VZCZCXRO6730
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV
DE RUEHFR #1659 1151553
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 251553Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6744
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

S E C R E T PARIS 001659 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR PM/RSAT AND NEA/I 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/25/2017 
TAGS: PREL IZ MARR MAS MOPS PREL PTER
SUBJECT: FRENCH PARTICIPATION IN THE IRAQ COALITION 
 
REF: STATE 54925 
 
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (S) Embassy Paris has regularly engaged the GoF on 
possibilities for French participation in the Iraq coalition, 
but has made little headway given President Chirac's 
original, adamant opposition to the war.  Although the French 
have generally tried since then to avoid provoking the U.S., 
and to indicate that they understand the dangers of a 
precipitate U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, in fact they have done 
little more than pay lip service to the idea that French 
interests are also at stake. 
 
¶2. (S) If anything, the French have grown more reticent about 
Iraq in the final days of Chirac's presidency: The French 
have taken off the table their long-standing offer to train 
Iraqi security forces in France; they have canceled plans to 
open a regional embassy office in Irbil; and they came fairly 
close to reducing or eliminating their diplomatic presence in 
Baghdad (an effort that was abandoned only after the French 
Ambassador in Baghdad strenuously objected to having been cut 
out of the policy discussion in Paris).  A change in French 
policy is not in prospect before Chirac leaves the Elysee in 
mid-May. 
 
¶3. (S) Although Chirac's departure may open the door to an 
eventual reconsideration of France's position, the likelihood 
of change remains limited in the short-term.  We will 
therefore need to think strategically about when and how to 
engage on Iraq with France's new president, framing our 
requests in a manner consonant with French political 
realities.  It would, for example, likely prove futile -- and 
counterproductive -- to welcome a new French government with 
a request to put French boots on the ground in Iraq.  The 
overwhelming majority of the French public believes that 
Chirac's opposition to the Iraq war has been vindicated by 
subsequent events, a view that has also been endorsed by the 
two remaining presidential candidates, Nicolas Sarkozy and 
Segolene Royal.  Neither candidate, if elected, would derive 
any political benefit from reversing that position.  To the 
contrary, Royal would likely face a revolt within her own 
party, and Sarkozy (who is already under fire from the left 
for being too pro-American), would risk confirming himself as 
Washington's toady. 
 
¶3. (S) A more realistic set of goals might include persuading 
the French to be more supportive of Iraq within an EU 
context, including by intensifying their civilian 
capacity-building efforts.  We could help lay the groundwork 
by assisting the GOI to do a better job of screening 
potential civil service candidates before sending them 
overseas (France's Inter-Ministerial Coordinator for Iraq 
Reconstruction, Jean-Pierre Guinhut, recently complained to 
us that a batch of Iraqi civil servants sent for training in 
France included a "60-year-old sheikh who spoke no language 
other than Arabic, and even that badly").  We might also 
encourage the French to offer further humanitarian assistance 
to Iraqi refugees.  In time, and particularly as progress is 
made on national reconciliation and the transfer of security 
control to the Iraqis (which may help reverse the French 
perception that Iraq is not yet fully sovereign), we might 
persuade the French to renew their offer of training for the 
Iraqi security services or possibly to engage more 
substantially with the NATO training mission in Iraq.  Post 
will provide further analysis of the possibilities for French 
engagement once we move past the presidential election and 
the new government takes office. 
 
 
 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
 
STAPLETON