to the 
political leadership.  In a follow-up conversation, the 
Assistant Minister of Security asked us whether the USG could 
provide specialized training for the police officers. (Note: 
Bosnia has already deployed approximately 20 police officers 
to UN-sponsored missions in Haiti, East Timor, and Cyprus. 
End note.) 
 
¶5. (C) Comment.  Securing early approval of the extended EOD 
deployment is a big win for USG security interests in Bosnia. 
 Keeping the Bosnian government focused on their 
international security responsibilities, along with 
supporting the development of NATO niche capabilities, 
remains one of our highest policy priorities in Bosnia. Our 
early and sustained lobbying with the Presidency, 
parliamentarians and the Ministry of Defense ultimately 
proved effective in continuing the mission.  We, along with 
our international partners, have made clear that Bosnian 
participation in peace support operations remains important 
to the goals of their PfP membership and of broader 
 
 
Euro-Atlantic integration. 
 
¶6. (C) Comment cont'd.  As we have noted before, the past 
year's shift in Bosniak politics makes requests for further 
deployments at this time difficult.  Bosniak Presidency 
Member Haris Silajdzic is primarily responsible for this 
development, and has made clear in public statements and 
private discussions that he would oppose further or augmented 
deployments.  Silajdzic's potential to make political hay 
over the deployment issue is real, and fits with his broader, 
confrontational approach in dealing with us.  Recognizing the 
importance of expanding Bosnia's overseas commitments, both 
in terms of our larger policy objectives here and as a means 
to decrease the burden on our own forces, we will continue to 
closely monitor the situation and advise Washington when to 
consider a mission expansion or alteration.  End comment. 
MCELHANEY