VZCZCXRO5216
PP RUEHRN RUEHROV
DE RUEHFR #1623/01 1141428
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 241428Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6684
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 3733
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 1985
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 001623 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/24/2017 
TAGS: PREL PINS MOPS CT FR
SUBJECT: C.A.R.:  FRENCH HOPEFUL BUT NOT CONVINCED 
REGARDING PEACE INITIATIVES 
 
REF: A. BANGUI 61 
 
     ¶B. BANGUI 62 
 
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, 1.4 (b/d 
). 
 
¶1.  (C)  SUMMARY:  MFA C.A.R. desk officer Daniel Westerink 
on April 28 said that the GOF was encouraged by the recent 
peace pact engineered by President Bozize and UFDR leader 
Damane but was not convinced that this arrangement would 
prove significant because of uncertainty over whether other 
UFDR elements would respect it.  Westerink provided details 
about French military deployments in C.A.R. and of France's 
desire to have FOMUC, perhaps at the beginning of 2008, 
extend its area of operations eastward, to include Birao, 
which would allow the French to withdraw French forces from 
Birao and ensconce them at the French base near the Bangui 
airport.  The GOF, however, faced questions about FOMUC's 
future (whether it would continue to be a CEMAC operation or 
whether ECCAS might also become involved).  Moreover, 
Westerink reported EU misgivings about extending FOMUC's area 
of responsibility, as this might conflict or overlap with 
planning for an international peacekeeping force along the 
C.A.R.-Sudan-Chad borders.  Westerink made clear that 
reducing the French role in backstopping the C.A.R. military 
in Birao was a high French priority.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (C)  MFA C.A.R. desk officer Daniel Westerink on April 18 
offered comments on the recent peace agreement brokered by 
President Bozize and UFDR leader Damane (reftels) in Birao 
within the Syrte process.  Westerink said that the deal 
offered hope but that France was reserving judgment in order 
to see if the arrangement proved to be real and effective. 
He noted that many "arrangements" and "deals" of this type, 
large and small, had been concluded in recent years in that 
part of Africa and that many had turned out to be 
meaningless, with neither side respecting them practically 
from the moment they had been signed.  This agreement, he 
said, might prove to be different, but only time would tell. 
Westerink said that an important concern was that UFDR 
elements imprisoned in Cotonou would reject Damane's deal 
outright, just as they had rejected the Syrte formula on 
previous occasions. 
 
¶3.  (C)  Westerink commented that Bozize did not help matters 
by celebrating, on March 15, the fourth anniversary of his 
coming to power.  That he came to power by leading an armed 
rebellion, and was now celebrating that victory, was not the 
kind of signal one should send when confronted by, and at the 
same time trying to make peace with, rebel elements seeking 
to accomplish the same thing, Westerink observed dryly. 
 
FRENCH FORCES 
 
¶4.  (C)  Westerink said that France did not want Birao to 
become a permanent, or quasi-permanent, base for French 
troops.  France would be willing to send troops there to 
reinforce the C.A.R. military as needed, but wanted to keep 
them stationed near Bangui.  (NOTE:  According to DAO 
sources, reported septel, the French may be willing to remain 
in Birao until the rainy season is in full swing late in May, 
effectively ending any combat in the region.  The French may 
leave a forward air controller in the area indefinitely, for 
close air support, or until FOMUC or other forces are capable 
of securing Birao.  DAO septel report will contain more 
precise figures on French forces and their disposition.  END 
NOTE.) 
 
FOMUC 
 
¶5.  (C)  One way to facilitate the departure of French forces 
from Birao would be to have FOMUC extend its areas of 
operation into eastern C.A.R., including Birao.  Westerink 
said that France was pursuing this possibility and hoped to 
achieve FOMUC's acceptance when its mandate would be renewed 
at the beginning of 2008.  He said it was too late to 
accomplish this by the time of the next mandate extension in 
June 2007. 
 
¶6.  (C)  However, the question of whether FOMUC would remain 
a CEMAC operation or become, in whole or part, an ECCAS 
operation (CEEAC in French), was a complication, Westerink 
noted.  While ECCAS, which includes more countries than CEMAC 
and which covers a broader geographic area, might present 
 
PARIS 00001623  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
advantages, it posed several problems as well.  First, it was 
less France-oriented.  The CEMAC countries were all members 
of the franc zone and were well versed in French thinking, 
concerns, and ways and means.  This was not the case with the 
ECCAS countries.  Moreover, Rwanda was a member of ECCAS, 
and, given the poor state of Rwanda-France relations, could 
serve as an obstacle regarding anything France might want to 
accomplish with ECCAS regarding C.A.R.  Westerink indicated 
that the GOF was continuing to think of ways to extend 
FOMUC's range, taking into account the possible effects of 
CEMAC and/or  ECCAS involvement. 
 
EUROPEAN UNION 
 
¶7.  (C)  A further issue, Westerink mentioned, was the EU, 
which had expressed concern about FOMUC's operating in 
eastern C.A.R.  Although he did not specify or provide 
details about the EU's interest, Westerink indicated that 
Brussels may worry that any expansion of FOMUC's area of 
operations in eastern C.A.R. could complicate planning for 
the deployment of an international peacekeeping force into 
the tri-border area of eastern and northeastern C.A.R., 
possibly as a part of a larger peacekeeping plan involving 
Chad and Sudan as well as C.A.R. 
 
¶8.  (C)  COMMENT:  Westerink made clear that relieving France 
of the duty of backstopping the C.A.R. military in Birao is a 
high French priority.  Accomplishing that without leaving 
C.A.R. vulnerable at that strategic location is proving to be 
difficult and may take many months, if Westerink's scenario 
develops as he described it.  That said, it appears that the 
French are willing to provide assistance to Birao if 
circumstances require during the interim.  END COMMENT. 
 
 
 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
 
STAPLETON