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O 230724Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6380
INFO RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE 4388
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 3282
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 5699
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT PRIORITY 3469
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 4607
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 9260
RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA PRIORITY 2950
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0692

C O N F I D E N T I A L RABAT 000704 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2009 
TAGS: MO PBTS PHUM PREL AG WI
SUBJECT: ALGERIAN AMBASSADOR SAYS GOA MIGHT BE READY TO 
TALK TO MOROCCANS 
 
Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Thomas T. Riley for Reasons 1.4 
 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY:  Algerian Ambassador Belkheir told Ambassador 
Riley April 17 that although Algeria was not prepared to 
listen to the Moroccans about their autonomy proposal, 
Algiers might accept a delegation from Rabat "after the end 
of the Security council debate," if it was not to talk about 
the Sahara.  He repeated familiar Algerian positions that 
Algiers is not a party to the dispute and was determined to 
support the principle of self-determination.  Amb./Gen. 
Belkheir, a longtime member of the Algerian military elite 
said security cooperation on counterterroism between the 
Maghreb neighbors was good and ongoing.    End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C)  Algerian Ambassador to Morocco General Larbi Belkheir 
accompanied by his number two, Ambassador-ranked Boumedienne 
Guennad, hosted Ambassador Riley and Polcouns April 17. 
Belkheir, a senior player on the Algerian side for decades, 
spoke of the long history of friction between the two Maghreb 
neighbors.  Belkheir, a regular visitor to Washington during 
his days as Presidential Chief of staff and virtual National 
Security Adviser spoke of his close contacts with senior 
officials and with a succession of US ambassadors.  After 
Baker's resignation, Algeria had wanted the USG to nominate a 
senior figure to replace him as Personal Envoy, and was 
disappointed that this did not happen . Belkheir praised the 
series of recent contacts between his staff and Embassy Rabat 
and believed the two embassies should work more closely 
together. 
 
Shared Fight Against Terror 
--------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C)  Ambassador Riley offered condolences for the losses 
in the recent terrorist attacks in Algiers.  Belkheir offered 
his for Blacksburg.  The Algerian ambassador said that the 
bombings in Algiers had not been suicide bombers, unlike 
those in Morocco.  Nonetheless Algiers believed that all had 
some kind of link to the GSPC Al Qaeda in the Lands of the 
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).  He maintained there is already good 
cooperation between Morocco and Algeria on 
security/counterterrorism, which has been getting stronger. 
 
Sahara 
------ 
 
¶4. (C)  Ambassador outlined U.S. positions on the serious and 
credible nature of the Moroccan initiative and in support of 
unconditional negotiations, noting these had been conveyed in 
Algiers.  He urged that the GOA encourage the POLISARIO to 
enter talks without preconditions.  Belkheir repeated 
standard Algerian rhetoric on its principled approach to 
self-determination, insisting that Algeria was not a party. 
(Ambassador Riley pushed back on this, noting that Algeria 
had been closely involved in previous U.N.-led efforts to 
find a solution.) Belkheir also stated, somewhat 
inconsistently, that if the Polisario and HOM were to come to 
an agreement, Algeria "would be the first to applaud it". 
When pressed, he admitted that support would apply even if 
the self-determination did not include an option of 
independence. 
 
¶5. (C) Belkheir cited the POLISARIO proposal as a mark of 
responsiveness drawing attention to new elements, such as its 
undertaking to establish close relations post independence 
with Morocco and to allow citizenship for Moroccans present 
in the territory for 10 years.  He did say however that 
Algeria might be able to support negotiations if they were 
not based on Moroccan sovereignty.  He confirmed that the GOM 
had offered to go to Algiers to brief on their plan but that 
his government could not accept this, repeating that Algeria 
was not a party to the dispute. 
 
Bilateral relations: Maybe an opening? 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C)  However, Belkheir said clearly that if Morocco 
offered to send a delegation to Algiers it is possible his 
government would accept it, if it was to discuss bilateral 
relations and not the Sahara.  He stressed that this would 
only work if it were proposed after the end of the Security 
 
Council debate and MINURSO rollover, so that it didn't look 
like they were discussing the Sahara.  Belkheir repeatedly 
insisted Algeria and Morocco were brothers, but, digging deep 
into the historical record as he saw it, made no secret of 
the intense and deep-seated differences between them.  He 
railed against the Moroccan press which he said regularly 
insults President Bouteflika (and himself).  Still, he said, 
there was a chance for improvement.  King Mohammed VI's 
statement of condolences for the Algiers bombings had been 
very well received.  If the Sahara problem were solved, it 
would immediately lead to a normalization of relations, 
opening of the border, and progress in Maghreb integration, 
he opined.  He stressed that Algeria was long committed to 
the stability of Morocco and to the continuation of the 
monarchy here. 
 
COMMENT: 
-------- 
 
¶7. (C)  Belkheir's suggestions of a Moroccan delegation to 
Algiers might be a good one, even if initially focused just 
on bilateral relations.  We are skeptical of their interest 
in a resolution of the issue, and certainly of their denial 
of having a decisive role.  Also, given the long rivalry 
between these neighbors, we doubt that even a solution to the 
Sahara would immediately lead to full-scale rapprochement. 
Rather the other way around, warmer bilateral relations would 
improve the prospects of a settlement on Sahara .  As we 
pursue a Sahara resolution, we should continue, even 
intensify a parallel effort to get these two to engage on 
both fighting their common Jihadist enemy and on the other 
issues that they have in common as well as those which divide 
them. 
****************************************** 
Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website; 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/rabat 
****************************************** 
 
RILEY